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California Supreme Court Survey
April 1996 - July 1997
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent
decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the read-
er of issues that the supreme court has addressed, as well as to serve as a start-
ing point for researching any of the topical areas. Attorney discipline, judicial
misconduct, and death penalty appeal cases have been omitted from the survey.
The survey will review California Supreme Court cases in either an article or
summary format Articles provide an in-depth analysis of selected California
Supreme Court cases including the potential impact a case may have on Califor-
nia law. Additionally, articles guide the reader to secondary sources that focus
on specific points of law.
Summaries provide a brief outline of the areas of law addressed in selected
California Supreme Court cases and include references to additional research
sources. Summaries are designed to provide the reader with a basic understand-
ing of the legal implications of cases in a concise format.
ARTICLES
1. ARBrRATION
A jury trial is not required in California state courts to
meet the constitutional guarantee of due process when
the existence of an arbitration agreement covered by the
United States Arbitration Act is at issue:
Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial
Securities Corp ................................ 196
II. CONSTm ONAL LAW
A. Preemployment drug testing, as part of a required medi-
cal examination, is valid under both the United States
Constitution and the California Constitution, whereas
prepromotional drug screening is unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness clause:
Loder v. City of Glendale ........................ 204
B. A regulation prohibiting discrimination against prospec-
tive tenants on the basis of marital status does not vio-
late a landlord's rights under the free exercise of religion
clauses of the United States and California Constitu-
tions, and is therefore enforceable against a landlord:
Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission. .. 225
III. CONTRACT/BINDING ARBITRATION
Where a health maintenance organization makes con-
tractual promises of expeditious claim processing in an
arbitration agreement, with the knowledge they are likely
false and with the intent to induce reliance on the part of
the insured, the insured may seek remedies in court,
including rescission of the agreement. And, a court may
deny a petition to compel arbitration based on theories
of fraud in the inducement or waiver of the agreement:
Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc .......... 235
IV. COURTS
The jurisdiction provision of the Washington Metropoli-
tan Area Transit Authority Compact, which expressly
grants jurisdiction to courts of United States, Maryland,
and Virginia, impliedly denies jurisdiction to courts of
other states:
Kingston Constructors, Inc. v. Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ............. 243
V. CRIMINAL LAW
A. A criminal defendant may waive the statute of limita-
tions for a lesser included offense as part of a plea agree-
ment involving a greater offense, provided: (1) the waiv-
er is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (2) the waiver
is made for the defendant's benefit and after consultation
with counsel; and (3) the waiver does not handicap the
defendant's defense or contravene any other public poli-
cy. Further, waiver of the statute of limitations precludes
challenging the conviction on that ground:
Cowan v. Superior Court ....................... 248
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B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found
that an alleged victim's payments to the district
attorney's office for investigation costs created a conflict
of interest that allowed for recusal of the district
attorney's office:
People v. Eubanks .............................. 256
C. The Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention
(STEP) Act, which provides for enhanced penalties when
the defendant's offense is gang related and the defendant
has committed two or more crimes enumerated therein,
does not require the state to prove that the two or more
previous crimes were gang related:
People v. Gardeley ............................ 261
D. Evidence regarding battered woman's syndrome is ad-
missible to prove that a defendant had an actual and
reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary to de-
fend against an abusive spouse:
People v. Humphrey ........................... 267
E. When a defendant is prosecuted under the 'natural and
probable consequences" doctrine, a trial court must pro-
vide a jury instruction identifying and describing target
crimes that a defendant may have aided or abetted. This
duty arises only when "substantial evidence" supports
the conclusion that the defendant intended to assist or
encourage the target offense, and a jury could reasonably
conclude that the committed crime was a natural and
probable consequence of the target crime:
People v. Prettyman .......................... 274
VI. FAmiLy LAW
A creditor that forfeits a security interest in community
real property pursuant to former Civil Code section 5127
retains the rights of any other unsecured creditor to seek
a judgment against the debtor spouse for satisfaction of
the underlying debt and to enforce a money judgment
lien against the community estate:
Lezine v. Security Pacific Financial Services, Inc ... 282
VII. HUSBAND AND WIFE
A county acting on behalf of a custodial parent may
successfully bring a cause of action against the non-cus-
todial parent for child support and arrearages, even
though the custodial parent actively concealed the child's
whereabouts, if the claim is brought before the child
reaches the age of majority:
In re Marriage of Comer ......................... 287
VIII. INJUNCTIONS
An injunction prohibiting gang members from certain
lawful and unlawful conduct did nt violate the First
Amendment and was neither overbroad nor void for
vagueness. Additionally, the Street Terrorism Enjbrce-
ment and Prevention Act does not preempt a city's use of
public nuisance statutes to abate gang activity:
People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna ..................... 294
IX. LABOR LAW
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) does not preempt
state regulation of overtime pay for maritime employees.
Additionally, the Division of Labor Standards En/orce-
ment (DLSE) compliance requirements with Industrial
Welfare Commission (IWC) orders to maritime employ-
ees operating off the coast constitute regulations and are
therefore subject to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA):
Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw........ 304
X. LETTERS OF CREDIT
Legislation enacted with the express intent to clarify
existing law has no impermissible retroactive conse-
quences and thus, applies to transactions predating its
enactment. Furthermore, the antideficiency laws govern-
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ing nonjudicial foreclosures do not operate to relieve an
issuer of its obligation to honor a standby letter of credit
used as additional support for loan obligations secured
by real property:
Western Security Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court ...... 311
XI. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
The statute of limitations period for a wrongful termina-
tion cause of action begins to run upon actual termina-
tion of employment, not upon notice of such termination:
Romano v. Rockwell Int'l, Inc ................... 322
XII. NEGLIGENCE
Shopkeepers do not owe a duty to comply with a rob-
ber's unlawful demand for property in order to avoid
injury to customers:
Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, Inc. v.
Superior Court (Brown) ....................... 330
XIII. PREMISES LIABILrrY LAw
A triable issue of fact exists regarding whether a land-
owner can be liable for failure to warn of a potential
hazard when a party is injured on property adjacent to
and controlled by the landowner, but which the landown-
er does not possess:
Alcaraz v. Vece ............................... 338
XlV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
There is a cause of action for strict liability based on
failure to warn when the manufacturer of a prescription
drug fails to warn of risks that are known or reasonably
scientifically knowable:
Carlin v. Superior Court (Upjohn Co.) ............. 350
XV. SCHOOLS
Education Code section 44919(b), governing the hiring
of athletic coaches, requires school districts to give an
advantage to their credentialed teachers currently em-
ployed in the district by considering their applications
before others. If the district determines that its creden-
tialed teachers fail to meet the district's qualification
standards, it is free to consider other applicants:
California Teachers Ass'n v. Governing Board of
Rialto Unified School District ................... 356
XVI. TRADE REGULATION/UNFAIR COMPETITION
A purchaser may bring a cause of action against a seller
by alleging that special discounts given to other buyers
injured the purchaser and had a tendency to destroy
competition among purchasers; a purchaser need not
show harm to competition among sellers. Furthermore, a
party may seek restitution under the Unfair Practices
Act without additionally seeking an injunction:
ABC International Traders, Inc. v. Matsushita
Electric .................................... 363
XVII. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Administrative law judges do not have statutory authori-
ty to order pre-judgment interest on a routine award of
retroactive unemployment insurance benefit payments:
AFL-CIO v. Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board .................................. 371
XVIII. WATER LAW
When a public entity's flood control measures, which
divert and re-channel water, fail in areds historically
known for flooding, private property owners seeking
recovery for inverse condemnation must prove that the
failure was due to unreasonable conduct on the part of
the public entity. In determining reasonableness, courts
must consider the following: (1) the overall public pur-
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pose served by such flood control measures; (2) the de-
gree to which plaintiffs loss is offset by reciprocal bene-
fits; (3) the availability of low risk alternatives; (4) the
severity of plaintiffs damage in relation to risk-bearing
capabilities; (5) the extent to which the kind of damage
is a normal risk of land ownership; and (6) the degree to
which the damage is distributed to a benefited public:
Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water District ............ 377
XIX. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
When a maritime employee suffers an industrial injury
that falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA) and the California Workers' Compensation Act
(the California Act), credit for LHWCA disability bene-
fits previously paid by the employer against an award
under the California Act must be calculated on a dollar-
for-dollar basis, regardless of whether the payment was
categorized as temporary or permanent indemnity:
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board ................................. 385
SUMMARIES
I. Abatement, Survival and Revival
Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34, which pro-
hibits recovery of damages for pain and suffering in
an action brought or maintained on behalf of a de-
ceased plaintiff, applies when the plaintiff dies be-
fore a final appealable judgment; section 377.34 does
not bar recovery for such damages when the plaintiff
dies following the trial court's judgment but before
resolution of an appeal from that judgment.
Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, Decided May 5, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 288, 935 P.2d
781, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74 ......................... 393
II. Appellate Review
California Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (d)
does not entitle a defendant to a new trial on liabil-
ity and compensatory damages following the reversal
of an award of punitive damages.
Torres v. Automobile Club of Southern California, Su-
preme Court of California, Decided June 2, 1997, 15 Cal.
4th 771, 937 P.2d 290, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859 .......... 398
III. Civil Procedure
For a notice of entry mailed by the court clerk to
qualify as notice under California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure section 664.5, and thus constitute the date on
which the time to rule on a motion for new trial be-
gins, the notice must "affirmatively state that it was
given 'upon order by the court' or 'under section
664.5.'
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Van Beurden Insurance Services, Inc. v. Customized
Worldwide Weather Insurance Agency, Inc., Supreme
Court of California, Decided March 6, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th
51, 931 P.2d 344, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166 ............... 401
IV. Criminal Law
A. The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does
not extend to pretrial disclosure of confidential or
privileged records in camera.
People v. Hammon, Supreme Court of California, Decid-
ed July 7, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 1117, 938 P.2d 986, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 74 .................................. 404
B. Penal Code section 1170.12, which provides for sen-
tence enhancements for "third strike" convictions, is
not violated when an indeterminate term is imposed
and runs consecutive to a prior determinate term;
section 1170.12 does not violate the state and fed-
eral ex post facto constitutional provisions by man-
dating that a sentence for a third strike offense run
consecutive to a sentence imposed before the third
strike law was enacted.
People v. Helms, Supreme Court of California, Decided
May 22, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 608, 936 P.2d 1230, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 620 ................................. 407
C. When a criminal defendant is convicted and sen-
tenced for a felony offense while on probation for a
prior felony conviction, the probationary conviction
is not a current conviction for the purposes of Cali-
fornia Penal Code section 667(c)(7), nor is the pro-
bation term considered as already serving another
sentence for the purposes of California Penal Code
section 667(c)(8), so that the sentences imposed for
the felony conviction and the probation violation
should be served concurrently rather than consecu-
tively.
People v. Rosbury, Supreme Court of California, Decided
March 17, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 206, 932 P.2d 207, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 635 ................................. 410
D. A request for reversal of a criminal conviction based
on ineffective assistance of counsel is appropriate in
a habeas corpus proceeding, but not on direct appeal
unless the record is sufficiently clear concerning the
motivations of counsel.
People v. Tello, Supreme Court of California, Decived
April 17, 1997, As Modified June 11, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th
264, 933 P.2d 1134, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437............ 413
E. Failure by a trial court to obtain a personal waiver
of the statutory right to jury trial on the issue of
prior prison terms from a defendant will result in
error if the issue is tried to the court, but does not
implicate state or federal constitutional issues of the
right to jury trial or due process; therefore, the error
must be preserved by objection in order to raise the
issue on appeal.
People v. Vera, Supreme Court of California, Decided
May 1, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 269, 934 P.2d 1279, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 754 .................................... 415
F. A sex offender's failure to register a change of ad-
dress pursuant to California Penal Code section
290(f) is a continuing offense; thus, felony prosecu-
tion after the effective date of amendment increasing
the crime from a misdemeanor to a felony, did not
violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws.
Wright v. Superior Court, Supreme Court of California,
Decided May 12, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 521, 936 P.2d 101, 63
Cal. Rptr. 2d 322. ................................ 419
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V. Delinquent, Dependent and Neglected Children
Where orders of a juvenile court referee require
approval of a juvenile court judge to become effec-
tive, such orders do not become final until the later
of ten calendar days after service of a written copy
of the juvenile court referee's order and findings or
twenty judicial days after the hearing; Welfare and
Institutions Code section 250 finalizing an order ten
calendar days after service applies only to orders
which do not require juvenile court judge approval.
In re Clifford C., Supreme Court of California, Decided
July 3, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 1085, 938 P.2d 932, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 873 ................................. 423
VI. Employer and Employee
Statute of limitations in breach of contract action
based upon constructive termination of employment
begins to run when the employee is actually termi-
nated, not when the intolerable working conditions
occur.
Mullins v. Rockwell International Corp., Supreme Court
of California, Decided May 29, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 731,
936 P.2d 1246, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 636. ............... 426
VII. Hospital Liens
When an insurer or payor, who has received timely
notice of a hospital lien, fails to honor the hospital
lien at the time of the judgment, compromise, or
settlement, the hospital may recover the original
amount imposed under the lien and no more.
Mercy Hospital v. Farmers Insurance Group, Supreme
Court of California, Decided March 20, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th
213, 932 P.2d 210, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638 ............. 429
VIII. Insurance Contracts and Coverage
After the expiration of the contestability period, an
imposter defense is unavailable where the named in-
sured personally applied for the insurance policy, but
substituted an imposter for the required medical
examination.
Amex Life Assurance Company v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Supreme Court of California, Decided
February 24, 1997, 14 Cal. 4th 1231, 930 P.2d 1264, 60
Cal. Rptr. 2d 898 ................................ 433
IX. Juvenile Adjudications
Penal Code section 667(d)(3)(C), requiring that in
previous adjudication a juvenile be found a fit and
proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile
court law to qualify as a prior felony subjecting a
defendant to increased penalty under the three
strikes law, does not require an express finding of
fitness.
People v. Davis, Supreme Court of California, Decided
July 3, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 1096, 938 P.2d 938, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 879 ................................. 436
X. Negligence
Where the noise in the operation of machinery
frightens a horse, causing injury to the rider, the
operator breaches no duty of care to the rider when
the operation of such machinery is socially benefi-
cial, and is performed in a "regular and necessary"
manner.
[Vol. 25: 183, 1997] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, Decided May 8, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 456, 936 P.2d
70, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291 ......................... 440
XI. Property Taxes
Fees imposed under the Childhood Lead Poisoning
Act on paint manufactures for failing to screen po-
tential child lead poisoning victims were regulatory
fees, not taxes, and required only a legislative
majority's approval.
Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board of Equalization, Su-
preme Court of California, Decided June 26, 1997, 15
Cal. 4th 866, 937 P.2d 1350, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 447 ...... 443
XII. Workers' Compensation
Labor Code section 5814 prohibits the imposition of
multiple penalties for a workers' compensation
insurer's single unreasonable act in terminating pre-
award benefits; furthermore, a workers' compensa-
tion insurer's or an employer's refusal to reinstate
benefits after a claimant gives notice of an intention
to seek penalties under section 5814 does not consti-
tute a separate and distinct act for which multiple
penalties may be awarded.
Christian v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, Su-
prene Court of California, Decided May 12, 1997, 15
Cal. 4th 505, 936 P.2d 115, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 ....... 446
I. ARBITRATION
A jury trial is not required in California state courts to
meet the constitutional guarantee of due process when
the existence of an arbitration agreement covered by the
United States Arbitration Act is at issue: Rosenthal[ v.
Great Western Financial Securities Corp.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp.,' the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court considered how the state could resolve disputes
over the existence of arbitration agreements subject to the United States
Arbitration Act.2 Federal law provides for a jury trial determination, but
the supreme court held that such disputes could properly be decided by
the superior courts based solely on written evidence produced in mo-
tions or hearings.3
On that basis, the court held that many plaintiffs provided insufficient
evidence to prove fraud in the execution of the arbitration agreements
made with the defendant.4 Thus, most plaintiffs were compelled to ar-
bitrate their dispute."
1. 14 Cal. 4th 394, 926 P.2d 1061, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875 (1996). Justice Werdegar
wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice George, and Justices Mosk, Baxter,
Chin, and Brown concurred. See id. at 402-31, 926 P.2d at 1065-84, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
878-97. Justice Kennard authored a separate concurring opinion. See id. at 431-33, 926
P.2d at 1084-85, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 897-99 (Kennard, J., concurring).
2. See id. at 402, 926 P.2d at 1065, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 878. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(United States Arbitration Act) (1994). See Jay M. Zitter, J.D., Annotation, Claim of
Fraud in Inducement of Contract as Subject to Compulsory Arbitration Clause Con-
tained in Contract, 11 A.LR 4th 774, 780-84 (1984) (examining the arguments for and
against subjecting fraudulent inducement to arbitration).
3. See Rosenthal, 14 Cal. 4th at 402, 926 P.2d at 1065, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 878-79.
Moreover, the court did not rule out the possibility of hearing live testimony to clarify
conflicting written evidence. See id.
4. See id. at 402, 926 P.2d at 1065, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 879. Twenty-three plaintiffs
invested in stocks and mutual funds via Great Western Financial Securities Corporation
(GWF!SC). See id. at 402-03, 926 P.2d at 1065, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 879. Most plaintiffs
banked at Great Western Bank (GWB) prior to the investments. See id. at 403, 926
P.2d at 1065, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 879. The plaintiffs claimed that GWFSC representa-
tives fostered the belief that deposits in GWFSC were just as safe as deposits in GWB.
See id, When the plaintiffs' funds declined, they brought suit against GWFSC. See id.
GWFSC promptly petitioned the trial court for an order compelling arbitration, which
the plaintiffs opposed. See id. The plaintiffs argued there was fraud in the inception of
the contract and that the contracts were "permeated with fraud." See id.
5. See id. at 402, 926 P.2d at 1065, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 879.
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II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Trial Court Procedure for Deciding a Petition to Compel
Arbitration
a. Section 4 of the United States Arbitration Act
First, the court acknowledged that the United States Arbitration Act
(Act) governed the present issue because the arbitration agreements
were provisions of contracts involving interstate commerce.6 Section 2
of the Act states that agreements to arbitrate are "valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable."7 As a federal law with the power of preemption, the court
reasoned that state courts must uphold the federal policy of enforcing
arbitration agreements. s
Next, the court proceeded to explain how sections 3 and 4 of the Act
implement section 2? Section 3 dictates that litigation over arbitrable
6. See id. at 405, 926 P.2d at 1066, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 880. See William G. Phelps,
J.D., Annotation, Pre-Emption by Federal Arbitration Act of State Laws Prohibiting or
Restricting Formation or Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 108 A.LR. FED. 179,
180-256 (1992) (explaining the preemption process).
See also Lauri Washington Sawyer, Casenote, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies v.
Dobson" The Implementation of the Purposes of the Federal Arbitration Act or an
Unjustified Intrusion into State Sovereignty?, 47 MERCER L REV. 645, 648-49 (1996)
(examining the Supreme Court's ruling that "evidencing a transaction in interstate com-
merce" of section 2 of the Act means the Act only applies if interstate commerce is
proven in fact and holding that section 2 preempts any opposing state laws in state
courts if the "contract at issue involves or affects interstate commerce 'in fact'"); Scott
R. Swier, Note, The Tenuous Tale of the Terrible Termites: The Federal Arbitration
Act and the Court's Decision to Interpret Section Two in the Broadest Possible Man-
ner: Allied-Bruce Terminex Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 41 S.D. L REV. 131, 165 (1996)
(concluding that the Court's expansive view of what constitutes interstate commerce is
incorrect).
7. See Rosenthal, 14 Cal. 4th at 405, 926 P.2d at 1066-67, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 880
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1995)); Michael R. Holden, Note, Arbitration of State-Law
Claims by Employees: An Argument for Containing Federal Arbitration Law, 80 COR-
NELL L REV. 1695, 1707-14 (1995) (detailing the evolving methods by which the federal
courts have sought to promulgate the policy behind section 2).
8. See Rosenthal, 14 Cal. 4th at 405, 926 P.2d at 1067, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 880.
Additionally, California's public policy also prefers arbitration over litigation "because it
is expeditious, inexpensive, avoids the delays of litigation, and relieves court conges-
tion." 6 CAL JUR. 3D Arbitration & Award § 1 (1988).
9. See Rosenthal, 14 Cal. 4th at 405, 926 P.2d at 1067, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881.
issues cease until the arbitration is concluded."° Section 4 mandates that
a federal district court consider applications to force arbitration." When
an arbitration agreement's existence is at issue, the party opposing arbi-
tration can insist on a jury trial.'2
The court emphasized the similarity of section 4 of the Act to section
1281.2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. 3 Section 1281.2 states
that "the court may deny the application [to compel arbitration] if it finds
the party resisting arbitration did not in fact agree to arbitrate.' 4 The
court noted that a key difference between the sections was California's
denial of a jury trial and the Act's provision that such matters only be
decided according to the "law for making and hearing of motions."5
In deciding whether section 4 should control in California's state
courts, the supreme court noted that the section's wording to applies
only to federal district courts. 6 In a broader analysis, the court noted
that section 2 does not limit its application to federal courts. 7 However,
the court viewed section 2 as the general rule of enforceability of arbi-
tration clauses and section 4 as only one means of implementing enforce-
ability, maintaining that other means, including comparable state proce-
dures, may serve to implement the federal goal embodied in section 2.18
The court supported this conclusion by pointing to the general pre-
emption standard that allows states to establish their own procedural
rules even when the case is governed by federal substantive law, as long
as the rules do not prevent "the uniform application of the federal statute
essential to effectuate its purpose." 9 On that basis, the court concluded
that California's implementation procedure of a summary judgment on
the motions was not offensive to the federal goal of arbitration clause
enforcement.'
10. See id.
11. See id. at 405-06, 926 P.2d at 1067, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881.
12. See id. at 406, 926 P.2d at 1067, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See id. at 407, 926 P.2d at 1067-68, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881. Any state proce-
dures which would thwart the goal of section 2 would be superseded by the Act. See
id. at 408, 926 P.2d at 1069, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882.
16. See id. at 407-08, 926 P.2d at 1068, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882.
17. See id. at 408, 926 P.2d at 1068, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882.
18. See id. at 408, 926 P.2d at 1068-69, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882-83.
19. See id. at 409, 926 P.2d at 1069, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883 (citing McCarroll v. Los
Angeles County Carpenters, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 61-62, 315 P.2d 322, 331 (1957)).
20. See id. at 410, 926 P.2d at 1070, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883.
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b. Jury trial under the California Constitution
In response to the plaintiffs' contentions that their due process rights
under the California Constitution were violated by the denial of a jury
trial, the supreme court explained why the state procedure was valid.2'
The court analogized petitions to compel arbitration to equity causes of
action for specific performance of a contract, and reasoned that because
the latter were not available at common law and are not guaranteed a
jury trial, petitions to compel arbitration are not ensured a jury trial ei-
ther.' In dismissing other arguments made by the plaintiffs,' the court
stated that the decision of whether to compel arbitration is not a deci-
sion on the merits of the case, but only a decision as to whether the
arbitration clause should be carried out.
c. Requirement of an evidentiary hearing
The defendant argued that the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing to
decide the relevant issues of fact constituted an abuse of discretion.'
The court rejected this argument, finding no authoritative basis for it.2"
The court agreed, however, that a trial court should hear oral testimony
when the factual issues are especially unclear.27
21. See id. at 410-11, 926 P.2d at 1070, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884.
22. See id. at 411, 926 P.2d at 1070, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884.
23. See id. at 411-13, 926 P.2d at 1070-72, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884-86. The plaintiffs
unsuccessfully compared their suit to cases in which there was fraud in the inception
or inducement of a release of liability and a jury trial was mandated. See id. at 411,
926 P.2d at 1070, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884. The plaintiffs also tried arguing that the
California procedures would prevent pleading certain causes of action and damage
claims if a claim had to be proven to the trial court before the jury. See id. at 411-12,
926 P.2d at 1071, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 885.
24. See id. at 412, 926 P.2d at 1071, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 885. The court also dis-
missed the defendant's argument that the party resisting arbitration should have to
prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance of the
evidence. See id. at 413, 926 P.2d at 1072, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886.
25. See id. at 414, 926 P.2d at 1072, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886.
26. See id.
27. See id.
d. Correctness of the procedures followed
The conflicting written evidence presented to the trial court left it
unclear whether the court needed to decide the actual factual issues or
only whether the plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action." The tri-
al court did the latter, but the supreme court held that the former course
was correct and that the trial court could have heard oral testimony and
made a ruling.' As a result, the factual issues were remanded to the
trial court.'
2. Legal Sufficiency of the Plaintiffs Declarations
a. Arbitrability of fraud claims under Prima Paint
The second part of Justice Werdegar's decision discussed the applica-
bility of the rule stated in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin.3 Pri-
ma Paint' held that claims of fraud directed at an entire contract and
solely at the agreement to arbitrate are arbitrable issues.' Regarding the
first claim of fraud in the execution of the agreements, the defendant
argued that Prima Paint requires arbitration of all fraud claims unless
there is "an 'independent' or 'separate and distinct' challenge to the arbi-
tration clause itself."' Unpersuaded, the court concluded that a trial
court must hear claims of fraud in the execution of a contract because
there is never an understanding to arbitrate when fraud renders an entire
agreement void.'
With respect to the second claim of fraud "permeating" the agree-
ments, the court reached the opposite conclusion and found such claims
arbitrable.' The court explained that while the permeation of fraud was
considered an exception to the general rule of arbitrability under Prima
Paint, it was "ill-defined" and confusing because different opinions used
28. See id. at 414, 926 P.2d at 1072-73, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886.
29. See id. at 414, 926 P.2d at 1073, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 414-19, 926 P.2d at 1073-1076, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887-89.
32. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
33. See id. at 404. Prima Paint is described as the seminal case, installing the "sep-
arability doctrine" in federal arbitration law. See Janet A. Rosen, Arbitration Under
Private International Law: The Doctrines of Separability and Competence De La Com-
petence, 17 FORDHAM INrr'L LJ. 599, 622 (1994).
34. See Rosenthal, 14 Cal. 4th at 415, 926 P.2d at 1073, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887. See
Jon R. Schumacher, Note, The Reach of the Federal Arbitration Act: Implications on
State Procedural Law, 70 N.D. 1 REv. 459, 474 (1994) (noting that "nothing in section
4 requires the separability of the arbitration clause from the contract").
35. See Rosenthal, 14 Cal. 4th at 416, 926 P.2d at 1074, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887-88.
36. See id. at 417, 926 P.2d at 1074, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 888.
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the permeation language to describe instances of fraud in the execution
and to address instances in which arbitration clauses were found invalid
because the entire agreement was induced by fraud.37 Finding the per-
meation doctrine devoid of any legal merit, the court denounced the
doctrine's further acknowledgement.'
b. Reasonableness of reliance as an element of fraud in the
inception
Whether the plaintiffs justifiably relied on the defendant's misrepre-
sentations was exanined next.' The court applied the principle that
"fraud does not render a written contract void where the defrauded party
had a reasonable opportunity to discover the real terms of the con-
tract,"4 and held that the plaintiffs had not met the reliance requirement
because their failure to read the contracts before signing rendered thefr
reliance unreasonable.4 Justice Werdegar further declared that such
unjustified reliance was an "insufficient basis" to support a claim for
fraud in the execution.42
c. Sufficiency of plaintiffs' showings of fraud in the execution
The court quickly dismissed most of plaintiffs' claims that the defen-
dant misrepresented the true nature of the agreements through asser-
tions of their standardness and triviality.' The court rejected the
37. See id. at 417-19, 926 P.2d at 1074-76, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 888-89. To remove the
confusion, the court stated definitively that the trial courts would hear claims that
fraud was used'to induce' consent to the arbitration clause and claims that fraud in
the execution prohibited contract formation. See id. at 419, 926 P.2d at 1075-76, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 889. The court specifically held that claims of fraud inducing the formation
of the entire contract, including arguments of fraud "permeating" the agreement, are
arbitrable. See id. at 419, 926 P.2d at 1076, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 889.
38. See id. at 419, 926 P.2d at 1075, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 889.
39. See id. at 419-23, 926 P.2d at 1076-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 889-92.
40. Id. at 419-20, 926 P.2d at 1076, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 890.
41. See id. at 423, 926 P.2d at 1078-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 892. Actual fraud re-
quires: (1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) made with
knowledge of its falsity or when one should have known of its falsity, (3) with the
intent to induce action on a person who, (4) acts in reliance upon the representation,
and (5) who is damaged by the misrepresentation. See 1 B.E. WrniN, SUMMARY OF
CAIFORNiA LAw, Contracts § 393 (1987 & Supp. 1996).
42. See Rosenthal, 14 Cal. 4th at 423, 926 P.2d at 1079, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 892.
43. See id. at 423-24, 926 P.2d at 1079, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 892-93. To find fraud
plaintiffs' arguments that their reliance was reasonable due to the length
of time they transacted business with the defendant and that the defen-
dant was under a fiduciary duty to inform the plaintiffs of the arbitration
clause contained within the agreements." Instead, the court focused on
the plaintiffs' failure to allege actual concealment of the arbitration
clause or any "affirmative misrepresentations regarding the existence or
meaning of an arbitration clause ... .
B. Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennard wrote separately to address how the impending arbi-
tration claims before the court should proceed. 6 She noted that after
the court's initial determination of whether the party opposing arbitration
possessed the opportunity to discover the contract's claimed misrepre-
sentation, the arbitrator must determine whether misrepresentations
were actually made and whether reformation of the agreement or anoth-
er remedy is "justified under the circumstances."4 7 Justice Kennard
stressed the importance of making the former determination first be-
cause that answer potentially affects all the related issues, such as
whether the arbitrator even has the continued ability to make further
judgments."
II. IMPACT
The impact of Rosenthal falls primarily upon the banking industry. To
avoid future claims of the kind asserted by the Rosenthal plaintiffs,'
there must have been an intentional misrepresentation-the suggestion of a fact's truth
when the party making such claim knows of its falsity. See 1 B.E. WrrKIN, SU MARY OF
CALFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 394 (1987 & Supp. 1996).
44. See Rosenthal, 14 Cal. 4th at 424-27, 926 P.2d at 1079-81, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
893-95.
45. See id. at 426, 926 P.2d at 1080, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 894. The court gave indi-
vidual attention to those plaintiffs who alleged additional facts pointing to fraud. See
id, at 427-31, 926 P.2d at 1081-83, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 895-97. For example, the court
concluded that plaintiffs who had a limited command of the English language, were le-
gally blind, or were afflicted with Alzheimer's disease, would have their cases sent
back on remand. See id.
46. See id. at 431, 926 P.2d at 1084, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 897-98 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring).
47. See id. at 431-32, 926 P.2d at 1084, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 898 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring). The standard remedies for a party fraudulently induced into an agreement are
either recision of the entire contract or affirmation with the ability to recover pursuant
to the contract. See 14 CAL. JuR. 3D Contracts § 63 (1974 & Supp. 1996).
48. See Rosenthal, 14 Cal. 4th at 432-33, 926 P.2d at 1085, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 898-99
(Kennard, J., concurring).
49. In addition to the Rosenthal plaintiffs, there is a similar federal action being
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banks will have to analyze how they sell their different investment op-
tions.' Banks and brokerage houses may need to establish standard
mechanisms for dealing with complaints before a dispute reaches the
point of arbitration or litigation because any dissatisfied client or cus-
tomer can bring suit.5"
A further result is the increasing difficulty future plaintiffs will face in
trying to challenge arbitration clauses.52 Plaintiffs will not be able to
benefit from the option of a jury trial; instead, they must prove that they
acted diligently by reading the contracts they signed.' One plaintiffs at-
torney stated that "the court has set too high a fraud standard."'
IV. CONCLUSION
In a unanimous decision, the California Supreme Court ruled that the
United States Arbitration Act's provision for a jury trial to decide issues
surrounding the enforceability of an arbitration agreement is not required
in California courts.' While section 4 of the Act establishes the basic
federal policy favoring arbitration, California is free to achieve that poli-
cy according to its own laws, providing the federal goal is not imped-
ed.' Summary adjudication is an acceptable state method because it
does not violate a citizen's constitutional due process rights.57
TERRI SCHALLENKAMP
brought by tens of thousands of investors. See Fraud Claim Over Arbitration
Agreement Not Triable by Jury-S.C., MRO. NEws-ENTERPRISE, Dec. 13, 1996, at 3,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File.
50. See id. (noting that in April there will likely be a "thorough review" of sales
policies).
51. See Carl Sullivan, Double Jeopardy, BANK INV. MKTG., June 1995, at 31, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Curnews File. He suggests treating complaints seriously by
training personnel how to respond to complaints, getting complaints in writing, re-
sponding in writing, and keeping detailed records of all complaints. See id.
52. See Rinat Fried, Court Bolsters Mandatory Arbitration, THE RECORDER, Dec. 13,
1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, New Library, Curnews File.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. See Rosenthal, 14 Cal. 4tl at 402, 926 P.2d at 1065, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 878.
56. See id. at 409-10, 926 P.2d at 1069-70, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 883.
57. See id. at 410-11, 926 P.2d at 1070, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 884.
203
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
A. Preemployment drug testing, as part of a required
medical examination, is valid under both the Unit-
ed States Constitution and the California Constitu-
tion, whereas prepromotional drug screening is
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness clause: Loder v. City of Glendale.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Loder v. City of Glendale,' the California Supreme Court decided
whether the City of Glendale could require all applicants for employment
and promotion to undergo urinalysis drug testing as part of a medical
examination prior to hiring or promotion.2 The plaintiff brought a
1. 14 Cal. 4th 846, 927 P.2d 1200, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (1997). Chief Justice George
wrote the lead opinion in which Justice Werdegar concurred. See id. at 852-900, 927
P.2d at 1202-35, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 698-731. Justice Mosk wrote a separate opinion
concurring and dissenting. See id. at 900-18, 927 P.2d at 1235-47, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
731-43 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard wrote a separate opinion
concurring and dissenting. See id. at 918-22, 927 P.2d at 1247-49, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
743-45 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Chin wrote an opinion concur-
ring and dissenting, with whom Justices Baxter and Brown concurred. See id. at 922-
33, 927 P.2d at 1249-57, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745-53 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
Finally, Justice Brown wrote'an opinion concurring and dissenting. See id. at 933-38,
927 P.2d at 1257-60, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753-56 (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
The following chart shows the voting pattern of the court with regard to the validity
of both preemployment and prepromotional drug testing:
PREEMPLOYMENT PREPROMOTIONAL
George, C.J.: Invalid Valid
Werdegar, J.: Invalid Valid
Mosk, J.: Invalid Invalid
Kennard, J.: Invalid Invalid
Chin, J.: Valid Valid
Baxter, J.: Valid Valid
Brown, J.: Valid Valid
2. See id. at 852, 927 P.2d at 1202, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 698. The City of Glendale
enacted an employment-related drug screening provision in 1986 which required appli-
cants for employment and promotion to submit to suspicionless urinalysis drug and
alcohol testing as a condition of employment or advancement, See id. Such testing was
conducted along with a required preplacement medical examination. See i. The city
notified applicants for employment of the potential drug and medical testing prior to
completing the initial application process. See id. at 853-54, 927 P.2d at 1203, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 699. Subsequently, if the city extended an offer of employment or a promo-
tion, the city notified the applicant that the offer was contingent upon the results of
the medical examination and drug screening. See id. To ensure receipt of the results, a
medical employee asked the applicant to'consent to the testing and the "release of the
test results to the city." Id. at 854, 927 P.2d at 1203-04, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 699-700. As
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taxpayer's action to enjoin the use of public funds for drug testing.3
First, the plaintiff contended that the drug testing scheme violated the
California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA). Second,
the plaintiff alleged the drug screening provision violated the United
States Constitution as an unreasonable search and seizure and a violation
of the right of privacy.' Additionally, the plaintiff argued that the drug
testing program violated the California Constitution, in the event it was
not invalidated under the United States Constitution.'
The trial court concluded that the testing did not violate the CMIA. 7
However, in analyzing each job category affected by Glendale's policy,
the trial court determined that as to thirty-six of the eighty job catego-
ries, the drug testing was constitutionally invalid in both the
part of the testing process, the medical employee asked the applicant to disrobe and
put on a hospital gown. See id. at 854, 927 P.2d at 1204, 59 Cal Rptr. 2d at 700.
Next, the medical employee would give the applicant a sealed container in which to
provide a urine sample. See id. At this point, a medical employee "accompanie[d] the
applicant to a restroom and [stood] in a cubicle next to the applicant's cubicle .... "
Id. The toilet bowl contained a blue dye to prevent tampering. See id. After collecting
the sample, the medical employee would test it to "screen for medical problems." Id.
at 854-55, 927 P.2d at 1204, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700. The employee then sealed the
sample with evidence tape and sent it to an independent laboratory to conduct the
drug and alcohol testing. See id. at 855, 927 P.2d at 1204, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 700. To
ensure a positive chain of custody, the applicant and the medical employee signed a
confirmation slip that was sealed in a laboratory envelope along with the sample. See
id. Finally, the laboratory forwarded the results to the city with a recommendation by
a physician, at which time the doctor hired by the city would review the test results
and place them into a confidential medical file. See id. at 855-56, 927 P.2d at 1205, 59.
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701. Applicants could appeal and request retesting in the event of a
positive test result. See id. at 856, 927 P.2d at 1205, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701. If the
results were negative upon retesting, a doctor reviewed the results and either recom-
mended qualifying or disqualifying the applicant for employment See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 68 ALK Jun. 2D Searches and Sei-
zures § 1 (1993 & Supp. 1997) (discussing Fourth Amendment protection from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures).
6. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 856, 927 P.2d at 1205, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 701. See
generally 7 B.E. WITIn, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNiA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 410, 454
(9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (reviewing unreasonable searches and seizures and the
nature and scope of protection under the California Constitution); 20 CAL. JuR. 3D
Criminal Law § 2505 (1985 & Supp. 1997) (addressing searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution).
7. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 858, 927 P.2d at 1206, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702.
preemployment and prepromotion contexts.8 The court of appeal upheld
the initial determination of the trial court, invalidating the drug testing in
both the preemployment and prepromotion contexts.9 However, the
court of appeal also found that the trial court improperly "upheld the
validity of the drug testing program with regard to many job classifica-
tions ... ."0
In a lead opinion written by Chief Justice George, the California Su-
preme Court found that the drug testing provisions did not violate the
CMIA." As for plaintiffs constitutional claims, the court held that
prepromotion drug testing violated the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, 2 but upheld the drug testing in the preemployment
context under both the United States 3 and California'4 Constitutions.
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Statutory Claims
a. Confidentiality of Medical Information Act
The California Supreme Court first reviewed the plaintiffs contention
that Glendale's drug screening program violated the CMIA. 5 The plain-
8. See id. at 857, 927 P.2d at 1206, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702.
9. See id. at 858, 927 P.2d at. 1206, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702.
10. Id. The court of appeal held that the drug testing was valid only in those areas
"'in which the regular duties, involveld] some special and obvious physical or ethical
demand.. . . '" Id. (quoting the lower court opinion). Furthermore, drug testing was
permissible only (1) upon "'initial'" employment in that particular job category, (2) if a
job offer was previously made, (3) if the test did not violate the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA), (4) if the sample was collected without unnecessary intrusion on
privacy, and (5) if the test was "'confirmed by a second test regarded as reliable by
the relevant scientific community.'" Id. at 858-59, 927 P.2d at 1207, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
703 (quoting the lower court opinion).
11. See id at 862, 927 P.2d at 1209, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705. See also ifrU notes
15-20 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis of the court concerning the
CMIA).
12. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 880, 927 P.2d at 1221, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 717.
13. See id. at 882, 927 P.2d at 1222, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 718; see also iiqfra notes
67-95 and accompanying text (discussing the validity of preemployment drug testing
under the United States Constitution).
14. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 898, 927 P.2d at 1233, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 729; see also
i(fru notes 96-124 and accompanying text (discussing the validity of preemployment
drug testing under the California Constitution).
15. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 859-62, 927 P.2d at 1207-09, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703-05.
The CMIA provides in pertinent part that "[n]o provider of health care shall disclose
medical information regarding a patient of the provider without first obtaining an au-
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tiff first argued that the city's testing procedure violated the CMIA's non-
discrimination provision because "the program automatically
disqualifie[d] from employment or promotion any employee who re-
fuse[d] to sign a form" authorizing receipt of the results by the city. 6
The court found that the City of Glendale did not discriminate against
employees who refused to provide an authorization because a drug test-
ing requirement would be "totally ineffective" if an employee could sim-
ply refuse to take the test.7
Second, the plaintiff asserted that the reference to "necessary" under
the CMIA required both a "compelling reason to act in the absence of
information" and that the employer had no less restrictive means by
which to obtain the information." The court disagreed with this con-
struction of the statute and found that the Legislature did not intend to
strictly limit an employer's access to necessary information. 9
Therefore, the court found that Glendale's disqualification of an appli-
cant who refused to disclose medical and drug testing results did not
violate the CMIAY °
b. Americans with Disabilities Act2'
Chief Justice George included a discussion about the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) in order to outline the parameters of a valid
preemployment medical examination.' The ADA imposes three general
thorization. . . ." CAL Civ. CODE § 56.10(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997). Furthermore,
section 56.20(b) states that "[n]o employee shall be discriminated against in terms or
conditions of employment due to that employee's refusal to sign an authorization....
However, nothing in this section shall prohibit an employer from taking such action as
is necessary . .. due to an employee's refusal to sign an authorization .... " CAL Civ.
CODE § 56.20(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1997). See generally Jill L Rosenberg, Legal Is-
sues Surrounding Employee Hiring, Privacy and Investigations, in 25TH ANNUAL INSTI-
TUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 569 (Practising Law Institute 1996) (discussing the CMIA).
16. Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 860,'927 P.2d at 1208, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
17. See id, at 861, 927 P.2d at 1208, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
18. Id. at 860-61, 927 P.2d at 1208, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
19. See id. at 861-62, 927 P.2d at 1209, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705.
20. See id. at 862, 927 P.2d at 1209, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1995). See generally Gary P. Scholick, Issues of
Workplace Privacy, 491 PIJLit 93, 100-05 (1994) (reviewing the requirements of the
ADA in connection with privacy in the workplace).
22. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 862-65, 927 P.2d at 1209-10, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705-07.
requirements on post-offer medical examinations.' First, the examina-
tion must be mandatory for all incoming employees without taking into
consideration any particular disability.' Second, the information and
test results must be stored by the employer in confidential medical
fies.' Third, the results must be used in accordance with the ADA as a
whole.2" The ADA also addresses post-employment medical examina-
tions (e.g. prepromotional medical testing) and states that "an employer
'shall not require a medical examination... unless such examination...
is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.'"27 Fi-
nally, Chief Justice George pointed out that the ADA specifically ex-
cluded drug testing from its definition of a medical examination, and
therefore, the ADA does not mandate procedures for an employer with
respect to preemployment and prepromotion drug testing.'
c. Fair Employment and Housing Act'
The California Supreme Court also took a brief look at the Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act (FEHA) to illustrate the state counterpart of
the general limitations upon preemployment medical examinations.'
FEHA requires that the same three conditions imposed by the ADA be
met prior to allowing the medical examination of a prospective employ-
ee.3' In addition, FEHA, like the ADA, does not purport to govern em-
ployer-mandated drug screening.'
2. Federal Constitutional Claim
Because the California Supreme Court had not yet addressed the issue
of employer-mandated drug testing, Chief Justice George discussed three
United States Supreme Court decisions which set forth the federal princi-
ples involved in reviewing the constitutionality of such a provision: Skin-
23. See id. at 862-63, 927 P.2d at 1209, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705.
24. See id. at 863, 927 P.2d at 1209, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. Id, at 863, 927 P.2d at 1209-10, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705-06 (quoting the ADA, 42
U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (1995)). See generally George P. Smith, H, Accessing Genomic
Information or Safeguarding Genetic Privacy, 9 J.L & HEALTH 121, 130 n.55 (1994-95)
(reviewing the provisions of FEA under § 12112(d)(4)(A)).
28. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 864, 927 P.2d at 1210, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706.
29. CAL Gov'T CODE §§ 12935(a), 12940 (West 1995).
30. See Loder, 14 Cal 4th at 865, 927 P.2d at 1211, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 707.
31. See id.; see also supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text
32. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 865, 927 P.2d at 1211, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 707.
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ner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,33 National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raab,3 and Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton. 5
a. United States Supreme Court Cases
In Skinner, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the constitu-
tionality of suspicionless drug testing of all railroad employees working
on a train immediately following a serious accident.' The first question
addressed by the Court was whether or not such testing constituted a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment.' Although urine testing does
not require a "surgical intrusion into the body," the Skinner Court found
that such testing constituted a search because the act of urinating is
uniquely private in nature.'
Turning to the issue of reasonableness, the Court noted that an other-
wise unreasonable search may be valid when "special needs" surpass the
necessity of a warrant or probable cause. 9 In such a situation, the ques-
tion of reasonableness is determined by weighing the government's inter-
est against the privacy interest of the individual.'
In Skinner, the Court found that the government possessed a special
need to ensure the safety of the railroad employees and customers.41
Therefore, the Court allowed suspicionless drug testing despite the lack
33. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
34. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
35. 115 S. Ct 2386 (1995).
36. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 866, 927 P.2d at 1212, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708; see also
George E. Warner, Jr., Note, The Ratification of the "Special Needs" Analysis to Em-
ployer Substance Abuse Testing: Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 13
HAMUNE L REV. 167 (1990) (providing an analysis of Skinner and its importance to
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
37. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 867, 927 P.2d at 1212, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708; see also
68 AM. Ju. 2D Searches and Seizures § 195 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
38. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 867, 927 P.2d at 1212, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708 (quoting
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617).
39. See id. at 867-68, 927 P.2d at 1212-13, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708-09 (citing Skinner,
489 U.S. at 619); see also Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creating a
Chasm in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L REV. 89 (1992) (discussing
the special needs analysis created by the Court in Skinner).
40. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 867, 927 P.2d at 1212-13, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 708-09
(citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619).
41. See id. at 868, 927 P.2d at 1213, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709 (citing Skinner, 489
U.S. at 620).
of probable cause.42 Furthermore, the Court observed that railroad em-
ployees had diminished privacy interests for two reasons: first, the "sam-
ple was to be collected 'in a medical environment;'" and second, the ex-
tensive regulation of the railroad industry operated to minimize the
employees' reasonable expectations of privacy.4" Therefore, the Skinner
Court upheld the validity of suspicionless drug testing in the private
context because the governmental interest outweighed the employees'
privacy expectations."
The California Supreme Court also sought guidance from National
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab," a case decided on the same
day as Skinner.' Chief Justice George noted the similarity of the facts
in Von Raab to Loder in that the drug testing requirement was imposed
upon public employees.47 Specifically, Von Raab involved the imposition
of drug testing on any individual whose potential employment falls under
three categories of United States Customs Service employees.' The first
category involved agents who were directly involved in "drug interdiction
or enforcement of related laws."49 The second classification included
employees who were required to carry a firearm.' The third category
was composed of agents who were required to "handle 'classified' materi-
al."5" The Court found that the deterrence of drug use in the Customs
Service embodied a special need under the Skinner analysis,52 and
therefore, the Court undertook a balancing of the government's interests
against the privacy expectations of the employees.'
42. See id. (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620).
43. See id. at 869, 927 P.2d at 1213-14, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709-10 (quoting Skinner,
489 U.S. at 626-27).
44. See id. at 870, 927 P.2d at 1214, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710 (citing Skinner, 489
U.S. at 633).
45. 489 U.S. 556 (1989).
46. Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 870, 927 P.2d at 1214, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 870-71, 927 P.2d at 1214-15, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710-11 (citing Van
Raab, 489 U.S. at 660); see also Alyssa C. Westover, Note, National Treasury Employ-
ees Union v. Von Raab-Will the War Against Drugs Abrogate Constitutional
Guarantees?, 17 PEPP. L REv. 793 (1990) (discussing the Von Raab decision and its
implications on privacy concerns and drug testing).
49. Id. at 870, 927 P.2d at 1215, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 711.
50. See id. at 870-71, 927 P.2d at 1215, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 711 (citing Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 660-61).
51. Id. at 871, 927 P.2d at 1215, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 711 (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S.
at 661).
52. See id. at 872, 927 P.2d at 1215, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 711.
53. See ad. at 872-74, 927 P.2d at 1216-17, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712-13 (citing Von
Raab, 489 U.S. at 670-72).
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With respect to the first and second categories, the Court found that
the government had a compelling interest in maintaining the "'integrity
and judgment'" of Customs employees.' In addition, the Court held that
such employees have a diminished privacy expectation because "'these
employees cannot reasonably expect to keep from the Service personal
information that bears directly on their fitness.'"' Therefore, the Court
upheld the testing of employees classified under the first two categories
of the Customs Service drug testing program.'
Finally, the Court addressed the third category of Customs Service
drug testing. 7 The Court held that the scope of "classified material" as
defined in the third category, was too broad, and therefore, the Court re-
manded this particular issue for further deliberations.'
The California Supreme Court looked at one final United States Su-
preme Court case to determine the proper Fourth Amendment analysis
for an intrusion on privacy.' In Vernonia School District 47J v.
Acton,' the school district required all students who wished to partici-
pate in the schools' athletic programs be tested for drugs." The Court
upheld the validity of the program because the government had a "parens
patriae" interest in the children while they were at school, and the stu-
dents had a diminished expectation of privacy when they chose to "'go
out for' a sport."'
The Vernonia Court provided a good analysis to determine what is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and addressed whether the
state must provide a "compelling" interest to justify an intrusion on pri-
vacy.' The Court did not construe the compelling interest requirement
54. See id. at 872-73, 927 P.2d at 1216, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712 (quoting Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 670).
55. Id. at 873-74, 927 P.2d at 1216-17, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712-13 (quoting Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 672).
56. See id. at 874, 927 P.2d at 1217, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 875, 927 P.2d at 1217-18, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713-14; see also Alex J.
Barker, Note, Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton Defining the Constitutional Scope
of Random Suspicioniess Drug Testing in Interscholastic Athletics and Beyond, 5
WIDENER J. PuB. L 445 (1996) (providing a look at Vernonia to determine the validity
of drug testing in connection with collegiate and high school athletics).
60. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
61. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 875, 927 P.2d at 1218, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 714.
62. Id. (quoting Vernonia, 115 S. Ct. at 2393).
63. See id.
strictly.' Rather, the Court concluded that the interest must "appear[]
important enough to justify the particular search at hand, in light of
other factors which show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a
genuine expectation of privacy."'
b. Application to the present case
The California Supreme Court shifted the focus back to the instant
case to determine whether the Fourth Amendment bars the drug testing
required by the City of Glendale.' First, the court acknowledged that
under Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia, drug testing clearly falls into
the realm of the Fourth Amendment." Furthermore, the court deter-
mined that because urinalysis drug testing is a search, it must satisfy the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement.'
Next, the court addressed whether the city could perform suspicion-
less drug testing.' To conduct such drug testing, the city must show
that its interest in "maintaining a drug-free workplace" outweighs the.
individual applicant's privacy expectations.7' The court first analyzed the
issue with respect to applicants for promotion,7 and then turned to ap-
plicants for employment. 2
Chief Justice George first found that the city's application of its drug
testing program to current employees who sought promotion was incon-
sistent with Von Raab.' For the employer to impose testing upon cur-
rent employees, the employer must provide a link with the particular
nature and duties of the position. Under Von Raab, the Government's
interest in itself is insufficient for three reasons.' First, the Von Raab
Court would not have placed as much emphasis on the categories of
Customs Service agents who were subjected to drug testing.7" Second,
the Court recognized that certain forms of employment entail a great
deal of supervision, thereby minimizing the privacy expectations of the
64. See id. at 876, 927 P.2d at 1218, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 714.
65. Id. (emphasis in original).
66. See id. at 876-87, 927 P.2d at 1218-26, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 714-22.
67. See id. at 876, 927 P.2d at 1218, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 714.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 876, 927 P.2d at 1218-19, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 714-15.
70. See id. at 877, 927 P.2d at 1219, 59 CaL Rptr. 2d at 715.
71. See id. at 877-81, 927 P.2d at 1219-21, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715-17.
72. See id. at 881-87, 927 P.2d at 1222-26, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 718-22.
73. See id. at 877-78, 927 P.2d at 1219, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715.
74. See id. at 878, 927 P.2d at 1219-20, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715-16.
75. See id. at 878-79, 927 P.2d at 1219-20, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715-16.
76. See id. at 878, 927 P.2d at 1219-20, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715-16.
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employee.77 Third, the Court in Von Raab would not have invalidated
the third classification of employees simply because the scope of employ-
ees entrusted with classified information was too broad.'
Therefore, the California Supreme Court found that a public employer
may not constitutionally require all applicants who apply for promotion
to submit to urinalysis drug testing.' Rather, the nature and duties of
the particular position must necessarily require drug testing.'
Chief Justice George next addressed the validity of testing job appli-
cants for drugs." Skinner and Von Raab, however, did not specifically
address drug testing of job applicants.' The court, therefore, used the
reasonableness test to balance the interests involved.'
In doing so, the court first looked to the strength of the Government's
interest involved.' The court held that all employers-government or
otherwise-have a "legitimate... interest in ascertaining whether per-
sons to be employed in any position currently are abusing drugs or alco-
hol." ' Unlike testing decisions regarding present employees, the city
does not have the chance to view new applicants to determine whether
drug testing is advisable.' Furthermore, the court recognized that the
"hiring of a new employee frequently represents a considerable invest-
ment on the part of an employer. . .. "' Accordingly, the City of Glen-
dale possesses a strong interest in requiring drug screening for prospec-
tive applicants.'
The court next reviewed the privacy expectations of the individuals
applying for government positions.' The key to this analysis was that
the drug testing was administered as part of a required preemployment
medical examination.' Therefore, the court examined the additional in-
77. See id. at 878-79, 927 P.2d at 1220, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716.
78. See id. at 879-80, 927 P.2d at 1220-21, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716-17.
79. See id. at 880, 927 P.2d at 1221, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 717.
80. See id. at 881 n.12, 927 P.2d at 1221 n.12, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 717 n.12.
81. See id. at 881-87, 927 P.2d at 1222-26, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 718-22.
82. See id. at 881-82, 927 P.2d at 1222, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 718.
83. See i&4 at 882, 927 P.2d at 1222, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 718.
84. See id. at 882-83, 927 P.2d at 1222-23, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 718-19.
85. Id. at 882-83, 927 P.2d at 1223, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 719.
86. See id. at 883, 927 P.2d at 1223, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 719.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 883-86, 927 P.2d at 1223-25, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 719-21.
90. See id. at 883-84, 927 P.2d at 1223-24, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 719-20. The plaintiff
trusions on privacy (including added security measures to ensure the
accuracy of the testing sample) and determined that the invasion of pri-
vacy was minimal when combined with the medical examination as a
whole.9 Chief Justice George again looked to the ADA and determined
that, unlike the prepromotion context, once an offer of employment has
been made, an employer can require the applicant to undergo a medical
examination without regard to the particular position being filled.'
The government interest involved clearly outweighed the minimal addi-
tional intrusion on privacy resulting from the drug screening." Conse-
quently, the California Supreme Court held that the City of Glendale's
drug testing program for new applicants was constitutionally permissible
under the Fourth Amendment.'
3. State Constitutional Claim
The California Supreme Court next turned to the plaintiffs contention
that the City of Glendale's drug testing policy violated the privacy provi-
sion of the California Constitution. 5 Because the provision relating to
prepromotional drug testing was invalid under the United States Consti-
tution, the court was required only to review the preemployment drug
testing under the California Constitution.'
a. Cases reviewed by Chief Justice George
The court first reviewed the court of appeal decision in Wilkinson v.
Times Mirror Corp.7 Wilkinson involved a private publishing company
that required job applicants to undergo urinalysis drug testing as part of
a preemployment medical examination. 8 The court of appeal first con-
cluded that the California Constitution applied to the drug testing pro-
did not contest the validity of the preemployment medical examination, because it was
not an issue in the case. See id. at 885, 927 P.2d at 1224, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 720.
91. See id. at 884, 927 P.2d at 1224, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 720.
92. See id. at 885-86, 927 P.2d at 1225, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 721.
93. See id. at 886-87, 927 P.2d at 1225-26, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 721-22.
94. See id. at 887, 927 P.2d at 1226, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722.
95. See id at 887-99, 927 P.2d at 1226-34, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722-30; see also CAL
CONST. art. I, § 1; 20 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2566 (1985 & Supp. 1997)
(discussing blood and urine testing as a search of the body).
96. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 887, 927 P.2d at 1226, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722.
97. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 264 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1989); see Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 888,
927 P.2d at 1226-27, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722-23.
98. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 888, 927 P.2d at 1226, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722. The
drug testing and procedures involved in Wilkinson were virtually identical to those
involved in Loder. See id.
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gram employed by the private company. The court then upheld the
drug testing program for two main reasons: (1) a preemployment medical
examination, which typically included the collection of a urine sample,
should be reasonably anticipated by a job applicant; and (2) the submis-
sion of a urine sample for further testing for drugs and alcohol is only a
minimal additional invasion of privacy."
The California Supreme Court next addressed its decision in Hill v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n"°' to aid the court in determining the
proper scope and application of California's privacy provision."° Hill
concerned the drug testing of college athletes who chose to participate
in NCAA-sponsored athletics."° The court determined that the Califor-
nia constitution applied to the NCAA, despite the fact that it was a non-
governmental entity."°
The Hill court addressed the proper standard of review to apply to
California Constitutional privacy claims. 5 The lower court applied a
strict standard of review, requiring the NCAA to prove a compelling in-
terest and the lack of less restrictive means by which to obtain the infor-
mation."° However, the California Supreme Court in Hill disagreed,
finding that the standard of review is heightened only when the case in-
volves an invasion of a fundamental privacy interest."7 On the other
hand, where the employer uses less intrusive means, the court will bal-
ance the interests involved."
The Hil court next devised three threshold elements of a state con-
stitutional privacy cause of action."° The plaintiff must initially show
99. See id.
100. See id. at 888, 927 P.2d at, 1226-27, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722-23 (citing Wilkinson,
215 Cal. App. 3d at 1046-52, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 202-06).
101. 7 Cal. 4th 1, 865 P.2d 633, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (1994).
102. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 889-96, 927 P.2d at 1227-32, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723-28.
103. See id. at 889, 927 P.2d at 1227, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723 (citing Hil, 7 Cal. 4th
at 8-9, 865 P.2d at 637, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838).
104. See id. (citing Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 20, 865 P.2d at 644, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845).
105. See id. at 889-90, 927 P.2d at 1227-28, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723-24 (citing Hil, 7
Cal. 4th at 20-35, 865 P.2d at 644-54, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845-56).
106. See id. at 890, 927 P.2d at 1227, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723 (citing Hll, 7 Cal. 4th
at 20, 865 P.2d at 644, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845-46).
107. See id. at 890, 927 P.2d at 1228, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724 (citing Hill, 7 Cal. 4th
at 34, 865 P.2d at 653, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855).
108. See id.
109. See id. at 890-91, 927 P.2d at 1228, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724 (citing Hil, 7 Cal.
4th at 39-40, 865 P.2d at 657, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859).
"'(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting
a serious invasion of privacy.'""' Chief Justice George, in the instant
case, stressed the fact that these three elements are not to be deemed
new requirements."' Rather, these elements constitute a screening tool
which the court can use to eliminate those claims that "do not involve a
significant intrusion on a privacy interest protected by the state consti-
tutional privacy provision."12 According to many California Supreme
Court decisions, the courts must conduct a balancing test between the
employer's interests and the privacy expectations of the individual."3
This contention is supported by the Hill decision because the court con-
ducted the balancing test despite an initial finding that the three ele-
ments were satisfied."4
The Hill court found that the NCAA's drug screening program was
valid under the state constitution."' The interest of the NCAA to "main-
tain[] the integrity of intercollegiate athletic competition and its interest
in protecting the health and safety of student athletes" outweighed the
minimal intrusion on privacy resulting from the drug testing."6 Howev-
er, the court limited its holding to the facts of the case by providing that
nothing in the opinion applied to preemployment drug testing."7 Conse-
quently, the Loder court was compelled to undertake its own balancing
of the interests involved in the preemployment context."'
b. Application to the present case
The lead opinion in Loder next balanced the privacy expectations of
the job applicants against the interests of the City of Glendale to deter-
mine whether the testing requirement was valid under the California
Constitution."9 The balancing test undertaken by the court to review
the state constitutional claim was analogous to the one discussed under
the United States Constitution."' The court found that the intrusion on
110. Id. (quoting Hi/l, 7 Cal. 4th at 39-40, 865 P.2d at 657, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859).
111. See id. at 891, 927 P.2d at 1228, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724.
112. Id. at 893, 927 P.2d at 1230, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 726.
113. See id. at 891-92, 927 P.2d at 1229, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725.
114. See id. at 894-95, 927 P.2d at 1231, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 727 (citing HiQl, 7 Cal.
4th at 40-55, 865 P.2d at 657-W9, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859-71).
115. See id. at 895, -927 P.2d at 1231, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 727 (citing Hill, 7 Cal. 4th
at 57, 865 P.2d at 669, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 895-96, 927 P.2d at 1231-32, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 727-28 (citing Hil, 7
Cal. 4th at 54-55, 865 P.2d at 657, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869).
118. See id. at 896-98, 927 P.2d at 1232-33, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 728-29.
119. See id.
120. See supra notes 67-95 and accompanying text (discussing the application of a
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the privacy of the individual was minimal in light of the required
preemployment medical examination. 2' Furthermore, the "legitimate
and substantial interest" of the city not to hire applicants who are cur-
rently abusing drugs outweighed the privacy interest of the job appli-
cant. 22 Therefore, the court held that the City of Glendale did not vio-
late the state constitution insofar as it required job applicants to submit
to drug testing "as part of a general preemployment medical examina-
tion. 123
4. Review of Specific Job Categories
The California Supreme Court next addressed the issue of whether it
should review each one of the city's job titles in order to determine for
which positions the city has constitutional authority to require
prepromotional drug testing." Chief Justice George wrote that such
review was unnecessary for two reasons.'25 First, because the city en-
acted its drug testing program three years prior to the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Skinner and Von Raab, the city officials
did not create the city's drug testing policy under the "position-by-posi-
tion review" standard described in those cases. 26 Second, the ADA was
enacted after Glendale promulgated its drug screening program. 7 The
ADA also restricts the city's ability to require the examination of current
employees."z Consequently, the California Supreme Court invalidated
Glendale's prepromotional drug testing requirement because it was incur-
ably overbroad, and ordered the city to restructure the program to com-
ply with constitutional requirements.' 29
Therefore, the lead opinion of the California Supreme Court held that
the prepromotional drug testing program was in violation of the United
balancing test to the City of Glendale's drug testing program under federal standards).
121. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 897, 927 P.2d at 1232-33, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 728-29.
122. See id. at 897-98, 927 P.2d at 1233, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 729.
123. Id. at 898, 927 P.2d at 1233, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 729.
124. See id.
125. See id. at 898-99, 927 P.2d at 1233-34, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 729-30.
126. See id. at 898, 927 P.2d at 1233-34, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 729-30. For a discussion
of the review standards required under Skinner and Von Raab, see supra notes 33-59
and accompanying text.
127. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 898-99, 927 P.2d at 1234, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 899, 927 P.2d at 1234, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730.
States Constitution, and preemployment drug screening was permissible
under both the federal and state constitutions.'30
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk wrote a separate opinion concurring with the lead opin-
ion insofar as it invalidated prepromotional drug testing. 3' However, he
dissented with the lead's determination that Glendale's drug testing pro-
gram for all job applicants was constitutionally permissible under both
the federal and state constitutions." In particular, Justice Mosk's dis-
sent rested on the conclusion that the city failed to demonstrate that its
drug testing program actually promoted a legitimate and substantial need
to ensure that people applying for jobs, such as typists or city attorneys,
are drug-free.'"
Justice Mosk first addressed the privacy concerns of the individual
applicant under the Fourth Amendment." According to Justice Mosk,
both the nature of the excretory function and the intrusion on. informa-
tional privacy evidence are a significant interference with an individual's
right to privacy." Moreover, simply performing testing as part of a
preemployment medical examination does not diminish these privacy
concerns." Rather, significant additional intrusions on privacy included
"the aural monitoring of the applicant's urination" and the disclosure of
personal medical information that would not otherwise be required.'37
Reviewing the governmental interest involved, Justice Mosk asserted
that the interest in maintaining a drug-free workplace is not in itself
sufficient to permit suspicionless preemployment drug testing. " He as-
serted that even if employers have a legitimate and substantial interest in
testing potential employees for drug abuse, that interest does not elini-
130. See id. at 900, 927 P.2d at 1234-35, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730-31.
131. See id. at 900, 927 P.2d at 1235, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
132. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
133. See id. at 900-01, 927 P.2d at 1235, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
134. See id. at 901-15, 927 P.2d at 1235-44, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731-40 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
135. See id. at 901, 927 P.2d at 1235-36, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731-32 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
136. See id. at 902-03, 927 P.2d at 1236, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
137. See id. at 902, 927 P.2d at 1236, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
138. See id. at 905, 927 P.2d at 1238, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 734 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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nate the need to conduct a "fact-specific" balancing test.l39 Skinner 4
and Von Raab14 permit suspicionless drug testing only in situations
where the government can articulate a compelling interest.4 1 Further-
more, under Harmon v. Thornburgh," Justice Mosk contended that
the government must establish "'a clear, direct nexus... between the
nature of the employee's duty and the nature of the feared violation.'"'"
According to Justice Mosk, the government interest must be tied to
health and public safety rather than to mere "efficiency" because "the
general interest in government efficiency.., can in the abstract be used
to justify drug testing of any and all positions.... "145
Next, Justice Mosk outlined his preferred approach for reviewing the
constitutionality of a privacy claim.'" First, the Government must pro-
vide a specific demonstration that drug abuse is a problem within the po-
sition being tested. 47 Second, the drug testing must be "a reasonable
means of addressing the problems at hand" in that the results of the
testing can accurately predict the performance of job applicants.'"
Third, the drug testing must be the least restrictive means to eliminate
the drug problem and improve the productivity within the particular
department or employment classification."
Justice Mosk found that the City of Glendale failed to meet all three of
these requirements: (1) the city did not prove that a problem existed as
to drug abuse within its system,"m (2) urinalysis drug testing did not
139. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
140. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
142. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 905-06, 927 P.2d at 1238-39, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 734-35
(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
143. 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
144. Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 906, 927 P.2d at 1239, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (quoting Harmon, 878 F.2d at 490).
145. Id. at 910, 927 P.2d at 1241, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
146. See id. at 910-12, 927 P.2d at 1241-42, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737-38 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
147. See id. at 910, 927 P.2d at 1241-42, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737-38 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
148. Id. at 911, 927 P.2d at 1242, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 738 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
149. See id. at 911-12, 927 P.2d at 1242, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 738 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
150. See id. at 912, 927 P.2d at 1242-43, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 738-39 (Mosk, J., con-
foreclose the possibility that inefficiency among employees would remain
in existence, 5' and (3) the city did not consider less intrusive means to
obtain information regarding the performance of job applicants.'52
Therefore, Justice Mosk concluded that the preemployment drug test re-
quired by the City of Glendale violated the United States Constitu-
tion."5
Justice Mosk also found that the preemployment drug testing scheme
violated the privacy provision of the California Constitution.'5 ' He relied
on his dissent in Hi/ to illustrate the necessity of a compelling interest
in the event that the Government interfered with the privacy of the plain-
tiff."5 For the same reasons discussed in connection with the United
States constitutional claim, Justice Mosk found that the Government
intruded upon the plaintiffs right of privacy." In addition, the Govern-
ment failed to provide the necessary compelling interest to justify such
an intrusion.'57
C. Justice Kennard's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard wrote a separate opinion concurring with the majority
opinion which invalidated prepromotion drug testing under the Fourth
Amendment." However, she asserted that preemployment drug testing
also violated the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment."5
Justice Kennard contended the requirement to provide the employer
with personal medical information, including the medications currently
cursing and dissenting).
151. See id. at 912-14, 927 P.2d at 1243-44, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 739-40 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
152. See id. at 914, 927 P.2d at 1244, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 740 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
153. See id. at 915, 927 P.2d at 1244, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 740 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
154. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
155. See id. at 916, 927 P.2d at 1245, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 741 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting) (citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 85-86, 865
P.2d 633, 688, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 890-91 (1994)).
156. See id. at 916-17, 927 P.2d at 1245-46, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 741-42 (Mosk, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (citing HILL, 7 Cal. 4th at 85-86, 865 P.2d at 688, 26 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 890-91; White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94,
106 (1975)); see also notes 90-93 and accompanying text (discussing the privacy expec-
tations of persons applying for government positions).
157. See Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at 917, 927 P.2d at 1246, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742 (Mosk,
J., concurring and dissenting).
158. See id. at 918, 927 P.2d at 1247, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
159. See id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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being taken, was a significant intrusion on the privacy of the individu-
al." Moreover, aural monitoring of urination is an invasion on privacy
which is "offensive to personal dignity. 161
Justice Kennard also argued that the Government's interest in econom-
ic efficiency was not sufficient "to overcome the interests in vindicating
human dignity.""8 According to Justice Kennard, even if the interest in
economics was sufficient, the Government was required to prove that no
less intrusive alternative was available." She contended that such an
alternative existed where the Government could hire the prospective em-
ployee on a probationary basis to observe potential problems in efficien-
cy and job performance."
Therefore, according to Justice Kennard, the City of Glendale's "blan-
ket suspicionless urinalysis drug and alcohol testing" program was in-
valid under the Fourth Amendment."'
D. Justice Chin's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Chin concurred with the- lead decision to uphold the city's drug
testing program as applied to job applicants." He argued, however,
that the balancing test supported the constitutionality of prepromotional
drug testing.'
67
According to Justice Chin, four factors operated to minimize the intru-
sion upon the privacy of applicants for promotion."8 First, the test oc-
curred as part of a routine medical examination."' Justice Chin con-
160. See id. at 919, 927 P.2d at 1247, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
161. See id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Loder, 14 Cal. 4th at
903, 927 P.2d at 1237, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting)).
162. Id. at 920, 927 P.2d at 1248, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 744 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting) (quoting Jonathan V. Holtzman, Applicant Testing for Drug Use: A Policy
and Legal Inquiry, 33 WM. & MARY L REV. 47, 90 (1991)).
163. See id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
164. See id. at 921, 927 P.2d at 1249, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
165. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
166. See id. at 922, 927 P.2d at 1249, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745 (Chin, J., concurring
and dissenting).
167. See id. (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
168. See id. at 923-26, 927 P.2d at 1250-52, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746-48 (Chin, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
169. See id. at 923, 927 P.2d at 1250, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746 (Chin, J., concurring
tended that the Von Raab decision dictated that drug testing was appro-
priate when included as part of a medical examination.70 Second, he
disagreed that the ADA prohibited medical examinations of applicants
for promotion.'7' Rather, the ADA provides that medical examinations
are permitted in the employment context so long as they are "job-related
and consistent with business necessity.'"'72 Third, the monitoring of uri-
nation was aural rather than visual, thereby minimizing the intrusion on
privacy.73 Finally, Justice Chin contended that requiring applicants to
provide their medical history and a list of current medications served to
"protect[] applicants from 'false positive' drug test results" and was not a
significant intrusion on privacy.'74 Justice Chin further claimed that em-
ployees who apply for promotion have a reduced expectation of privacy
because they are notified of the drug testing procedure before they make
the final decision to apply for the job.'
Justice Chin advanced three arguments in support of the Government's
interest in maintaining a drug-free workplace.'76 First, "[d]rug testing
helps assure work force economy, efficiency, and safety."'77 Moreover,
prepromotion drug testing is important because a promotion generally
elevates an employee into a position requiring a higher level of responsi-
bility.78 Second, Justice Chin opined that the city's public nature re-
quires that a number of factors be taken into consideration, including
"public safety, health, security, morale, and fiscal integrity .... ". ' It is
therefore important to ensure that none of the city's employees are abus-
and dissenting).
170. See id. at 923-24, 927 P.2d at 1250-51, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 746-47 (Chin, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
171. See id. at 924, 927 P.2d at 1251, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747 (Chin, J., concurring
and dissenting).
172. Id. (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A)
(1994)).
173. See id. at 925, 927 P.2d at 1251-52, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747-48 (Chin, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
174. See id. at 925-26, 927 P.2d at 1252, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 748 (Chin, J., concurring
and dissenting) (citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 52-54, 865
P.2d 633, 666-67, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 868-69 (1994)).
175. See id. at 926, 927 P.2d at 1252, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 748 (Chin, J., concurring
and dissenting).
176. See id. at 926-33, 927 P.2d at 1252-56, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 748-52 (Chin, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
177. Id. at 927, 927 P.2d at 1253, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 749 (Chin, J., concurring and
dissenting).
178. See id. at 928, 927 P.2d at 1253, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 749 (Chin, J., concurring
and dissenting).
179. Id. at 928-29, 927 P.2d at 1254, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750 (Chin, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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ing drugs."8 Finally, Justice Chin asserted that case law fails to distin-
guish between prepromotional and preemployment drug screening. 8 '
Moreover, courts have only overruled "random, unannounced test-
For these reasons, Justice Chin found the strong interests of the Gov-
ernment outweighed the minimal privacy intrusion on both employment
and promotion applicants and, therefore, the City of Glendale's drug
testing scheme was constitutionally valid in its entirety."
E. Justice Brown's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brown concurred with the opinion written by Justice Chin, but
wrote a separate opinion to emphasize her concern with the balancing
approach utilized in Fourth Amendment drug testing claims."u Justice
Brown argued that applicants for employment and promotion were
aware in advance that hiring was conditioned upon passing a drug and
alcohol test and, therefore, waived their constitutional right to privacy by
applying for the position." In addition, "In]either job applicants nor
employees risk the loss of anything they already possess. Employees who
test positive are not fired; they are simply ineligible for promotion."
Finally, Justice Brown argued that, as an employer, the Government
should not be held to higher constitutional standards than those imputed
to private employers. 7
180. See id. (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
181. See id. at 929-33, 927 P.2d at 1254-56, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750-52 (Chin, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
182. Id. at 929, 927 P.2d at 1254, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750 (emphasis in original)
(Chin, J., concurring and dissenting). In particular, Justice Chin addressed the decision
in Willner v. Thornburgh, 928 F.2d 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See id. at 931-32, 927 P.2d at
1256, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 751-52 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting). The Wiliner court
noted that employees were in the position to choose whether or not to apply for a
promotion and, therefore, "had control over whether they would be tested . . . ." Id. at
932, 927 P.2d at 1256, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 752 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting).
183. See id. at 933, 927 P.2d at 1256-57, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753 (Chin, J., concurring
and dissenting).
184. See id. at 933-34, 927 P.2d at 1257, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 753-54 (Brown, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
185. See id. at 935, 927 P.2d at 1258, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 754 (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting).
186. Id. (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
187. See id. at 937, 927 P.2d at 1259, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 755 (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting).
III. IMPACT & CONCLUSION
For the first time, the California Supreme Court addressed
preemployment and prepromotional drug testing in the public con-
text.'" By specifically holding that drug testing is valid as part of a
preemployment medical examination, the court allows the City of Glen-
dale and other cities to intrude upon the privacy of job applicants with-
out violating the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.'" Such broad drug testing power may eventually lead to random,
unannounced testing.
However, the court expressly denied the City of Glendale the right to
test applicants for promotion.'" As a result, cities may be investing a
great deal of time and effort to train employees who it may later find are
inept due to drug or alcohol abuse. 9 ' Moreover, the upper level func-
tioning of a city may be in danger due to the ineffectiveness of employ-
ees who may be involved with drugs or alcohol."9
Lastly, because the reasonableness test involves balancing the interests
of the government and the privacy of the individual, it is inherently sub-
jective. The court may choose to weigh one factor more heavily than
another, thereby changing the entire outcome of the case. This is readily
apparent from the number of opinions written in the present case. Con-
sequently, the court has leeway in applying the reasonableness test in
other drug testing scenarios; it can choose to follow this precedent, or it
can apply the factors differently to arrive at a different outcome.
MARISA CASTAGNET
188. See id. at 852, 927 P.2d at 1202, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 698.
189. See id. at 882, 927 P.2d at 1222, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 718.
190. See id. at 880-81, 927 P.2d at 1221, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 717.
191. See id. at 883, 927 P.2d at 1223, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 719.
192. See id. at 928, 927 P.2d at 1254, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 750 (Chin, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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B. A regulation prohibiting discrimination against
prospective tenants on the basis of marital status
does not violate a landlord's rights -under the free
exercise of religion clauses of the United States and
California Constitutions, and is therefore enforce-
able against a landlord: Smith v. Fair Employment
& Housing Commission.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission,' the Califor-
nia Supreme Court considered whether the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA), California Government Code section 12955,
and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, both of which provide that it is unlawful
for a landlord to discriminate against any persons based on marital sta-
tus, violate a landlord's right to free exercise of religion under the United
States and California Constitutions.2 The administrative law judge found
1. 12 Cal. 4th 1143, 913 P.2d 909, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700 (1996). Justice Werdegar
delivered the majority opinion in which Chief Justice George and retired Associate
Justice Arabian concurred. See id. at 1150-79, 913 P.2d at 912-31, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
702-22. Justice Mosk wrote a concurring opinion. See id. at 1179-92, 913 P.2d at 931-39,
51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722-30 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Kennard concurred in part
and dissented in part. See id. at 1192-218, 913 P.2d at 939-57, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730-
47 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Baxter concurred in part and dis-
sented in part, joined by Justice Lucas. See id. at 1218-51, 913 P.2d at 957-80, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 747-70 (Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. See id. at 1192, 913 P.2d at 939, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 730. Evelyn Smith (Smith),
a Christian, owns and leases four rental units in Chico, California entirely for business
and commercial purposes. See id. at 1151, 913 P.2d at 912, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 702-03.
Her customary rental routine is to advertise in local newspapers. See id. at 1151, 913
P.2d at 912, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 703. Upon inquiry by a prospective tenant, Smith informs
them that she prefers to rent to married couples because her religious beliefs oppose
sex outside of marriage. See id. Further, she believes it is sinful to rent her units to
tenants who will engage in nonmarital sex. See id. Other than her preference not to
rent to persons who will engage in non-marital sex, Smith does not discriminate based
on the religious beliefs, race, origin, color or other physical handicaps of her tenants.
See id. Between March and April, 1997, Smith advertised one of her apartments. Gal
Randall and Kenneth Phillips responded to the advertisement by telephone. See id. at
1152, 913 P.2d at 912, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703. During the initial telephone conversa-
tion, Smith informed Randall and Phillips, that she preferred to rent to married cou-
ples. See id. at 1152, 913 P.2d at 912-13, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703. When Randall and
Phillips went to observe the unit, Smith stated she would not rent to an unmarried
couple. See 14 at 1152, 913 P.2d at 913, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703. Phillips falsely repre-
that the FEHA prohibits discrimination against unmarried couples.' Fur-
ther, the judge rejected Smith's argument that the FEHA mandate to rent
to unmarried couples violated the free exercise of religion clauses of the
United States and California Constitutions.4 The Fair Employment and
Housing Commission (Commission) agreed that Smith's refusal to rent an
apartment to an unmarried couple violated the discrimination prohibi-
tions under the FEHA and the Unruh Civil Rights Act.5 The Commission
refused to address Smith's constitutional arguments and ordered Smith
to pay $454.00 in compensatory damages and $500.00 in emotional dis-
tress damages to Phillips and Randall.6
The court of appeal reversed the Commission's finding, ruling that the
application of the FEHA to a landlord whose religious beliefs transgress
the renting of an apartment to an unmarried couple is unconstitutional
under the free exercise clauses of the United States and California Con-
stitutions.7 The court also found no right to privacy violation under the
sented that he and Randall were married, and they proceeded to complete art informal
application. See id. On or about April 7, 1987, Randall and Phillips entered into a lease
agreement with Smith, beginning May 1, 1987, for a monthly rent of $325.00 and they
paid a security deposit of $150.00. See id. During this meeting, Smith reiterated her
refusal to rent to unmarried couples. See id. Later that same day, Randall telephoned
Smith to inquire if Smith doubted that she and Phillips were married, and if Smith
wanted a copy of their marriage license. See id. Smith said that was unnecessary. See
id. Later that same day, Phillips telephoned Smith and informed her that he and
Randall were not married. See id. Smith stated that she would not rent to an unmar-
ried couple because it violated her religious beliefs, and returned their security deposit
by mail. See id. at 1152, 913 P.2d at 913, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 703-04. Randall and Phil-
lips filed individual complaints with the Commission, alleging Smith had violated Cali-
fornia Government Code (FEHA) section 12955, and California Civil Code section 51.
See id. at 1i52-53, 913 P.2d 913, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704. See CAL GOV'T CODE § 12955
(West & Supp. 1997) (providing the anti-discrimination provisions of the FERA); CAL
CONST. art. I, § 4 (stating that "[f]ree exercise and enjoyment of religion without dis-
crimination or preference are guaranteed"). See generally 8 B.E. WrrN, SUMMARY OF
CAuFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 764-765 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing FEHA and
outlining the unlawful activities pursuant to the FEHA); 7 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF
CAuFORNiA LAw, Constitutional Law §§ 373-374 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing the param-
eters of the federal and state free exercise clauses); 51 CAL JuR. 3D Public Housing
§ 61 (1979) (detailing unlawful acts by owners of housing accommodations); 12 CAL
JuR. 3D Civil Rights §§ 5-6 (1974) (explaining the Unruh Civil Rights Act's discrimina-
tion prohibitions on business establishments).
3. See Smith, 12 Cal 4th at 1153, 913 P.2d at 913-14, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 1153, 913 P.2d at 914, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704; see CAL CIV. CODE
§ 51 (West 1992) (containing the Unruh Civil Rights Act).
6. See Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1153, 913 P.2d at 914, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704-05.
7. See id. at 1154, 913 P.2d at 914, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705.
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California Constitution by Smith's inquiry into Phillips and Randall's
marital status.8
The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's decision
and held that the FEHA prohibited Smith from refusing to rent to un-
married cohabitants and thus concluded that, the FEHA provision was a
religiously neutral, generally applicable law, which did not violate the
federal or state free exercise of religion clauses.9
11. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. The FEHA ban on housing discrimination applies to unmarried
couples.
The court began its analysis by considering the legislative intent be-
hind the FEHA "marital status" discrimination prohibition.'" Giving the
words their ordinary meaning, the court stated that a landlord may not
inquire into two prospective tenants' marital status or refuse to rent to
two prospective tenants because they are, or are not, married." The
court found no legislative intent to treat married and unmarried couples
differently. 2 The Legislature has used the term "marital status" in other
statutes to convey the idea of the presence or absence of a marital rela-
tionship between two people. 3 Moreover, the Commission and the
courts consistently have interpreted section 12955 to protect married and
unmarried couples alike. 4 Finally, the court noted that courts construe
the Rumford Act, which was superseded by the FEHA, to bar discrimina-
tion of both married and unmarried couples. 5 In instances where the
8. See id.
9. See id. at 1160, 1176, 913 P.2d at 918, 929, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709, 719-20.
10. See id. at 1154-60, 913 P.2d at 914-18, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 705-09. For an oppos-
ing viewpoint suggesting that the state overreaches its powers by including unmarried
couples within the marital status anti-discrunination prohibition, see Peter M. Stein,
Casenote, Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission: Does the Right to Ex-
clude, Combined with Religious Freedom, Present a "Hybrid Situation" Under Employ-
ment Division v. Smith?, 4 GEO. MASON L REV. 141, 211-12 (1995).
11. See Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1155, 913 P.2d at 915, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706.
12. See id. at 1156, 913 P.2d at 915, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706.
13. See id. at 1160, 913 P.2d at 918, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709.
14. See id. at 1156-60, 913 P.2d at 916-18, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 706-09.
15. See id. at 1157-59, 913 P.2d at 916-17, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 707-08.
Legislature reenacted a statute and did not change statutory interpreta-
tion, the court presumed the Legislature acquiesced to the court's prior
statutory construction. 6 Therefore, the court held that the FEHA pro-
tects unmarried cohabitants against housing discrimination.7
2. Neither the Federal nor State Constitutions' free exercise of
religion clause exempts Smith from complying with the FEHA
requirements.
The court next turned its attention to whether California must exempt
Smith from the FEHA mandates to avoid burdening the exercise of her
religious freedom.'8 In examining the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution, the court stated that the right to free exercise of
religion does not exempt individuals from compliance with valid and
neutral laws of general applicability. 9 The court reasoned that because
section 12955 is generally applicable, prohibits all discrimination without
reference to motivation, and is neutral towards religion in that its objec-
tive is to prohibit discrimination regardless of reason, section 12955 does
not violate the free exercise clause of the United States Constitution.
Although the court found no issue regarding the United States Supreme
Court's view of the free exercise clause, the court proceeded to examine
the Supreme Court's derivation of the current approach to neutral laws
of general applicability which incidentally burden religious exercise.2'
16. See id, at 1158, 913 P.2d at 917, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 707.
17. See id. at 1160, 913 P.2d at 918, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709.
18. See id. at 1161, 913 P.2d at 918, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709.
19. See id. at 1161, 913 P.2d at 919, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709. The Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S.
CONST. amend. . The Establishment Clause was made applicable to the states through
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). See 42 U.S.C. § 3603 (b) (1997)
(providing the exceptions to the federal Fair Housing Act). See generally 7 B.E. WrrmiN,
SUMMARY OF CAUIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 373 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution).
20. See Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1161-62, 913 P.2d at 919, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709-10.
The court found the law generally applicable because it prohibited "all discrimination
without reference to motivation." Id. at 1161, 913 P.2d at 919, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709-
10. The law neutrality was derived from its prohibition of "discrimination irrespective
of reason." Id. at 1161, 913 P.2d at 919, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710.
21. See id. at 1162-65, 913 P.2d at 919-21, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 710-12. See generally
Michael P. Farris & Jordan W. Lorence, Employment Division v. Smith and the Need
for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 6 REGENT U.L REv. 65, 67-71 (1995) (de-
scribing the evolution of the Supreme Court's approach to the free exercise clause);
James C. Geoly & Kevin R Gustafson, Religious Liberty and Fair Housing: Must a
Landlord Rent Against His Conscience?, 29 J. MARHALL L REv. 455, 458-65 (1996)
(discussing standard of review of free exercise claims).
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The court concluded that the proper test to apply in instances of a sub-
stantial governmental burden on freedom of religious exercise is the
"compelling interest" test.2
The court next considered the application of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) to the case at bar because Smith argued that the
FEHA burdened her religious exercise.' The court outlined the proper
analysis for cases involving neutral, generally applicable laws which argu-
ably burdened one's exercise of religious freedom." First, "the burden
must fall on a religious belief rather than on a philosophy or way of
life."25 Second, the claimant must sincerely believe the burdened reli-
gious belief.26 Third, the claimant must prove the burden is substantial
or legally significant.27 Finally, if the claimant proves the aforemen-
tioned elements, the government must demonstrate that the application
of the burden furthers a compelling governmental interest and that such
burden is the least restrictive means of furthering said interest.2 The
court also noted that a regulation which indirectly impacts one's reli-
gious beliefs, such as one requiring Smith to rent to unmarried couples
and thereby implicating her religious belief against extramarital promis-
cuity, is sufficient to test a claim under the RFRA analysis.'
In applying the test to the instant case, the court first concluded that
Smith sincerely held her religious beliefs, as evidenced by "an honest
22. See Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1165, 913 P.2d at 921, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712. See
generally Rebecca A. Wistner, Note, Cohabitation, Fornication and the Free Exercise
of Religion: Landlords Seeking Religious Exemption from Fair Housing Laws, 46
CASE W. REs. L REV. 1071 (1996) (analyzing each element of the compelling interest
test).
23. See Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1165, 913 P.2d at 921, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712. Under
the Religious Freedom of Restoration Act (RFRA) a government shall not substantially
burden an individual's freedom of religious exercise unless the government
"demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(l) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest" 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
24. See Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1166-67, 913 P.2d at 922-23, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713.
See Farris & Lorence, supra note 21; Wistner, supra note 22.
25. Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1166-67, 913 P.2d at 922-23, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 1166-67, 913 P.2d at 922-23, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713.
29. See id. at 1167, 913 P.2d at 923, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713-14. See Geoly &
Gustafson, supra note 21, at 458-72 (summarizing the legal basis of free exercise of
religion and RFRA as a defense to discrimination claims, and discussing the states'
case law application of RFRA to landlords).
conviction" that her religion prohibited her compliance with the FEHA. °
The court struggled to find a substantial burden because Congress has
not clearly defined "substantial burden," nor has case precedent offered a
definition or determining test.31 The court set forth a rule, stating that a
burden exists when a benefit is conferred or denied based upon "conduct
mandated by a religious belief, thereby asserting substantial pressure
on... [a party to] violate his beliefs. " ' The court concluded that Smith,
"without threatening her livelihood," could sell her units and reinvest her
capital in investments other than rental units if she did not wish to com-
ply with the FEHA. 3 The court further argued that because of the com-
mercial nature of Smith's activities, any exemption from the FEHA re-
quirements would sacrifice the public's right to have equal access to
accommodations.' Thus, because Smith could avoid burdening her reli-
gious beliefs by following alternative investment opportunities, the court
found no substantial burden in the instant case.' The court also stated
that any additional economic cost Smith might incur in order to follow
her religious convictions under the FEHA would not trigger a substantial
burden.' Therefore, the court concluded that the alleged burden is a
result of a religious-neutral, generally applicable law that happens to
make Smith's exercise of religion more expensive, but does not substan-
tially burden her free exercise of religion.37
Finally, the court considered whether article I, section 4 of the Cali-
fornia Constitution, which provides for the free exercise of religion, ex-,
empts Smith from the FEHA mandates. 38 The court, upon reviewing
both federal and state case law, explained that California courts have
construed article I, section 4 to afford the same protection as the United
30. See Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1167-68, 913 P.2d at 923, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 714.
31. See id. at 1168-69, 913 P.2d at 923-24, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 714-15.
32. Id. at 1170, 913 P.2d at 925, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715.
33. See id. at 1170, 913 P.2d at 925, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 715-16.
34. See id. at 1170, 913 P.2d at 925, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716.
35. See id. at 1171, 913 P.2d at 926, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 716.
36. See id. at 1172, 913 P.2d at 926-27, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 717.
37. See id. at 1175-76, 913 P.2d at 928-29, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 719-20. See generally
Maureen E. Markey, The Price of Landlord's "Free" Exercise of Religion: Tenant's
Right to Discrimination-Free Housing and Privacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699 (1995)
(arguing that the preservation of the delicate balance between religious freedom and
religious tolerance mandates that no "individual, court-ordered free exercise [of religion]
exemption" should be granted to landlords who violate fair housing laws by refusing to
rent to unmarried couples).
38. See Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1177, 913 P.2d at 929, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 720. The
California Constitution provides, "Free exercise and enjoyment of religion without dis-
crimination or preference are guaranteed. This liberty. or conscience does not excuse
acts that are licentious or inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State." CAL
CONST., art. I, § 4 (West 1983).
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States Constitution.' Therefore, the court concluded that the RFRA
analysis set forth above also disposes of Smith's argument based on the
California Constitution.4" Therefore, because the court found that the
FEHA protection extends to unmarried cohabitants, the court held that
no exemption from the FEHA non-discrimination requirements is merited
where no substantial burden on Smith's religious beliefs exists.4' The
court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent that it
vacated the Commission's $500.00 emotional distress damage award.42
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk concurred with the majority, but took issue with the
majority's application of RFRA to the instant case.' Justice Mosk ar-
gued that RFRA itself is unconstitutional." While acknowledging that
the First Amendment's free exercise clause affords every individual the
absolute right to hold and profess his own religious beliefs and "engage
in religious conduct immune from intentionally invidious government
action," Justice Mosk insisted that the right to free exercise of religion
does not include exempting religious conduct from "neutral and generally
applicable government action."45 Justice Mosk argued that it is beyond
the role of the courts to determine the validity of an individual's religious
beliefs or practices.4" After a brief review of RFRA and its limitations,
focusing on the threshold inquiry of whether a government action sub-
stantially burdens an individual's exercise of religion,47 Justice Mosk
concluded that RFRA violates the separation of powers doctrine because
the substantial burden determination empowers courts to decide the
39. See Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1177, 913 P.2d at 930, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 720-21. See
generally 7.B.E. WrruN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNA LAw, Constitutional Law § 385 (9th
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (finding broader protection under the free exercise clause of
the California Constitution).
40. See Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1178, 913 P.2d at 930, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 721.
41. See id. at 1175-76, 913 P.2d at 928-29, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 719-20.
42. See id. at 1154, 1179, 913 P.2d at 914, 931, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 704-05, 722.
43. See id. at 1179-80, 913 P.2d at 931, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722. (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
44. See id. at 1180, 913 P.2d at 931, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722 (Mosk, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 1180-81, 913 P.2d at 932, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722-23 (Mosk, J., concurring).
46. See id. at 1182, 913 P.2d at 933, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723 (Mosk, J., concurring).
47. See id. at 1"184-88, 913 P.2d at 934-36, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 725-27 (Mosk, J., con-
curring).
validity of specific religious conduct or beliefs." Consequently, Justice
Mosk found RFRA to be violative of the United States Constitution. 9
C. Justice Kennard's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard concurred with the majority's holding that the FEHA
protects unmarried couples from housing discrimination.' Further, Jus-
tice Kennard also agreed that RFRA's substantial burden test intended to
expand protection for religiously motivated conduct.5'
Justice Kennard disagreed, however, with the majority's holding that
under RFRA, the State need not justify its action by demonstrating that
such action is the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling gov-
ernment interest. 2 She argued that requiring Smith to comply with state
law by renting to an unmarried couple, contrary to her religious beliefs,
substantially burdened her exercise of those beliefs.' Justice Kennard
then concluded that because California had failed to justify the sub-
stantial burden it imposed on Smith's religious beliefs through the dem-
onstration of no existing, less restrictive alternative that would allow the
State to pursue its goal of abolishing discrimination against unmarried
couples while granting case-by-case exemptions to landlords with reli-
gious objections, RFRA precludes the State from requiring Smith to rent
to unmarried couples.'
D. Justice Baxter's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Baxter concurred with the majority's finding that the FEHA
prohibited discrimination against unmarried cohabiting couples.' Jus-
tice Baxter disagreed, however, with the majority's conclusion that, as a
matter of law, the state policy of prohibiting housing discrimination must
48. See id. at 1188-91, 913 P.2d at 937-39, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 727-29 (Mosk, J., con-
curring).
49. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
50. See id. at 1195, 913 P.2d at 941, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
51. See id. at 1196, 913 P.2d at 942, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
52. See id. at 1193, 913 P.2d at 940, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
53. See id. at 1197-209, 1217-18, 913 P.2d at 942-51, 957, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733-42,
747 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
54. See id. at 1209-17, 913 P.2d at 951-56, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742-47 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
55. See id. at 1218, 913 P.2d at 957, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747 (Baxter, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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always prevail over a landlord's right to free exercise of religion.' Jus-
tice Baxter argued that, under the Federal Supremacy Clause,57 RFRA
must prevail over any contrary state law; therefore, California had the
burden of proving the existence of a compelling interest before the court
could make a determination that there was a substantial burden.' Be-
cause Justice Baxter believed that the state -was never forced to demon-
strate that the FEHA was the least restrictive means of implementing the
compelling governmental interest of the statute, he concluded that the
present case should have been remanded to the Commission for such a
determination'
II. IMPACT
The holding in Smith adds to the body of conflicting state case law
involving religious adherents seeking exemption from anti-discrimination
laws.' These cases force courts to consider whether there is any inher-
ent limit to the number and type of classifications that a state legislature
may add to its fair housing laws.6' In Smith, the court confirmed the
applicability of the FEHA to unmarried couples.' As the concurring and
dissenting opinions discussed, however, the court failed to reach the
issue of whether the government's interest in preventing discrimination
against unmarried couples was a compelling one.' Until the court pro-
56. See id. at 1219, 913 P.2d at 957, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 748 (Baxter, J., concurring
and dissenting).
57. See U.S. CONST., art VI, cl. 2.
58. See Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1219, 913 P.2d at 957-58, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 748
(Baxter, J., concurring and dissenting).
59. See id. at 1219-20, 913 P.2d at 958, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 748-49 (Baxter, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
60. See generally Melissa Fishman Cordish, Comment, A Proposal for the Reconcilia-
tion of Free Exercise Rights and Anti-Discrimination Law, 43 UCLA L Rsv. 2113,
2117-28 (1996) (discussing the problems and inconsistencies of the prevailing test
where a religious individual seeks an exemption from an anti-discrimination statute);
Geoly & Gustafson, supra note 21 (tracing the modern history of the Federal Free
Expression Clause); Kelly D. Eckel, Comment, Legitimate Limitation of a Landlord's
Rights-A New Dawn for Unmarried Cohabitants, 68 TEmp. L REV. 811, 811-17 (1995)
(explaining that no uniform standard exists to resolve the competing values among
landlords and their prospective, unmarried tenants).
61. See Stein, supra note 10 (arguing that unmarried cohabitants' status is self-im-
posed and should not, therefore, be afforded the protection of anti-discrimination laws).
62. See Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1160, 913 P.2d at 918, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 709.
63. See id. at 1193, 913 P.2d at 940, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731 (Kennard, J., concurring
vides a clear approach to these free exercise claims, lower courts will
continue to have difficulty in resolving the clash between the fundamen-
tal right to a free society and the preservation of religious and civil
rights.64
IV. CONCLUSION
In Smith, the California Supreme Court confirmed that the FEHA pro-
hibited a landlord from refusing to rent to unmarried cohabitants, and
because the FEHA requirement was a religiously neutral, generally ap-
plicable law, it did not violate either the federal or state free exercise of
religion clause.'
MONICA M. RANDAZZO
and dissenting); Id. at 1219, 913 P.2d at 957-58, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 748 (Baxter, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
64. See Cordish, supra note 60, at 2116 (describing the clash between free exercise
rights and the compelling interest of states to enforce their fair housing laws).
65. See Smith, 12 Cal. 4th at 1160, 1175-76, 913 P.2d at 918, 928-29, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 709, 719-20.
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Il. CONTRACT/BINDING ARBITRATION
Where a health maintenance organization makes con-
tractual promises of expeditious claim processing in an
arbitration agreement, with the knowledge they are likely
false and with the intent to induce reliance on the part of
the insured, the insured may seek remedies in court,
including rescission of the agreement. And, a court may
deny a petition to compel arbitration based on theories
of fraud in the inducement or waiver of the agreement:
Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.,' the California Su-
preme Court considered whether to enforce a binding arbitration agree-
ment between an insured and a health maintenance organization (IMO)
when the HMO makes contractual promises of speedy claim processing,
knows they are likely to be false, and conceals an unofficial policy of
delaying the arbitration process.2 The trial court denied Permanente
1. 15 Cal. 4th 951, 938 P.2d 903, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (1997). Justice Mosk deliv-
ered the majority opinion in which Chief Justice George and Justices Baxter, Werdegar,
and Chin concurred. See id. at 960-86, 938 P.2d at 907-25, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847-66.
Justice Kennard wrote a concurring opinion. See id. at 986-89, 938 P.2d at 925-27, 64
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866-68 (Kennard, J., concurring). Justice Brown wrote a dissenting
opinion. See id. at 989-96, 938 P.2d at 927-32, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868-73 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
2. See id. at 960, 938 P.2d at 907-08, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847-48. Wilfredo Engalla
(Engalla) was enrolled through his employer, Olive Tire and Rubber Company, in a
health insurance plan operated by the Permanente Medical Group, Inc., Kaiser Foun-
dation Hospitals, and the Kaiser Foundation Health Plan (Kaiser). See id. at 960-61, 938
P.2d at 908, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847-48. Engalla enrolled in the plan by signing an ap-
plication agreeing to submit any monetary claims against Kaiser for injury or death to
binding arbitration, rather than pursuing a remedy in court. See id. at 961, 938 P.2d at
908, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848. The arbitration program was designed and administered
by Kaiser rather than through an independent agency. See id. at 962, 938 P.2d at 909,
64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849. The administrative functions of the arbitration program were
handled by Kaiser's outside counsel, which represented Kaiser in an adversarial ca-
pacity. See id.
In 1986, Engalla began to experience various symptoms of respiratory illness, such
as coughing and shortness of breath. See id. at 961, 938 P.2d at 908, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d
Medical Group's (Kaiser) petition to compel arbitration based on spe-
cific factual findings including fraud in the inducement, as well as a de-
termination that the agreement was unconscionable as a violation of
public policy.3
The court of appeal reversed the trial court, finding that Kaiser did not
defraud Wilfredo Engalla and his family (Engalla).4 The court reasoned
that because the contractual representations at issue in the arbitration
agreement involved cooperation of the parties, they were neither binding
promises nor statements of fact.5 The court also determined that there
at 848. Radiologic tests ordered by a Kaiser doctor indicated an abnormality in
Engalla's right lung. See id. At that time, the doctor indicated the need for follow-up
treatment, but none was performed. See id. at 961, 938 P.2d at 908-09, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 848.
Over the next five years, Engalla repeatedly complained to Kaiser of his worsen-
ing symptoms, but was diagnosed with colds or allergies and treated with inhalation
medication. See id. at 961, 938 P.2d at 909, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848. Kaiser failed to
perform diagnostic tests that could have detected Engalla's lung cancer until 1991, but
by that time his condition was inoperable. See id. at 961, 938 P.2d at 909, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 848-49. In May 1991, Engalla served a written demand for arbitration on
Kaiser, claiming negligence for their failure to diagnose and treat his cancer in a time-
ly manner. See id. at 961-62, 938 P.2d at 909, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849. Despite the fact
that Engalla's attorney made it clear to Kaiser on several occasions that his client
was gravely ill, and that the arbitration proceeding should be expedited as much as
possible in order to conclude it before Engalla's death, Kaiser persisted in delaying
the proceeding. See id. at 963-67, 938 P.2d at 910-12, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 850-52.
Engalla died on October 23, 1991, with the arbitration proceeding still in its initial
stages. See id. at 967, 938 P.2d at 912, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 852. Subsequent to
Engalla's death, the family's attorney notified Kaiser of their refusal to continue with
the arbitration, and suit was filed in superior court alleging, among other things, mal-
practice and fraud. See id. at 969-70, 938 P.2d at 914, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 854.
3. See id. at 970, 938 P.2d at 915, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855. See generally 6 CAL.
JUR. 3D Arbitration & Award §§ 6-23 (1986 & Supp. 1997) (providing an overview of
the judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements); 11 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAu-
FORNIA LAw, Equity §§ 36-40 (9th ed. 1990 & Supp. 1996) (providing a general discus-
sion of arbitration agreements); William A. Chittenden M, Malpractice Liability and
Managed Health Care: History and Prognosis, 26 TORT & INS. UJ. 451 (1991) (discuss-
ing forms of managed health care as well as liability and defense theories); Amy E.
Elliott, Comment, Arbitration and Managed Care: Will Consumers Suffer if the Two
are Combined?, 10 01o ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 417 (1995) (discussing medical malprac-
tice arbitration in the managed care setting); Thomas B. Metzloff, The Unrealized Po-
tential of Malpractice Arbitration, 31 WAKE FOREST L REv. 203 (1996) (discussing the
benefits and perceived drawbacks of medical malpractice arbitration).
4. See Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 971, 938 P.2d at 915, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855.
5. See id. The specific representations involving the timing of the arbitration at
issue in the agreement were that "each side 'shall' designate a party arbitrator within
30 days of service of the claim and that the 2 party arbitrators 'shall' designate a
third, neutral arbitrator within 30 days thereafter." Id. at 962, 938 P.2d at 909, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 849.
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was no evidence of reliance by Engalla on the promises made in the
agreement.6
The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and denied
Kaiser's petition for enforcement of the arbitration agreement pending
factual determinations by the trial court as to the issues of fraud and
waiver of the agreement.' The court concluded that, while there was
sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's initial find-
ing that Kaiser acted fraudulently, the trial court must decide questions
of fact to determine if Kaiser did commit fraud.8
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The court discussed three separate grounds raised by Engalla for deny-
ing Kaiser's petition to compel arbitration: (1) fraud in the inducement,9
(2) waiver of the agreement,'° and (3) unconscionability." The court
indicated that if it found evidence to support any of these defenses to en-
forcement, it must remand the case to the trial court to resolve the factu-
al disputes and to reach a final determination on the petition.2
1. Fraud in the Inducement
The court began its discussion of fraud in the inducement by noting
that California Civil Code section 1689(b)(1) designates fraud as a ground
upon which a party may rescind a contract. 3 The court indicated that
Engalla alleged a "subspecies" of fraud, known as promissory fraud, as a
defense to enforcement of the petition to compel arbitration, and then
6. See id. at 971, 938 P.2d at 915, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855.
7. See id. at 960, 938 P.2d at 908, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 973-81, 938 P.2d at 916-22, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856-62.
10. See id. at 982-84, 938 P.2d at 922-24, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863-64.
11. See id. at 984-86, 938 P.2d at 924-25, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864-66.
12. See id. at 973, 938 P.2d at 916, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856. The court noted that
the trial court in the original proceeding erroneously treated the petition to compel
arbitration as a summary judgment motion, rather than acting as the trier of fact and
reaching a final determination as to the disposition of the motion. See id. at 972, 938
P.2d at 916, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
13. See id. at 973, 938 P.2d at 916, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857; see also CAL CIV. CODE
§ 1689(b)(1) (West 1985).
discussed each element of promissory fraud (knowing misrepresentation,
intent to induce reliance, actual reliance, and injury)' as it applied to the
facts of the instant case.4
a. Knowing misrepresentation
The court found that there were sufficient facts in the present case to
support a conclusion that Kaiser induced Engalla to enter into the arbi-
tration agreement through false representations made either knowingly
or with a reckless disregard for their truth.5 The two main factors on
which the court relied were (1) a survey indicating that a neutral arbi-
trator was named within the sixty day time limit in only one percent of
Kaiser arbitrations performed between 1984 and 1986, and (2) deposi-
tions by two of Kaiser's in-house attorneys stating that Kaiser was
aware of the delays inherent in its arbitration system, yet it persisted in
including representations of quick resolution of claims in its arbitration
agreements. 6
b. Intent to induce reliance
The court stated that newsletters distributed by Kaiser to its sub-
scribers indicated an intent on the behalf of Kaiser to induce reliance on
the misrepresentations of expeditious claim processing. 7 These newslet-
ters represented Kaiser's arbitration program as being much more effi-
cient than the court system, with claims adjudicated in months rather
than years." The court reasoned that these assertions could indicate
Kaiser's intent to gain subscribers or to renew subscriptions based on
its misrepresentations. 9
14. See Engalta, 15 Cal. 4th at 973-81, 938 P.2d at 916-22, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856-62.
See generally 34 CAL JuR. 3D Fraud & Deceit §§ 1-94 (1987 & Supp. 1997) (providing
an overview of actionable fraud); 1 B.E. WrnaN, SUMMRY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Con-
tracts §§ 392-415 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1997) (discussing fraud in the context of con-
tracts, including rescission as a remedy); R. Alston Hamilton, Note, Tennessee's Long-
Awaited Adoption of Promissory Fraud- Steed Realty v. Oveisi, 59 TENN. L. REv. 325
(1992) (discussing the doctrine of promissory fraud); Terri Schallenkamp, Note, Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Survey: A Review of Decisions, Lazar v. Superior Court, 24
PEPP. L REv. 1119 (1997) (discussing promissory fraud in an employment contract
context).
15. See Engaila, 15 Cal. 4th at 974, 938 P.2d at 917, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
16. See id. at 974-75, 938 P.2d at 917, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858.
17. See id. at 976, 938 P.2d at 918-19, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859.
18. See id.
19. See id at 976, 938 P.2d at 919, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859.
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c. Actual Reliance
In discussing the element of actual reliance, which is required to estab-
lish a prima facie case of promissory fraud, the court noted that Engalla
need only show that the misrepresentations in the arbitration agreement
were material to Engalla's employer selecting Kaiser's health plan.'
The court reasoned that one of the most important selling points of a
health plan utilizing an arbitration process is its speed and economy
compared with the court system.2 Therefore, if Kaiser's representation
of its program's efficiency falsely concealed a system rife with delay, the
court determined that this misrepresentation could have influenced the
selection of Kaiser's health plan by Engalla's employer.'
d. Resulting Injury
The court explained that recision of an arbitration agreement does not
require a showing of pecuniary loss;' rather, Engalla must prove a
breach of the agreement creating a result contrary to the party's "reason-
able, fraudulently induced, contractual expectations. " ' The court found
ample evidence in the record indicating that Kaiser obstructed the arbi-
tration process through non-response, as well as by adding conditions
not contained in the original agreement.25 Because of this course of con-
duct, the court decided that there was sufficient evidence to determine
that Kaiser breached its contractual obligation to timely appoint an arbi-
trator.
26
20. See id. at 977, 938 P.2d at 919, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859. The court stated that a
misrepresentation is material if "a reasonable man would attach importance to its exis-
tence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in ques-
tion." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRs § 538(2)(a) (1977)).
21. See id. at 978, 938 P.2d at 920, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 979, 938 P.2d at 921, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861.
24. Id. at 980, 938 P.2d at 921, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861.
25. See id. at 980, 938 P.2d at 921, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862. The "extracontractual"
condition that the court referenced was Kaiser's position that Engalla had to choose
a party arbitrator before Kaiser would make its choice. See id. This was not a require-
ment of the original arbitration agreement. See id. at 964, 938 P.2d at 910, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 850.
26. See id. at 980, 938 P.2d at 921, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862. Further, the court dis-
agreed with Kaiser's assertion that California Civil Procedure Code section 1281.6, pro-
viding for court appointment of arbitrators when the agreed method of appointment
The court concluded its promissory fraud analysis by finding sufficient
evidence in the record that Kaiser fraudulently induced Engalla to enter
into the arbitration agreement, and that Engalla relied on the inducement
to his detriment by suffering significant delays in the settlement of his
malpractice claim.27
2. Waiver of the Arbitration Agreement
Engalla also alleged that by delaying and obstructing the arbitration
process, Kaiser waived its right to compel arbitration.' The court noted
that California Civil Procedure Code section 1281.2(a) allows for a trial
court finding of waiver by the petitioner of a motion to compel
arbitration.' The court indicated that bad faith or willful misconduct
may be grounds for a finding of waiver, but that waiver of arbitration "'is
not to be lightly inferred.'"' ° The court then referenced the previously
discussed delay tactics used by Kaiser and stated that a trial court could
construe those actions as unreasonable or in bad faith." The court em-
phasized that parties should normally resolve any good faith disputes
through a petition to the court, as provided for by California Civil Proce-
dure Code section 1281.6, but because there was ample evidence of Kai-
ser's unreasonable, bad faith misconduct in the present case, it would
be left to the trial court to determine if Kaiser's actions constituted a
waiver of the arbitration agreement.'
fails, excused Kaiser's duty to select an arbitrator with reasonable diligence and in
good faith. See id. at 980-81, 938 P.2d at 921, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862; CAL CM. PROC.
CODE § 1281.6 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997).
27. See EngaUa, 15 Cal. 4th at 981, 938 P.2d at 922, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862.
28. See id. at 982, 938 P.2d at 922, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863.
29. See id. Section 1281.2 provides in pertinent part, that "the court shall order the
petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an
agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that- (a) The right
to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner." CAL CIv. Poc. CODE
§ 1281.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997).
30. Engalia, 15 Cal. 4th at 983, 938 P.2d at 923, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864 (citing Da-
vis v. Blue Cross of N. Cal., 25 Cal. 3d 418, 426, 600 P.2d 1060, 1064, 158 Cal. Rptr.
828, 832 (1979)). The court defined waiver as both "the voluntary relinquishment of a
known right'" and "'the loss of an opportunity or a right as a result of a party's fail-
ure to perform an act it is required to perform, regardless of the party's intent
to ... relinquish the right.'" Id. at 983, 938 P.2d at 923, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863 (citing
Platt Pacific, Inc. v. Andelson, 6 Cal. 4th 307, 315, 862 P.2d 158, 162, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d
597, 601 (1993)).
31. See id. at 984, 938 P.2d at 924, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864.
32. See id. Section 1281.6 provides, in pertinent part, "[I]f the agreed method [to
appoint an arbitrator] fails ... the court, on petition of a party to the arbitration
agreement, shall appoint the arbitrator." CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.6 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1997)
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3. Unconscionability
The court dismissed Engalla's allegation that the arbitration agreement
was unconscionable by noting that the issues raised did not involve one-
sidedness in the agreement, but rather concerned Kaiser's bad faith
delays and obstruction in the arbitration process despite contractual
representations of expeditiousness.' The court stated that, given the
facts of the present case, the most relevant laws to apply to settle the
dispute were the doctrines of fraud and waiver.'
B. Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennard concurred in the majority opinion, but wrote sepa-
rately in order to emphasize her view that the courts play an important
role in ensuring the fundamental fairness of the arbitration system.'
She indicated that Kaiser's arbitration process, which was offered on a
"take it or leave it" basis and administered by Kaiser's own defense
attorneys,3" manifested a degree of procedural unfairness extreme
enough to warrant intervention by the court. 7 Justice Kennard reasoned
that it is the duty of the courts to ensure not only that private arbitration
remains an efficient method of dispute resolution, but also to prevent it
from becoming "an instrument of injustice."
C. Justice Brown 's Dissenting Opinion
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Brown did not defend the conduct of
Kaiser.' Instead, she contended that the appropriate arbitral forum
should have handled Engalla's claims rather than Engalla unilaterally ex-
iting the arbitration process to seek relief in the courts.4" Justice Brown
indicated that there are adequate remedies for the types of fraudulent
conduct perpetrated by Kaiser within the arbitration system, such as
33. See EngaUa, 15 Cal. 4th at 986, 938 P.2d at 925, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865-66.
34. See id. at 986, 938 P.2d at 925, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866.
35. See id. at 986, 938 P.2d at 925, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866 (Kennard, J., concurring).
36. See id. at 988, 938 P.2d at 927, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867-68 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring).
37. See id. at 986-87, 938 P.2d at 925-26, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866 (Kennard, J., con-
curring).
38. See id, at 989, 938 P.2d at 927, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868 (Kennard, J., concurring).
39. See id. at 991, 938 P.2d at 929, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869 (Brown, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 990, 938 P.2d at 928, 64 Cal. Rpir. 2d at 868 (Brown, J., dissenting).
those provided for by California Civil Procedure Code section 1281.6.'
She reasoned that, by allowing Engalla to exit the arbitration process in
this case, the majority set a dangerous precedent of allowing a dissatis-
fied party involved in arbitration to seek remedies in court rather than
through the arbitration process itself, as intended by California law.42
Ill. IMPACT & CONCLUSION
It is clear that this opinion will have a significant impact on how Cali-
fonda health care insurers will contract and perform arbitration agree-
ments in the future. What is not clear is whether that impact will be
positive or negative. The court certainly implied that attempts by insurers
to delay or obstruct arbitration proceedings will likely result in rescission
of the arbitration agreement on the basis of fraud or waiver.'4 This eval-
uation of the law should cause health care insurers to review their arbi-
tration agreements and procedures in order to insure compliance with
contractual representations of efficiency. As Justice Kennard indicated in
her concurring opinion, the court's decision should go far in ensuring
the procedural and substantive fairness of arbitration proceedings.'
On the negative side, a potential for abuse, resulting from the majori-
ty's opinion, also exists. With precedence now established supporting
unilateral withdrawal from an arbitration proceeding, parties who have
no desire to involve themselves in binding arbitration will potentially be
able to use this opinion as an escape hatch from their contractual obliga-
tion to arbitrate disputes. The likely result will be a flood of litigation in
the courts. As Justice Brown noted, the majority's opinion "pokes a hole
in the barrier separating private arbitrations and the courts... [and] like
any such breach, this hole will eventually cause the dam to burst."'
JOHN W. CORRINGTON
41. See id. at 992-94, 938 P.2d at 929-31, 64 CaL Rptr. 2d at 870-72 (Brown, J., dis-
senting). But cf. supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing the majority's inter-
pretation of section 1281.6).
42. See Engalia, 15 Cal. 4th at 994-96, 938 P.2d at 931-32, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 872-73
(Brown, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 960, 938 P.2d at 908, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848.
44. See id. at 986-89, 938 P.2d at 925-27, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861-68 (Kennard, J.,
concurring).
45. Id. at 995, 938 P.2d at 932, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 873 (Brown, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 25: 183, 1997] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
IV. COURTS
The jurisdiction provision of the Washington Metropoli-
tan Area Transit Authority Compact, which expressly
grants jurisdiction to courts of United States, Maryland,
and Virginia, impliedly denies jurisdiction to courts of
other states: Kingston Constructors, Inc. v. Washing-
ton Metropolitan Area Transit Authority.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kingston Constructors, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority,' the California Supreme Court considered whether
California courts have jurisdiction over actions brought by or against the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA).2 The superi-
1. 14 Cal. 4th 939, 928 P.2d 581, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866 (1997), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 2454 (1997). Justice Mosk delivered the unanimous opinion in which Chief Justice
George and Justices Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin, and Brown concurred. See id. at
952, 928 P.2d at 589, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 874.
2. See id. at 941, 928 P.2d at 582, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867. The Washington Metro-
politan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) "is a regional instrumentality empowered ...
to provide transit facilities in and around the District. of Columbia and neighboring
parts of the State of Maryland and the Commonwealth of Virginia." Id. On May 28,
1992, Power Energy Industries (PEI), a California corporation, brought a contract and
tort action in the Los Angeles Superior Court against Kingston Constructors, Inc.
(Kingston), a California corporation, and the WMATA. See id. PEI alleged that the
WMATA had entered into a contract with Kingston to supply and install certain electri-
cal transformers with the intention that PEI design and manufacture the transformers.
See id. at 941-42, 928 P.2d at 582, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867. PEI maintained that the
WMATA and Kingston breached duties owed to PEI pursuant to the contract and the
subcontract, causing PEI to sustain both contractual and tortious injuries. See id. In a
letter to the superior court dated July 24, 1992, the WMATA disavowed an appearance
because, under section 81 of the WMATA Compact, the superior court did not have
jurisdiction in this action. See id. at 942, 928 P.2d at 582, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867-68.
On or about September 9, 1992, the superior court, without prejudice, dismissed
Kingston as a party to this action and PEI proceeded to bring a separate action
against Kingston alone on or about November 10, .1992 (the "Second Action"). See id
at 942, 928 P.2d at 582, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868. On October 19, 1992, the clerk of the
superior court, on PEI's application, entered the WMATA's default See id. As part of
PEI's settlement of the Second Action, on December 22, 1993, PEI assigned to Kingston
its claims against the WMATA. See id. On May 5, 1994, the Los Angeles Superior Court
rendered default judgment in the First Action in favor of Kingston, as PEI's successor,
or court vacated a $6,985,413 damages, interest, and attorneys' fees
award on the basis that under section 81 of the WMATA Compact (Com-
pact), it lacked jurisdiction over the action.3 The court of appeal af-
firmed the trial court's order, ruling that the lower court did not have
proper jurisdiction pursuant to the Compact.4
The California Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's decision,
holding that courts of the state of California do not have jurisdiction
over actions brought by or against the WMATAP
II. TREATMENT
The court began its analysis by discussing the history of the WMATA
and the validity of the Compact, a document empowering the WMATA to
provide transit facilities in and around the District of Columbia,
Maryland, and Virginia, and by setting forth the WMATA's zone of gov-
erned territory.8 The court found that Congress' consummation of the
Compact was to further joint federal, state, and local purposes.7 After
the Compact's initial creation, the District of Columbia joined through an
and awarded damages against the WMATA of $6,934,758, as well as interest and
attorneys' fees totaling $50,655. See id. On September 1, 1994, the superior court grant-
ed the WMATA's motion to vacate the default judgment, finding that, under section 81
of the WMATA Compact, the court lacked proper jurisdiction. See id. at 942, 928 P.2d
at 582-83, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868. See generally 16 CAL JUR. 3D Courts § 112 (1983)
(stating that "state courts have concurrent jurisdiction in federal matters unless Con-
gress or the federal constitution expressly or impliedly indicates otherwise" and detail-
ing specific instances of concurrent jurisdiction); 2 B.E. WrriKN, CAUFORNIA PROCEDURE,
Jurisdictions § 83 (4th ed. 1996) (explaining that state courts generally have concur-
rent jurisdiction for actions arising under federal statute where such jurisdiction is not
denied by statute, or where there is no statutory indication that federal jurisdiction is
intended to be exclusive). For a commentary which anticipates the end of concurrent
jurisdiction, see Thomas E. Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism:
"Neither Out Far Nor In Deep," 45 CAsE W. REs. L REv. 705, 773-78 (1995).
3. See Kingston, 14 Cal. 4th at 942, 928 P.2d at 582-83, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868.
4. See id. at 943, 928 P.2d at 583, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868.
5. See id. at 941, 928 P.2d at 582, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867.
6. See id. at 943, 928 P.2d at 583, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868. See generally Dale D.
Goble, The Compact Clause and Transboundary Problems: "A Federal Remedy for the
Disease Most Incident to a Federal Government", 17 ENvTL L 785 (1987) (outlining
two applications of the Compact Clause as a response to tunsboundary disputes);
Herbert H. Naujoks, Compacts and Agreements Between States and a Foreign Power,
36 MARQ. L REv. 219 (1952-53) (analyzing the history of interstate compacts in the
United States).
7. See Kingston, 14 Cal. 4th at 943, 928 P.2d at 583, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868; Wash-
ington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Compact, Pub. L No. 89-774, § 2, 80 Stat.
1324, 1325 (1966) (explaining Congress' purposes behind the creation of the WMATA
and the Compact).
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enactment by Congress pursuant to its powers under article I, section 8,
Clauses 3 and 17 of the United States Constitution.8 Further, the court
stated that congressional consent to the Compact made it a law of the
United States and rendered any conflicting state provisions invalid.9
The court next turned its attention to the meaning behind the spe-
cific Compact provision that addresses jurisdiction." The court found
that section 81 expressly granted original jurisdiction over actions
brought by or against the WMATA to the United States District Courts
and concurrent jurisdiction to the courts of Maryland and Virginia."
Moreover, the court noted that because the Compact was a federal law,
the federal courts also had jurisdiction under Article HI, Section 2,
Clause 1 of the Constitution. 2 Because of the express jurisdictional lan-
guage adopted in section 81 of the Compact, the court found no congres-
sional intent to grant jurisdiction over WMATA actions to courts of other
states. 3 The court concluded that the explicit inclusion of Maryland and
8. See Kingston, 14 Cal. 4th at 943-44, 928 P.2d at 583, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868-69.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution grants Congress the
power to "regulate Commerce ... among the several States." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.
3. Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to
"exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over [the] District" as "the Seat
of Government of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
9. See Kingston, 14 Cal. 4th at 944, 928 P.2d at 583-84, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869.
Congress consented to the Compact pursuant to Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 of the
Constitution, which provides that "'[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Con-
gress .... enter into any ... Compact with another State.'" Id. at 944, 928 P.2d at
583, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3). As a law of the
United States, the Compact is "supreme" and "renders without effect any such state
provision that is in conflict." Id. at 944, 928 P.2d at 583-84, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869.
10. See id. at 944-45, 928 P.2d at 584, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869. Section 81 of the
Compact, entitled "Jurisdiction of Courts," provides that
'The United States District Courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent
with the Courts of Maryland and Virginia, of all actions brought by or against
[the WMATA] and to enforce subpoenas issued under [the WMATA Compact).
Any such action initiated in a State Court shall be removable to the appropri-
ate United States District Court.... '
Id. at 944, 928 P.2d at 584, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869 (alteration in original (quoting § 81,
80 Stat. at 1350). See generally 2 B.E. WMUN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction
§ 10 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing jurisdiction of the subject matter).
11. See Kingston, 14 Cal. 4th at 945-46, 928 P.2d at 584-85, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869-
70.
12. See id. at 945, 928 P.2d at 984, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870. See generally 2 B.E.
WITEIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction § 75 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that district
courts may be given exclusive jurisdiction over certain activities by special statute).
13. See Kingston, 14 Cal. 4th at 946-47, 928 P.2d at 585, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870-71.
Virginia courts impliedly denied original jurisdiction to any other state
court." The court further noted that because the zone of governance of
the WMATA includes no other state territories, state courts other than
Maryland and Virginia could not exercise proper judicial power over
WMATA actions."6 The court resolved that because section 81 impliedly
bars jurisdiction to state courts other than Maryland and Virginia, Cali-
fornia courts do not have jurisdiction over WMATA actions. 6
The court found that the general presumption, that state and federal
courts share concurrent jurisdiction, arises only when statutory provi-
sions are silent as to state court jurisdictional authority. 7 In applying
this rule to the present case, the court reasoned that section 81's express
jurisdictional grant to Maryland and Virginia impliedly denied other states
concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts in WMATA actions."8
Finally, the court addressed whether a jurisdictional grant to United
States District Courts and certain state courts violated the Constitution
as discriminatory against other states." The court reasoned that
Congress' broad constitutional seat-of-government and commerce powers
made the enactment of section 81 a valid exercise of congressional au-
thority.' The court also found the fact that the WMATA does not em-
brace territories in states other than Maryland and Virginia to fail to evi-
dence serious discrimination and, that by consenting to the Compact,
Congress agreed.2'
Therefore, the California Supreme Court concluded that the court of
appeal did not err in denying the superior court subject matter jurisdic-
tion over this WMATA matter.'
See generally 16 CAL. JuR. 3D Courts § 103 (1983) (stating that jurisdiction of a subject
matter for which a court has no jurisdiction cannot be conferred by contract or other
means); Timothy C. Blank, Significant Development, A Proposed Application of the
Compact Clause, 66 B.U.L REv. 1067 (1986) (discussing the impact of the Compact
Clause on contracts between states and foreign nations).
14. See Kingston, 14 Cal. 4th at 946-47, 928 P.2d at 585, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870-71.
15. See id. at 946, 928 P.2d at 585, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870.
16. See id. at 946-47, 928 P.2d at 585-86, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871.
17. See id. at 947-48, 928 P.2d at 586, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871.
18. See id at 949, 928 P.2d at 587, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 872.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 949-50, 928 P.2d at 587, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 872-73.
21. See id. at 951, 928 P.2d at 588, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 873-74.
22. See id. at 951-52, 928 P.2d at 588, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 874.
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m. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
The unanimous decision in Kingston enforces the policy of implicit
denial of state court jurisdiction in certain instances. Because the Com-
pact explicitly limited jurisdiction to the courts of the United States,
Maryland, and Virginia, the court affirmatively recognized the limitations
of the reach of the state court system. The court's acknowledgment that
certain jurisdictional grants are not only permissive, but necessary to
uphold congressional intent, can only further judicial economy and en-
courage efficient resolution of matters which directly impact the state of
California.
MONICA M. RANDAZZO
V. CRIMINAL LAW
A. A criminal defendant may waive the statute of limi-
tations for a lesser included offense as part of a plea
agreement involving a greater offense, provided: (1)
the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary;
(2) the waiver is made for the defendant's benefit
and after consultation with counsel; and (3) the
waiver does not handicap the defendant's defense or
contravene any other public policy. Further, waiver
of the statute of limitations precludes challenging
the conviction on that ground: Cowan v. Superior
Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Cowan v. Superior Court,' the California Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a crininal defendant may waive the statute of limitations
for a lesser included offense as part of a plea agreement for a greater of-
fense.2 The trial court granted the prosecution's motion to set aside the
plea, reasoning that the statute of limitations was a jurisdictional defect
1. 14 Cal. 4th 367, 926 P.2d 438, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458 (1996). Justice Chin wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice George and Justices Mask and Werdegar
concurred. See id. at 370-77, 926 P.2d at 439-44, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459-64. Justice
Baxter wrote a separate concurring opinion. See id. at 377-78, 926 P.2d at 444, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 464. Justice Chin also wrote a separate concurring opinion. See id. at 378-
83, 926 P.2d at 444-48, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464-68. Justice Brown wrote a concurring
and dissenting opinion in which Justice Kennard joined. See id. at 383-93, 926 P.2d at
448-55, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468-75.
2. See id. at 370-77, 926 P.2d at 439-44, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459-64. In Cowan, a
criminal complaint was filed in 1994 against the defendant for three murders commit-
ted in 1984. See id. at 370, 926 P.2d at 439, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459. Following a pre-
im-dnary hearing, the defendant and the district attorney negotiated a plea agreement
whereby the defendant would plead no contest to voluntary manslaughter in exchange
for dismissal of the remaining charges. See id. Prior to sentencing, the district attorney
discovered that the six year statute of limitations had run on voluntary manslaughter
and moved to set aside the plea on the grounds that the plea was illegal because the
statute of limitations had run and that the statute of limitations was jurisdictional and
could not be waived. See id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 800 (Deering Supp. 1997) (setting
forth the statute of limitations for manslaughter). At the hearing to set aside the plea,
the defendant stated that he was willing to waive the statute of limitations. See
Cowan, 14 Cal. 4th at 370, 926 P.2d at 439, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459. See generally 17
CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 78, 79 (1984 & Supp. 1996) (discussing lesser included
offenses).
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that could not be cured by stipulation of the parties.3 The court of ap-
peal denied the defendant's petition for writ of mandate which sought to
order the trial court to accept the plea.4 The supreme court granted re-
view and issued an alternative writ of mandate to allow the plea.5
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Chin, writing for the majority, cited People v. McGee' for the
assertion that the statute of limitations in criminal cases is jurisdictional
rather than a defense to be affirmatively pleaded.7 Furthermore, because
jurisdiction defines a court's power to proceed, jurisdiction cannot be
conferred over the subject matter by consent of the litigants.8 To dem-
onstrate the literal manner in which courts have applied the holding of
McGee, Justice Chin offered two cases in which attempts to waive the
statute of limitations were rebuffed.9 In support of allowing waiver of
the statute of limitations despite the apparent lack of jurisdiction, Justice
Chin distinguished Cowan from precedent on the ground that no other
case "involved a lesser offense to a charged offense... that was not
time-barred and over which the court unquestionably did have jurisdic-
3. See Cowan, 14 Cal. 4th at 370, 926 P.2d at 439, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 377, 926 P.2d at 444, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464.
6. 1 Cal. 2d 611, 36 P.2d 378 (1934), overruled by Cowan, 14 Cal. 4th 367, 926
P.2d 438, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458.
7. See Cowan, 14 Cal. 4th at 371-72, 926 P.2d at 440, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460.
8. See id.; see also 17 CAL. Jun. 3D Criminal Law § 2259 (1985 & Supp. 1996) (de-
scribing the statute of limitations as jurisdictional); 1 B.E. WrII, CALIFORNIA CRMINAL
LAW, Defenses § 368 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (explaining that because the statute of
limitations is jurisdictional, failure to raise it does not constitute waiver).
9. See Cowan, 14 Cal. 4th at 375, 926 P.2d at 442-43, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462-63
(citing People v. Brice, 206 Cal. App. 3d 111 (1988), 253 Cal. Rptr. 370 (reversing con-
viction on ground that requesting jury instruction of time-barred lesser related offense
was an invalid waiver of the statute of limitations under McGee); People v. Ognibene,
12 Cal. App. 4th 1286 (1993), 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96 (affirming trial court's refusal to in-
struct the jury on the time-barred lesser related offense despite the defendant's willing-
ness to expressly waive the statute of limitations), overruled by Cowan, 14 Cal. 4th
367, 926 P.2d 438, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 458). See generally 6 B.E. WrrIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMI-
NAL LAW, Reversible Error § 3303 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1996) (providing that acting
without jurisdiction may constitute per se reversible error).
tion, i.e., the power to proceed." ° Justice Chin concluded that because
of the charged offense, the court had fundamental subject matter juris-
diction and could act in excess of its jurisdiction to accept a plea to a
time-barred lesser offense." The majority expressly overruled McGee
and its progeny only to the extent that McGee suggests that a trial court
lacks fundamental jurisdiction, reserving for the future a reconsideration
of the statute of limitations as jurisdictional or an affirmative defense. 2
Justice Chin advanced several arguments in favor of allowing waiver.
First, he cited the proposition that criminal defendants may ordinarily
waive rights that exist for their benefit, provided the public does not
have a countervailing interest." Second, the statute of limitations' lan-
guage does not prohibit waiver. 4 Third, the United States Supreme
Court has held that waiver may even be necessary in some cases. Fi-
nally, other states have allowed waiver.
The majority discussed the Alaska Supreme Court's reasoning in Padie
v. State,7 which had addressed the same issue. 8 Adopting the test
enunciated in Padie, the majority held that a criminal defendant may
waive the statute of limitations if the trial court determines the following:
"'(1) the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (2) it is made for
the defendant's benefit and after consultation with counsel; and (3) the
defendant's waiver does not handicap his defense or contravene any
other public policy reasons motivating the enactment of the statutes.'"'"
10. Cowan, 14 Cal. 4th at 373, 926 P.2d at 441, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 461.
11. See id. at 374, 926 P.2d at 442, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462.
12. See id. Justice Chin emphasized the need to distinguish between waiver, which
is the intentional relinquishing of a known right, and forfeiture, which is the loss of a
right by failing to assert it. See id. at 371, 926 P.2d at 440, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460.
When the statute of limitations is jurisdictional it cannot be forfeited, only waived. See
id.
13. See id. at 371, 926 P.2d at 439, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459.
14. See id. at 372, 926 P.2d at 440, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460.
15. See id.; Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 454-57 (1984) (holding that a defen-
dant in a capital case may be required to waive the statute of limitations to permit the
trial court to instruct on the lesser included offense); see also Jodi L Short & Mark D.
Spoto, Project, Twenty-Third Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Su-
preme Court and Courts of Appeals 1992-1993, 82 GEo. LJ. 597, 1219 (1994) (dis-
cussing Spaziano's impact).
16. See Cowan, 14 Cal. 4th 372, 926 P.2d at 440, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460. For a
discussion of how other jurisdictions address the statute of limitations, see Tim A.
Thomas, Annotation, Waivability of Bar of Limitations Against Criminal Prosecution,
78 A.LR. 4th 693 (1990 & Supp. 1996), and Chris L Kileppin, Comment, Yossarian is
Back, the Ultimate Catch-22: What to Do When the Statute of Limitations Has Run on
Lesser Offenses, 8 ST. THOMAS L REv. 229 (1995).
17. 594 P.2d 50 (Alaska 1979).
18. See Cowan, 14 Cal. 4th 372-74, 926 P.2d at 440-42, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460-62.
19. Id. at 372, 926 P.2d at 440-41, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460-61 (quoting Padie, 594
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Convinced that satisfying these prerequisites would not be difficult, the
majority simply required the following: (1) that the court inform the
defendant that the charge is, or may be, time-barred, and elicit a waiver
of the bar, (2) absent evidence to the contrary, an appellate court may
presume that a represented defendant consulted with counsel; and (3)
waiving the bar as part of a plea agreement would be for the defendant's
benefit and would not handicap the defense.20 In adopting the new rule,
the majority expressly disapproved People v. Brice2" and People v.
Ognibene" to the extent that they were inconsistent.'
Justice Chin perceived no public policy reasons to preclude waiving
the statute of limitations in this context.24 To the contrary, the majority
stated that allowing waiver actually promotes the three policy consid-
erations of a statute of limitations as follows: limiting litigation, reducing
the risk of blackmail, and reducing the threat of further prosecution.'
Moreover, by holding that a defendant who waives the statute of limita-
tions may not later challenge the conviction on the statute of limitations
ground, the majority allayed concerns that the waiver would be
abused.26
P.2d at 57) (footnote omitted) (citing Comment, The Statute of Limitations in a Crim-
inal Case: Can it be Waived?, 18 WM. & MARY L REV. 823, 840 (1977) (enunciating
the test later adopted by the court in Padie)).
20. See Cowan, 14 Cal. 4th at 373, 926 P.2d at 441, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 461.
21. 206 Cal. App. 3d 111 (1988), 253 Cal. Rptr. 370.
22. 12 Cal. App. 4th 1286 (1993), 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96.
23. See Cowan, 14 Cal. 4th at 375, 926 P.2d at 443, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463.
24. See id. at 374, 926 P.2d at 442, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462 (citing People v. Trejo,
217 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 1032 (1990), 266 Cal. Rptr. 266, 269; Padie, 594 P.2d at 57).
25. See id. at 375, 926 P.2d at 442, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462; see also People v.
Zamora, 18 Cal. 3d 538, 546-48, 557 P.2d 75, 80-81, 134 Cal. Rptr. 784, 789-90 (1976)
(identifying policy considerations of a statute of limitations). See generally Alan L
Adlestein, Coqflict of the Criminal Statute of Limitations With Lesser Offenses at
Trial, 37 WM. & MARY L REV. 199, 261-69 (1995) (discussing purposes of the statute of
limitations in criminal cases). But see J. Anthony Chavez, Statutes of Limitations and
the Right to a Fair Trial When is a Crime Complete?, 10 CRIM. JusT. 2 (Summer
1995) (arguing that extending statutes of limitations may compromise a defendant's
right to a fair trial).
26. See Cowan, 14 Cal. 4th at 376, 926 P.2d at 443, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463.
B. Justice Baxter's Concurring Opinion
In his concurrence, Justice Baxter identified two reasons for joining
the majority: it did not overrule McGee in its entirety and it did not re-
consider whether the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional matter or an
affirmative defense.27 Justice Baxter warned that had the facts of the
case been an appropriate vehicle for addressing his second concern, he
likely would have joined Justice Brown's concurring and dissenting opin-
ion.'
C. Justice Chin's Concurring Opinion
While concurring completely in his majority opinion, Justice Chin also
wrote separately to reinforce his view that the statute of limitations
should remain jurisdictional and not be treated as an affirmative de-
fense. 9 Justice Chin listed several justifications for this view." First,
stare decisis should insulate sixty years of jurisprudence from sudden
change, absent some compelling reason." Second, fairness dictates that
no defendant languish in prison for accidentally failing to assert an abso-
lute bar to his prosecution.' Third, fairness also requires that defen-
dants knowingly waive the statute of limitations, requiring them to be
aware of all options.3 Finally, requiring an express waiver will fully de-
velop the trial record for appeal, eliminating the ambiguity of a silent
record and the likelihood of ineffective assistance of counsel claims that
such silence would breed.3 Justice Chin concluded his concurrence by
responding to Justice Brown's criticisms of the jurisdictional approach.'
27. See id. at 377-78, 926 P.2d at 444, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464 (Baxter, J., concur-
ring).
28. See id. at 378, 926 P.2d at 444, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464 (Baxter, J., concurring).
29. See id. at 378, 926 P.2d at, 444-45, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464-65 (Chin, J., concur-
ring).
30. See id. at 378-81, 926 P.2d at 445-46, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465-6 (Chin, J., con-
curring).
31. See id. at 378, 926 P.2d at 445, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465 (Chin, J., concurring).
32. See id. at 379, 926 P.2d at 445, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465 (Chin, J., concurring).
33. See id. (Chin, J., concurring).
34. See id. at 379-80, 926 P.2d at 445-46, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465-66 (Chin, J., con-
curring).
35. See id. at 381-83, 926 P.2d at 447-48, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 467-68 (Chin, J., con-
curring). Justice Chin rejected claims by Justice Brown that determining the statute of
limitations can be too complex and that requiring an express waiver adds to the com-
plexity of plea allocution. See id. (Chin, J., concurring).
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D. Justice Brown's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brown concurred in the majority's holding that a defendant
may waive the statute of limitations but dissented over the majority's
requirement that the waiver be express rather than a forfeiture for failing
to assert it as an affirmative defense.' Justice Brown discussed several
policy reasons in support of an affirmative defense approach.37 First,
due to the statute of limitations' importance in promoting a fair trial by
ensuring that evidence is not stale, a defendant is likely to raise it as a
defense.' Second, because an affirmative defense must be raised at
trial, an adequate record will be developed.' Third, there are no "statu-
tory or constitutional impediments to adopting an affirmative defense ap-
proach...."40 Finally, Justice Brown argued that adopting an affirmative
defense approach would bring California in conformity with other juris-
dictions that have addressed the issue.4'
Justice Brown argued that a forfeiture approach is preferable to an
express waiver approach for several reasons.42 First, forfeiture avoids
adding an additional element to plea allocution and obviates the need to
calculate the statute of limitations.' Second, the affirmative defense
36. See id. at 383, 926 P.2d at 448, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468 (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting).
37. See id. at 387-89, 926 P.2d at 450-52, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470-72 (Brown, J., con-
curting and dissenting).
38. See A4. at 387, 926 P.2d at 450, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470 (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting).
39. See id. (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Brown argued that for
several reasons a well developed record is more important now than at the time
McGee was decided. (1) the statute of limitations discovery rule applies to some of-
fenses but not others; (2) it is difficult to determine who qualifies to discover an of-
fense; and (3) tolling provisions add to the complexity of calculating the statute of
limitations. See id. at 387-88, 926 P.2d at 451, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471 (Brown, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
40. Id. at 388, 926 P.2d at 451, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471 (Brown, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Brown emphasized that California adopted the jurisdictional ap-
proach simply because it seemed more desirable, not because it was constitutionally or
statutorily required. See id. at 388, 926 P.2d at 451-52, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471-72
(Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
41. See id. at 389, 926 P.2d at 452, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472 (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting).
42. See id. at 389-93, 926 P.2d at 452-55, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472-75 (Brown, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
43. See id. at 390, 926 P.2d at 453, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting).
approach is consistent with California precedent allowing forfeiture of
certain constitutional rights.' Third, forfeiture would resolve the prob-
lems related to the jurisdictional approach invoked in Cowan, Brice, and
Ognibene.45 Finally, Justice Brown argued that ineffective assistance of
counsel claims would not dramatically increase with a forfeiture ap-
proach.' In addition, she criticized the jurisdictional approach for en-
couraging "gamesmanship" and requiring collateral proceedings to de-
terinne if the waiver of the statute of limitations was knowing and in-
telligent." Justice Brown concluded by stating that existing California
criminal procedure provides ample opportunity for a defendant to assert
the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense.'
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
Prior to Cowan a criminal defendant could not plead guilty to a time-
barred lesser included offense, despite his own willingness and the coop-
eration of the prosecution. Without discarding the jurisdictional ap-
proach, the court at least has clarified it so that a court has jurisdiction
to accept a plea to a time-barred lesser included offense of a greater of-
fense over which the court has jurisdiction.49 Cowan may allow for
greater efficiency in the administration of justice by allowing a plea
agreement for a lesser included offense whose statute of limitations is
shorter than the greater offense. The supreme court appears to be
readying itself for a battle over the proper approach to the statute of
limitations with Justices Brown, Baxter, and Kennard, at the least, in
support of abandoning the majority's jurisdictional approach in favor of
the affirmative defense approach. Without regard to the jurisdiction ver-
sus affirmative defense debate, the California Supreme Court's holding in
44. See id. at 391, 926 P.2d at 454, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474 (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting).
45. See id. at 391-92, 926 P.2d at 454, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474 (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting).
46. See id. (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
47. See id. (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
48. See id. at 392-93, 926 P.2d at 454-55, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474-75 (Brown, J., con-
curring and dissenting). Justice Brown argued that a facially deficient criminal com-
plaint can simply be met with a demurrer. See id. Furthermore, a complaint that is not
facially deficient can be opposed in a pretrial hearing on the defense, during jury in-
structions, or by objecting when a judge instructs the jury on a time-barred lesser
related offense. See id. at 393, 926 P.2d at 455, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475 (Brown, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
49. See id. at 373, 926 P.2d at 441, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 461.
[VoL 25: 183, 1997] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Cowan is a step toward a more consistent jurisprudence, in which a
criminal defendant can waive a statutory right as easily as a constitution-
al one.
PAUL A. ROSE
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
found that an alleged victim's payments to the dis-
trict attorney's office for investigation costs created
a conflict of interest that allowed for recusal of the
district attorney's office: People v. Eubanks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Eubanks,' the California Supreme Court held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it found that financial assistance
from an alleged victim to the district attorney's office created a conflict
of interest that required disqualification.2 The superior court granted the
1. 14 Cal. 4th 580, 927 P.2d 310, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200 (1996), modified, 14 Cal. 4th
1282d (modification only altered the footnote language and did not affect the judg-
ment). Justice Werdegar authored the opinion of the court in which Justices Mosk,
Kennard, Baxter, Chin, and Brown concurred. See id. at 583-601, 927 P.2d 312-23, 59
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202-13. Chief Justice George filed a concurring opinion in which Jus-
tice Mosk joined. See id. at 601-04, 927 P.2d at 323-25, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213-15 (George,
C.J., concurring). Although the criminal charges against both defendants were dropped,
the supreme court heard the case "to resolve the legal issues raised, which are of
continuing public interest and are likely to recur." See id. at 584 n.2, 927 P.2d at 312
n.2, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202 n.2 (citing Baluyut v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 4th 876, 829
n.4, 911 P.2d 1, 3 n.4, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 103 n.4 (1996); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Fales, 8 Cal.3d 712, 715-16, 505 P.2d 213, 215, 106 Cal. Rptr. 21, 23 (1973)). See gener-
ally 12 CAL JUR. 3D Certiorari § 10 (1974) (discussing the review of moot or abstract
questions); 7 B.E. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 72 (9th
ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (examining the constitutional "case or controversy" require-
ment).
2. See Eubanks, 14 Cal. 4th at 584, 927 P.2d at 312, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202. In
1992, defendant Wang quit his job as vice president of Borland International (Borland),
a computer software developer. See id. at 584-85, 927 P.2d at 312, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
202. Defendant Eubanks was president of Symantec, Borland's competitor. See id. at
585, 927 P.2d at 312, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202. After Wang's departure, executives at
Borland found several electronic mail messages from Wang to Eubanks. See id. Borland
contacted the police. See id. The grand jury indicted defendants Eubanks and Wang on
conspiracy to receive stolen property and conspiracy to access and make use of com-
puter information. See id. Furthermore, the grand jury charged Wang with trade secret
theft and unlawful use of information and Eubanks with several more counts of receiv-
ing stolen property. See id. at 584, 927 P.2d at 312, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202. Lacking
manpower, the district attorney requested that Borland representatives provide the tech-
nical support necessary to sufficiently investigate the case. See id at 585, 927 P.2d at
312, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202. Rather than use its employees, Borland suggested and
agreed to pay for independent consultants to assist the district attorney's office. See id.
at 585, 927 P.2d at 313, 59 Cal Rptr. 2d at 203. Further, Borland paid for a private
company to transcribe interview tapes after the district attorney's investigator stated
that the investigation would be delayed because of a backup in tape transcription. See
id. at 587, 927 P.2d at 314, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 204. Defendants moved to recuse the
district attorney's office on the grounds that the payments constituted a conflict of
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recusal motion, holding that the victim's payments created an actual
conflict of interest.3 The court of appeal reverse,d viewing the payments
as "'comparable to the cooperation victims often give to prosecutors in
criminal cases.'"4 Reversing the court of appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
the district attorney's office could be disqualified due to an alleged
victim's contributions to the investigation.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Werdegar divided the majority opinion into three sections.'
The first section discussed the role of the prosecutor.' This section fo-
cused on the need of the prosecutor to be independent from persons and
influences giving rise to questions concerning the office's impartiality.'
The court noted that although the district attorney has a duty to ardent-
ly litigate each case to, "'both the accused and the public have a legiti-
mate expectation that his zeal... will be born of objective and impartial
consideration of each individual case.'"9
interest See id,
3. See id. See generally 27 CA Ju. 3D District and Municipal Attorneys § 28
(1987 & Supp. 1997) (discussing recusal of the district attorney's office); Susan W.
Brenner & James Geoffrey Durham, Towards Resolving Prosecutor Conflicts of Interest,
6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 415 (1993) (discussing the disqualification of prosecutors); Jo-
seph T. McLaughlin et al., Disqualification of Attorneys and Judges, C824 A.L.-A.B.A.
785 (1993), available in WL, AUI-ABA database (discussing the disqualification of attor-
neys and judges); Christopher Vaeth, Annotation, Disqualification or Recusal of Prose-
cuting Attorney Because of Relationship with Alleged Victim or Victim's Family, 12
ALR 5th 909 (1993) (discussing the disqualification of the district attorney's office due
to a conflict of interest).
4. See Eubanks, 14 Cal. 4th at 588, 927 P.2d at 314, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 204 (quot-
ing People v. Eubanks, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (depublished),
rev'd, 14 Cal. 4th 580, 927 P.2d 310, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200 (1997)).
5. See id. at 600-01, 927 P.2d at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213.
6. See id. at 583-601, 927 P.2d at 312-23, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202-13.
7. See id. at 588-90, 927 P.2d at 315-16, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 205-06.
8. See id. Additionally, Justice Werdegar discussed the nature of the California
criminal system in this section. See id. For a discussion on the roles and responsibili-
ties of the prosecutor, see 27 CAL JuR. 3D District and Municipal Attorneys §§ 19-22
(1987 & Supp. 1997).
9. See Eubanks, 14 Cal. 4th at 590, 927 P.2d at 316, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 206 (quot-
ing People v. Superior Court (Greer), 19 Cal. 3d 255, 267, 561 P.2d 1164, 1172, 137 Cal.
The opinion's second section traced the development of California's
standards for prosecutorial recusal, examining both case and statutory
law.10 The opinion noted that section 1424, as enacted in 1980, estab-
lished that a motion for recusal "shall not be granted unless it is shown
by the evidence that a conflict of interest exists that would render it
unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial."" The court added
that the conflict may be either "actual" or "apparent."2 The court relied
on its holding in People v. McPartland"3 which recognized that "'recusal
cannot be warranted solely by how a case may appear to the public.'""
Lastly, the majority exanined the facts of the case at bar and ad-
dressed the appropriate standard to employ when reviewing a trial
court's refusal or grant of a motion to recuse.' The supreme court de-
termined that abuse of discretion was the proper standard. 6 The court
Rptr. 476, 484 (1977) (omission in original), superseded by statute as stated izn People
v. Conner, 34 Cal. 3d 141, 147, 666 P.2d 5, 8, 193 Cal. Rptr. 148, 151 (1983)).
10. See id. at 590-94, 927 P.2d at 316-19, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 206-09. The California
Supreme Court first addressed the issue of recusal of the district attorney's office in
People v. Superior Court (Greer), 19 Cal. 3d 255, 561 P.2d 1164, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476
(1977). Greer discussed actual conflict and the "appearance of impropriety." See id. at
255, 561 P.2d at 1164, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 476. Subsequently, the Legislature enacted Pe-
nal Code section 1424 which stated that "[tihe motion shall not be granted unless it is
shown by the evidence that a conflict of interest exists such as would render it unlike-
ly that the defendant would receive a fair trial." CAL PENAL CODE § 1424 (West 1982)
(current version located at CAL PENAL CODE § 1424 (West Supp. 1997)).
11. See CAL PENAL CODE § 1424 (West 1982).
12. See Eubanks, 14 Cal. 4th at 592-93, 927 P.2d at 317, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 207; see
also People v. Conner, 34 Cal. 3d 141, 147, 666 P.2d 5, 8, 193 Cal. Rptr. 148, 151
(1983). In Conner, the California Supreme Court established a two-part test (1) is
there a conflict of interest? and (2) is the conflict so severe as to disqualify the dis-
trict attorney from acting? See Eubanks, 14 Cal. 4th at 594, 927 P.2d at 318, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 209 (citing Conner 34 Cal. 3d at 148-49, 666 P.2d at 9, 193 Cal. Rptr. at
152).
13. 198 Cal. App. 3d 569, 243 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1988).
14. See Eubanks, 14 Cal. 4th at 592, 927 P.2d at 317, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 207 (quoting
McPartland, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 574, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 755).
15. See id. at 594-601, 927 P.2d at 319-23, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209-13.
16. See id. at 594-95, 927 P.2d at 319, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209. The supreme court
previously addressed this issue in Conner, finding that the lower court's decision was
reviewable if evidence was supported by "substantial evidence." See Conner, 34 Cal. 3d
at 149, 666 P.2d at 6, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 152. However, in People v. Hamilton, the court
stated that "abuse of discretion" was the appropriate standard. See Hamilton, 46 Cal.
3d 123, 141, 756 P.2d 1348, 1356, 249 Cal. Rptr. 320, 328 (1988). In People v. Breaux,
the court cleared up the inconsistency, stating that, "[o]ur role is to determine whether
there is substantial evidence to support the findings, and, based on those findings, to
determine whether the trial court; abused its discretion in denying the motion." See
Breux, I Cal. 4th 281, 293-94, 821 P.2d 585, 590, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81, 86 (1991) (citing
Hamilton, 46 Cal. 3d at 140, 756 P.2d at 1348, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 320; Conner, 34 Cal.
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rejected the notion that the conflict must arise from a personal interest
by a member of the district attorney's office. 7 The supreme court found
that institutional interests were enough to recuse the district att orney's
office. 8 Accordingly, the court concluded that payments to the district
attorney's office were adequate grounds for recusal and that the money
did not need to "'benefit any official's personal pocketbook'"9
B. Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice George joined the majority opinion, but wrote a separate
concurrence because he believed that recusal of the district attorney's
office should have been mandatory as a matter of law.2' Chief Justice
George maintained that the circumstances did not only "support" recusal,
they "mandated" it under statutory and case law.2' In reaching this con-
clusion, Chief Justice George relied on three factors: (1) the solicitation
of contributions to pay for expenses incurred by the district attorney's
investigation of the case; (2) the size of the contributions relative to the
small budget of the district attorney's office; and (3) the weakness of the
prosecution's case.' Chief Justice George further noted that because
3d at 141, 666 P.2d at 5, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 148; Love v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App.
3d 367, 371, 168 Cal. Rptr. 577, 579 (1980), superseded by statute as stated in People
v. Lopez, 155 Cal. App. 3d 813, 822, 202 Cal. Rptr. 333, 338 (1984); People v. Battin,
77 Cal. App. 3d 635, 671, 143 Cal. Rptr. 731, 753 (1978), superseded by statute as stat-
ed in Conner, 34 Cal. 3d at 147, 666 P.2d at 8, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 151). See generally
Francis M. Allegra, Section 482: Mapping the Contours of the Abuse of Discretion
Standard of Judicial Review, 13 VA. TAx REv. 423 (1994) (discussing the abuse of
discretion standard in the tax field); Jeffrey L Romig, Administrative Review of Cases
Involving the Exercise of Discretion Under Section 212(c): Should the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals Adopt an "Abuse of Discretion" Standard?, 9 GEo. IMMIGR. UJ. 63
(1995) (advocating that the Board of Immigration Appeals adopt an abuse of discretion
standard).
17. See Eubanks, 14 Cal. 4th at 595, 927 P.2d at 319-20, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209-10.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 595, 927 P.2d at 319, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 209 (quoting the Attorney Gener-
al).
20. See id. at 601, 927 P.2d at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213 (George, C.J., concur-
ring).
21. See id. at 602, 927 P.2d at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214 (George, C.J., concur-
ring).
22. See id. at 601-03, 927 P.2d at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214 (George, C.J., concur-
ring). Chief Justice George highlighted several benefits that Borland stood to receive if
the prosecution succeeded: protection of trade secrets, ammunition in the pending civil
trial, disruption of Symantec's business operations, and deterrence of similar future
Borland had so much to gain from the successful prosecution of the
case, it may have exerted pressure on the district attorney's office by
paying the office for investigation costs.' As a result, the district attor-
ney may have felt obligated to continue pursuing the case because of the
contributions.'
ImI. IMPACT
The majority opinion did not directly address whether alleged victims
may contribute money to the district attorney's office to further investi-
gations without creating a conflict of interest.' Instead, the court deter-
mined the appropriate standard of review and found that the trial court
had not abused its discretion.' The supreme court noted that financial
assistance to the prosecution "may create a legally cognizable conflict of
interest for the prosecutor.27 Therefore, the question remains unre-
solved as to whether an alleged victim can safely contribute to the dis-
trict attorney's office.
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court did not draw any bright line conclusions
about whether an alleged victim can give money to the district attorney's
office to fund an investigation. The court did, however, hold that the
lower court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the alleged
victim's donation created a conflict of interest that allowed for recusal of
the district attorney's office.
KELLY C. QUINN
acts. See id, at 602-03, 927 P.2d at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214 (George, C.J., concur-
ring). See genemrly 19 CAL JuR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2067-2068 (1984 & Supp. 1997)
(discussing discriminatory prosecution and equal protection in criminal cases); 7 B.E.
WrrKCN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 415 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp.
1996) (describing the protections afforded to persons accused of a crime in California).
23. See Eubanks, 14 Cal. 4th at 602-03, 927 P.2d at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214
(George, C.J., concurring).
24. See id. (George, C.J., concurring).
25. See id, at 583-601, 927 P.2d at 312-23, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202-13.
26. See id. at 600-01, 927 P.2d at 323, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213.
27. See id. at 598, 927 P.2d at 321, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211.
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C. The Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention
(STEP) Act, which provides for enhanced penalties
when the defendant's offense is gang related and the
defendant has committed two or more crimes enu-
merated therein, does not require the state to prove
that the two or more previous crimes were gang
related: People v. Gardeley.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Gardeley,1 the California Supreme Court considered
whether the STEP Act, which requires prosecutors to prove that a defen-
dant sustained a "pattern of criminal gang activity" by showing the defen-
dant committed "two or more" enumerated offenses (the "predicate of-
fenses") in order to seek an enhanced sentence for the defendant, man-
dates that the predicate offenses be "gang related."' After the jury found
1. 14 Cal. 4th 605, 927 P.2d 713, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356 (1996). Justice Kennard
wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice George and Justices Mosk, Baxter,
Werdegar, Chin and Brown concurred. See id. at 609-26, 927 P.2d at 715-27, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 358-70.
2. Id. at 609-10, 927 P.2d at 715-16, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 358-59. In the summer of
1992, the defendants, Rochelle Gardeley and Tommie Thompson, along with another
man, approached the victim, who was urinating in an apartment complex garage locat-
ed "in an area controlled by the Family Crip gang." See id. at 610, 927 P.2d at 716, 59
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359. The defendants beat the victim and robbed him of a watch, a
necklace, and some cash. See id. at 610-11, 927 P.2d at 716, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359. A
short while later, the police stopped and searched a car in which Thompson was driv-
ing and Gardeley was a passenger. See id at 611, 927 P.2d at 716, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
359. The police found a baggie containing cocaine outside the car door next to
Gardeley and observed that he had a bloody shirt and lip. See id. The State charged
the defendants with attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon (with a great
bodily injury enhancement), robbery, as well as gang related assault and/or battery. See
id.
At trial, the prosecution introduced Patrick Boyd, a highly experienced detective
who had interviewed the defendants after their arrest. See id. at 611, 927 P.2d at 716-
17, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 359-60. After a hearsay determination outside the presence of
the jury and a limiting instruction to the jury, Detective Boyd, testifying as an expert,
revealed that the defendants had told him their Family Crip gang names. See id. at
611-12, 927 P.2d at 717, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360. Detective Boyd also gave opinion
testimony that the gang's primary purpose was to deal drugs and engage in violence
"to further its drug-dealing activities." See id. at 612, 927 P.2d at 717, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 360. When presented with hypothetical facts identical to those of the instant case,
Boyd opined that the defendants' actions were gang activity to intimidate the residents
the defendants guilty of attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon
with the intent to do great bodily injury, engaging in a pattern of gang
activity, and gang-related assault and/or battery, the trial court utilized
the STEP Act's sentence enhancement guidelines to sentence the defen-
dants.3 The court of appeal reversed, concluding that the prosecution
had "failed to prove the statutorily required 'two or more' predicate of-
fenses to establish that the Family Crip gang was a criminal street gang
within the meaning of the statute" because Detective Boyd's testimony
was not based on facts in evidence or personal knowledge.4 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and found that the pros-
ecution proved each of the elements required by the STEP Act.5
I. TREATMENT
The court began its opinion with a discussion of the STEP Act of 1988
and the underlying legislative rationale of coping with California's street
gang problem.' The court explained that the STEP Act provides for en-
hanced penalties for gang crimes and set forth the relevant definitions of
a "criminal street gang," a "pattern of criminal gang activity" and "predi-
cate offenses."7 After a recitation of the facts of the case, the court reit-
of the neighborhood in which they were dealing drugs. See id. at 612-13, 927 P.2d at
717-18, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360-61. The detective also testified that three previous inci-
dents involving the defendants, namely a 1992 shooting, a threat against a dug dealer,
and possession of crack cocaine were gang-related activities. See id. at 613, 927 P.2d
at 718, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361. The trial court allowed three abstracts of judgment
concerning these three incidents to be admitted as evidence. See id. at 613-14, 927
P.2d at 718, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361. For a discussion of the issues involved in present-
ing "gang evidence," see Susan L Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense,
30 SANTA CLARA L REv. 739 (1990).
3. See Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 614 & n.6, 927 P.2d at, 718 & n.6, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 361-62 & n.6; see also Criminal Street Gangs: Spencer v. Beni, 25 PAc. U. 523-24
(giving statutory examples of street gang crime penalties).
4. See Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 614, 927 P.2d at 718-19, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361-62.
5. See id. at 626, 927 P.2d at 726-27, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369-70.
6. See id. at 609, 927 P.2d at 715, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 358; see also 17 CAL JU& 3D
Criminal Law § 33 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the gang violence problem in Cali-
fornia); 2 B.E. WITKN, CAUFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw 2D, Crimes Against Governmental
Authority § 1251B (Supp. 1996) (outlining the STEP Act).
7. See Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 609-10, 927 P.2d at 715-16, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 358-
59. A criminal street gang is an "ongoing association of three or more persons that
shares a common name or common identifying sign or symbol," and systematically
commits a "pattern of criminal gang activity." Id. A pattern of criminal gang activity is
found when gang members engage in certain "predicate offenses" within a specified
period of time. See id. at 610, 927 P.2d at 715-16, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258-59. The
"predicate offenses" are listed in the STEP Act. See id.; see also infra note 9 (setting
out listed offenses); 17 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 35 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (defining
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erated that the purpose of the STEP Act is to target and eliminate the
California gang problem by granting trial courts the discretion to increase
gang members' sentences if the crime at issue was gang related.'
Although the STEP Act requires that the offense be in furtherance of
the purposes of the gang, the court recognized that the statute enumer-
ates the predicate offenses.' Accordingly, the court listed the elements
the prosecution needed to prove in order to comply with the STEP
Act."0 The remainder of the court's opinion illustrated how the
prosecution met its burden of proving each element."
First, the court examined the testimony of Detective Boyd and deter-
mined that the jury needed Boyd's expert opinion to explain gang activity
because it was outside the common experience of the ordinary person. 2
The court then recited the rules concerning expert opinion testimony,
noting that judges may allow comment on hypotheticals if "rooted in
facts shown by the evidence," statements on facts not in evidence are
permissible if "it is material of a type that is reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming their opinions," and if reliable,
a criminal street gang member); B.E. WrIN, CALFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 2D, Punishment
for Crime § 1501 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (discussing enhancement provisions for
defendants who carry or use a firearm); Lori L Proudfit, Note, California Supreme
Court Survey; A Review of Decisions, People v. Bland, 23 PEPP. L REV. 1033, 1034
(1996) (discussing the deterrent effect of enhancement provisions).
8. See Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 610-17, 927 P.2d at 716-20, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 358-
63; see also David R. Truman, Note, The Jets and Sharks are Dead: State Statutory
Responses to Criminal Street Gangs, 73 WASH. U. LQ. 683 (1995) (outlining
California's, South Dakota's, Florida's, and Illinois' responses to the criminal street gang
problem).
9. See Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 615-16, 927 P.2d at 720, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363.
These listed offenses include:
(1) [a]ssault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury ... (2) [rlobbery . . . (3) [u]nlawful homicide or man-
slaughter . . . (4) [t]he sale, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture,
offer for sale, or offer to manufacture controlled substances ... (5)
[sihooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle ... (6)
[airson .. . (7) [t]he intimidation of witnesses and victims ... [and] (8)
[girand theft of any vehicle, trailer, or vessel .... "
Id. at 616 n.8, 927 P.2d at 720 n.8, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363 n.8.
10. See id. at 616-17, 927 P.2d at 720, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363. The court required
that the prosecution prove the instant crime was gang-related, the defendants were
members of a gang, and they "engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.'" See id.
11. See id. at 617-26, 927 P.2d at 720-26, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363-70.
12. See id. at 617, 927 P.2d at 720-21, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 363-64.
even inadmissible hearsay can be the basis of an expert opinion.3 The
court concluded that, based upon Detective Boyd's answer to the hypo-
thetical rooted in the facts of the instant case, the jury could reasonably
find that the STEP Act requirements of a gang related offense committed
by members of a criminal street gang were satisfied.'4
Turning to the pattern of criminal gang activity element, the supreme
court reviewed the STEP Act's definition and timing requirements. 5 The
court inferred the legislative intent behind the act by examining the plain
language of the statute requiring that predicate offenses be two or more
of the enumerated offenses, not two or more gang related offenses."
Responding to the defendants' argument that because the statute deals
with penalties, the court must construe the statute in favor of the defen-
dant, the court noted that the language was not ambiguous and thus the
letter of the law controlled, even though it had consequences adverse to
the defendants. 7
Next, the court addressed the defendants' reliance on a New Jersey
case holding that a statute maldng it a crime to belong to a gang violated
constitutionally mandated due process. 8 The court distinguished the
New Jersey statute by indicating that the STEP Act gave a more specific
definition of a gang and involved gang crime rather than gang member-
ship. 9 Finally, the court concluded its analysis by applying the facts of
the case to the statute and declaring the defendants' prior conviction for
shooting at a dwelling, plus the instant conviction for assault, with a
deadly weapon with the intent to do great bodily injury, to be two enu-
merated offenses, thus finding that the timing requirements of the STEP
13. See id. at 618, 927 P.2d at 721, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 364.
14. See id. at 619-20, 927 P.2d at 722-23, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365-66.
15. See id. at 620-21, 927 P.2d at 723, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366. A "pattern of criminal
gang activity" exists where the defendants committed two or more of the listed crimes
"provided at least one of those offenses occurred after the effective date of (the STEP
Act] and the last of those offenses occurred within three years after a prior offense,
and the offenses are committed on separate occasions, or by two or more persons."
Id.
16. See id. at 621, 927 P.2d at 723, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366. The court reasoned that
because the phrase triggering the interpretation that the offense be gang-related is used
elsewhere in the statute, but is absent in the part of the statute at issue, the court
cannot imply its existence. See id. at 622, 927 P.2d at 723-24, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366-
67.
17. See id. at 621-22, 927 P.2d at 724, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366-67.
18. See id. at 622-23, 927 P.2d at 724, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367 (discussing Lanzetta v.
State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)).
19. See id. at 623-24, 927 P.2d at 724-25, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367-68.
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Act were met.2' Accordingly, the court decreed that the prosecution had
met their burden and reversed the decision of the court of appeal.21
III. IMPACT
The decision of the California Supreme Court in Gardeley cleared up
confusion as to whether predicate offenses must be gang related; the
court declared that they do not.' The court further clarified that the
instant offense, which must be gang-related, can count as one of the two
or more enumerated offenses required to satisfy the STEP Act.2 By set-
ting forth such a rule, the supreme court and the Legislature have sent a
message to criminal street gangs that crimes committed by gang mem-
bers will be punished severely.2'
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to Gardeley, there was uncertainty as to whether the STEP Act's
pattern of criminal gang activity element required that a defendant com-
mit two or more gang related offenses.' However, in Gardeley, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court declared that the predicate offenses do not have
to be gang related, only enumerated in the STEP Act.' Furthermore, the
State can rely on the instant offense in fulfilling the two or more predi-
20. See id. at 624-26, 927 P.2d at 725-26, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 368-69. The court em-
phasized that although the instant offense could be considered in reaching the adequate
number of predicate offenses, it still had to be gang related to satisfy the mandates of
the statute. See id. at 625 n.12, 927 P.2d at 726 n.12, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369 n.12.
21. See id. at 626, 927 P.2d at 726-27, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369-70.
22. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
23. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text
24. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. As noted in Lanzetta v. New Jer-
sey, this stance appears to rest on a guilt by association rationale. See supra note 18
and accompanying text. See also Alexander A. Molina, Note, California's Anti-Gang
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act: One Step Forward, Two Steps
Back?, 22 Sw. U. L REV. 457 (1993) (arguing that the STEP Act's guilt by association
basis is unconstitutional). For another method to curb the street gang problem, see
Sharon A. Ligorsky, Note, Williams v. GarcettL. Constitutional Defects in California's
"Gang-Parent" Liability Statute, 28 LoY. LA. L REV. 447 (1994).
25. See supra note 2 and accompanying text
26. See supra note 16 and accompanying text
cate offenses requirement, so long as the defendant committed the of-
fense in furtherance of gang purposes."
PAMELA L. ScHLEHEiz
27. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text; see also 17 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal
Law § 34 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (discussing "enhanced prosecution efforts" to battle
California street gangs).
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D. Evidence regarding battered woman's syndrome is
admissible to prove that a defendant had an actual
and reasonable belief that deadly force was neces-
sary to defend against an abusive spouse: People v.
Humphrey.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Humphrey,' the California Supreme Court decided
whether evidence of battered woman's syndrome (BWS) could be used
by the jury to determine the reasonableness of the defendant's belief that
(1) the defendant was in imminent harm and (2) it was necessary for the
defendant to use deadly force iri self-defense.2 The trial court granted a
1. 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 921 P.2d 1, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142 (1996). Justice Chin authored
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice George and Justices Mosk, Kennard, and
Werdegar concurred. See id. at 1076-90, 921 P.2d at, 2-11, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144-53.
Justice Baxter filed a separate concurring opinion. See id. at 1090-91, 921 P.2d at 11-
12, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153-54 (Baxter, J., concurring). Justice Werdegar also wrote a
concurring opinion. See id. at 1091-92, 921 P.2d at 12-13, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154
(Werdegar, J., concurring). Justice Brown wrote a concurring opinion in which Chief
Justice George and Justice Baxter concurred. See id. at 1092-1103, 921 P.2d at 13-20,
56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154-62 (Brown, J., concurring).
2. See id. at 1076-77, 921 P.2d at 2, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144. At trial, the defendant
asserted that she shot and killed her husband, Albert Hampton, in self-defense. See id.
at 1078, 921 P.2d at 3, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145. The defendant made several statements
to the police, including "I shot him .. . I just couldn't take him beating on me no
more." Id. at 1077, 921 P.2d at 3, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144. At the police station, the
defendant stated that her husband often abused her and attempted to shoot her the
night before. See id. The defendant alleged that she shot Hampton in self-defense be-
cause she believed he was about to hit her with an object he had picked up. See id.
at 1077, 921 P.2d at 3, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144-45. In her defense, the defendant pre-
sented the expert testimony of Dr. Lee Bowker on battered woman's syndrome. See id.
at 1078-79, 921 P.2d at 3-4, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145-46. Battered woman's syndrome is
defined as "'a series of common characteristics that appear in women who are abused
physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male
figure in their lives.'" Id. at 1083-84, 921 P.2d at 7, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148-49 (quoting
State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (1984)); Elisabeth Ayyildiz, When Battered Woman's
Syndrome Does Not Go Far Enough." The Battered Woman as Vigilante, 4 AM. U.J.
GENDER & L 141 (1995) (addressing battered woman's syndrome); Symposium, Domi-
nation in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. Prm. L REv. 553 (1996) (pro-
viding further comment about battered woman's syndrome); Melanie Frager Griffith,
Battered Woman Syndrome: A Toot for Batterers?, 64 FoRDHAm L REV. 141 (1995)
(analyzing the use of battered woman's syndrome as evidence); Lynne Henderson,
Whose Justice? Which Victims?, 94 MICH. L REv. 1596 (1996) (book review) (discuss-
section 1118.1 motion to acquit the defendant of first degree murder.' As
to the remaining charges of second degree murder and manslaughter,4
however, the court instructed the jury that evidence regarding battered
woman's syndrome may only be considered to determine whether the de-
fendant held the required subjective honest belief.' In addition, the court
instructed the jury that such evidence may not be considered objectively
in determining the reasonableness requirement for perfect self-defense.6
The jury convicted the defendant of voluntary manslaughter, and she was
sentenced to eight years in prison.7 The court of appeal affirmed the
judgment, remanding solely for the purpose of resentencing'
ing the use of battered woman's syndrome in self-defense scenarios); Symposium, Self-
Defense, Domination, and the Social Contract, 57 U. Prrr. L REv. 579 (1996) (discuss-
ing self-defense and battered woman's syndrome); see also 1 B.E. WITKIN, California
Evidence § 493 (1986 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the admissibility of battered woman's
syndrome as evidence). Dr. Bowker testified about the possible reasons why defendant
failed to leave her husband, such as economic insecurity, social isolation, lack of self-
confidence, and perhaps most importantly, fear of the abuser. See Humphrey, 13 Cal.
4th at 1078, 921 P.2d at 3, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145. In addition, Dr. Bowker described
the nature of an abusive relationship, testifying that "[tihe violence can gradually esca-
late, as the batterer keeps control using ever more severe actions." Id. at 1078, 921
P.2d at 4, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145. Dr. Bowker concluded by testifying that the defen-
dant "suffered from battered woman's syndrome in 'about as extreme a pattern as you
could find'" Id. at 1079, 921 P.2d at 4, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146. The defendant also
testified as to the occurrences of abuse, including her husband's attempt to shoot her
the night before she shot him and the details of the night of the shooting. See id. at
1079-80, 921 P.2d at 4-5, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146. Furthermore, other witnesses corrobo-
rated the defendant's testimony regarding her relationship with her husband. See id. at
1080, 921 P.2d at 5, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146.
3. See id. at 1081, 921 P.2d at 5, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147.
4. See 17 CAL Ju. 3D Criminal Law § 185 (1984 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the
classification of culpable homicide).
5. See Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1081, 921 P.2d at 5, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147.
6. See id. The self-defense instruction included the following language:
[AIn actual and reasonable belief that the killing was necessary [is] a com-
plete defense; an actual but unreasonable belief [is] a defense to murder, but
not to voluntary manslaughter. In determining reasonableness, the jury [is] to
consider what would appear to be necessary to a reasonable person in a
similar situation and with similar knowledge.
Id. For more information regarding self-defense, see 20 CAL Jun. 3D Criminal Law
§ 2286 (1985 & Supp. 1996) and 1 B.E. WrIN & NORMAN L EPSTIN, California Crim-
inal Law, § 239 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp 1996).
7. See Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1081, 921 P.2d at 5, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147.
8. See id.
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If. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Chin, writing for the majority, began by discussing the attempt
at trial to use Evidence Code section 1107 in order to allow the admis-
sion of expert testimony regarding battered woman's syndrome into evi-
dence. In the instant case, only the issue of relevancy prevented admis-
sion of the testimony under section 1107."° To determine relevancy, the
majority reviewed the elements of self-defense." First, a defendant
"must actually and reasonably believe in the need to defend."' 2 Second,
in order for the defense to be perfect, thereby preventing a prosecution,
the belief in the need to defend must be objectively reasonable. 3 In the
case at bar, the lower court allowed the expert testimony of Dr. Lee
Bowker to be considered as to the first element of self-defense, but spe-
cifically instructed the jury that such evidence could not be considered
in regard to the second element." Therefore, Justice Chin discussed pri-
marily the relevancy of the evidence to determine the objective reason-
ableness of the defendant in her claim of self-defense. 5
The majority found that in determining objective reasonableness, "a
jury must consider what 'would appear to be necessary to a reasonable
person in a similar situation and with similar knowledge.'"'6 The court
used the decision in People v. Ochoa 7 to support the proposition that
9. See id. at 1081-82, 921 P.2d at 5-6, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147. California Evidence
Code § 1107 provides in pertinent part
(a) In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible ... regarding bat-
tered women's syndrome, including the physical, emotional, or mental effects
upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic vio-
lence....
(b) The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of this expert testimony
if the proponent... establishes its relevancy and the proper qualifications of
the expert witness.
CAL EvID. CODE § 1107 (West 1995).
10. See Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1082, 921 P.2d at 6, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147.
11. See id. at 1082-83, 921 P.2d at 6, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147-48.
12. Id. at 1082, 921 P.2d at 6, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147.
13. See id. at 1082-83, 921 P.2d at 6, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148.
14. See id at 1076, 921 P.2d at 2, 56 CaL Rptr. 2d at 144.
15. See id. at 1082-83, 921 P.2d at 6-7, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148.
16. Id. at 1082-83, 921 P.2d at 6, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148 (quoting 1 California Jury
Instructions, Criminal (CALUIC) No. 5.50 (5th ed. 1988)).
17. 6 Cal. 4th 1199, 864 P.2d 103, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23 (1993):
the jury must take into consideration the subjective state of mind of the
defendant in determining objective reasonableness."8
Next, the California Supreme Court addressed two California appellate
decisions that disallowed expert testimony of battered woman's syn-
drome based on irrelevance. First, in People v. Aris,9 the appellate
court decided that battered woman's syndrome evidence was not rele-
vant to the reasonableness requirement because an inquiry into reason-
ableness required not "an evaluation of the defendant's subjective state
of mind, but.., an objective evaluation of the defendant's assertedly de-
fensive acts."2° Second, in People v. Day,2' the court of appeal again
concluded that evidence of BWS "would not have been relevant to show
the objective reasonableness of the defendant's actions."22
Despite these two appellate decisions, Justice Chin and the majority
stated that "the jury, in determining objective reasonableness, must view
the situation from the defendant's perspective. " ' To clarify its decision,
the court stated that the jury may be presented with a full professional
explanation of battered woman's syndrome through expert testimony.'
Furthermore, the court explained that it was not "changing the standard
from objective to subjective, or replacing the reasonable 'person' stan-
dard with a reasonable 'battered woman' standard."' The majority sim-
ply stated that subjective factors may be used to consider objective rea-
sonableness as a whole.26 Finally, the court ruled that evidence of bat-
tered woman's syndrome is also relevant to determine the credibility of
the defendant.27
Therefore, the California Supreme Court held that "evidence of bat-
tered woman's syndrome is generally relevant to the reasonableness, as
well as the subjective existence, of defendant's belief in the need to de-
fend, and, to the extent it is relevant, the jury may consider it in deciding
both questions."'
18. See Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1083, 921 P.2d at 6-7, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148
(1996).
19. 215 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1989).
20. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1085, 921 P.2d at 8, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 149 (quoting
Aris, 215 Cal. App. 3d at 1196, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 179) (emphasis omitted).
21. 2 Cal. App. 4th 405, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (1992).
22. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1085-86, 921 P.2d at 8, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150 (citing
Day, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 414-15, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921-22).
23. Id. at 1086, 921 P.2d at 8, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150.
24. See id. at 1086, 921 P.2d at 9, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151; State v. Allery, 682 P.2d
312, 316 (Wash. 1984).
25. Humphrey, 13 Cal. 4th at 1087, 921 P.2d at 9, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 1151.
26. See id. at 1082-83, 921 P.2d at 6-7, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148.
27. See id. at 1087, 921 P.2d at 9, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
28. Id. at 1088-89, 921 P.2d at 10, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152. Furthermore, the court
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B. Justice Baxter's Concurring Opinion
Justice Baxter wrote separately to emphasize his opinion that expert
testimony regarding battered woman's syndrome is not absolutely rele-
vant in deciding objective reasonableness and, therefore, should not be
"admissible without regard to the facts of the particular case or the con-
tent of the expert testimony."' According to Justice Baxter, such expert
testimony is only relevant under Evidence Code section 1107 if it is relat-
ed to "the physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, percep-
tions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence."' Justice Baxter as-
serted that much of Dr. Bowker's testimony related to the specific expe-
riences of the defendant, and therefore, was only relevant for the limited
purpose of "explain[ing] the basis for his opinion that defendant suffered
from battered woman's syndrome."3 Furthermore, Justice Baxter con-
tended that "[i]f the evidence is admitted, the court, on request, must
give instructions limiting consideration of the evidence to the specific
issue or issues to which it is relevant."4
C. Justice Werdegar's Concurring Opinion
Justice Werdegar wrote a separate concurring opinion expressing the
view that expert testimony regarding BWS is only relevant where "the
defendant's claim of reasonableness is based upon facts that would not,
outside of a battering relationship, tend to show the reasonableness of
the defendant's belief in the need to use deadly force."' Therefore, if
the expert testimony is not necessary to establish a claim of reasonable
belief, according to Justice Werdegar, a court should give a limiting in-
struction to the jury forbidding the use of that testimony to determine
reasonableness.'
found that the instructional error was prejudicial because there was a "reasonable
probability [that] the error affected the verdict adversely to [the] defendant" Id. at
1089, 921 P.2d at 10-11, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152. The jury likely based the defendant's
guilt on the lack of objective reasonableness. See id. at 1089, 921 P.2d at 11, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 152.
29. Id. at 1090, 921 P.2d at 11, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153 (Baxter, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 1091, 921 P.2d at 12, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153 (Baxter, J., concurring)
(quoting CAL Evm. CODE § 1107 (West 1995)).
31. Id. at 1091, 921 P.2d at 12, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 153-54 (Baxter, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 1091, 921 P.2d at 12, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154 (Baxter, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 1092, 921 P.2d at 12, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154 (Werdegar, J., concurring).
34. See id. at 1092, 921 P.2d at 13, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 154 (Werdegar, J., concur-
D. Justice Brown's Concurring Opinion
Justice Brown began her concurring opinion by explaining the nature
of battered woman's syndrome' and agreeing that evidence of it is use-
ful to prove objective reasonableness where "the victim's threats caused
the defendant 'to fear greater peril than she would have had other-
wise.' "' Justice Brown contended, however, that expert testimony on
battered woman's syndrome is of limited relevance and is not admissible
"until the defendant puts at issue conduct or circumstances the jury
might not otherwise understand as the basis for self-defense."37 Justice
Brown explained that traditional claims of self-defense, such as "when
the victim threatens... the defendant with a gun or knife" create the
common feeling of fear which a jury is capable of comprehending with-
out the assistance of expert testimony.' Finally, Justice Brown support-
ed the majority's emphasis that the inquiry remain objective, stating that
"[tihe concept of hypervigilance is not the evidentiary equivalent of, or
substitute for, an actual perception of impending danger, only a possible
explanation."'
I. IMPACT
The primary impact of the decision by the California Supreme Court in
People v. Humphrey is that expert testimony regarding battered woman's
syndrome will almost always be deemed relevant by trial courts.' In
addition, although the majority of the court claimed that the test for
objective reasonableness remains purely objective,41 the Humphrey de-
cision provides an avenue for a jury to consider subjective factors.'
Therefore, it is possible that despite a proper limiting instruction,' a
jury will subjectively consider expert testimony on battered woman's syn-
drome in its ultimate determination of the guilt or innocence of a defen-
dant claiming self-defense."
ring).
35. See id. at 1095-98, 921 P.2d at 14-16, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-58 (Brown, J., con-
curring).
36. Id. at 1098, 921 P.2d at 17, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158 (Brown, J., concurring)
(quoting People v. Moore, 43 Cal. 2d 517, 528, 275 P.2d 485).
37. Id. (Brown, J., concurring).
38. See id, at 1098, 921 P.2d at 17, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158-59 (Brown, J., concur-
ring).
39. Id. at 1099, 921 P.2d at 18, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159 (Brown, J., concurring).
40. See id. at 1088-89, 921 P.2d at 10, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
41. See id. at 1087, 921 P.2d at 9, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151.
42. See id. at 1082-83, 921 P.2d at 6-7, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148.
43. See id. at 1088, 921 P.2d at 10, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
44. See id.
[VoL 25: 183, 1997] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
IV. CONCLUSION
In Humphrey, the California Supreme Court extended the scope of the
permissible use of evidence regarding battered woman's syndrome.*
The court found that expert testimony is relevant not only in determining
whether a defendant had an actual belief of imminent harm, but also to
assess the reasonableness of that belief.'
MARISA CASTAGNET
45. See id. at 1088-89, 921 P.2d at 10, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152.
46. See id
E. When a defendant is prosecuted under the 'natural
and probable consequences" doctrine, a trial court
must provide a jury instruction identifying and
describing target crimes that a defendant may have
aided or abetted. This duty arises only when "sub-
stantial evidence" supports the conclusion that the
defendant intended to assist or encourage the target
offense, and a jury could reasonably conclude that
the committed crime was a natural and probable
consequence of the target crime: People v.
Prettyman.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Prettyman,' the California Supreme Court addressed
whether the trial court has an obligation to give jury instructions, sua
sponte, identifying and describing target crimes in which a defendant
might have aided or abetted, when jurors are instructed on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.2 Affirming the court of appeal's
1. 14 Cal. 4th 248, 926 P.2d 1013, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 827 (1996). Justice Kennard
wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice George and Justices Werdegar and
Chin concurred. See id. at 254-76, 926 P.2d at 1015-30, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829-44. Jus-
tice Mosk wrote a concurring opinion. See id. at 277-83, 926 P.2d at 1030435, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 844-49 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Baxter wrote a separate concurring
opinion. See id. at 283-84, 926 P.2d at 1035, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849 (Baxter, J., concur-
ring). Justice Brown also wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion. See id.
at 284-93, 926 P.2d at 1035-41, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849-55 (Brown, J., concurring and
dissenting).
2. See id, at 254, 926 P.2d at 1015, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829. The defendant Debra
Bray and codefendant Richard Prettyman were each found guilty of first degree murder
of a fellow homeless person, Gaylord Van Camp. See id. Bray and Prettyrman argued
about Bray's identification papers, which were in Prettyman's possession, because Bray
needed them to collect a benefit check See id. at 255, 926 P.2d at 1016, 58 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 830. A church director intervened, asking Van Camp, the murder victim, to leave
the church with Prettyman until Bray was calm. See id. As the two men started to
leave, Bray gave her wallet to Van Camp for "safekeeping." See id. Later that evening,
Prettyman and Van Camp returned to the church and found separate places in the
courtyard to sleep. See id. Between approximately 3:00 and 4:00 am., a homeless man
overheard a conversation between Bray and Prettyman in which Bray stated, "We are
going to get.. .Vance. He has no idea who he is messing with. He ain't getting away
with this s***." Id. at 255-56, 926 P.2d at 1016, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830. Prettyman re-
plied, "Yep. Okay." Id. at 256, 926 P.2d at 1016, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 830. Later that
evening, between 4:00 and 5:30 am., another homeless man awoke to loud "thumping
noises," and heard Prettyman say "Take that." Id. The witness said that Prettyman
walked away from the courtyard carrying a "three-to-four-foot pipe," while Van Camp
remained, making "gagging noises." Id. Before the homeless man could approach Van
Camp, Bray appeared and told the man to leave. See id. Prettyman returned to the
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decision, the supreme court held that when a defendant is prosecuted
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, a trial court must
provide a jury instruction identifying and describing target crimes in
which a defendant may have aided or abetted.3 The court explained that
such a jury instruction would help jurors determine whether the commit-
ted crime was a natural and probable consequence of the intended target
crimes, and also reduce the risk of jury speculation.4
courtyard where he had left Van Camp and reported to Bray, "Van Camp had choked
on his own blood ... teach him to steal a wallet [and] to threaten us, . .. [he] de-
served it" Id. Prettyman later admitted to another homeless man that he had killed
Van Camp with a metal pipe. See id. The prosecution tried Bray as an accomplice to
first degree murder. See id. at 254, 926 P.2d at 1015, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829. The trial
court instructed the jury on "aiding and abetting," and the court gave the natural and
probable consequences instruction on its own motion. See id. at 257-58, 926 P.2d at
1017-18, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831-32; see inifra note 3. The court did not identify or de-
scribe for the jury a target crime that Bray may have "originally contemplated." Id.
The jury convicted Bray and Prettyman of first degree murder, and the court of appeal
affirmed their convictions. See id. at 258, 926 P.2d at 1018, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832.
For a general discussion of aiding and abetting and criminal liability .under the doc-
trine, see 17 CAL JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 105, 194 (1984 & Supp. 1996).
3. See Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th at 254, 926 P.2d at 1015, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829.
The California Jury Instruction that the trial court used to explain the natural and
probable consequences doctrine was similar to the first version of CALJIC No. 3.02,
written in 1988. See id. at 258, 926 P.2d at 1017, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831. The jury in-
struction provided in relevant part
One who aids and abets is not only guilty of the particular crime aided and
abetted, but is also liable for the natural and probable consequences of the
commission of such crime. You must determine whether the defendant is
guilty of the crime originally contemplated, and, if so, whether any other
crime charged was a natural and probable consequence of such originally
contemplated crime.
Id. at 257-58, 926 P.2d at 1017, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 831. Had the trial court relied on
CALJIC No. 3.02 as it was revised in 1992, the language would have included the fol-
lowing requirements:
In order to find the defendant guilty of the crime[s] of -, . . . you must be
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that- (1) The crime [or crimes] of -
[was] [were] committed, (2) The defendant aided and abetted such crime[s],
(3) A co-principal in such crime committed the crime[s] of _ and (4) The
crime[s] of - was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of
the crime[s] of .
Id. at 258 n.3, 926 P.2d at 1018 n.3, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 832 n.3. This revision specifies
the target crime which the defendant may have originally contemplated. See id.
4. See id. at 254, 926 P.2d at 1015, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 829.
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The court first stated the fundamental principles of aiding and abetting
liability, and then explained the natural and probable consequences doc-
trine.6 In its analysis, the court set forth the elements of the natural and
probable consequences doctrine:
[TIhe trier of fact must find that the defendant, acting with (1) knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and (2) the intent or purpose of committing,
encouraging, or facilitating the commission of a predicate or target offense; (3) by
act or advice aided, promoted, encouraged or instigated, the commission of the
target crime .... (4) the defendant's confederate committed an offense other than
the target crime; and (5) the offense committed by the confederate was a natural
and probable consequence of the target crime that the defendant aided and abet-
ted.'
1. The trial court must identify and describe any target crimes which
the natural and probable consequences doctrine contemplates.
Justice Kennard, writing for the majority, addressed whether the trial
court must provide jury instructions identifying and describing target
crimes under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.7 Although
this was a case of first impression, the court first directed its attention to
an earlier case, People v. Failla,8 which also addressed a trial court's
failure to instruct jurors on an uncharged target offense.9 Applying
Failla to the instant case, the court held that a trial court has a duty to
identify and describe uncharged target offenses to jurors when the
prosecution's theory of liability relies on the uncharged offenses and sub-
stantial evidence supports the theory."0
The court opined that the identification of a target offense would aid
jurors in determining whether the charged crime was a natural and prob-
5. See id. at 262, 926 P.2d at 1020, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 834.
6. Id.
7. See id. at 266-70, 926 P.2d at 1023-26, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837-40. The defendant
Bray argued, and the court agreed, that the trial court should have given jury instruc-
tions, sua sponte, from the 1992 revision of CALMC No. 3.02, which would have
identified the target crime that may have led to the murder of Van Camp as a natural
and probable consequence. See id. at 265, 926 P.2d at 1023, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837.
8. 64 Cal. 2d 560, 414 P.2d 39, 51 Cal. Rptr. 103 (1966) (holding that in a prosecu-
tion for burglary, jurors must be instructed on the meaning of the term "felony" to
fully explain the element of intent).
9. See Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th at 266, 926 P.2d at 1023, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837.
10. See id. at 266-67, 926 P.2d at 1023, 58 CaL Rptr. 2d at 837.
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able consequence of the uncharged target crime." The court noted that
because of the potential difficulty of factual application to the five ele-
ments of the natural and probable consequences doctrine, 2 further in-
structions "describing each step in this process" would ensure that jurors
correctly applied the doctrine. 3
An additional concern of the court was "unguided speculation" by the
jurors. 4 Believing that jurors might convict a person on a "generalized
belief that the defendant intended to assist... unspecified 'nefarious'
conduct," the court reasoned that its decision was necessary to ensure
that jurors based their convictions on specific criminal conduct. 5
To avoid placing an additional burden on trial courts, the court imple-
mented a test which limits its holding."6 Under this test, when a prose-
cutor relies on the doctrine, the trial court should grant the prosecutor's
request for the instruction if substantial evidence supports a defendant's
intent to aid or abet a target offense and from the evidence a jury rea-
sonably could conclude that the committed crime was a natural and
probable consequence of the intended target crime."
2. The trial court's inadequate instruction on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine constituted harmless error.
Next, the court addressed the prejudicial effect of the trial court's
inadequate instructions regarding the natural and probable consequences
doctrine in this case." The court found that the error was harmless for
11. See id. at 267, 926 P.2d at 1024, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837-38.
12. See id. at 267, 926 P.2d at 1024, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838. The five elements are:
[WIhether the defendant (1) with knowledge of the confederate's unlawful
purpose, and (2) the intent of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the
commission of any target crime(s), (3) aided, promoted encouraged, or insti-
gated the commission of the target crime(s); whether (4) the defendant's con-
federate committed an offense other than the target crime(s); and whether
(6) the offense committed by the confederate was a natural and probable
consequence of the target crime(s) that the defendant encouraged or facilitat-
ed.
Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 267-68, 926 P.2d at 1024-25, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838-39.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 270-74, 926 P.2d at 1026-28, 58 CaL Rptr. 2d at 840-42.
two reasons."0 First, jury reliance on the doctrine was unlikely because
the parties did not refer to it when they addressed the jury.2" Second,
even if the jury had relied on the doctrine, there was no reasonable like-
lihood that the trial court's failure to specify assault with a deadly
weapon as a target crime caused the jury to misapply the doctrine.2"
3. Even if the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on
involuntary manslaughter, the error was harmless.
Finally, the court considered whether the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter 2 No determination of
trial court error was needed, however, because the court found no preju-
dice.' The trial court instructed the jury on first and second degree
murder and the jury convicted under first degree murder, necessarily
rejecting the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter.24
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk concurred with the majority, agreeing that there was no
reversible error in the appellate court's decision.25 He disagreed, howev-
er, with the majority's discussion regarding a trial court's duty to give
instructions on a target crime.26 Justice Mosk stated that the court
should be cautious when it; imposes, sua sponte, instructional duties on
trial courts, which are already burdened by similar obligations. '7 Justice
Mosk next expressed concern that the additional instructions would
misguide jurors, causing them to focus on inapplicable law rather than
the relevant facts of a case. 8 Finally, Justice Mosk stated that the in-
structions could impair a defendant's right to receive a fair trial and a
reliable outcome because jurors might emphasize the target crimes and
overlook the criminal activity at issue.'
19. See id. For a discussion of harmless error when a court fails to give proper jury
instructions, see 9 B.E. WrrFIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 341 (9th ed. 1985 &
Supp. 1996).
20. See Prettyman. 14 Cal. 4th at 273, 926 P.2d at 1028, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 274-76, 926 P.2d at 1028-30, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842-44.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 276, 926 P.2d at 1030, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844.
25. See id. at 277-83, 926 P.2d at 1030-35, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844-49 (Mosk, J., con-
curring).
26. See id. at 277, 926 P.2d at 1030, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844 (Mosk, J., concurring).
27. See id. at 278, 926 P.2d at 1031, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845 (Mosk, J., concurring).
28. See id. at 279, 926 P.2d at 1032, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 846 (Mosk, J., concurring).
29. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
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C. Justice Baxter's Concurring Opinion
Justice Baxter concurred with the majority opinion, finding no revers-
ible error.' He disagreed, however, with the majority's rationale for
finding the harmless error."s Justice Baxter argued that the harmless
error was not initiated by a failure to give additional instructions regard-
ing the natural and probable consequences doctrine, but rather arose
when the court instructed the jury, sua sponte, on a doctrine which was
factually inapplicable to the prosecution's case-in-chief.'
D. Justice Brown's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brown concurred in the judgment affirming the decision of the
court of appeal.' She dissented, however, from the majority's decision
to impose a duty on trial courts to instruct on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.' Justice Brown argued that such instructions
were likely to confuse jurors and "hopelessly derail the central fact-find-
ing task."' Further, she argued that the majority ignored the critical
role of causation, stating, "'[w]hether there is a nexus of foreseeability
between the predicate and the perpetrated offense depends not on crime
definitions but on the specific facts of each offense.'"'
III. IMPACT
Prior to Prettyman, the failure of the California Supreme Court to
directly impose a duty upon trial courts to describe and identify target
offenses in relation to the natural and probable consequences doctrine
resulted in conflicting precedents from appellate courts.37 While
30. See id. at 283, 926 P.2d at 1035, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849 (Baxter, J., concurring).
31. See id. at 283-84, 926 P.2d at 1035, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849 (Baxter, J., concur-
ring).
32. See id. (Baxter, J., concurring).
33. See id. at 284, 926 P.2d at 1035, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849 (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting).
34. See id. at 284, 926 P.2d at 1036, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849 (Brown, J., concurring
and dissenting).
35. Id. (Brown, J., concurring and dissenting).
36. Id. at 290, 926 P.2d at 1039, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 853 (quoting People v. Solis, 20
Cal. App. 4th 269, 273 (1993), 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 190 (1993), overnded by People v.
Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th 248, 926 P.2d 1013, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 827 (1996)) (Brown, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
37. See People v. Mouton, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1313, 1319, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 426
Prettyman eliminates this conflict, it may adversely impact trial courts
and jurors. By imposing a duty on trial courts to provide jury instruc-
tions, the court gives trial judges discretion regarding the prosecution of
a particular case.' This duty will burden trial judges who now must act
on their own initiative to avoid potentially reversible error.' This
decision's impact on jurors also is questionable. As the majority spec-
ulated, the description of a target offense may clarify the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, assisting jurors in their decisions and
simplifying the application of facts to the doctrine.40 As some of the
concurring opinions argued, however, the added instruction may appear
complicated to jurors, confusing them and causing them to lose sight of
the factual issues to be determined.4
(1993) (holding that trial courts have a duty to "instruct the jury on all general legal
principles raised by the evidence and necessary for the jury's understanding of the
case"); but see Solis, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 273, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190 (holding that "the
finder of fact need identify the nature of the predicate offense only in a generalized
manner"), overruled by People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th 248, 926 P.2d 10 13, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 827 (1996).
38. See 9 B.E. WmaN, CAUFORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal § 277 (9th ed. 1985 & Supp.
1996) (discussing the limits of a trial judge's legal discretion, and the possibility of
reversible error if no reasonable basis for the action is shown).
39. Requiring judicial discretion in determining whether the proffered evidence in a
given case substantially supports the natural and probable consequences doctrine may
prove problematic. See generally David McCord, "But Perry Mason Made it Look So
Easy!": The Admissibility of Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant to Suggest
that Someone Else is Guilty, 63 TENN. L REv. 917, 919 (1996) (giving "alter-native per-
petrator evidence the attention it merits"). Some scholars have argued that such an
approach "obscures the trial court's [traditional] obligation[s]." Id. at 933.
40. See Douglas W. Schwartz, Note, Imposing the Death Sentence for Felony Murder
on a Non-Triggerman, 37 STAN. L REV. 857 (1985) (discussing the death penalty as it
may be applied to an accomplice, regardless of the individual defendant's culpability in
a murder). Certain states impose the death sentence on accomplices to a capital crime;
therefore, the court may be attempting to err on the side of caution by giving the
jurors complete and thorough instructions necessary to reach the correct verdict. See
id.
41. See Christopher N. May, "What Do We Do Now?": Helping Juries Apply the In-
structions, 28 Loy. LA. L REv. 869 (1995) (arguing that a considerable body of evi-
dence shows that rewriting and simplifying the language of jury instructions significant-
ly increases jurors' understanding of the law); Robert P. Charrow & Veda I. Charrow,
Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psychilinguistic Study of Jury Instruc-
tions, 79 COLuM. L REV. 1306, 1333, 1370 (1979) (reporting a study in which mock
jurors who were read California jury instructions had a comprehension level of 44.796,
while their understanding of modified instructions was 59.296); William W. Schwarzer,
Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575 (1991) (arguing that jurors have difficulty under-
standing cases adequately). While this last article deals with the complexity of civil
litigation, it is relevant here in a discussion of a juror's potential confusion which may
be caused by increased complexity in criminal jury instructions.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court established new precedent in People v.
Prettyman, in which a trial court must provide a jury instruction to iden-
tify and describe the target crimes that a defendant might have assisted
in or encouraged whenever a prosecutor relies on the natural and proba-
ble consequences doctrine. While this holding imposes an added burden
on trial courts, the court has narrowed its focus to situations where a
prosecutor relies upon the doctrine and the evidence brought at trial
supports such an instruction. While the impact of this decision is some-
what unclear at this time, the scope of this holding may prove suffi-
ciently narrow to avoid the concurring Justices' concerns.
CHRISTIANE E. CARGILL
VI. FAMILY LAW
A creditor that forfeits a security interest in community
real property pursuant to former Civil Code section 5127
retains the rights of any other unsecured creditor to seek
a judgment against the debtor spouse for satisfaction of
the underlying debt and to enforce a money judgment
lien against the community estate: Lezne v. Security
Pacific Financial Services, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Lezine v. Security Pacific Financial Services, Inc.,' the California
Supreme Court addressed whether community real property remains
subject to a debt after the transfer of a security interest in the property,
which secured repayment of that debt, is found to have been void under
former Civil Code section 5127 (hereafter former section 5127). 2 The
supreme court affirmed the court of appeal's reversal of the trial court,3
1. 14 Cal. 4th 56, 925 P.2d 1002, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76 (1996). Chief Justice George
delivered the majority opinion, in which Justices Mosk, Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar,
Chin, and Brown concurred. See id. at 59-75, 925 P.2d at 1003-14, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
77-88.
2. See id. at 59-75, 925 P.2d at 1003-14, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 77-88. In Lezine, Henry
Lezine (Lezine), during his marriage to plaintiff Gloria Lezine, unilaterally transferred
two deeds of trust in community real property, one to Guardian Savings & Loan and
one to Security Pacific, in violation of former section 5127. See id. at 60-61, 925 P.2d
at 1004, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 78. The plaintiff, in addition to filing for dissolution of the
marriage, sought declaratory relief, quiet title, and cancellation of the deeds of trust
pursuant to the rules set forth in former section 5127 and Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan
& Ross, 54 Cal. 3d 26, 812 P.2d 931, 283 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1991) (holding that a transfer
to a spouse made in violation of former section 5127 was voidable in its entirety when
the nonconsenting spouse, during marriage, challenged the transfer in a timely manner).
See Lezine, 14 Cal. 4th at 61, 925 P.2d at 1004, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 78. After the court
awarded the encumbered property to the plaintiff as her separate property and award-
ed judgment in favor of Guardian and Security Pacific against Lezine personally, the
plaintiff sought to have the abstracts of judgment recorded by Guardian and Security
Pacific set aside pursuant to Droeger. See id. at 59, 925 P.2d at 1003, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 77. The trial court issued an order providing that the abstracts of judgment did not
constitute liens against the real property. See id. However, the court of appeal re-
versed. See id.; infra note 3 (discussing the court of appeal's rationale for reversing
the trial court).
3. See Lezine v. Security Pac. Fin. Servs., Inc., 37 Cal. App. 4th 1132, 44 Cal. Rptr.
2d 116 (1995), review granted and opinion superseded, 907 P.2d 1323, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d
777 (1995), affd, 14 Cal. 4th 56, 925 P.2d 1002, 568 Cal. Rptr. 2d 76 (1996). The court
of appeal reasoned that because the recording of the abstract of judgment was made
prior to the dissolution proceedings, a judgment lien that attached to the community
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and held that when a spouse improperly transfers a security interest in
community real property and the creditor subsequently forfeits the inter-
est pursuant to former section 5127, the community estate remains sub-
ject to the underlying debt and the loss of security does not extinguish
the debt.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
As a basis for its analysis, the majority set forth the applicable rules
governing the liability of community property for debts incurred during
the marriage.5 The court stated that "the liability of community property
property was created. See Lezine, 14 Cal. 4th at 62-63, 925 P.2d at 1005, 58 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 79. Accordingly, the court of appeal reversed the trial court after concluding that
the property awarded to the plaintiff at dissolution was taken subject to the judgment
lien held by Security Pacific. See id.
4. See id. at 70, 925 P.2d at 1010, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84. "Effective January 1,
1994, section 5127 was repealed and reenacted without substantive change as Family
Code section 1102." Id. at 59 n.i, 925 P.2d at 1003 n.1, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 77 n.l.
Former section 5127 provided in pertinent part that
"either spouse has the management and control of the community real prop-
erty . . . but both spouses either personally or by duly authorized agent,
must join in executing any instrument by which such community real proper-
ty or any interest therein is leased for a longer period than one year, or is
sold, conveyed, or encumbered .. ."
Id. at 66, 925 P.2d at 1007, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81 (quoting CAL CIV. CODE § 5127,
repealed by CAL. FAM. CODE § 1102 (West 1994)). See generally Elizabeth De Armond,
It Takes Two: Remodeling the Management and Control Provisions of Community
Property Law, 30 GONz. L REV. 235 (1995) (outlining the history of community proper-
ty law).
5. See Lezine, 14 Cal. 4th at 64, 925 P.2d at 1006, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 80. The ma-
jority cited the Family Code for the general rule regarding the liability of community
property:
"[E]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by statute, the community estate is
liable for a debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage, re-
gardless of which spouse has the management and control of the property
and regardless of whether one or both spouses are parties to the debt or to
a judgment for the debt"
Id. (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 910(a) (West 1994)). See generally 32 CAL JuR. 3D Fam-
ily Law § 474 (1994) (summarizing the requirements for the sale, conveyance, or en-
cumbrance of community real property and a nonconsenting spouse's recourse if such
requirements are not satisfied); 11 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFIORNIA LAW, Commu-
is not limited to debts incurred for the benefit of the community, but ex-
tends to debts incurred by one spouse alone exclusively for his or her
own personal benefit."6 Accordingly, the majority concluded that the
community property of the plaintiff and Lezine was liable for the loan
obligations owed to Guardian and Security Pacific, which were incurred
by Lezine without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff.7
Because it found that Security Pacific's judgment lien was created
before the real community property was awarded solely to the plaintiff in
the dissolution proceedings, the court determined the following: (1) that
the plaintiff took the property subject to the judgment lien; (2) that the
property remained liable for the satisfaction of the lien, notwithstanding
the fact that the underlying loan obligation was assigned to Lezine; and
(3) that the plaintiff had the right to seek reimbursement from Lezine to
the extent that the property was used to satisfy the lien.'
The majority next addressed whether former section 5127 and the
applicable cases were consistent with the rules and principles the court
nity Property § 151 (9th ed. 1990) (setting forth the general rule regarding the liability
of community property for debts incurred by one or both spouses).
6. Lezine, 14 Cal. 4th at 64, 925 P.2d at 1006, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 80 (citing Rob-
ertson v. Willis, 77 Cal. App. 3d 358, 362, 143 Cal. Rptr. 523, 527 (1978); Stratton v.
Superior Court, 87 Cal. App. 2d 809, 197 P.2d 821 (1948)); see also William A. Reppy,
Jr., Debt Collection from Married Californians: Problems Caused by Transmutations,
Single-Spouse Management, and Invalid Marriage, 18 SAN DIEGO L REv. 143, 169
(1981) (footnote omitted) (stating that "[iln effect, one spouse alone can indirectly
alienate community realty by incurring an enforceable obligation and refusing to pay
it").
7. See Lezine, 14 Cal. 4th at 64, 925 P.2d at 1006, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at, 80. The
court further stated that Security Pacific's recordation of an abstract of judgment cre-
ated a judgment lien that attached to the community property. See id. at 64-65, 925
P.2d at 1007, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 697.310, 697.340
(West 1995)). See generally 15A Am. Jun. 2D Community Property § 90 (2d ed. 1976)
(discussing the liabilities of the community estate in terms of obligations arising from
management of the estate).
8. See Lezine, 14 Cal. 4th at 65.66, 925 P.2d at 1007, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81. The
plaintiffs right to reimbursement, was codified in section 5120.160 of the Civil Code
(subdivisions (a)(2) and (b)), which was repealed without substantive change by Family
Code section 916, effective January 1, 1994. See id. at 65 n.5, 925 P.2d at 1007 n.5, 58
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81 n.5. See generally William A. Reppy, Jr., Acquisitions with a Mix
of Community and Separate Funds: Displacing California's Presumption qf Gift by
Recognizing Shared Ownership or a Right of Reimbursement, 31 IDAHO L REV. 965,
1028 n.236 (1995) ("Where the interest is community, the co-owning spouse who has
not joined in the deed of conveyance usually can recover from the other spouse's
grantee the entire community interest."); 32 CAL. JUt. 3D Family Law §§ 503-517
(1994) (setting forth the right to reimbursement of a spouse when the other spouse
applies community property to the satisfaction of a debt); 11 B.E. WrrIaN, SUMMARY OF
CALFORNIA LAw, Community Property § 157(a) (9th ed. 1990) (discussing a spouse's
right to reimbursement as established in section 5120(a) of the Civil Code).
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used in its analysis? After examining the language of former section
5127 and the decisions reached by earlier courts addressing similar is-
sues, the court found the same result. ° Accordingly, the majority stated
that "if the security interest is forfeited pursuant to former section 5127
the community remains liable.., for the underlying debt. The loss of the
security does not extinguish the underlying debt, or the character of that
unsecured debt as one for which the community estate is liable.""
Therefore, even though Security Pacific forfeited its security interest
pursuant to former section 5127, it could resort to the community estate
for satisfaction of the underlying debt, notwithstanding the fact that
Lezine incurred the debt unilaterally. 2
9. See Lezine, 14 Cal. 4th at 66-71, 925 P.2d at 1007-11, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81-85.
See generally Carol S. Bruch, Management Powers and Duties under California's Com-
munity Property Law, 34 HASTINGS U. 229 (1982) (setting forth existing and proposed
remedies for unauthorized transfers and discussing former Civil Code section 5127).
10. See Lezine, 14 Cal. 4th at 66-71, 925 P.2d at 1007-11, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 81-85;
Droeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross, 54 Cal. 3d 26, 812 P.2d 931, 283 Cal. Rptr. 584
(1991) (failing to address the effect of a cancellation of the deeds of trust at issue on
the underlying obligation for payment of attorney fees); Andrade Dev. Co. v. Martin,
138 Cal. App. 3d 330, 187 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1982) (holding that although a contract for
the sale of community property was voided pursuant to former section 5127, the bona
fide purchaser might be entitled to damages for breach of contract from the communi-
ty estate); Mark v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 122 Cal. App. 301, 9 P.2d 839 (1932) (hold-
ing that although the improper transfer of a security interest was voidable by the non-
consenting spouse, the community was required to reimburse the bona fide purchaser
for the consideration paid for the interest).
11. Lezine, 14 Cal. 4th at 70, 925 P.2d at 1010, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84; Mitchell v.
American Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 220, 167 Cal. Rptr. 760 (1980) (holding
that where the improper transfer that is set aside is an encumbrance, "what is re-
moved is only the encumbrance, without any effect upon the underlying obligation
which it secures"), overruling recognized by Lezine, 14 Cal. 4th 56, 925 P.2d 1002, 58
Cal. Rptr. 2d 76. See generally 32 CAL. Jui. 3D.Family Law §§ 479-483 (1994) (outlin-
ing the procedural aspects of setting aside a transfer that was in violation of statutory
requirements).
12. See Lezine, 14 Cal. 4th at 72, 925 P.2d at 1012, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86. The ma-
jority stated further that Security Pacific, after forfeiting its security interest, would be
placed in the same position as any other judgment creditor entitled to enforce the
judgment against the community estate. See id. at 73, 925 P.2d at 1012, 58 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 86; Carol S. Bruch, Protecting the Rights of Spouses in Intact Marriages: The
1987 California Community Property Reform and Why It Was So Hard to Get, 1990
Wis. L REv. 731, 743 n.35 (1990) (stating that "[tihis solution [that a third party
transferee should be permitted to assert rights as an unsecured creditor for reim-
bursement of consideration paid for the forfeited interest] would entail no violation of
community property management principles .. ).
Accordingly, the majority affirmed the conclusion of the court of ap-
peal, holding that the trial court "lacked authority to expunge Security
Pacific's judgment lien" after the plaintiff was awarded the property en-
cumbered by the lien."'
III. IMPACT
The majority's holding may negate a substantial portion of the relief
available under former section 5127 when, as in Lezine, the voidable
transfer is an interest securing repayment of a debt. 4 After the security
interest is set aside and an abstract of judgment is recorded, a judgment
is converted into a judgment lien against the real community property."s
Furthermore, a trend may evolve that places innocent nondebtor
spouses at a significant disadvantage because institutional lenders, such
as Security Pacific, are in a better position to prevent forgeries and de-
ception by debtor spouses."6
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the majority in Lezine concluded that where a creditor was
awarded a judgment and recorded an abstract of judgment creating a
judgment lien enforceable against a community estate, the forfeiture of a
security interest pursuant to former section 5127 had no effect on the
enforceability of the underlying debt." Applied to the instant case, Se-
curity Pacific's judgment lien is enforceable against the community es-
tate, notwithstanding the fact that its security interest was forfeited.
JOSEPH E. FOSS
13. Lezine, 14 Cal. 4th at 74, 925 P.2d at 1013, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87.
14. See id. at 73, 925 P.2d at 1012, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 75, 925 P.2d at 1013-14, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87-88.
17. See id. at 59-75, 925 P.2d at 1003-14, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 77-88.
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VII. HUSBAND AND WIFE
A county acting on behalf of a custodial parent may
successfully bring a cause of action against the non-cus-
todial parent for child support and arrearages, even
though the custodial parent actively concealed the child's
whereabouts, if the claim is brought before the child
reaches the age of majority: In re Marriage of Comer.
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re Marriage of Comer,1 the California Supreme Court considered
whether a father had a valid defense against a mother's claim for child
support and arrearages, brought on her behalf by the State, when she
concealed the location of their two children from him.2 The trial court
reduced the amount of the existing child support decree between the
two parties and ordered Mr. Comer to pay $4952 in arrearages, but it
rejected the county's argument for past support during a period when the
1. 14 Cal. 4th 504, 927 P.2d 265, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155 (1996). Chief Justice George
wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Kennard, Werdegar, and Chin concurred.
See id. at 509-30, 927 P.2d at 266-79, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 155-69. Justice Mosk wrote a
separate concurring opinion. See id. at 530-31, 927 P.2d at 279-80, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
169-70 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Baxter also wrote a concurring opinion in which
Justice Brown concurred. See id at 531-43, 927 P.2d at 280-88, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170-
78 (Baxter, J., concurring).
2. See id. at 515-16, 927 P.2d at 270, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160. The plaintiff, Donna
Jean Comer, and the defendant, Gerald Lee Comer, were married and had two children
while living in Florida in the early 1980s. See id. at 510-11, 927 P.2d at 266, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 156. In 1985, Mrs. Comer and the children moved to Gila County, Arizona,
where she obtained a divorce. See id. Despite Mr. Corner's absence from the proceed-
ings, the Gila County court granted custody of the children to the mother, allowed
visitation by the father, and awarded $700 per month in child support. See id. at 511,
927 P.2d at 267, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157. Mrs. Comer did not tell her ex-husband
where she and the children were living. See id. Consequently, Mr. Comer paid only
$400 in child support over a seven year period. See id. Between 1985 and 1992, Mrs.
Comer collected welfare from Gila County and assigned to them her legal "rights to all
current and past due support." See id. In late 1992, Gila County sued Mr. Comer, who
had moved to Orange County, California, to enforce the 1985 child support order and
collect all past-due amounts. See id. In response, Mr. Comer asserted a number of
defenses, including the defense that Mrs. Comer was estopped from collecting child
support because she concealed her whereabouts and those of their children. See id. at
512-13, 927 P.2d at 268, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157-58.
mother actively concealed the children from the father.3 The court of
appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the mother's
concealment of the children estopped the State from collecting on its
assigned right to receive support arrearages.4 The California Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeal, and held that a non-custodial parent
cannot assert an estoppel defense against a governmental entity if the
concealment ends when the child is a minor.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The California Supreme Court began its opinion by reviewing In re
Marriage of Damico, in which the court held that a custodial parent
who concealed a child from a non-custodial parent until the minor
reached adulthood may be estopped from seeking child support
arrearages.7 The court reasoned in Damico that awarding support to
benefit a minor child is defeated when that child reaches adulthood be-
cause it would simply be a financial windfall to the custodial parent?
The supreme court illustrated two factors that distinguished the instant
case from Damico. First, the Comer children were still minors; and sec-
ond, the government was a party to the suit in Comer.9
Accordingly, the supreme court held that when the concealment of a
child ends before the child reaches adulthood, the non-custodial parent
does not have a valid defense to paying arrearages in child support be-
3. See id. at 513, 927 P.2d at 268, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158. The trial court, reasoned
that the father could not send child support or serve his ex-wife with proper docu-
ments for modification of the court order if he did not know her address. See id.
4. See id. at 514, 927 P.2d at 268, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158; see also Case Develop-
ments, Child Support, Does Concealment Bar Collection of Child Support?, FAIR$HARE,
Jan. 1994, at 32 (noting conflicting holdings regarding the concealment defense); Ira
Lurvey, California: 1993 Bellwether Matrimonial Cases, FAIR$HARE, Mar. 1995, at 19
(same).
5. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 510, 927 P.2d at 266, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
6. 7 Cal. 4th 673, 872 P.2d 126, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 787 (1994). For a discussion of
Damico, see April Anstett, California Supreme Court Survey, Review of Decisions, 22
PEPP. L REv. 1739 (1995).
7. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 514-15, 927 P.2d at 269, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159;
Damico, 7 Cal. 4th at 676, 872 P.2d at 126, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787. In Damico, the
court expressed no opinion as to whether a custodial parent would be estopped from
collecting arrearages if the child's concealment ended while the child was a minor. See
id. at 685, 872 P.2d at 133, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794. The court also declined to decide
whether concealment by a custodial parent would estop a governmental agency from
recouping public assistance payments made to that parent' See id.
8. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 514-15, 927 P.2d at 269, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159.
9. See id. at 515, 927 P.2d at. 269, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159.
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cause the child may still reap the benefits of the payments. ° Further-
more, the court reasoned that its holding complied with the public policy
of separating the legal issues of support and visitation."
Next, the court noted that during the pendency of the appeal to the
supreme court, the federal government passed the Full Faith and Credit
for Child Support Orders Act (FFCCSOA). 2 The plaintiff argued that the
FFCCSOA precluded the defendant from raising the concealment de-
fense, and the defendant contended that, under the choice of law pro-
visions of the FFCCSOA, the plaintiffs concealment constituted a "com-
plete defense" for owed child support.3 The court, however, decided
that any issues raised by passage of the FFCCSOA were irrelevant be-
cause the court already rejected the defendant's concept of the estoppel
defense. 4
The court then considered whether a governmental entity, which had
been assigned the custodial parent's right to receive past-due child sup-
port, could be estopped from collecting those arrearages based upon the
mother's concealment of herself and the child. 5 The court concluded
that, as assignees of the custodial parent's right to sue for child support,
the government assumes the same rights as the custodial parent."6 Ac-
10. See id. at 51516, 927 P.2d at 270, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160-61.
11. See id. at 516, 927 P.2d at 270, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160. In Moffat v. Moffat, 27
Cal. 3d 645, 612 P.2d 967, 165 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1980), the supreme court noted that
while it may seem unfair to the non-custodial parent who wants to withhold support
until the custodial parent complies with visitation orders, the support of the child
"must be the paramount consideration." See id. at 651, 612 P.2d at 970, 165 Cal. Rptr.
at 880; see also 10 B.E. WIaMN, SUMMARY OF CAuFORmA LAW, Parent and Child
§ 326B(6) (Supp. 1996) (positing that support issues should be kept separate from
visitation issues); 33 CAL JuR. 3D Family Law § 1084 (1994) (same). But see Greg
Geisman, Strengthening the Weak Link in the Family Law Chain: Child Support and
Visitation as Complementary Activities, 38 S.D. L REv. 568 (1993) (arguing the inher-
ent connection between child support and visitation).
12. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 518, 927 P.2d at 271-72, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161-62.
The FFCCSOA, which mandates that state courts award "full faith and credit" to child
support decrees from other states, is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994).
13. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 519, 927 P.2d at 272, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 520, 927 P.2d at 272, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162.
16. See id. at 520-25, 927 P.2d at 272-76, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162-66. The court relied
on several statutes and cases to support this conclusion. See CAL FAM. CODE § 4822
(West 1994).(stating that the government may bring a cause of action for child support
when they furnish support to a custodial parent); State of Washington ex rel. Burton v.
Leyser, 196 Cal. App. 3d 451, 457, 241 Cal. Rptr. 812, 816 (1987) (stating that "[a] pub-
cordingly, the court concluded that because the father could not use the
"concealment defense" against the mother, he could not use it against the
State in their action to recover child support arrearages. 7
In response to the father's argument that the State did not attempt to
locate him to enforce the support decree, the court concluded that there
was no authority for his position because the father had a duty to sup-
port his children regardless of the State's failure to act.'" Additionally,
the court noted that the State provides resources to non-custodial par-
ents to help locate children, including the California District Attorney's
Office and the California Parent Locator Service. 9 While the court rec-
ognized the near impossibility of providing notice to non-custodial par-
ents that custodial parents assigned their child support rights to the gov-
ernment, the court emphasized the State's strong public policies of con-
serving tax dollars and preserving family unity.2" The court, while sym-
pathizing with non-custodial parents whose children are hidden from
them, concluded by reiterating that such concealment is not a legal de-
fense to a failure to pay child support.2'
lic agency cannot be estopped because of the conduct of the parents"); In me Marriage
of Kelley, 186 Cal. App. 3d 613, 231 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1986) (rejecting the argument that
the State is subject to the same defenses as the custodial parent); In mn Marriage of
Lugo, 170 Cal. App. 3d 427, 217 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1985) (asserting that a non-custodial
parent cannot claim a valid estoppel defense against the State unless the State makes
some affirmative action upon which the defendant relies); In re Marriage of Shore, 71
Cal. App. 3d 290, 139 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1977) (holding that the State's cause of action is
not dependent on bad faith actions of a custodial parent).
The court disagreed with one case upon which the appellate court relied, In re
Marriage of Smith, 209 Cal. App. 3d 196, 257 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1989), which held that the
government, as assignee of rights to child support, was subject to the same defenses
as the assignor. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 523-24, 927 P.2d at 275, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
165. The majority reasoned that the Smith court failed to consider all of the policy
implications of such a rule and reiterated that because the father did not have a "con-
cealment defense" against the mother, he could not assert the defense against the
State. See id. at 523-25, 927 P.2d at 275-76, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165-66.
17. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 525, 927 P.2d at 276, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166.
18. See id. at 525-26, 927 P.2d at 276-77, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166-67.
19. See id. at 526-27, 927 P.2d at 277, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167.
20. See id. at 527-29, 927 P.2d at 277-79, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167-69.
21. See id. at 529-30, 927 P.2d at 279, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169. But see Ira H.
Lurvey, What Goes Around Comes Around-Even in Family Law, FAM. ADvoc., Winter
1995, at 6 (describing the act of forcing a parent to pay support after the other parent
hides the child as "violence").
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B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk wrote separately to confirm that the majority's holding
was consistent with Damico.' He analogized the child support system
to a trust, where the custodial parent is the trustee and the children are
the beneficiaries.' He argued that the holdings in Comer and Damico
simply mean that during the minority of the child, the trustee cannot de-
prive the child of support. However, once the child reaches the age of
majority, the trust terminates.24
C. Justice Baxter's Concurring Opinion
Justice Baxter joined the majority's holding but additionally asserted
that the concealment defense should never be recognized, and that
Damico should be overruled.25 He argued that the concealment defense
violates public policy because it promotes distance and disinterest by
non-custodial parents, by encouraging them to stay away until the child
reaches the age of majority to avoid financial obligations.2" Furthermore,
Justice Baxter reasoned that minor children may still benefit from the
child support award because any awards will go to the government as
assignees of the child support rights.7 He blasted Damico, labeling it "a
judicial effort to punish custodial parents who deny non-custodial par-
ents access to their children."28
Justice Baxter concluded his concurring opinion by detailing how the
majority's holding in Damico conflicts with federal law.' He reasoned
22. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 530-31, 927 P.2d at 279-80, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169-70
(Mosk, J., concurring).
23. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
24. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
25. See id. at 531-32, 927 P.2d at 280, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170 (Baxter, J., concur-
ring); see also Rebecca C. Raskin, Fisco v. Department of Human Services The Ineq-
uity of Equitable Defenses in Child Support Arrearage Cases, 48 ME. L REV. 153
(1996) (arguing that equitable defenses should not be recognized in the area of child
support).
26. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 532, 927 P.2d at 281, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171 (Baxter,
J., concurring). Justice Baxter also pointed out that California law allows the collection
of arrearages for up to 10 years after the child reaches the age of majority. See id.
(Baxter, J., concurring).
27. See id. at 533, 927 P.2d at 281, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171 (Baxter, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 534, 927 P.2d at 282, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172 (Baxter, J., concurring).
29. See id. at 534-43, 927 P.2d at 282-88, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172-78 (Baxter, J., con-
curring); cf. Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B. Walker, Family Law in the Fifty States:
291
that the purpose of federal legislation was to create uniformity through-
out the states to ensure that different states do not allow different de-
fenses.' Finally, Justice Baxter asserted that allowing the concealment
defense once the child reaches the age of majority deprives the custodial
parents of property rights to enforce obligations owed to them without
due process.31
II. IMPACT
On its face, the Comer opinion creates a bright line rule that dictates
when the concealment defense may properly be asserted.' The court
conditioned its holding on a determination of whether the child has
reached adulthood.' However, this test is inconsistent with the applica-
ble statute of limitations which allows a custodial parent to sue for child
support arrearages up to ten years after the child reaches the age of
majority.3
The majority's holding allows non-custodial parents to successfully
argue the concealment defense once the child reaches age eighteen.'
Consequently, the holding may encourage non-custodial parents to avoid
contact with their children until they reach that magic age.36 The rule
adopted by the court also presents attorneys with the ethical dilemma of
how to advise non-custodial parents. 7 On the other hand, custodial par-
ents and county officials now have an added incentive to end conceal-
An Overview, 22 FAM. LQ. 367 (1989) (providing an overview of family law distinctions
between states). For a discussion of uniform federal legislation for child support, see
Robert E. Oliphant, Is Sweeping Change Possible? Minnesota Adopts the Uniform In-
terstate Family Support Act, 21 WM. MrrCHELL L REv. 989 (1996).
30. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 535, 927 P.2d at 282, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172 (Baxter,
J., concurring). Justice Baxter wrote that Damico's equitable defense to URESA trans-
formed "routine matter[s] . . . [into] full blown lawsuit[s] over concealment," and con-
ditioned support on visitation compliance-a concept that directly contradicts California
case law. See id. at 536, 927 P.2d at 283, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173 (Baxter, J., concur-
ring); see also 33 CAL. JuR. 3D Family Law § 1103 (1994) (noting that the California
Legislature passed guidelines "to ensure that California remains in compliance with fed-
eral regulations for child support").
31. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 541, 927 P.2d at 286, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 176 (Baxter,
J., concurring). For a discussion of custodial parents' remedies, see 10 B.E. WrrIN,
SUMMARY OF CAuFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child § 325B (Supp. 1996).
32. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 510, 927 P.2d at 266, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
33. See id.
34. See supra note 25.
35. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 510, 927 P.2d at 266, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
36. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
37. See id.
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ment of children from non-custodial parents and to encourage continuing
contact between them.38
IV. CONCLUSION
In Comer, the California Supreme Court examined the equitable con-
cealment defense to child support payments and decided to draw a
bright line rule based on the age of the child at the time the concealment
ends.' Consequently, non-custodial parents have one less excuse for
avoiding support of their children and custodial parents have a financial
incentive to open channels of communication and end concealment.4"
PAMELA L. SCHLEHER
38. See id.
39. See Comer, 14 Cal. 4th at 510, 927 P.2d at 266, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156.
40. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. See generally 10 B.E. WrrKIN, SUM-
MARY OF CAuFoRNIA LAW, Parent and Child § 324 (9th ed. 1989) (outlining a list of
defenses to paying child support).
VIII. INJUNCTIONS
An injunction prohibiting gang members from certain
lawful and unlawful conduct did not violate the First
Amendment and was neither overbroad nor void for
vagueness. Additionally, the Street Terrorism Enforce-
ment and Prevention Act does not preempt a city's use of
public nuisance statutes to abate gang activity: People
ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna,' the California Supreme Court con-
sidered whether an injunction preventing gang members from appearing
in public with other gang members violates the First Amendment,
whether the injunction was overbroad or void for vagueness, whether the
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act was the ex-
clusive means of enjoining criminal street gang activity, and whether the
gang members' conduct constituted a public nuisance.2 The trial court
1. 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 929 P.2d 596, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (1997). Justice Brown wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice George and Justices Baxter and Werdegar
concurred. See id. at 1099-126, 929 P.2d at 601-19, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282-300. Justice
Kennard wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. See id. at 1126-28, 929 P.2d at 619-
20, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 300-01 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Chin
also wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. See id. at 1128-32, 929 P.2d at 620-23,
60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 301-04 (Chin, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk wrote a
dissenting opinion. See id. at 1132-48, 929 P.2d at 623-33, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 304-14
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
2. See id. at 1090-126, 929 P.2d at 596-619, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277-300. In Ga/o,
the City of San Jose sought to enjoin individual members of a criminal street gang
known as Varrio Sureno Town (VST), or Varrio Sureno locos (VSL), pursuant to sec-
tion 731 of the California Code of Civil Procedure and section 3480 of the Civil Code,
California's public nuisance statutes. See id. at 1100, 929 P.2d at 601, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 282. The City submitted declarations from 48 neighbors describing in graphic detail
the gang members' conduct See id. Descriptions of the conduct included the following:
the open consumption of alcohol and drugs; loud talking and music; vulgarity and pro-
fanity; murder, attempted murder, and other violent crimes; urinating on residents'
homes, using homes as escape routes, obstructing traffic on public roads, and vandaliz-
ing property and vehicles; and verbal harassment, physical intimidation, and threats of
retaliation against anyone who complained to the police. See id. at 1100, 929 P.2d at
601-02, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282-83. The City's complaint alleged that the gang members'
conduct "constitute[d] a public nuisance ...injurious to the health, indecent or offen-
sive to the senses, [and] an obstruction to the free use of property so as to interfere
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . ." Id. at 1100-01, 929 P.2d at
602, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283. The superior court, finding "the prospect of 'geat and
irreparable injury' and the absence of 'a plain, adequate and speedy remedy at law,'"
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granted a temporary restraining order, followed by a preliminary injunc-
tion.3 The court of appeal upheld that portion of the injunction enjoining
conduct which was independently criminal in nature.4 The court of ap-
peal also ruled that many provisions of the injunction, including para-
graphs (a) and (k), either violated the First Amendment's right to associ-
ation or were overbroad or void for vagueness.' Reversing the court of
appeal, the supreme court held that paragraphs (a) and (k) did not vio-
late the First or Fifth Amendments.
II. TREATMENT
A. Justice Brown's Majority Opinion
1. The superior court acted within the scope of its equitable
jurisdiction to enjoin a public nuisance.
The court began its analysis by discussing the scope and purpose of
public nuisance law.' Relying on the theory of a social contract between
the government and its citizens,' the court stated that the government's
primary obligation is to maintain a decent society, while a citizen's recip-
rocal duty is to accept societally-imposed standards in place of his or her
granted an ex parte temporary restraining order enjoining thirty-eight defendants indi-
vidually named in the complaint and issued an order to show cause. See id. at 1101,
929 P.2d at 602, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283. Only five defendants responded to the order
to show cause, which resulted in the issuance of a preliminary injunction against the
remaining thirty-three defendants. See id. Following the court of appeal's invalidation of
the injunction, the City challenged the reversal of paragraphs (a) and (k). See id.
3. See id. at 1101, 929 P.2d at 602, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283.
4. See id.
5. See 14. Paragraph (a) enjoined the following acts: "Standing, sitting, walking,
driving, gathering or appearing anywhere in public view with any other defendant here-
in, or with any other known 'VST' . . . member[.]" Id. at 1135 n.3, 929 P.2d at 624 n.3,
60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 305 n.3 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Paragraph (k) enjoined the following
acts: "In any manner confronting, intimidating, annoying, harassing, threatening, chal-
lenging, provoking, assaulting and/or battering any residents or patrons, or visitors to
'Rocksprings', or any other persons who are known to have complained about gang
activities ... ." Id. at 1135 n.3, 929 P.2d at 625 n.3, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 306 n.3 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
6. See id. at 1126, 929 P.2d at 619, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 300.
7. See id. at 1102-03, 929 P.2d at 602-03, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283-84.
8. The court relied on Montesqieu, Madison, and Locke. See id. at 1102-03, 929
P.2d at 603, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284.
own.9 The court then stated that a principal use of the public nuisance
doctrine was the "maintenance of public order-tranquillity, security and
protection-when the criminal law proves inadequate."" After recount-
ing the historical origin of public nuisance as an offense against the pub-
lic, the court stated that California's codification of nuisance embraced
the same purpose." The court noted that People v. Lim 2 warned of
the judicial expansion of the definition of a public nuisance when grant-
ing injunctions on behalf of the state, but the court was satisfied that the
Legislature's ultimate authority to define a nuisance served as a check on
the potential for judicial activism."s The court then stated that in addi-
tion to property rights, public and social interests deserve equity's pro-
tection via public nuisance law." The court addressed the court of
appeal's conclusion that a public nuisance can only enjoin independently
criminal acts. 5 The court reasoned that under California's statutory nui-
sance scheme every public nuisance is also a criminal offense, but not
every act must be precluded by criminal law (aside from section 370 of
the Penal Code) to constitute a public nuisance." The supreme court
concluded that the superior court acted within its equitable jurisdiction
when it enjoined acts not independently criminal in nature. 7
9. See id. at 1102, 929 P.2d at 603, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284.
10. Id. at 1103, 929 P.2d at 603, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284.
11. See id. at 1103-04, 929 P.2d at 603-04, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284-85; see also CAL
CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 1997) (defining nuisance as anything "injurious to health ...
or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property,
so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property"); CAL CiV. CODE
§ 3480 (West 1997) ("A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an en-
tire community or neighborhood . . . . "); CAL. CIrv. CODE § 3491 (West 1997) (stating
that the remedies for public nuisance are indictment or information, a civil action, or
abatement); CAL PENAL CODE § 372n (regarding public nuisance as a misdemeanor).
See generally 11 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Equity §§ 121-124, 143 (9th
ed. 1990 & Supp. 1996) (defining nuisance and distinguishing between public and pri-
vate nuisance and declaring public nuisance a misdemeanor); 47 CAL Ju. 3D .Nuisance
§ 24 (1979 & Supp. 1997) (distinguishing between public and private nuisance).
12. 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P.2d 472 (1941).
13. See Gallo, 14 Cal. 4th at 1106-07, 929 P.2d at 605-06, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286-87.
14. See id, at 1107, 929 P.2d at 606, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287.
15. See id. For a discussion of the implications of using civil remedies for criminal
conduct, see Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTNGS UJ. 1325 (1991).
16. See Gallo, 14 Cal. 4th at 1108-09, 929 P.2d at 607, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288.
17. See id. See generally 47 CAL Jun. 3D Nuisance § 42 (1979 & Supp. 1997) (stat-
ing that the superior court has jurisdiction over public nuisance actions).
[Vol. 25: 183, 1997] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
2. Paragraphs (a) and (k) do not violate the First Amendment's
right to association, nor are they overbroad or void for vagueness.
The court applied the constitutional standard enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees"8 to determine
whether the injunction violated the gang members' right to
association. 9 The court concluded that the gang activity at issue did not
come within either of the two protected classes of association.2' The
court further foreclosed any opportunity for protection based on the
freedom of association by stating that "the First Amendment, 'does not
extend to joining with others for the purpose of depriving third parties of
their lawful rights.'"'"
The court then addressed the court of appeal's conclusion that para-
graph (a) of the injunction was overbroad.' The court explained the
overbreadth doctrine as "the inhibitory effect a contested statute may
18. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In Jaycees, the Court held that rights of association are lim-
ited to two types of classifications as follows: (1) association for the purpose of exer-
cising specific First Amendment rights such as protected speech or religious activities,
and (2) association for the purpose of maintaining certain intimate human relationships.
See id. at 617-18. The latter commonly applies to families, but may also apply to asso-
ciations with "such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in deci-
sions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects
of the relationship." Id. at 620. For a discussion of Jaycees' impact on the right to
association, see Douglas 0. Under, Comment, Freedom of Association After Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 82 MIcH. L REV. 1878 (1984).
19. See Gallo, 14 Cal. 4th at 1110-11, 929 P.2d at 608, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289. For a
general discussion of the freedom of association and its limits, see 13 CAL. Jun. 3D
Constitutional Law §§ 268-269 (1989 & Supp. 1997).
20. See Gallo, 14 Cal. 4th at 1111, 929 P.2d at 608, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289. Ad-
dressing the issue of association for the exercise of First Amendment rights, the court
stated that the "loosely structured, elective form of social association ... is in itself
insufficient to command constitutional protection ... ." Id at 1111, 929 P.2d at 609,
60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290. Addressing the intimate association category, the court stated
that although gangs "may thus share one or two of the characteristics that define in-
trinsically valuable and constitutionally protected associations," the type of association
intended to be protected is "a narrow band of affiliations that permit deep and endur-
ing personal bonds to flourish, inculcating and nourishing civilization's fundamental val-
ues . . . ." Id. at 1112, 929 P.2d at 609, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290. The court also stated
that it did not consider the activities of the gang to be either "private or intimate as
constitutionally defined." Id.
21. See id. (quoting Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2530
(1994)).
22. See id. at 1112-15, 929 P.2d at 609-11, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290-92.
exert on the freedom of those who, although possibly subject to its
reach, are not before the court."' The court rejected the claim of over-
breadth, reasoning that the doctrine was inapplicable.24 The court stated
that the doctrine was intended to protect absent members of a class
from being inhibited by a statute that may apply to them, but concluded
that injunctions are different because they are addressed to identifiable
members of a class, all of whom are before the court, and the enjoined
conduct is described with particularity.2"
The court then addressed the court of appeal's conclusion that para-
graphs (a) and (k) of the injunction were void for vagueness.26 The
court stated that vagueness is grounds for invalidation when a vague law
fails to provide adequate notice to the citizenry of what conduct is pro-
hibited, potentially resulting in arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment.27 The court followed two guidelines provided by the United States
Supreme Court. First, "abstract legal commands must be applied in a
specific context."s Second, the court must determine whether the in-
junction satisfies the principle of "reasonable specificity," which states
that a law is not void for vagueness where a reasonable construction can
give its terms reasonably certain meaning.' The court addressed para-
graph (a)'s prohibition against associating with "known" gang mem-
bers.' The court disagreed with the court of appeal and stated that the
23. Id. at 1113, 929 P.2d at 610, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291 (italics in original); see also
16A AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law §§ 460-462 (1979 & Supp. 1993) (discussing over-
breadth of legislation generally). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of
Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991) (defining overbreadth and providing an approach
for its analysis).
24. See Gallo, 14 Cal. 4th. at 1113-15, 929 P.2d at 610-11, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291-92.
25. See id. at 1114, 929 P.2d at 611, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292. The court also relied
on Madsen to conclude that, in the context of overbreadth, injunctions are different
than statutes. See id. Bryan K Eliott, Note, Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.:
Heightened Scrutiny for Injunctions Implicating First Amendment Freedoms, 24 CAP.
U. L REv. 457 (1995) (discussing the same); Mathew D. Stayer, Injunctive Relief and
the Madsen Test, 14 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 465 (1995) (addressing the impact of
Madsen on injunctions against speech activity).
26. See Gallo, 14 Cal. 4th at 1115, 929 P.2d at 611, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292. See
generally 16A AM. Jun. 2D Constitutional Law § 459 (1979 & Supp. 1997) (discussing
vagueness in a First Amendment context).
27. See Galo, 14 Cal. 4th at 1115-16, 929 P.2d at 611-12, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292-93.
28. Id. at 1116, 929 P.2d at 612, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293.
29. See id. at 1117, 929 P.2d at 612-13, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293-94. The court rea-
soned that due to the lack of precision inherent in words, requiring a higher standard
would be impractical. See id. The court further reasoned that if the terms were rea-
sonably certain, it would not be "unfair to require that one who deliberately goes per-
ilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross
the line." Id. (quoting Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952)).
30. See id. at 1117-18, 929 P.2d at 613, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294.
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word "known" fairly implied that the city would have to establish a
defendant's own knowledge of his associate's gang membership, thus
withstanding the challenge on vagueness grounds.3' The court also dis-
agreed with the court of appeal's conclusion regarding paragraph (k) for
two reasons.3 First, the knowledge requirement, like paragraph (a), was
fairly implied.3 Second, when considered in the context of the in-
junction, words describing the prohibited conduct were sufficiently def-
nite.34
3. The STEP Act is not the exclusive means of abating criminal
gang activity as a public nuisance.
The court summarily rejected the gang members' argument that the
Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act3 was the exclusive
means of enjoining criminal street gang activity.3 Relying on express
language within the statute, the court rejected the preemption claim.37
4. The preliminary injunction's substantive limits are valid, the
enjoined activity is within the statutory definition of public
nuisance, and the provisions comply with the constitutional
standard of burdening no more speech than is necessary.
Examining the neighbors' declarations in light of the statutory re-
quirements of public nuisance, the court held that the enjoined activity
was within the statutory definition.3" The court then considered whether
31. See id.
32. See id. at 1118, 929 P.2d at 613, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294.
33. See id.
34. See id. The court also noted that the Madsen court upheld similar terminology
against a vagueness challenge. See id
35. CAL PENAL CODE §§ 186.20-.28 (Deering 1997).
36. See Gallo, 14 Cal. 4th at 1119, 929 P.2d at 614, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 295.
37. See id.; see also CAL PENAL CODE § 186.25 (Deering 1997) ("IT]his chapter shall
be construed as providing alternative remedies and not as preempting the field."). See
generally Omar Saleem, Killing the Proverbial Two Birds with One Stone: Using En-
vironmental Statutes and Nuisance to Combat the Crime of Illegal Drug Trafficking,
100 DicK L. REv. 685 (1996) (discussing additional means of enjoining criminal activi-
ty); Suzanne G. Lieberman, Note, Drug Dealing and Street Gangs-the New Nuisances:
Modernizing Old Theories and Bringing Neighbors Together in the War Against
Crime, 50 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L 235 (1996) (discussing nuisance and other
theories of liability).
38. See Gallo, 14 Cal. 4th at 1120, 929 P.2d at 614-15, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 295-96;
the activity enjoined by paragraph (a) burdened more speech than neces-
sary to serve an important government interest.3 The court stated that
it was the congregation of gang members that created the public nui-
sance and enjoining the association of two members was not excessive,
particularly in light of the "carnival-like atmosphere of collective may-
hem" described in the declarations." The court further stated that the
impact on protected speech was minimal because most of the gang's
protected speech was "inextricably intertwined with unlawful conduct,"
either criminal or civil.4 Additionally, because the injunction only ap-
plied to a limited geographical area, the court concluded that paragraph
(a) was valid.42 Based on the premise that violence and threats of vio-
lence are not protected speech, the court reached the same conclusion
with respect to paragraph (k).'
5. Individualized proof is not required for the entry of a preliminary
injunction upon a showing that it is the gang, acting through its
individual members, that is responsible for the conditions
prevailing.
In determining to whom the preliminary injunction applied, the court
rejected the gang members' contention that each member, in order to be
bound, must have "a specific intent to further an unlawful aim embraced
by [the gang]."" Instead, the court stated that courts may enjoin an en-
tire organization when acts that are "themselves peaceful... are en-
meshed with contemporaneously violent conduct which is concededly
outlawed."45 Because the city could have enjoined the gang as an entity,
the court concluded that enjoining its individual members was also val-
id."
supra notes 2 and 11 (comparing the activity complained of and statutory definitions).
39. See GaUo, 14 Cal. 4th at 1120-21, 929 P.2d at 615, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 296.
40. See id. at 1121, 929 P.2d at 615, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 296.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 1122, 929 P.2d at 616, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 297.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 1122-23, 929 P.2d at 616, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 297 (quoting NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 925 (1982)). But see Christopher S. Yoo, Com-
ment, The Constitutionality of Enjoining Criminal Street Gangs as Public Nuisances,
89 Nw. U. L. REv. 212, 237 (1994) (suggesting that courts scrutinize the determination
of each defendant's involvement in gang activity).
45. Gallo, 14 Cal. 4th at 1123, 929 P.2d at 617, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 298 (quoting Milk
Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 292 (1941)).
46. See id. at 1125, 929 P.2d at 618, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 299.
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B. Justice Kennard's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard concurred with the majority on the validity of para-
graph (k), but dissented on the validity of paragraph (a).47 Justice
Kennard stated that the prohibitions of paragraph (a) were not tailored
narrowly enough to achieve the government goal with a minimal level of
infringement upon protected interests.' She further stated that "a state
may not make criminal the exercise of the right of assembly simply be-
cause its exercise may offend some people."49
C. Justice Chin's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Chin concurred with the majority on the general validity of
paragraphs (a) and (k), but dissented with respect to applying the indunc-
tion to two of the thirty-eight defendants.' While he agreed with the
majority's application of Milk Wagon Drivers, Justice Chin stated that
Claiborne Hardware should also apply, requiring evidence of specific
intent to participate in the enjoined activity.5 ' Justice Chin argued that
applying these standards simultaneously was not inconsistent because
one could infer the specific intent to participate from membership in an
organization whose purpose is clearly established.' Because the city's
criteria for gang membership did not include the intent to promote the
gang's illicit purposes, Justice Chin concluded that membership alone
was insufficient to infer the members' criminal intent.'
47. See id. at 1126-27, 929 P.2d at 619-20, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 300-01 (Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
48. See id. at 1127, 929 P.2d at 620, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 301 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting) (citing Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615-16 (1971)).
49. Id. at 1127, 929 P.2d at 619, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 300 (Kennard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
50. See id. at 1128, 929 P.2d at 620, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 301 (Chin, J., concurring
and dissenting). For a discussion of the difficulty of determining gang membership, see
Susan L Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA L REV.
739, 746-51 (1990).
51. See Ga/o, 14 Cal. 4th at 1129, 929 P.2d at 620, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 301 (Chin, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
52. See id. at 1129-30, 929 P.2d at 621, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 302 (Chin, J., concurring
and dissenting).
53. See id. at 1131, 929 P.2d at 622, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 303 (Chin, J., concurring
and dissenting.)
D. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
Although dissenting, Justice Mosk agreed with the majority that the
STEP Act was not the exclusive means of enjoining criminal street gang
activity.' Justice Mosk argued that paragraph (a) was void for vague-
ness and went further than necessary.' He also disagreed with the
majority's application of Jaycees and Dallas v. Stranglin,5 stating that
some gang conduct is not only innocent, but is of the type of intimate
and expressive conduct Jaycees protects.67 Justice Mosk further argued
that paragraph (k), aside from the words "harassing" and "intimidating,"
was void for vagueness.' Justice Mosk asserted that none of the indi-
vidual gang members could be enjoined absent proof that the member
was likely to engage in conduct constituting a public nuisance.'
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
Prior to Ga/o, the supreme court had not addressed the legality of
e~joining criminal street gang activity as a public nuisance. With this
holding there will likely be a revival of public nuisance as a means of
supplementing criminal law when it proves inadequate. Additionally, the
54. Id. at 1137, 929 P.2d at 626, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 307 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
55. See id. 1142-43, 929 P.2d at 629-30, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 310-11 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing). The injunction was vague, Justice Mask argued, because it failed to define gang
membership and, therefore, did not provide adequate notice to those bound by the
injunction, thereby subjecting them to arbitrary enforcement by police officers operating
with the same want of a definition. See id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mask argued
that the injunction went too far because it "penaliz[ed] much ordinary and lawful activ-
ity that does not fall within the statutory definition of a public nuisance." Id. at 1143,
929 P.2d at 630, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
56. 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
57. See Galo, 14 Cal. 4th at 1143, 929 P.2d at 630, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 311 (Mosk,
J., dissenting); see also Terence R. Boga, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local Govern-
ments, and the Battle for Public Space, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L L REv. 477, 486-89 (1994)
(discussing the social and communal aspects of gang membership).
58. See id. at 1144, 929 P.2d at 631, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 312 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 1146, 929 P.2d at 632, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 313 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Justice Mosk reasoned that this was due to the fluid nature of gang membership com-
pared with the unions in Milk Wagon Drivers and the anti-abortion organirations in
Madsen. See id. at 1145-46, 929 P.2d at 632, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 313 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Mosk stated that equity is offended when an injunction prohibits someone
from doing something he has never done nor is likely to ever do. See id. at 1146, 929
P.2d at 632, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 313 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Based on the absence of
intent, Justice Mosk concluded that the record did not support enjoining three of the
named defendants. See id. at 1147, 929 P.2d at 632-33, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 313-14
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
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state may now use either the STEP Act or the public nuisance doctrine
to enjoin gang activity, furthering crime prevention by expanding the
universe of available remedies. As Justice Kennard noted, however, the
ability to enjoin the innocent acts of politically unpopular groups is ac-
companied by the concomitant potential for abuse.' Thus, the anticipat-
ed enthusiasm for this recently sanctioned remedy must be tempered by
a resolve for egalitarianism among law-abiding citizens.
PAuL A. ROSE
60. See id. at 1127, 929 P.2d at 619, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 300 (Kennard, J., concurring
and dissenting).
IX. LABOR LAW
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) does not preempt
state regulation of overtime pay for maritime employees.
Additionally, the Division of Labor Standards Enforce-
ment (DLSE) compliance requirements with Industrial
Welfare Commission (IWC) orders to maritime employ-
ees operating off the coast constitute regulations and are
therefore subject to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA): Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw,' the California Su-
preme Court addressed whether the FLSA preempted state laws regulat-
ing overtime compensation for maritime employees.2 The court also ad-
dressed whether the DLSE enforcement of the IWC orders violated the
procedural requirements of the APA 3 The superior court granted the
1. 14 Cal. 4th 557, 927 P.2d 296, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 186 (1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct 1862 (1997). Justice Chin wrote a unanimous opinion in which Chief Justice George
and Justices Mask, Kennard, Baxter, Werdegar, and Brown joined. See id. at 561-79,
927 P.2d at 298-309, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188-99.
2. See id. at 564-68, 927 P.2d at 300-02, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190-92. The plaintiffs,
two maritime transport firms and a maritime trade association, brought the present
action seeking an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the California labor laws.
See id. at 563, 927 P.2d at 299, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189. Under the California labor
laws, employees are entitled to "[ojne and one-half (1 1/2) times the employee's regular
rate of pay" for time worked in excess of eight hours per day not exceeding twelve
hours. See id. at 562, 927 P.2d at 298, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188 (quoting CAL CODE
REGS. tit. 8, §§ 11040, subd. 3(A)(1), 11090, subd. 3(A)(1) (1990)). Crew members for
the maritime fleets were on duty for twelve hours per day during which time shifts
were broken up between leisure time and work. See id. at 561, 927 P.2d at 298, 59
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 188. Despite California regulations, the plaintiffs' policy was to com-
pensate the workers with "a flat daily rate without special compensation for 'over-
time.'" Id. The plaintiffs instituted this action after the plaintiffs' employees began
filing suit in 1992 for recovery of their past overtime compensation under the Califor-
nia labor laws. See id. at 563, 927 P.2d at 299, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189. According to
the plaintiffs, seamen are exempted under the FILSA from paying overtime wages to
their employees. See id. (citing.29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(6) (1994)).
3. See id. at 568-77, 927 P.2d at 302-08, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192-98. While both the
IWC and DISE play a role in agency oversight in the employment arena, they have
differing functions. The IWC is responsible for ascertaining the wages, hours, and con-
ditions of employment for all employees in the state. See 41 CAL JuR. 3D Labor §§ 24-
27 (1978 & Supp. 1997). On the other hand, the primary goal of the DLSE is to en-
force labor laws where "enforcement is not specifically vested elsewhere." 2 B.E.
WrrN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNA LAW, Agency and Employtnent § 290(a) (1987) (citing
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plaintiffs' request for an injunction, "barring application of IWC wage or-
ders to [plaintiffs'] employees working more than three miles off the
coast."4 The court of appeal reversed, holding that the DLSE provisions
were not regulations subject to APA guidelines.5 Affirming the court of
appeal, the California Supreme Court held that federal law did not pre-
empt state law in this situation, but nevertheless found the DLSE provi-
sions to be regulations in violation of the APA 6 Ultimately, however, the
court found the IWC wage orders applicable to the maritime workers.7
CAL LAB. CODE § 95 (West 1989)). For a discussion of the APA, see 48 AM. Ju. 2D
Labor and Labor Relations § 929 (1994) (stating that the APA "dictates judicial review
standards and procedures but does not grant any party rights that it does not already
have under the NLRA").
4. Tidewater, 14 Cal. 4th at 563, 927 P.2d at 299, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189.
5. See id. As opposed to "regulations," the court of appeal found.the provisions to
be "interpretations" applying to "a specific group of employers." Id. at 563-64, 927 P.2d
at 299, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189.
6. See id. at 577-79, 927 P.2d at 308-09, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 198-99. Where federal
and state law conflict, federal law may preempt the enforcement of the state law. See
discussion infra Part ILA. and accompanying notes. See also 58 CAL. JuR. 3D Statutes
§ 80 (1980) (stating that state law may be suspended where it is in conflict with a
valid federal law); 2 B.E. WrriaN, SUMMARY OF CAuFORNIA LAW, Agency and Employ-
ment §§ 438-439 (1987 & Supp. 1997) (discussing when federal laws preempt state laws
and providing examples of cases where preemption has been upheld). See generally
Kevin J. McKeon, Comment, NLRA Preemption Put Simply: Livadas v. Bradshaw, 33
DUQ. L REV. 887 (1995) (discussing the preemption doctrine in general and as applied
to the NLRA); Dan M. Scheuermann, Labor Law, 42 LA. B.J. 301 (1994) (stating that
the United States Supreme Court does not determine the reasonableness of state stat-
utes in preemption cases but looks for conflict with the federal statute).
7. See Tidewater, 14 Cal. 4th at 568, 927 P.2d at 302, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192. De-
spite the invalidity of the DLSE and a great deal of federal law in the area of seaman
wage provisions, the court found that the state wage orders prevailed. See id. See also
57 CAL JuR. 3D Ships and Shipping § 53 (1980 & Supp. 1997) ("Federal statutes con-
tain various provisions with respect to wages of crew members."); 2 B.E. WmrN, SUM-
MARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency and Employment § 430 (1987 & Supp. 1997) (stating
that the FISA "regulates the hours and wages of employees or enterprises engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.").
II. TREATMENT
A. Federal Preemption
Justice Chin, writing for a unanimous court, held that California may
regulate maritime employment in the Santa Barbara Channel.8 Justice
Chin stated that even though federal law defined the state's territory
lying off the coast in more narrow terms than state law, Congress did'
not intend to prevent California from regulating outside the federal
boundaries but within the state's boundaries.9 Furthermore, Justice
Chin cited a 1947 United States Supreme Court opinion which held that
California had the power to regulate conduct in territory belonging to the
United States, as defined by federal law." Thus, even under federal ter-
ritorial limits of state boundaries, the state of California can exercise its
police powers."
The court next determined the applicability of the federal definitions
of state boundaries. 2 Justice Chin asserted, "federal law boundaries ap-
ply 'when the extent of a state's territorial jurisdiction is relevant to the
operation of federal law.'"" Thus, according to the court, where federal
and state laws do not conflict, state law boundaries apply. 4 Moreover,
the court expressed that even if California defined its boundaries in the
8. See Tidewater, 14 Cal. 4th at 564, 927 P.2d at 300, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190. Ac-
cording to Justice Chin, the court needed to first decide whether federal law preempt-
ed state law. See id. If the court answered affirmatively, they would not need to con-
sider the second issue. See id.
9. See id. Under federal law, California's boundaries extend "three nautical miles
from the coast, and including a three-mile-wide band around any islands lying off the
coast, but excluding waters between the islands and the coast." Id. (citing 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1301(b), 1312 (1994)). California's broader definition extends three nautical miles
from the islands, "including waters between those islands and the coast" Id. (citing
CAL CONST., art. III, § 2 (1972); CAL Gov'T CODE §§ 170, 171 (West 1995)).
10. See id. at 565, 927 P.2d at 300, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190 (citing United States v.
California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) (supp. opinion at 332 U.S. 804)). In California, the Su-
preme Court held that the United States owned the lands, excluding the bays, con-
tained in the territory where federal and state laws conflict See id. (citing California,
332 U.S. at 805). However, the Court limited its opinion to ownership, allowing Califor-
nia to "exercise local police power functions." See id. (quoting California, 332 U.S. at
36).
11. See id.
12. See id. at 565, 927 P.2d at 300-01, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190-91.
13. Id. at 565, 927 P.2d at 300, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190 (quoting People v. Weeren,
26 Cal. 3d 654, 660, 607 P.2d 1279, 1282, 163 Cal. Rptr. 255, 258 (1980)). In Weeren,
the court declared that federal law defines "the state's 'boundaries' for all purposes,
political or proprietary as between Nation and State." Weeren, 26 Cal. 3d at 663, 607
P.2d at 1283, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (quoting United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139,
157 (1965)).
14. See Tidewater, 14 Cal. 4th at 565, 927 P.2d at 300-01, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190-91.
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same manner as federal law, the state could still regulate beyond those
boundaries."5
Lastly, the court found that the FLSA neither conflicted with nor pre-
empted the state overtime regulations."6 In determining preemption, the
court stated that it must "ascertain the intent of Congress." 7 According
to the court, preemption occurs as follows: "(1) where the federal law
expressly so states, (2) where the federal law is so comprehensive that it
leaves 'no room for supplementary state regulation,' or (3) where the
federal and state laws 'actually conflict.'"" In the instant case, the
court found that the FLSA expressly allowed for state regulation. 9 Addi-
tionally, the court reasoned that the laws did not conflict because the
FLSA did not preclude state regulation either expressly or implicitly. °
15. See id. at 565, 927 P.2d at 301, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191 (citing Smith v. United
States, 507 U.S. 197, 213 (1993); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941); Weeren, 26
Cal. 3d at 666, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 261, 607 P.2d at 1285). In Skiriotes, the Court held
that Florida could prohibit the use of certain dive equipment regardless of whether
Sldriotes was beyond Florida's coastal boundaries. See Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 77 ("[W]e
see no reason why the state of Florida may not ... govern the conduct of its citizens
upon the high seas with respect to matters in which the state has a legitimate interest
and where there is no conflict with acts of Congress.").
16. See Tidewater, 14 Cal. 4th at 566, 927 P.2d at 301, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191. Ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, the FISA exemption for seamen in regards to overtime pay
regulations was Congress' manifestation of "an affirmative preemption of state regula-
tion." See id. However, the court rejected this argument. See id. at 567-69, 927 P.2d at
301-02, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191-92. For a discussion of FISA rules for overtime com-
pensation, see 48A Am. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations §§ 4260-4435 (1994 & Supp.
1997). In particular, section 4261 states that state or local overtime pay rules apply
where the laws are more stringent than the FLSA. See id. at § 4261.
17. Tidewater, 14 Cal. 4th at 567, 927 P.2d at 302, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192 (quoting
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987)). The court also
stated that Congress' intent must be "clear and manifest" Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
18. Id. (quoting Guerra, 479 U.S. at 280-81).
19. See id. The "savings clause" of the FLSA provides the following: "No provision
of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any ...
state law or municipal ordinance establishing ... a maximum workweek lower than
the maximum workweek established under this chapter . . . ." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 218(a) (1994)). The court stated that the savings clause has been interpreted by fed-
eral courts to extend to overtime wages. See id. at 567, 927 P.2d at 302, 59 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 192.
20. See id. at 568, 927 P.2d at 302, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192. The court based its
conclusion from the legislative history of the FLSA's seaman exemption. See id. (cit-
ing 29 C.F.R. § 783.29 (1996) (discussing the legislative history of the FLSA's seaman
exemption)). See generally C. Todd Jones, The Practical Effects on Labor of Repealing
B. The APA Requirements for Proposed Regulations
In the second part of his opinion, Justice Chin held that the DLSE's
policy was void because the agency did not follow the policy re-
quirements under the APA. 2 Justice Chin asserted that the DLSE was
subject to the APA requirements because of its involvement in creating
regulations and other rules, and its lack of governance from the Labor
Code.' Additionally, Justice Chin found that the DLSE policy was a reg-
ulation because of its general applicability to and its interpreting function
of the scope of the IWC wage ordersY Thus, the court concluded that
because the DLSE policy was a regulation, it was subject to APA proce-
dural requirements.2' Furthermore, because the DLSE did not follow the
APA requirements, the court held that the regulation was void.25
C. The Applicability of the Wage Orders to the Plaintiffs
Despite finding the DSLE's policy an invalid regulation, the court
determined that the underlying IWC wage orders were applicable to the
plaintiffs.26 The court stated that IWC wage orders apply where an em-
American Cabotage Laws, 22 TzNmsp. U. 403, 415-22 (1995) (discussing the FISA ap-
plication to seamen); Louis B. Livingston & Sharon Toncray, Fair Labor Standards Act:
Substance and Procedure, available in WESTLAW, C983 A.LI.-A.B.A. 601 (1995) (dis-
cussing the FLSA as applied to overtime and seamen).
21. See Tidewater, 14 Cal. 4th at 568, 927 P.2d at 302, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192. The
court listed several procedures that must be followed under the APA. See id. at 568,
927 P.2d at 302-03, 59 Cal. Rplr. 2d at 192-93. For an additional source of APA re-
quirements, see CAL GOV'T CODE §§ 11346-11347.5 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997). Accord-
ing to the court, the purpose of the APA requirements "is to ensure that those persons
or entities whom a regulation will affect have a voice in its creation." Tidewater, 14
Cal. 4th at 568, 927 P.2d at 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193 (citing Armistead v. State
Personnel Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 198, 204-05, 583 P.2d 744, 747-48, 149 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4-5
(1978)).
22. See id. at 569-70, 927 P.2d at 303-04, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193-94. Even though the
procedural requirements in the California Labor Code are analogous to the APA re-
quirements, the court found that the Labor Code only applied to the IWO. See id. at
569, 927 P.2d at 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193. Moreover, the court could not find any
provision in the California Labor Code exempting the DLSE from APA regulation. See
id. at 570, 927 P.2d at 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193.
23. See id. at 572, 927 P.2d at 305, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 195. The APA defines a reg-
ulation as including "every rule, regulation, order, or standard of general applica-
tion ... by any state agency to implement, interpret, or make specific the law en-
forced or administered by it, or to govern its procedure .... " CAL. GOVT CODE
§ 11342(g) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
24. See Tidewater, 14 Cal. 4th at 576, 927 P.2d at 308, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 198.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 576-77, 927 P.2d at 308, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 198. The plaintiffs argued
that the IWC's and DLSE's jurisdiction is limited to California's territorial bound-
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ployee is a resident of California, principally works in the state, and gets
paid there. Moreover, the court cited its previous discussion to find
that federal law did not preempt the wage orders.' Thus, because the
plaintiffs' employees were residents of California and worked in the
Santa Barbara Channel, they were protected by the IWC wage orders.'
1II. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
As a result of the court's holding, other maritime transport firms may
be required to compensate their employees for previously unpaid over-
time.' While the impact on these firms may be great, the court's hold-
ing is not overly surprising. In 1987, the IWC wage orders were first ap-
plied to the maritime employees located in the Santa Barbara channel.31
Furthermore, in 1990, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that "federal law did not preempt the IWC wage orders governing over-
time wages."" Thus, the lack of favorability toward maritime firms by
aries. See id. However, the court found no such limitations in the Labor Code. See id.
27. See id. at 578, 927 P.2d at 309, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199. In support of its rule,
the court quoted the Labor Code which provides that "[o]ne of the functions of the
Department of Industrial Relations [which includes the IWC and the DLSE] is to foster,
promote, and develop the welfare of the wage earners of California ... . Id. (quot-
ing CAL. LAB. CODE § 50.5 (West 1989) (italics not in original)).
28. See id. Restating its previous discussion, the court concluded that the federal
and state laws did not conflict. See id. Thus, the court held that the California state
law boundaries applied. See id. Nevertheless, even where conflict emerges, the United
States Supreme Court gives the states considerable power to regulate. See 2 B.E.
WrIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNA LAW, Agency and Employment § 440 (1987 & Supp.
1997) ("[T]he United States Supreme Court has recognized a substantial area of en-
forceable state law and state court and administrative jurisdiction, even in areas of
coincidence of federal and state law.").
29. See Tidewater, 14 Cal. 4th at 578-79, 927 P.2d at 309, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199.
30. In 1992, the employees of the firms began filing claims for retroactive pay. See
id. at 563, 927 P.2d at 299, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189. The present suit by the plaintiffs
was to enjoin those actions. See id. However, the holding by the court removes that
injunction. See id. at 579, 927 P.2d at 309, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199.
31. See id. at 562-63, 927 P.2d at 299, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189.
32. Id. at 563, 927 P.2d at 299, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189 (citing Pacific Merchant Ship-
ping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1427 (9th Cir. 1990)). With the exception of the
Ninth Circuit, courts generally look to "the character of the work" and not what the
work is called or where it is performed to determine if the seamen exemption applies.
See 48A AM. JUR. 2D Labor and Labor Relations § 4150 (1994). See generally Marc
Wall & Karen Houston, Survey: Recent Maritime Decisions Within the Ninth Circuit
Region, 8 U.S.F. MAR. LJ. 379 (1996) (summarizing 1995 federal and state maritime
the courts should have been ample warning that IWC wage orders would
eventually be applied.
JEREMY D. DOLNICK
decisions within the Ninth Circuit); Michael A. Faillace, Fair Labor Standards Act:
Recent Case Law Development, available in WESTLAW, 548 PLI/LIT 681, 715 (1996)
(stating which employees fall under the seaman exception).
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X. LETTERS OF CREDIT
Legislation enacted with the eapress intent to clarify
existing law has no impermissible retroactive conse-
quences and thus, applies to transactions predating its
enactment. Furthermore, the antideficiency laws govern-
ing nonjudicial foreclosures do not operate to relieve an
issuer of its obligation to honor a standby letter of credit
used as additional support for loan obligations secured
by real property: Western Security Bank, N.A. v. Supe-
rior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Western Security Bank, N.A. v. Superior Court,' the California Su-
preme Court granted review to reconcile the conflict between California's
antideficiency laws and the "independence principle" applicable to letters
of credit.2 Specifically, the supreme court considered whether urgency
legislation circumscribing the use of standby letters of credit issued as
additional security for real estate loan obligations governed the case at
bar or, instead, had only prospective application.3 The trial court de-
1. 15 Cal. 4th 232, 933 P.2d 507, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 243 (1997). Justice Chin delivered
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice George, and Justices Baxter and Brown
concurred. See id. at 236-53, 933 P.2d at 509-20, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245-56. Justice
Werdegar wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. See id. at 253-54, 933 P.2d at 521,
62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257 (Werdegar, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk also
wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justice Kennard joined. See id. at
254-63, 933 P.2d at 521-27, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257-63 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissent-
ing).
2. See id. at 236-37, 933 P.2d at 509, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 245; CAL COM. CODE
§ 5103(a) (West 1964 & Supp. 1997) (defining a letter of credit as "an engagement by
a bank or other person made at the request of a customer . . . that the [bank] will
honor drafts or other demands for payment upon compliance with the conditions speci-
fied in the [letter of] credit"). For a general discussion of the uses, operation, and
effect of letters of credit, see 3 B.E. WrIIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Negotiable
Instruments §§ 10, 11 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1997); Peter J. Gregora, Letters of Credit
in Real Property Finance Transactions, 9 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 1, 1-2 (1991) [hereinafter
Gregora] (noting that the use of letters of credit is a relatively new phenomenon in
real estate financing but is now commonplace).
3. See Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 236-38, 933 P.2d at 509-10, 62 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 245-46. In Western Security Bank, Vista Place Associates (Vista) defaulted on the
clared that the beneficiary, Beverly Hills Business Bank (the Bank) could
recover $375,000 from plaintiff Western Security Bank (Western), the
issuer of a standby letter of credit, following the beneficiary's nonjudicial
foreclosure sale of the real property collateral.4 The trial court, further
declared that Western could seek reimbursement from each of the de-
faulting debtors pursuant to the promissory notes given in consideration
of the letters of credit.5
On rehearing, the court of appeal reversed the trial court's pro-
nouncements, concluding that California's antideficiency laws relieve a
standby letter of credit issuer of its obligation to pay the beneficiary
upon proper presentment, if the purpose is to satisfy a deficiency fol-
lowing the beneficiary's nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the real property
security.' The court of appeal equated such an attempt to draw on a
standby letter of credit to an improper deficiency judgment and conse-
quently, concluded that such an attempt would constitute a "fraud in the
transaction" under section 5114(2)(b) of the California Commercial Code,
$3,250,000 loan it obtained from Beverly Hills Business Bank (the Bank) to purchase a
shopping center. See id. at 238, 933 P.2d at 510-11, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246-47. Vista's
loan obligation was in the form of a purchase money mortgage secured by a deed of
trust and a letter of credit. See id. at 238, 933 P.2d at 511, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 247.
Under a subsequent loan modification agreement, the Bank agreed to modify the loan
terms in exchange for additionai collateral security in the form of three $125,000 irre-
vocable standby letters of credit issued by Western Security Bank (Western) (totalling
$375,000 of additional security). See id. at 238-39, 933 P.2d at 511, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
As is customary in a letter of credit transaction, each of the three Vista partners
agreed to reimburse Western for any payment made to the Bank pursuant to the let-
ters and each executed a $125,000 promissory note in favor of Western. See id. at 239
& n.3, 933 P.2d at 511, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 247. In 1990, three years later, Vista defaulted
on the restructured loan. See id. at 238, 933 P.2d 511, 62 Cal. Rptr. 247. The Bank
elected the remedy of a nonjudicial foreclosure and, as the only bidder, purchased the
shopping center in a Trustee's Sale, leaving an unpaid deficiency of over $500,000. See
id. at 239-40, 933 P.2d at 511-12, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 2,17-48. The Bank inunediately
presented the three letters of credit to Western and demanded payment See id. at 240,
933 P.2d at 512, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248. Relying on the assertion of the Vista attor-
neys that section 580d of the Code of Civil Procedure precluded any reimbursement
from the Vista partners, Western refused to honor the letters of credit. See id. Rather,
Western filed an action against the Bank, Vista, and the Vista partners, seeking a dec-
laration that it was either not obligated to honor the letters of credit or, if so obligat-
ed, that it was entitled to reimbursement from the Vista partners under the terms of
their promissory notes. See id. Although there were multiple cross-complaints in this
action, the trial court ultimately addressed only Western's complaint for declaratory
relief and the Bank's complaint against Western alleging that the issuer wrongfully
dishonored the letters of credit. See id. at 240-41, 933 P.2d at 512, 62 Cal. lptr. 2d at
248.
4. See id. at 241, 933 P.2d at 512, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 248.
5. See id.
6. See id.
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relieving the issuer of any obligation to honor the beneficiary's demand
for payment.7
While the case was pending review by the supreme court, the Legisla-
ture responded to the court of appeal's decision by enacting Senate Bill
No. 1612, which essentially provides that the antideficiency laws do not
operate to relieve an issuer of its obligation to honor a standby letter of
credit issued as additional security in a real estate loan transaction fol-
lowing the beneficiary's private foreclosure sale of the real property
security.8 Consequently, the supreme court transferred the case to the
court of appeal for further consideration in light of Senate Bill No. 1612.'
On reconsideration, the court of appeal confirmed its prior holding, con-
cluding that the legislation was prospective only because it effected a
"substantial change in existing law" and therefore had no effect on the
parties in the case at bar.1°
The California Supreme Court again granted review and reversed the
court of appeal, rejecting the contention that Senate Bill No. 1612 had no
bearing on the present case or any other existing letter of credit
transactions." The supreme court, by contrast, concluded that because
the legislation did not substantially change, but rather merely clarified
existing law, it had no impermissible retrospective effect and thus gov-
erned the transaction in this case. 2 Moreover, the antideficiency laws,
and specifically section 580d of the Code of Civil Procedure, 3 did not
7. See id.; see also CAL. COM. CODE § 5114(2)(b) (West 1964 & Supp. 1997) (pro-
viding that an issuer that has been notified by the customer of "fraud, forgery or other
defect not apparent on the face of the documents" may, but is not obligated to, honor
an otherwise conforming draw on the letter of credit). See generally, Neil R.
Rubenstein, The Issuer's Rights and Obligations Under a Letter of Credit, 17 UCC LJ.
129 (1984).
8. See Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 241-42, 933 P.2d at 513, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 249 (citing Legislative Counsel's Digest, Sen. Bill No. 1612 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.)).
9. See id. at 242, 933 P.2d at 513, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 238, 933 P.2d at 510, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246.
12. See id. at 238, 252, 933 P.2d at 510, 520, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 246, 256.
13. CAL CIV. PRoc. CODE § 580d (West 1976 & Supp. 1997). Section 580d provides
in relevant part-
No judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency upon a note secured by a
deed of trust or mortgage upon real property ... in any case in which the
real property ... has been sold by the mortgagee or trustee under power of
sale contained in the mortgage or deed of trust
relieve Western of its obligation to honor the standby letter of credit
following the beneficiary's nonjudicial foreclosure of the real property se-
curity.'
4
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The court initially considered whether Senate Bill No. 1612,'" enacted
during the pendency of the court's initial grant of review, governed the
litigants in the case at bar.' Sunmarizing the rules applicable to retro-
spective application of new legislation, the court noted that although new
legislation is presumptively prospective, absent due process constraints,
a statute will apply retroactively when the Legislature manifestly intends
such an effect." The court further explained that legislation which
"merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law" has no retrospective
effect.'" Such legislation does not "substantially change[] the legal con-
sequences of past events"'" but merely explains the true meaning of the
existing law."0 Furthermore, even material changes in statutory language
can constitute clarification if the surrounding circumstances support
such a finding."
Id. For a general discussion of California's antideficiency laws, see Cynthia A. Mertens,
California's Foreclosure Statutes: Some Proposals for Reform, 26 SANTA CLARA L REv.
533 (1986); David A. Leipziger, Deficiency Judgments in California: The Supreme
Court Tries Again, 22 UCLA L REV. 753 (1975); see also 57 CAL JUR. 3D Secured
Transactions §§ 198-204 (1980 & Supp. 1997) (summarizing nonjudicial sales or other
dispositions of collateral).
14. See Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 252-53, 933 P.2d at 520, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 256.
15. 1994 CAL. STAT. ch. 11 (specifically abrogating the decision of the court of ap-
peal in this case to provide that a draw on a letter of credit does not violate the
antideficiency laws and those laws afford no basis for an issuer to refuse a demand
for payment).
16. See Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 242-46, 933 P.2d at 513-16, 62 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 249-52.
17. See id. at 243, 933 P.2d at 513, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249. "Whether a statute is to
apply retrospectively or only prospectively is, in the first instance, a policy question for
the legislative body enacting the statute." Id. at 244, 933 P.2d at 515, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 251 (citing Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1206, 753 P.2d 585, 596,
246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 640 (1988)).
18. Id. at 243, 933 P.2d at 514, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250.
19. Id. at 243, 933 P.2d at 513, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249 (citing Kizer v. Hanna, 48
Cal. 3d 1, 7, 767 P.2d 679, 682, 255 Cal. Rptr. 412, 415 (1989)).
20. See id. at 243, 933 P.2d at 513-14, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 249-50.
21. See id. at 243, 933 P.2d at 514, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250. The majority noted that
the Legislature's prompt amendment of statutory language in response to a court's
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While conceding that the Legislature's subsequent interpretation of an
existing statute is "neither binding nor conclusive in construing the stat-
ute,"' the majority noted that a court may properly consider the
Legislature's expressed views in construing prior legislation.' Regard-
less of whether the court agrees with the Legislature's characterization of
new legislation as simply a "'clarification, '"" an express provision that
the statute clarifies or declares existing law establishes the necessary leg-
islative intent required for the statute to apply retrospectively." In this
case, the court found that the statute's express statements that the stat-
ute clarified and declared existing law26 clearly established that Con-
gress intended Senate Bill No. 1612 to apply not only to the case at bar,
initial interpretation of a prior statute would be a circumstance indicating that even
material changes in the statutory language are for clarification only. See id.
22. Id. at 244, 933 P.2d at 514, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250. The court explained that, as
delineated in the California Constitution, statutory interpretation is exclusively within
the province of the judiciary. See id.
23. See id at 244, 933 P.2d at 514, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250.
24. Id. at 244, 933 P.2d at 515, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 251 (citing California Empl.
Stabilization Comm'n v. Payne, 31 Cal. 2d 210, 214, 187 P.2d 702, 704 (1947)).
25. See id. at 244, 933 P.2d at 514-15, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 250-51.
26. The court observed that both section 5 of the statute and the statement of facts
justifying its enactment as an urgency statute expressly provided that the purpose of
the statute was to clarify existing law. See id. at 245-46, 933 P.2d at 515-16, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 251-52. Section 5 states:
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting Sections 2 and 4 of this act to
confirm the independent nature of the letter of credit engagement and to
abrogate the holding in [the court of appeal's earlier opinion in this case],
that presentment of a draft under a letter of credit issued in connection with
a real property secured loan following foreclosure violates Section 580d of
the Code of Civil Procedure and constitutes a "fraud ... or other defect not
apparent on the face of the documents" under paragraph (b) of subdivision
(2) of Section 5114 of the Commercial Code ....
The Legislature also intends to confirm the expectation of the parties to a
contract that underlies a letter of credit, that the beneficiary will have avail-
able the value of the real estate collateral and the benefit of the letter of
credit without regard to the order in which the beneficiary may resort to
either.
1994 CAL STAT. ch. 611 § 5; see Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 245-46, 933 P.2d at
515-16, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 251-52. Congress also expressed its intent that the statute take
effect immediately in the statement of facts, which provides that immediate application
is necessary to fulfill the statute's purpose of "confirm[ing] and clarify[ing] the law ap-
plicable to obligations which are secured by real property . . . and which also are
supported by a letter of credit" See id. at 245, 933 P.2d at 515, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 251
(quoting 1994 CAL STAT. ch. 611, § 6).
but to all outstanding real estate transactions secured by both real prop-
erty and outstanding letters of credit.27
The court next examined the state of the law prior to the enactment of
Senate Bill No. 1612 to determine whether the statute substantially
changed or merely clarified existing law.' As a preliminary matter, the
court concluded that the statute's amendments to section 5114 of the
California Commercial Code were "'technical, nonsubstantive changes'"
related to a letter of credit issuer's obligation to honor a conforming
draw.29 The court then turned its focus to the statute's amendment of
Civil Code section 2787 codifying the legal distinction between a letter of
credit and a suretyship obligation.' Prior to the enactment of Senate
Bill No. 1612, existing law clearly recognized the distinction between the
guarantor or surety's secondary obligation and the letter of credit issuer's
primary, independent obligation.3 '
27. See Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 246, 933 P.2d at 516, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
252.
28. See id. at 246-52, 933 P.2d at 516-20, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252-56. As noted by the
court, Senate Bill No. 1612 amended California Uniform Commercial Code section 5114
and California Civil Code section 2787, and added sections 580.5 and 580.7 to the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure. See id. at 246, 933 P.2d at 516, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
252. The court, however, did not address the addition of section 580.7 to the Code of
Civil Procedure, which renders a letter of credit unenforceable in certain residential
real estate loan transactions, explaining that the section did not apply to the case at
bar and therefore no interpretation was required. See id. at 247 n.6, 933 P.2d at 517
n.6, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 253 n.6.
29. Id. at 246, 933 P.2d at 516, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252 (quoting Legislative
Counsel's Digest, Senate Bill No. 1612, 1993-94 Reg. Sess.).
30. See id. at 24647, 933 P.2d at 516, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252. Section 2787 pertains
primarily to surety relationships and defines a guarantor or surety as "one who prom-
ises to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, or hypothecates proper-
ty as security therefor." CAL Civ. CODE § 2787 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997), amended by
1994 Cal. Stat ch. 611, sec. 1; see Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 246, 933 P.2d at
516, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252. The amendment to section 2787 clarified the definition by
providing that "[a] letter of credit is not a form of suretyship obligation." CAL. Civ.
CODE § 2787; see Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 246, 933 P.2d at 516, 62 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 252.
31. See Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 246-47, 933 P.2d at 516, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 252; see also CAL CIv. CODE §§ 2806-2810 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (establishing
the secondary liability of a surety); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bank Leumi, 42 Cal.
App. 4th 928, 933-34, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 23-24 (1996) (describing the background and
relationships of a letter of credit); Paramount Export Co. v. Asia Trust Bank, 193 Cal.
App. 3d 1474, 1480, 238 Cal. Rptr. 920, 923 (1987) (detailing the functions of a letter of
credit); Lumbermans Acceptance Co. v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 86 Cal. App. 3d 175,
178, 150 Cal. Rptr. 69, 71 (1978) (recognizing the primary obligation of an issuer of a
letter of credit). For an in-depth analysis of the "independence principle," see Michael
Stem, The Independence Rule in Standby Letters of Credit, 52 U. Cm. L REv. 218
(1985); Gregora, supra note 2, at 3-4.
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The court's analysis focused on the addition of section 580.5 to the
Code of Civil Procedure.32 The supreme court rejected the court of
appeal's view that section 580.5,' which essentially provides that letter
of credit draws are not tantamount to deficiency judgments, effected a
change in the existing law.' The supreme court criticized the decision
of the court of appeal because it employed an improper analogy, which
established a rule far broader than warranted by the precedent cases.'
By improperly viewing a letter of credit as a form of guaranty or surety
obligation, the court of appeal misguidedly relied on Union Bank v.
Gradsky' and Commonwealth Mortgage Assurance Co. v. Superior
Court37 for the proposition that, under the existing law, the
antideficiency provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 580d prevent
a beneficiary from drawing on a letter of credit issued as additional secu-
rity for a real estate loan obligation.' Moreover, the supreme court ob-
32. See Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 247-52, 933 P.2d at 516-20, 62 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 252-56.
33. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580.5 (West Supp. 1997).
34. See Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 252, 933 P.2d at 520, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
256.
35. See id. at 247-50, 933 P.2d at 517-19, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 253-55.
36. 265 Cal. App. 2d 40, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1968) (holding that a creditor may not re-
cover any deficiency remaining following a private, nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the
real property collateral from the guarantor). As the supreme court noted, however, the
Gradsky court did not base its holding on a perceived conflict with section 580d; rath-
er, the court's decision was founded on estoppel principles that bar a creditor from
recovering a deficiency from the guarantor after the creditor has destroyed the
guarantors right of subrogation against the debtor by electing the remedy of nonjudi-
cial foreclosure. See Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 248, 933 P.2d at 517, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 253 (citing Gradsky, 265 Cal. App. 2d at 41, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 65). For a
discussion of the election of remedies applicable to real estate loan transactions includ-
ing judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure, see 3 B.E. Wrr N, SUMMARY OF CAuFORNIA
LAW, Security Transactions In Real Property §§ 124-150 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1997);
27 CAL JUR. 3D Deeds of Trust §§ 201-203 (1987 & Supp. 1997).
37. 211 Cal. App. 3d 508, 259 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1989). Commonwealth Mortgage ex-
panded Gradksy to prevent a mortgage guaranty insurer from seeking reimbursement
from the defaulting mortgagor for payments made to the mortgagee following a non-
judicial foreclosure sale of the real property collateral securing the mortgage. See id. at
517, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 430. Significantly, the Commonwealth Mortgage court viewed the
mortgage insurance policy as a form of guaranty similar to the one in Gradsky and
thus, voided the indemnity agreements contained in the policy as invalid attempts to
avoid section 580d's prohibition against deficiency judgments. See id.
38. See Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 250, 933 P.2d at 518-19, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 254-55.
served that the rules extrapolated from these precedent cases were
grounded primarily in dicta.'
The supreme court explained that, contrary to the court of appeal's
proposition, letters of credit are unique instruments "not governed by
suretyship principles" because they create an independent obligation be-
tween the issuer and the beneficiary.4 ° The court held that a letter of
credit issued as additional security in a real estate loan transaction, as in
this case, does not run afoul of the existing antideficiency laws.4' The
court reasoned that because a standby letter of credit issued as addition-
al security is separate, distinct, and unrelated to the real property securi-
ty, the antideficiency laws should not affect a real estate lender's draw
on the letter of credit.42
The court concluded its analysis by holding that Senate Bill No. 1612
did not substantially change the existing law because prior to its enact-
ment, the applicable antideficiency laws did not operate to prevent a real
estate lender from calling upon a letter of credit issued as additional se-
curity following the nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the real property that
also secured the loan obligation.' Thus, the supreme court reversed the
court of appeal and held that Senate Bill No. 1612 did not operate retro-
spectively and, therefore, governed the rights of the parties in the case at
bar and in similar existing transactions supported by both real property
and letters of credit."
B. Justice Werdegar's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Although Justice Werdegar criticized the majority's reasoning, she
agreed with the conclusion that a lender's attempt to draw on a standby
letter of credit does not constitute a fraud in the transaction under sec-
39. See id. at 249-50, 933 P.2d at 518-19, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 254-55. Specifically, the
supreme court rejected the court of appeal's assertion that Gradsky and Common-
wealth Mortgage established the principle "that a lender should not be able to utilize a
device of any kind [including letters of credit] to avoid the limitations of section 580d."
See id. at 250, 933 P.2d at 519, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255 (quoting Western Sec. Bank v.
Superior Court, 47 Cal. App. 4th 1257, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664 (1995) (the court of
appeal's decision in this case)).
40. See id. at 250-51, 933 P.2d at 519, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255. See generally Stern,
supra note 30 (discussing the independence principle applicable to letters of credit).
41. See Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 251-52, 933 P.2d at 519-20, 62 Cal. Rptr. at
255-56.
42. See id. at 252, 933 P.2d at 520, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 256. "A creditor that draws
on a letter of credit does no more than call on all the security pledged for the debt.
When it does so, it does not violate the prohibition of deficiency judgments." Id.
43. See id. at 252, 933 P.2d at 520, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 256.
44. See id. at 252-53, 933 P.2d at 520, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 256.
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tion 5114(2)(b) of the California Commercial Code.5 Contrary to the
majority, Justice Werdegar viewed Senate Bill No. 1612 as a substantial
change in the law requiring prospective application.41 Specifically, Jus-
tice Werdegar argued that Senate Bill No. 1612's addition of new Civil
Code section 580.7 went beyond existing law and created a distinction
between residential and nonresidential real estate transactions that did
not exist prior to the statute's enactment.4 ' Thus, Justice Werdegar con-
cluded that Senate Bill No. 1612 had prospective application only and
therefore, did not govern the case at bar.'
Justice Werdegar agreed with Justice Mosk's view that because section
5114 did not apply to the case at bar, the issuer was obligated to honor
its letter of credit upon proper presentment by the beneficiary.' More-
over, Justice Werdegar asserted that under the principle of judicial re-
straint, the majority should have limited its holding to the facts of the
case at bar and refrained from maling "broader pronouncements on the
antideficiency law's effect on other claims and other parties."'
C. Justice Mosk's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk agreed with the majority's holding that Senate Bill No.
1612 did not have retrospective application.5 But, Justice Mosk dis-
agreed with the majority's underlying determination that Senate Bill No.
1612 merely clarified and did not change existing law.52 Justice Mosk
45. See id. at 253-55, 933 P.2d at 521, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257 (Werdegar, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
46. See id. (Werdegar, J., concurring and dissenting).
47. See id. at 254, 933 P.2d at 521, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257 (Werdegar, J., concurring
and dissenting).
48. See id. (Werdegar, J., concurring and dissenting). As noted above, the majority
concluded that section 580.7 did not apply to the case at bar and consequently did not
consider the effect of the addition of this section on existing law. See id. at 247 n.6,
933 P.2d at 517 n.6, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 253 n.6.
49. See id. at 253, 933 P.2d at 521, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257 (Werdegar, J., concurring
and dissenting).
50. Id. at 253-54, 933 P.2d at 521, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257 (Werdegar, J., concurring
and dissenting).
51. See id. at 254, 933 P.2d at 521-22, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257-58 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting). Justice Mask's conclusion, however, is based on the premise that
Senate Bill No. 1612 "significantly altered prior law" warranting prospective application,
contrary to the majority's premise that the legislation was a clarification only and
therefore had no retrospective effect See id. at 260, 933 P.2d at 525, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 261 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
52. See id. at 255, 933 P.2d at 522, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258 (Mosk, J., concurring
argued that under prior applicable law, the antideficiency statutes ap-
plied to real estate loan transactions supported by letters of credit and
precluded the issuer from seeking reimbursement from the defaulting
debtor after the beneficiary's election of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.'
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Mosk analogized the specific use of a
standby letter of credit as additional loan collateral to a guarantee de-
vice.'
Justice Mosk further asserted that because the applicable statutes and
their legislative histories provide no express or implied exception to the
general prohibition against deficiency judgments,' the court of appeal
correctly relied upon the precedent cases of Gradsky and Common-
wealth Mortgage.'
Although Justice Mosk agreed with the court of appeal that the
antideficiency statutes afford some protection to defaulting debtors in
transactions involving standby letters of credit, he disagreed with the
proposition that a conforming draw on such a letter of credit constitutes
a fraud in the transaction under Uniform Commercial Code section
5114."7 Justice Mosk found that a letter of credit issuer has no authority
to decline a conforming draw under section 5114; but rather, the issuer
must consider only the documents presented by the beneficiary and hon-
or a demand for payment if the documents conform to the letter's
terms.' Nevertheless, Justice Mosk stated that section 580d afforded
some protection to the defaulting debtors in this case.' Under Justice
Mosk's view, the Vista partners would be entitled to seek disgorgement
of the Bank's recovery, following their reimbursement of Western pursu-
ant to the promissory notes60
and dissenting).
53. See id. at 262, 933 P.2d at 526, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 262 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
54. See id. at 256, 933 P.2d at 523, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
55. See id. at 257, 933 P.2d at 523, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
56. See id. at 259, 933 P.2d at 254, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
57. See id. at 262, 933 P.2d at 526, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 262 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
58. See id. at 262, 933 P.2d at 526-27, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 262-63 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
59. See id. at 262-63, 933 P.2d at 527, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
60. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). This conclusion presumes that the
Vista partners did not legally waive protection under the antideficiency laws--a pre-
sumption not addressed here. See id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
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Justice Mosk rejected the majority's contention that a standby letter of
credit is more analogous to cash collateral than to a guaranty or surety
obligation."' Furthermore, he criticized the majority's disregard of the
"strong judicial concern" about lenders' attempts to avoid the proscrip-
tions of section 580d after a nonudicial foreclosure sale by employing
various financial mechanisms between the debtor and third parties, es-
poused in both Gradsky and Commonwealth Mortgage.'
Ill. IMPACT & CONCLUSION
Following the decision in Western Security Bank, real estate lenders
and borrowers no doubt breathed a sigh of relief.' The majority's rever-
sal of the court of appeal's decision expanding the fraud in the transac-
tion exception relieved their fears that the independence principle appli-
cable to letters of credit would be all but lost in real estate financing
transactions.' This decision served to realize the intent of the Legisla-
ture to clarify the interrelationship between the antideficiency laws and
the independence principle applicable to letters of credit, thereby pro-
viding stability to the real estate finance market.' The majority's hold-
ing serves to facilitate commercial real estate transactions and gives
effect to the express intentions of the Legislature.?
SHANNON M. MASON
61. See id. at 261 & n.4, 933 P.2d at 525-26 & n.4, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261-62 & n.4
(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
62. See id. at 260, 933 P.2d at 525, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
63. See Monte M. Brem, Note, Western Security Bank v. Beverly Hills Business
Bank: The Vanishing Utility of Letters of Credit in Real Estate Transactions, 31 SAN
DIEGO L REv. 775, 777 (1994) (arguing that the use of letters of credit in real estate
financing is vital to the California real estate market).
64. See id. at 799-802 (discussing the impairment of the utility of letters of credit).
65. See Western Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 245, 933 P.2d at 515, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
251.
66. See id. at 256, 933 P.2d at 516, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252.
XI. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
The statute of limitations period for a wrongful termina-
tion cause of action begins to run upon actual termina-
tion of employment, not upon notice of such termination:
Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Romano v. Rockwell International, Inc., the California Supreme
Court addressed whether the statute of limitations begins to run in a
wrongful termination action when the employer informs the employee of
his or her termination or when the employment relationship is actually
terminated.' The trial court entered summary judgment for Rockwell,
reasoning that Romano's claims were time-barred because the statute of
limitations began to run when the company notified the plaintiff of his
termination.2 The court of appeal reversed the trial court, holding that
1. See 14 Cal. 4th 479, 926 P.2d 1114, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20 (1996). Chief Justice
George wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Mosk, Baxter, Werdegar, Chin,
and Brown concurred. See id. at 483-503, 926 P.2d at 1116-29, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22-
34. Justice Kennard wrote a concurring opinion. See id. at 503, 926 P.2d at 1129, 59
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 35 (Kennard, J., concurring).
2. See id. at 486, 926 P.2d at 1117-18, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23. On December 6,
1988, Rockwell International, Inc. [hereinafter Rockwell] notified Romano that his em-
ployment would be terminated. See id. at 484, 926 P.2d at 1116, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22.
Rockwell proposed an agreement that would allow Romano to pursue a teaching fel-
lowship until he reached 85 service points, which would qualify him for early retire-
ment under Rockwell's retirement plan. See id. Romano accepted this proposal, contin-
ued to work until he reached 85 service points, and retired on May 31, 1991. See id.
at 484-85, 926 P.2d at 1116-17, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22. On September 18, 1991, Romano
filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (hereinafter
DFEH]. See id. at 485, 926 P.2d at 1117, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22. On September 21,
1991, the DFEH notified Romano that his case had been closed. See id. On December
9, 1991, Romano filed a complaint with the superior court against Rockwell alleging
breach of an implied contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, retaliatory termination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (hereinaf-
ter FEHA], age discrimination under FEHA, and wrongful termination in violation of
public policy. See id. at 485, 926 P.2d at 1117, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22-23. Rocklwell filed
a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the causes of action were time-barred
under the applicable statutes of limitations. See id. at 485, 926 P.2d at 1117, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 23. Both parties stipulated that the following statutes of limitations applied:
a two-year limitation on the breach of contract claims, a one-year filing deadline for
FEHA claims, and a one-year limitation on the termination in violation of public policy
claim. See id. at 485-86, 926 P.2d at 1117, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23; see also CAL Civ.
PROC. CODE § 339 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (setting the limitations period for a
breach of contract cause of action at one year); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12960 (West 1992
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the statute of limitations begins to run when the employer actually termi-
nates the employee, and therefore, the applicable statute of limitations
had not expired as to Romano.3 The California Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeal.4
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Breach of Contract Causes of Action
The court first considered when the statute of limitations begins to run
for breach of an implied contract not to terminate absent good cause and
for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.6 The
court stated that a cause of action for breach of a contract may not ac-
& Supp. 1997) (setting the limitations period for FEHA claims at one year); CAL. CIrv.
Poc. CODE § 340 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (setting the limitations period for a termi-
nation in violation of public policy cause of action at one year). For an annotated list-
ing of California statutes of limitations, see Annotated California Statutes of Limita-
tion, 25 Sw. U. L REv. 745 (1996). However, the parties disagreed as to when the
applicable statutes accrued. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th 486, 926 P.2d at 1117, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 23. See generally Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, Unraveling the
Tangled Web: Choosing the Proper Statute of Limitation for Breach of the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 26 Sw. U. L REv. 1, 21-24 (1996) (discuss-
ing various approaches to cause of action accrual). Rockwell argued that the applicable
statutes of limitations began to run on December 6, 1988, when Rockwell notified
Romano of his termination. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 486, 926 P.2d at 1117, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 23. Romano argued that the statutes of limitations began to run on May 31,
1991, when his employment was terminated. See id.
3. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th 486, 926 P.2d at 1118, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23. The court
of appeal reasoned that allowing the limitations period to run at the time of notice of
termination would "destroy any possibility that the employer might rescind the termina-
tion decision." See id. Further, it would "create a situation in which employees would
be likely to sleep on their claims, and ultimately lose them under the statute of limi-
tations." Id.
4. See id. at 503, 926 P.2d at 1129, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34.
5. See id. at 488-91, 926 P.2d at 1119-21, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25-27. See generally 29
CAL JUR. 3D Employer and Employee § 72 (1987 & Supp. 1996) (explaining a breach
of an implied-in-fact promise not to terminate without good cause); 29 CAL JUR. 3D
Employer and Employee § 73 (1987 & Supp. 1996) (explaining a breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Elisabeth C. Brandon, Note, From Tameny to
Foley: Time for Constitutional Limitations on California's Employment at Will Doc-
trine?, 15 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 359, 360-79 (1987) (tracing the evolution of wrongful
termination causes of action under the employment at will doctrine in California).
crue prior to the time of breach.6 The court reasoned that both breach
of contract causes of action at issue preclude the employer from termi-
nating employment without good cause.7 Therefore, the act of termina-
tion without good cause would constitute the breach, thereby triggering
the commencement of the statute of limitations.'
Additionally, the court reasoned that it could consider Rockwell's noti-
fication of its intent to terminate Romano an anticipatory repudiation
because Rockwell repudiated the contract before actual terudnation.
Therefore, the court concluded that Romano could elect to file suit im-
mediately upon notice or, alternatively, continue employment and await
the employer's future performance.' ° Under this alternate theory, the
statute of limitations was tolled as to an anticipatory repudiation cause
of action upon actual termination because Romano elected to continue
the fulfillment of his contractual obligations with Rockwell after the
notice of termination." Additionally, the court reasoned that regardless
of an anticipatory repudiation, Rockwell had an ongoing obligation to
Romano, which allowed Romano to choose to rely on the contract until
the cessation of Rockwell's performance and then treat the action as a
breach."
2. FEHA Causes of Action
The court next considered when the statute of limitations begins to
run for causes of action uider the FEHA for retaliatory termination in
violation of California Government Code section 12940(0 and age dis-
crimination in violation of California Government Code section 12941."3
6. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th 488, 926 P.2d at 1119, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25. See gen-
erally 43 CAL. Jun. 3D Limitations of Actions § 39 (1978 & Supp. 1996) (explaining
the accrual of a breach of contract cause of action).
7. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 490, 926 P.2d at 1120, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26.
8. See id. at 489-91, 926 P.2d at 1119-21, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25-27.
9. See id. See generally 51 AM. Jun. 2D Limitation of Actions § 132 (1970 & Supp.
1996) (explaining the effect of an anticipatory repudiation on statute of limitations
accrual).
10. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 489-90, 926 P.2d at 1119-20, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25-
26.
11. See id. See generally James M. Fischer, The Limits of Statutes of Limitation, 16
Sw. U. L REv. 1, 3-4, 8-14 (1986) (discussing tolling in general and exploring the equi-
table tolling concept which permits judicially created tolling beyond tolling expressly
allowed in statutes).
12. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 489-91, 926 P.2d at 1119-21, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25-
27.
13. See id. at 491-500, 926 P.2d at 1121-27, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27-33. For a de-
scription of the process of filing FEHA claims and a discussion on whether Congress
intended FEHA to replace common law causes of action for wrongful termination, see
[Vol. 25: 183, 1997] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The court analyzed the plain meaning of the code sections to determine
when the causes of action accrue. 4 The court noted that both code sec-
tions expressly include the term "discharge" as an "unlawful employment
practice," and further noted that no other unlawful employment practices
listed in the Code sections apply to these facts.5 Additionally, California
Government Code section 12960 states that the limitations period accrues
"after" the unlawful employment practice occurs. 6 Therefore, the court
concluded that the actual discharge or termination of Romano was the
alleged unlawful employment practice which triggered the commence-
ment of the statute of limitations, not the notice of such termination. 7
Chief Justice George asserted several reasons in support of the ma-
jority's interpretation of the FEHA2 First, if the court held that the
date of notice of termination commenced the statute of limitations, then
such a holding would preclude the adjudication of legitimate claims.'9
Second, the majority's interpretation of the Government Code would not
create an excessive burden on employers because employers control
both the date of notice and the date of actual termination. 9 Third, the
date of actual termination was more easily ascertainable than the date of
David Benjamin Oppenheimer & Margaret M. Baumgartner, Employment Discrimination
and Wrongful Discharge: Does the Fair Employment and Housing Act Displace Com-
mon Law Remedies, 23 U.S.F. L REv. 145, 155-82 (1989).
14. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 493, 926 P.2d at 1122, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27.
15. See id. at 492, 926 P.2d at 1122, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27. California Government
Code section 12940 states: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice ... to dis-
charge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has op-
posed any practices forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a com-
plaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this part." CAL GOV'T CODE
§ 12940(f) (West 1992) (emphasis added). California Government Code section 12941(a)
provides: "It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire or
employ, or to discharge, dismiss, reduce, suspend, or demote, any individual over the
age of 40 on the ground of age, except in cases where the law compels or provides
for such action." CAL GOV'T CODE § 12941(a) (West 1992) (emphasis added).
16. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 493, 926 P.2d at 1122, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28; see
also CAL GOV'T CODE § 12960 (West 1992) (governing procedures for prevention and
culmination of unlawful employment practices).
17. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 492-93, 926 P.2d at 1122, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 27.
18. See id. at 493-95, 926 P.2d at 1122-23, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28-29.
19. See id. at 494, 926 P.2d at 1122-23, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28. See generally Fischer,
supra note 11, at 3 (questioning the arbitrariness of fixed statutes of limitations which
may preclude meritorious claims).
20. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 494, 926 P.2d at 1123, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28.
notice of termination.21 Fourth, adopting notice as the triggering event
for the commencement of the statute of limitations may cause employees
to fie premature claims that could be resolved prior to actual termina-
tion without resorting to litigation.2 Finally, the court noted that other
states had reached similar conclusions when interpreting the applicability
of statutes of limitations to unlawful employment practice laws.'
The court next addressed Rockwell's claim that federal case law dic-
tated the use of the date of notification to commence the statute of limi-
tations.24 The court rejected Rockwell's contention and noted that fed-
eral authority did not control the court's interpretation of the language of
the state statute.' Further, because the FEHA requires that the limita-
tions period begin to run after the unlawful employment practice, a dif-
ferent interpretation would be wholly inconsistent with the plain lan-
guage of the statute.26 Additionally, the court declined to apply the fed-
eral authorities cited by Rockwell because it determined that employees
should not be required to file suit prior to discharge when no "concrete
harm has been suffered."27
The court next considered Rockwell's contention that the court follow
the court of appeal's ruling in Regents of University of California v.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 494-95, 926 P.2d at 1123, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28-29.
23. See id. at 495, 926 P.2d at 1123-24, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29; see also Keelan v.
Bell Communications Research, 674 A.2d 603, 606-07 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)
(construing the New Jersey state Conscientious Employee Protection Act containing the
term "retaliatory action" to include "discharge" or termination as the date the cause of
action accrues, not the date of notice of such termination); Allison v. Jumping Horse
Ranch, Inc., 843 P.2d 753, 755-56 (Mont. 1992) (holding that the Montana Wrongful
Discharge From Employment Act requires the statute of limitations to run from the
date of actual termination); Harris v. Home Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 663 So. 2d 92, 95
(La. Ct. App. 1995) (construing the Louisiana Age Discrimination in Employment Act to
run from the date of actual termination, rather than an earlier date of notice).
24. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 495-99, 926 P.2d at 1124-26, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 29-
31; see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (holding that notice of the
decision to terminate based on political reasons violating the First Amendment started
the statute of limitations running, not the consequence of actual termination); Delaware
State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 257-58 (1980) (holding the denial of tenure as the
discriminatory practice which started the statute of limitations running, not the
eventual termination of employment). The court distinguished the denial of tenure in
academic situations by stating that notification of denial of tenure is different than
notification of termination because in non-academic situations it is possible that ter-
mination may never culminate. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 497, 926 P.2d at 1125, 59
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 30.
25. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 497, 926 P.2d at 1125, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 30.
26. See id.; see also CAL. Gov'r CODE § 12960 (West 1992) (stating the time frame
for the statute of limitations period as to FEHA claims).
27. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 497-98, 926 P.2d at 1125, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 31.
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Superior Court.' However, the court distinguished this decision be-
cause the plaintiff in Regents did not base her claim on statutory inter-
pretation of the FEHA, but instead claimed that continual violations
caused the statute of limitations to run anew.'
Lastly, the court addressed Rockwell's assertion that allowing the
statute of limitations to commence on the date of actual termination
would discourage employers from giving advance notice of termination
to employees.' The court reiterated that because employers control
both the date of notice and termination, this ruling would not heavily
burden employers.3 Further, the rule supported by the majority contin-
ues to serve the policy justifications for the statute of limitations by "pro-
tect[ing] defendants from the necessity of defending stale claims and
requir[ing] plaintiffs to pursue their claims diligently."'
3. Tort Cause of Action
Lastly, the court addressed when the statute of limitations accrues for
a tort cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public
policy.' The court stated that, generally, the statute of limitations be-
gins to run in a tort action when "'the events have developed to a point
where plaintiff is entitled to a legal remedy .... Tort causes of ac-
28. See id. at 499-500, 926 P.2d at 1131-32, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25; see also Regents,
33 Cal. App. 4th 1710, 1717-18, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 919, 922-23 (1995) (holding that the
limitations period for a FEHA claim began running upon notice that Regents required
the plaintiff to repeat her third year of the residency program, not the inevitable con-
sequence of having to leave the program without graduating after not fulfilling this
requirement), overnded by 14 Cal. 4th 479, 926 P.2d 1114, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20 (1996).
29. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 499-500, 926 P.2d at 1126, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32.
See generally 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 84 (1987) (explaining that a cause of
action accrues anew with each new violation until permanent injury occurs).
30. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 500, 926 P.2d at 1126-27, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32-33.
31. See id. at 500, 926 P.2d at 1127, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32.
32. See id. at 488, 500, 926 P.2d at 1119, 1127, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 24, 32. See gener-
ally Fischer, supra note 11, at 1-2 (listing the policies for the running of the statute of
limitations); 43 CAL JuR. 3D Limitations of Actions § 4 (1978) (discussing various
court opinions about the running of the statute of limitations).
33. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 500-03, 926 P.2d at 1127-29, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33-
35. See generally Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164
Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980) (recognizing a cause of action for the dismissal of an employee
who refuses to engage in unlawful activities); 2 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAIFORNIA
LAW, Agency and Employment §§ 169, 183 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996) (discussing
Tameny's role in recognizing a cause of action for wrongful termination).
34. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 500-01, 926 P.2d at 1127, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33
tion for wrongful termination in violation of public policy restrict the
employer's power to discharge employees.' Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the act which would entitle the plaintiff to a remedy would
be the actual act of dismissal on improper grounds.'
B. Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennard concurred with the majority, but stated that; a case
discussed by the majority, Delaware State College v. Ricks,37 did not
necessarily apply to denial of tenure situations.'
III. IMPACT
The holding in Romano clarifies when wrongful termination causes of
action accrue and also eliminates future litigation regarding notice as the
date the statute of limitations begins to run.' Further, the holding will
allow employees additional time to attempt to reconcile disputes with
their employers in hopes of retaining employment, rather than filing suit,
thereby immediately foreclosing future reconciliation.' However, it will
be interesting to monitor the willingness of employers after Rornano to
delay actual termination to allow pension accrual in order to avoid ex-
tending the limitations period.4"
(quoting Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502, 513, 535 P.2d 1161, 1168, 121 Cal. Rptr. 705,
712 (1975)).
35. See id. at 501, 926 P.2d at 1128, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33. See generahay 5 B.E.
WITKIN, CAUFORNIA PROCEDURE Pleading § 730 (3d ed. 1985) (explaining that a tort
cause of action may be brought against an employer for terminating an employee in
violation of an important public policy).
36. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 501, 926 P.2d at 1128, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 33.
37. 449 U.S. 250 (1980).
38. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 503, 926 P.2d at 1129, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 34
(Kennard, J., concurring).
39. See id. at 494, 926 P.2d at 1123, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 28.
40. See id. at 500, 926 P.2d at 1126-27, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 32-33.
41. See id.
[Vol. 25: 183, 1997] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to Romano, the California Supreme Court's approach to the
date of commencement of the limitations period for wrongful termination
causes of action was ambiguous.42 The court resolved this uncertainty
by holding that the statute of limitations begins to run in a wrongful
termination cause of action when the employer actually terminates the
employee and not upon notice of such termination.'
KIRSTEN C. INK
42. See Ochoa & Wistrich, supra note 2, at 32-34, n. 135 (attempting to resolve the
inconsistency by theorizing that the California Supreme Court intended to hold the date
of notice of termination as the date of accrual while noting that final resolution would
be forthcoming in Romano.); see also Shoemaker v. Myers, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1407, 1427,
4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 203, 215 (1992) (holding a wrongful termination cause of action did not
accrue until termination, the date when plaintiff suffered sufficient harm justifying a
legal remedy); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 147 Cal. App. 3d
1071, 1078, 195 Cal. Rptr. 576, 580 (1983) (holding that causes of action for wrongful
termination began to run on the date the employer's act injures the employee).
43. See Romano, 14 Cal. 4th at 489-90, 492-93, 501, 926 P.2d at 1119-20, 1122, 1128,
59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 25-28, 33.
XII. NEGLIGENCE
Shopkeepers do not owe a duty to comply with a rob-
ber's unlawful demand for property in order to avoid
injury to customers: Kentucky Fried Chicken of Cali-
fornia, Inc. v. Superior Court (Brown).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kentucky Fried Chicken of California, Inc. v. Superior Court
(Brown),1 the California Supreme Court addressed whether shopkeepers
owe a duty to their customers to comply with an armed robber's de-
mand for money to avoid injury to customers.2 Kentucky Fried Chicken
of California, Inc. (KFC) moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action because KFC did not owe a
duty to comply with an armed robber's demands and, alternatively, KFC
did not breach this duty.3 The trial court denied the motion for summary
judgment.4
Seeking to reverse the trial court's decision, KTC filed a petition for
writ of mandate arguing the nonexistence of a duty to concede to an
armed robber's demands to avoid injury to customers.5 The court of
appeal denied the petition for writ of mandate, holding that KFC owed a
duty of reasonable care to ensure its customers' safety.6 The court
1. 14 Cal. 4th 814, 927 P.2d 1260, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756 (1997). Justice Baxter wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice George and Justices Chin and Brown con-
curred. See id. at 817-30, 927 P.2d at 1262-70, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758-66. Justice Mosk
wrote a dissenting opinion. See id. at 830-31, 927 P.2d at 1270-71, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
766-67. Justice Kennard wrote a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Justice
Werdegar. See id. at 831-45, 927 P.2d at 1271-80, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 767-76.
2. See id. at 817, 927 P.2d at 1262, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758. A robber entered the
Kentucky Fried Chicken Restaurant and stuck a gun in the back of Kathy Brown, the
restaurant's only customer. Brown complied with the robber's demands for her money
and wallet. See id. at 818, 927 P.2d at 1262, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758. The robber de-
manded the clerk to open the cash register and give him the money. See id. The clerk
did not comply with this demand and said she had to get the key from the back of
the store. See id. The robber became angry and "shoved his gun harder into Brown's
back, and told the employee he would shoot Brown if the employee did not 'quit play-
ing games' and open the cash register immediately." See id. After Brown screamed to
the clerk to open the cash register, the clerk complied with the demands and turned
over the money to the robber. See id. The robber fled with the money. See id. The
store was unaware of any prior crimes at this location. See id. at 818, 927 P.2d at
1263, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
3. See id. at 818, 927 P.2d at 1262-63, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758-59.
4. See id. at 818, 927 P.2d at 1263, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
5. See id. at 818-19, 927 P.2d at 1263, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
6. See id. at 819-20, 927 P.2d at 1263, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759. For a general dis-
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found it was reasonably foreseeable that noncompliance with the armed
robber's demands would increase the possibility of harm or death to
hostages. 7 Further, the court reasoned that the shopkeeper's compli-
ance with such demands was a minimal burden and his interest in pro-
tecting his property was outweighed by the concern for customer safe-
ty.8 The court stated that imposing a duty to comply with a robber's de-
mands will not increase hostage-taking situations because criminals are
usually not aware of current tort law standards.9 Reversing the court of
appeal's judgment, the California Supreme Court held that KFC did not
owe a customer a duty to comply with an unlawful demand for money.'0
H. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The court began its analysis by considering the duty shopkeepers owe
to their customers." The court recognized that shopkeepers who open
their premises to the public owe a duty to protect their customers. 2
The court noted that business operators are subject to liability "'for phys-
ical harm caused by the accidental, negligent, or intentionally harmful
acts of third persons'. . . ."" Acknowledging that a business is not re-
quired to guarantee a visitor's safety, 4 the court held that shopkeepers
cussion of business owner liability for criminal acts of third parties, see Marjorie -A.
Caner, Annotation, Liability of Owner or Operator of Shopping Center, or Business
Housed Therein, for Injury to Patron on Premises from Criminal Attack by Third
Party, 31 A.LR. 5th 550 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
7. See KFC, 14 Cal. 4th at 820, 927 P.2d at 1264, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760. See gen-
eraly 62 AM. Jun. 2D Premises Liability § 48 (1990) (discussing the foreseeability of
third party criminal acts).
8. See KFC, 14 Cal. 4th at 821-22, 927 P.2d at 1264-65, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760-61.
9. See id. at 822, 927 P.2d at 1265, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761.
10. See id. at 817, 927 P.2d at 1262, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758.
11. See id. at 822-24, 927 P.2d at 1265-66, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761-62. See generally 6
B.E. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 933 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996)
(discussing a landowner's duty to take affirmative actions to control the wrongful acts
of third parties).
12. See KFC, 14 Cal. 4th at 822-23, 927 P.2d at 1265, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761.
13. Id. at 823, 927 P.2d at 1265, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965)).
14. See id. 14 Cal. 4th at 823, 927 P.2d at 1265, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761. See gener-
ally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965) (stating that "the possessor
[of land] is not an insurer of the visitor's safety").
only have a duty of care to customers when they know or have reason to
know harmful third party acts are likely to occur." Therefore, shop-
keepers are only required to take reasonable actions under the circum-
stances to protect their customers' safety."
Because California has never held that shopkeepers have a duty to
comply with an armed robber to protect others, 7 the court turned to
other jurisdictions for guidance."8 The court found that no jurisdiction
has recognized a duty to comply with a robber's demand for proper-
ty. 9 Furthermore, some jurisdictions recognize the right to actively re-
15. See KFIC, 14 Cal. 4th at 823-24, 927 P.2d at 1266, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762. See
generally 50 CAL JUR. 3D Premises Liability § 39 (1993 & Supp. 1997) (stating that a
landlord has a duty to protect against "known or reasonably foreseeable" criminal acts
of third parties).
16. See KFC, 14 Cal. 4th at 823-24, 927 P.2d at 1266, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762. See
generally Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48
STAN. L REV. 311 (1996) (discussing the concept of reasonableness and comparing it
with the concept of rationality).
17. See KFC, 14 Cal. 4th at 824, 927 P.2d at 1266, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762.
18. See id. at 824-28, 927 P.2d at 1266-69, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762-65; see also Kelly
v. Kroger Co., 484 F.2d 1362, 1363-64 (10th Cir. 1973) (focusing on foreseeability of the
harm to customers during an armed robbery after a pamphlet had been distributed to
employees advising actions to take during an armed robbery); Bennett v. Estate of
Baker, 557 P.2d 195, 198 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the law should not impose
a duty to comply with the unlawful demands of a criminal); Schubowsky v. Hearn
Food Store, Inc., 247 So.2d 484, 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (holding that the victim
of the armed robbery was "justified and privileged against liability" from injuries of a
customer arising from the shopkeeper's active resistance); Bence v. Crawford Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 400 N.E.2d 39, 42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that the existence of a duty
is determined by weighing various factors, not solely upon the foreseeability of the
event); Yingst v. Pratt, 220 N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ind. App. 1966) (holding that resistance is
superior public policy even where third parties are injured as a result); Adkins v.
Ashland Supermarkets, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (holding there is
no duty to comply with third party criminal demands); Helms v. Church's Fried
Chicken, Inc., 344 S.E.2d 349, 351 (N.C. CL App. 1986) (holding that storekeepers have
a duty to avoid increasing harm to customers during an armed robbery); Genovay v.
Fox, 143 A.2d 229, 239-40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958) (balancing the storeowner's
right to protect property with his duty to prevent foreseeable harm to customers from
criminal acts of third parties), rev'd on other grounds, 149 K2d 212 (N.J. 1959);
Helms v. Harris, 281 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) (holding that liability should
arise only where the individual should have foreseen that such active resistance creat-
ed unreasonable risk of physical harm to others). See generally David A. Roodman,
Note, Business Oumers Duty to Protect Invitees from Third Party Attacks-or-"Business
Owners Beware: Missouri Ups the Ante," 54 Mo. L REv. 443 (1989) (discussing premis-
es liability for third party criminal acts in Missouri); Donald W. Giffin & Brian F.
Stayton, Landowners Beware: The Current Status of Premises Liability in Kansas, J.
KAN. B. ASS'N, Jan. 1995, at 18 (discussing premises liability in Kansas).
19. See KFC, 14 Cal. 4th at 824, 927 P.2d at 1266, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762.
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sist robbery attempts if the resistance is reasonable under the circum-
stances. 0
The court next addressed the plaintiff's argument that section 1714(a)
of the California Civil Code imposed a responsibility on KFC for "'injury
occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the man-
agement of his property or person'.... 2 1 Although the court recog-
nized such a duty, the court reasoned that this provision has never been
construed to require a shopkeeper to comply with the unlawful demands
of a robber.' The court adopted the reasoning in Vandermost v. Alpha
Beta Co.23 for not imposing such a duty on shopkeepers.' First, due to
the unpredictability of robbers, the connection between complying with a
robber's demands and avoiding injury to customers is tenuous.' Sec-
ond, imposing such a duty is contrary to public policy because it may
encourage hostage-taking situations with the expectation of compliance
by shopkeepers. 6
The court further reasoned that both the California Constitution and
the California Civil Code grant shopkeepers the right to protect their
property with reasonable force. 7 The court concluded that recognizing
a shopkeeper's duty to comply with unlawful requests for property by a
robber is inconsistent with California law.' Moreover, the court noted
that no active resistance occurred in this situation, only noncompliance
with demands.'
Disagreeing with the court of appeal, the court was concerned that
criminals might become aware of a shopkeeper's duty to comply with a
robber's demand for property and, as a result, increase hostage-taking
20. See id.
21. Id. at 828, 927 P.2d at 1269, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765 (quoting CAL CIV. CODE
§ 1714(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997)).
22. See id. 14 Cal. 4th at 828, 927 P.2d at 1269, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765; see also
CAL CIv. CODE § 1714 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
23. 164 Cal. App. 3d 771, 210 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1985).
24. See KFC, 14 Cal. 4th at 829-30, 927 P.2d at 1269-70, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765-66
(citing Vandermost, 164 Cal. App. 3d 771, 775, 210 Cal. Rptr. 613, 618 (1985) (holding
that no duty to comply with robber's demands should be imposed because it is poor
public policy to hold otherwise)).
25. See id. 14 Cal. 4th at 829-30, 927 P.2d at 1269-70, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765-66.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 829, 927 P.2d at 1269-70, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765-66; CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997); CAL CIV. CODE § 50 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997).
28. See KFY, 14 Cal. 4th at 829, 927 P.2d at 1269-70, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765-66.
29. See id. at 829, 927 P.2d at 1270, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 766.
occurrences.' Additionally, the court reiterated its uncertainty that com-
pliance would prevent injury to customers."' Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that public policy is best served by not imposing a duty to accede
to such criminal demands.'
B. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
In a separate opinion, Justice Mosk disagreed with the majority's
holding that a shopkeeper never owes a duty to comply with a robber's
demands to protect customers.' Reiterating the court's holding in
Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc.,' that a shopkeeper must exercise rea-
sonable care to protect customers from third party criminal acts, Justice
Mosk urged that the imposition of the duty to comply with such de-
mands should be fact-specific, not absolute.'
Justice Mosk found two flaws in the majority's reasoning.' First,
Justice Mosk noted the majority's reasoning, that not imposing a duty to
comply will deter criminal acts, is at odds with their reasoning that crim-
inals are unpredictable.37 Second, the right to protect property under
California law is not absolute and is subject to the requirement that a
shopkeeper exercise reasonable care to protect customers from third
party criminal acts.'
C. Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority's formulation of the is-
sue.' Justice Kennard argued that the issue involves two questions: (1)
30. See id. at 829-30, 927 P.2d at 1270, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 766.
31. See id. at 830, 927 P.2d at 1270, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 766.
32. See id.
33. See id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
34. 65 Cal. 2d 114, 416 P.2d 793, 52 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1966).
35. See KFC 14 Cal. 4th at 830-31, 927 P.2d at 1270-71, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 766-67
(Mosk, J., dissenting); see also Taylor, 65 Cal. 2d at 121, 416 P.2d at 797, 52 Cal. Rptr.
at 565 (holding that a shopkeeper has a duty of reasonable care to protect against
foreseeable criminal acts of third parties).
36. See KFC, 14 Cal. 4th at 831, 927 P.2d at 1270-71, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 766-67
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
37. See id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
38. See id. at 831, 927 P.2d at 1271, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 767 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
See generally Robert C. Bishop, J.D., Annotation, Liability of Storekeeper for Death of
or Injury to Customer in Course of Robbery, 72 !kLR. 3D 1269, 1275-77 (1976) (dis-
cussing the weighing of the shopkeeper's right to protect property against the duty of
care owed to customers).
39. See KFC, 14 Cal. 4th at 832, 927 P.2d at 1271, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 767 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
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whether KFC owed a duty of reasonable care to protect its customers
from criminal third party acts, and (2) whether KFC breached this duty
of care by not complying with the robber's initial demand for money.4°
The first issue as to whether a duty exists "is decided as a matter of law
by the court."4 The second issue as to whether the defendant breached
this duty of care is a question for the jury to determine if the court finds
reasonable minds could differ.42 Agreeing with the majority's recogni-
tion of a shopkeeper's duty to protect customers from third party crimi-
nal acts,' Justice Kennard argued that reasonable minds could differ as
to the question of breach." Accordingly, Justice Kennard would have af-
firmed the court of appeal's denial of the writ of mandate because the
trial court was correct in denying the summary judgment motion, leaving
the jury to decide the question of breach.'
Justice Kennard stated that the majority, by deciding this case as a
question of duty, created an absolute standard and abandoned the more
flexible fact-sensitive standard normally applied in negligence actions.'
By abandoning the flexibility of the reasonable person standard, future
cases will be bound by the same rule, although the specific circum-
stances may demand a different outcome. 7
7
40. See id. at 831-32, 927 P.2d at 1271-72, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 767-68. (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
41. See id. at 832, 927 P.2d at 1271, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 767 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing). See generally 6 B.E. WITIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 748 (9th ed.
1988 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the determination of a legal duty as a question of law).
42. See KFC, 14 Cal. 4th at 832, 927 P.2d at 1271, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 767 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 832, 927 P.2d at 1271, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 767 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing).
44. See id. at 835, 927 P.2d at 1273, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing).
45. See id. at 845, 927 P.2d at 1280, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 776 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing).
46. See id. at 839, 927 P.2d at 1276, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing). See generally 46 CAL. JuR. 3D Negligence § 9 (1978 & Supp. 1997) (examining the
factors considered by courts in deciding whether to create a duty); Charles M. Riffle,
Comment, A Landlord's Duty to Protect his Tenants from the Criminal Acts of Third
Persons, 5 U.S.F. L REv. 378, 384-86 (1971) (discussing the policy considerations of
imposing liability on landlords for third party criminal acts); Joseph N. Komowsld,
Comment, California's Approach to Third Party Liability for Criminal Violence, 13
LoY. L REV. 535, 546-56 (1980) (discussing various approaches of determining the exis-
tence of a duty of third parties for liability arising from criminal acts).
47. See KFC, 14 Cal. 4th at 839, 927 P.2d at 1276, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772 (Kennard,
Justice Kennard discussed the reasoning behind the preference of a
jury determining this issue as a question of breach." First, reasonable
conduct of a shopkeeper is dependent on specific circumstances requir-
ing a fact-sensitive inquiry by a jury.49 Second, permitting a jury to de-
termine what is reasonable conduct under the circumstances allows the
standard of reasonableness to adjust to changes in society, thereby giving
shopkeepers an incentive to update and increase precautionary mea-
sures.' Third, it is preferable to allow a jury with diverse experiences,
rather that a single judge, to determine what is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances."1
Ill. IMPACT
The holding in KFC is narrowly limited to a refusal to comply with a
robber's unlawful demand for property; active resistance was not con-
sidered. 2 The holding affords a shopkeeper flexibility in deciding
whether to comply with a robber's demands and injects uncertainty in
the response expected by a robber. It is possible, however, that situa-
tions will arise where compliance would have been the most reasonable
act, demonstrating Justice Kennard's concern for the overbreadth of
establishing no duty to comply, rather than a fact-sensitive analysis of
the circumstances.'
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to KFC, it was unclear how far the duty to protect customers
extended when responding to unlawful demands of a robber. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court resolved this uncertainty by holding that; a shop-
J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 840-43, 927 P.2d at 1276-79, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772-75 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
49. See id. at 840-41, 927 P.2d at 1277-78, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773-74 ({ennard, J.,
dissenting).
50. See id. at 841-42, 927 P.2d at 1278, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing).
51. See id. at 842-43, 927 P.2d at 1278-79, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774-75 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
52. See id. at 829, 927 P.2d at 1269-70, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765-66.
53. See i. at 839, 927 P.2d at 1276, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 772 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing).
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keeper does not owe a duty to comply with a robber's unlawful de-
mands for property in order to protect his customers from injury.'
KIRSTEN C. INK
54. See id. at 817, 927 P.2d at 1262, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758.
XIII. PREMISES LIABILITY LAW
A triable issue of fact exists regarding whether a land-
owner can be liable for failure to warn of a potential
hazard when a party is injured on property adjacent to
and controlled by the landowner, but which the landown-
er does not possess: Alcaraz v. Vece.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Alcaraz v. Vece,' the California Supreme Court examined whether a
landlord had a duty to warn2 a tenant of a potential danger on 'land bor-
dering the landlord's property, over which the landlord had exercised
some control.' The potential danger was an uncovered "utility meter box
embedded in the lawn" of the neighboring land.4 The defendant argued
that he owed no duty because both the land and the meter box were not
his property.5 The superior court agreed, granting summary judgment for
the defendant, finding that the city owned the property where the box
was located.6 The appellate court reversed the lower court decision,
holding that the defendant's maintenance of the yard surrounding the
meter box and the fact that he had actual notice that the meter box was
uncovered raised triable issues of fact as to whether the defendant owed
1. 14 Cal. 4th 1149, 929 P.2d 1239, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 448 (1997). Chief Justice
George authored the majority opinion. See id. at 1152, 929 P.2d at 1240, 60 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 449. Justices Chin, Mosk, and Werdegar concurred. See id. at 1171, 929 P.2d at
1253, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462. Justice Mosk wrote a separate concurring opinion. See
id. at 1171-74, 929 P.2d at 1253-55, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462-64 (Mosk, J., concurring).
Justice Kennard filed a dissenting opinion. See id. at 1174-86, 929 P.2d at 1255-64, 60
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464-72 (Kermard, J., dissenting). Justice Baxter authored a separate
dissenting opinion. See id. at 1186-90, 929 P.2d at 1264-66, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472-74
(Baxter, J., dissenting). Justice Brown also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. See id.
at 1190-98, 929 P.2d at 1266-72, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474-80 (Brown, J., dissenting).
2. See 6 B.E. WrrIN, SUMMARY OF CAuFORNI LAW Torts § 935 (9th ed. 1988) (de-
tailing landowner warnings that have sufficed to discharge the landowner of his duty
without taking other steps to remove the cause of harm).
3. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1152-53, 929 P.2d at 1241, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449-50.
4. Id. at 1153, 929 P.2d at 1241, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 450. Gilardo Alcaraz was in-
jured when he walked into an uncovered utility meter box positioned in the ground
adjacent to the sidewalk in front of the apartment building in which he lived. See id.
His amended complaint alleged that the landlord had actual notice of the exposed
meter box. See id.
5. See id. at 1153, 929 P.2d at 1241, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 450; 51 CAL JuP. 3D Prop-
erty § 19 (1979) (stating the general rule that a landowner is normally only responsible
for injuries to third parties on his property if he fails to use ordinary care).
6. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1154-55, 929 P.2d at 1242, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 451.
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a duty to the plaintiff.7 Affirming the court of appeal, the California Su-
preme Court held that triable issues existed and, therefore, the defendant
was not entitled to summary judgment.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The first part of Chief Justice George's opinion set forth the appro-
priate rule to apply in assessing the liability of a landowner.' Namely,
the proper standard "'is whether in the management of his property [the
landowner] acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury
to others.'"'" Thus, the court found a duty to keep property under one's
control in a "reasonably safe condition."" Based on precedent, 2 the
court extended the duty to cover situations in which the property is con-
7. See id. at 1155, 929 P.2d at 1242, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 451.
8. See id. at 1170-71, 929 P.2d at 1253, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 461-62.
9. See id. at 1156, 929 P.2d at 1243, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 451.
10. Id. (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 119, 443 P.2d 561, 568, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97, 104 (1968)). See John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of
Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative
Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L REV. 867, 870 (1991) (recommending that
the court impose a duty to act reasonably, even when there is no common law duty
to do so unless countervailing considerations demand otherwise). But see Mark K
Osbeck, Bad Samaritanism and the Duty to Render Aid: A Proposal, 19 U. MICH. J.L
REF. 315, 318-19 (1985) (arguing that there should be a duty to notify in lieu of a duty
to rescue).
11. Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1156, 929 P.2d at 1243, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452. See
James T.R Jones, Trains, Trucks, Trees and Shrubs: Vision-Blocking Natural Vegeta-
* tion and a Landowner's Duty to Those Off the Premises, 39 ViLL L REV. 1263, 1266
(1994) (concluding that, at least in regard to trimming back overgrown natural vegeta-
tion, "all possessors and occupiers of property are obligated to act reasonably to safe-
guard those adjacent to their premises from harm.")
12. The court cited Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 44 Cal. 2d 225, 282
P.2d 69 (1955), and Krongos v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 7 Cal. App. 4th 387, 9 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 124 (1992), to demonstrate that a landowner could be liable for failure to
warn of the danger posed by a crane working near electrical lines despite the
landowner's clear non-possessory interest in the power lines. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th
at 1156, 929 P.2d at 1243, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452. In a hypothetical, the court stated
that the proper course of conduct in a similar situation would be either to set up
barriers or give warnings of the danger. See id.
trolled by the landowner even though the cause of the potential harm is
not under his control. 3
The defendant, relying on Hamilton v. Gage Bowl, Inc.," argued that
owners of property are not liable for injuries occurring outside of their
property. 5 In Hamilton, the court held that a bowling alley was not lia-
ble for injuries caused from a sign falling down from an adjacent build-
ing.' The Alcaraz court discounted Hamilton's applicability, distin-
guishing it on the basis that Hamilton dealt with the duty to detect a
dangerous situation while in the present case, the defendant knew of the
potential harm.'
The second part of the majority opinion centered upon explaining why
control, as opposed to actual possession of land, is the key determina-
tion in assigning liability. 8 The court first specified the cases standing
for the principle that the law imposes liability on defendants who control
injury-inducing property, despite lack of official title.' The court contin-
ued by noting that the Restatement Second of Torts" defines the person
responsible for injuries caused on land as the one who possesses land,
not as the one who owns or leases land.2 Finally, the court discussed
the appellate court's practice of basing liability on control rather than ti-
tleY
13. See id.
14. 6 Cal. App. 4th 1706, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819 (1992).
15. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1156-57, 929 P.2d at 1243, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 1157, 929 P.2d at 1243-44, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 452.
18. See id. at 1157-62, 929 P.2d at 1244-47, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453-56; see also 51
CAL. Jup. 3D Property § 14 (1979) (associating the rights to control and possess with
ownership).
19. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1157-58, 929 P.2d at 1244-45, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453
(citing Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, 30 Cal. 3d 358, 636 P.2d 1121, 178 Cal. Rptr.
783 (1981), Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, Inc., 28 Cal. 2d 394, 170 P.2d 5
(1946), and Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd., 67 Cal. 2d 232, 430 P.2d 68, 60 Cal. Rptr.
510 (1967)). See also David W. Burcham, Sprecher v. Adamson Companies: Nonfeasance
Immunity Slides by the California Supreme Court, 16 Loy. LA. L REv. 625, 627
(1983) (discussing the court's imposition of a new rule placing an affirmative duty on
landowners to "manage their property reasonably" when a natural condition on land
causes harm).
20. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1158-59, 929 P.2d at 1245, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Toins § 328E (1965)). One definition the Restatement
gives for a possessor of land is "'a person who is in occupation of the land with the
intent to control it.'" Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328E (1965)).
Comment (a) explains, "The important thing in the law of torts is the possession, and
not whether it is or is not rightful as between the possessor and some third person."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToiTs § 328E cmt. a (1965)).
21. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1158-59, 929 P.2d at 1245, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453.
22. See id. at 1159, 929 P.2d at 1245, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 453-54.
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Discovering additional support in the similar application of the princi-
ple in two federal circuit court opinions,' the majority continued its
analysis by applying the principle to the instant case.2' By finding evi-
dence that the landowner had exercised control over the land surround-
ing the meter box by maintaining the lawn and fencing off the area after
the plaintiffs injury, the court concluded that there were triable issues of
fact upon which reasonable jurors could differ. 5
Chief Justice George concluded the second part of his opinion by ad-
dressing the issue raised by Justice Brown's dissent." The majority read
Justice Brown's dissent as requiring a finding that a landowner both
exercised control over the property on which a party is injured and re-
ceived a commercial benefit from that property before liability can
arise.27 Acknowledging that two recent appellate court decisions sug-
gested a commercial benefit element,s the Chief Justice discounted reli-
23. The cited cases were: Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., 757 F.2d 909
(7th Cir. 1985) and Husovsky v. United States, 590 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See
Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1159-61, 929 P.2d at 1245-47, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454-55. In
Orthmann, the court refused to grant a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss filed by the defen-
dant, an inner tube rental association, when the plaintiff rented an inner tube to float
down a river, stopped at a place not owned by the association along the river, dove
from the riverbank, and injured himself on a rock See id. at 1159-60, 929 P.2d at
1245, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454 (citing Orthmann, 757 F.2d at 910). The court refused to
grant the 12(b)(6) motion for dismissal because the association had exercised control
over the property by keeping it clean and by subsequently cutting down the tree, even
though it did not own that particular piece of property. See id. at 1160, 929 P.2d at
1245-46, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 454-55 (citing Orthmann, 757 F.2d 909). In Husovsky, the
plaintiff was injured while driving on a public road when a tree fell and struck his
car. See id. at 1160, 929 P.2d at 1246, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455 (citing Husovsky, 590
F.2d at 948). The court found the United States Government liable even though the
tree was on land owned by the Government of India because the United States treated
the tract of land in all respects exactly like the surrounding federal parkland. See id.
at 1160-61, 929 P.2d at 1246, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455 (citing Husovsky, 590 F.2d at
953).
24. See id. at 1161, 929 P.2d at 1247, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455-56.
25. See id. at 1161-62, 929 P.2d at 1247, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 455-56.
26. See id. at 1162-66, 929 P.2d at 1247-50, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 456-58.
27. See id. at 1162, 929 P.2d at 1247, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 456.
28. See id. at 1164-65, 929 P.2d at 1249-50, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 457-58. Alcaraz quot-
ed Swann v. Olivier as recognizing that liability has been imposed on businesses
which have "'received a special commercial benefit from the area of the injury plus
had direct or de facto control of that area.'" Id. at 1164-65, 929 P.2d at 1249, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 457 (quoting Swann v. Olivier, 22 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 1330 (1994)). Refer-
encing Princess Hotels Int'l Inc. v. Superior Court, the Alcaraz court also observed
ance on these opinions, maintaining that the references to a commercial
benefit requirement were only made in dicta." The failure of the two
cases to account for why a commercial benefit element should be a pre-
requisite to finding liability also influenced the Chief Justice's disapprov-
al.30
The final section of the majority opinion focused on whether the intro-
duction of evidence that the defendant had built a fence around the en-
tire lawn was proper.31 The defendant first argued that the evidence
concerning the construction of the fence was irrelevant.32 After defining
relevant evidence,' the court found that both the defendant's mowing
of the city lawn and the defendant's construction of a fence around the
meter box were relevant.' The court held the mowing to be slightly rel-
evant 0 as circumstantial evidence that the defendant "exercised posses-
sion and control over the property at the time plaintiff was injured."0
The defendant's second argument was that the admission of evidence
of building the fence violated Evidence Code section 1151"7 which pro-
hibits evidence of subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence.3'
Disregarding the applicability of the statute, the court stated that the rule
only applies when the purpose is to prove negligence, not to prove
the precedent cases "'require control as well as a commercial benefit.'" Id. at 1165, 929
P.2d at 1249, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 458 (quoting Princess Hotels Int'l Inc. v. Superior Ct.,
33 Cal. App. 4th 645, 652 (1995)).
29. See Alearaz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1164-65, 929 P.2d at 1249, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 457-58.
30. See id. at 1165-66, 929 P.2d at 1250, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 458.
31. See id. at 1166-71, 929 P.2d at 1250-53, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 458-42. The trial
court disallowed the evidence and although the appellate court overruled the lower
court decision, it never held specifically on the evidential issue. See id. at 1166, 929
P.2d at 1250, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459.
32. See id. at 1166, 929 P.2d at 1250, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 458-59.
33. The court defined relevant evidence as "'evidence . .. having any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determi-
nation of the action.'" Id. at 1167, 929 P.2d at 1250, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459 (quoting
CAL EViD. CODE § 210 (West 1995)).
34. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1166, 929 P.2d at 1250, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459.
35. See id. at 1167, 929 P.2d at 1250, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459.
36. Id. The court conceded that building the fence before the injury would have
been more indicative of control and, thus, more probative evidence, but it still found
the evidence to be relevant See id. at 1167-68, 929 P.2d at 1251, 60 Ca]. Rptr. 2d at
459-60.
37. The California statute states: "When, after the occurrence of an event, remedial
or precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken previously, would have tended to
make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is inadmis-
sible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event." CAL Evil.
CODE § 1151 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997).
38. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1168-69, 929 P.2d at 1252, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 460.
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whether control was exercised.' Thus, the evidence was proper for use
in determining whether the defendant controlled the strip of city land.4"
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk concurred in the majority's judgment but wrote separate-
ly because he found two reasons to deny the motion for summary judg-
ment.4 The first reason followed the majority's opinion that the plaintiff
had displayed enough proof that the defendant controlled the area of
injury to create a triable issue of fact for a jury.42 Justice Mosk based
his second reason in the law of appurtenances.' He stated that, because
the defendant received a benefit from an appurtenance located on adjoin-
ing land, the defendant's failure to maintain the appurtenance was suffi-
cient to preclude a summary judgment ruling on liability." Justice Mosk
cited case law establishing the principle that "'an abutting landowner
may be held liable for the dangerous condition of portions of the public
sidewalk which have been altered or constructed for the benefit of his
property.'"4" Because appurtenances, such as meter boxes, benefit the
possessor and controller of adjacent land, the imposition of liability on
the one who receives the advantage is justifiable.46 Although, in the
present case, the appurtenance was within the lawn and not on a side-
walk, Justice Mosk concluded that liability should still arise because the
injured party was not just a passerby, but was a tenant who could be ex-
pected to walk on the lawn.47
39. See id.
40. See id. at 1170, 929 P.2d at 1252-53, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 461.
41. See id. at 1174, 929 P.2d at 1255, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464 (Mosk, J., concurring).
42. See i.d at 1171-72, 929 P.2d at 1253-54, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462 (Mosk, J., con-
curring).
43. See id. at 1171-73, 929 P.2d at 1253-55, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462-64 (Mosk, J.,
concurring). An appurtenance is "[t]hat which belongs to something else . . . [a]n arti-
cle adapted to the use of the property to which it is connected, and which was in-
tended to be a permanent accession to the freehold." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 103 (6th
ed. 1990).
44. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1172, 929 P.2d at 1254, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 462
(Mosk, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 1172, 929 P.2d at 1254, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463 (Mosk, J., concurring)
(quoting Peters v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 Cal. 2d 419, 423, 260 P.2d 55,
58 (1953)).
46. See id. at 1173, 929 P.2d at 1254-55, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463 (Mosk, J., concur-
ring).
47. See id. at 1174, 929 P.2d at 1255, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 463-64 (Mosk, J., concur-
C. Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion
In a three-part dissent, Justice Kennard posited her reasons for coming
to the opposite conclusion.' The thrust of Justice Kennard's dissent
was that a landowner with no possessory interest in adjacent property,
no legal right to control the property or the cause of harm, and no re-
sponsibility for causing or increasing the harm has no duty to defend
others from a present danger." Justice Kennard also maintained that the
majority opinion changes California law and runs counter to traditional
tort policies by exposing "innocuous or good-neighborly conduct" to
potential liability.'
After recounting the facts in the first part of her dissent, Justice
Kennard began by defining the inconsistency of the majority's rule with
the previous California law that only imposed liability when the landown-
er (1) had a legal right to control the hazard or the property containing
the hazard or (2) produced or increased the harm.5 Justice Kennard's
examination of relevant case law' led her to conclude that Ca:lifornia's
general rule is that "[a]bsent the right to control either the premises or
the dangerous condition, there generally is no duty to correct or to
warn."' Justice Kennard recognized an exception that assigns liability
when a party's conduct on another's property exacerbates the likelihood
of harm, but she ruled out its applicability because the facts presented
ring).
48. See id. at 1174-86, 929 P.2d at 1255-64, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464-72 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
49. See id. at 1174, 929 P.2d at 1255, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing).
50. Id. at 1174, 929 P.2d at 1256, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 464 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 1175-76, 929 P.2d at 1256, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
52. Justice Kennard discussed Sprecher v. Adamson COmpanies, 30 Cal. 3d 358, 636
P.2d 1121, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981), to establish the principle that landowners have an
affirmative duty to protect people from dangers on their land because, as owners, they
have the right to control the property. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1176, 929 P.2d at
1257, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Thus, landowners are in the
best position to prevent harm. See id. Justice Kennard also named Johnston v. De La
Guerra Properties, 28 Cal. 2d 394, 170 P.2d 5 (1946), Morehouse v. Taubman Co., 5
Cal. App. 3d 548, 85 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1970), and Uccello v. Laudenslayer, 44 Cal. App.
3d 504, 118 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1975), to demonstrate, respectively, that: 1) both a landlord
and a tenant may possess limited rights of control over the same area; 2) a non-owner
may be liable for a hazardous condition on property if he had the right to control the
premises; and 3) a person may be liable even if he had only the right to control the
device of harm and not the property on which the harm occurred. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal.
4th at 1176-77, 929 P.2d at 1257-58, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 465-66 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
53. Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1178, 929 P.2d at 1258, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 466 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
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no evidence that the landlord had conducted himself in a manner which
would make the exposed meter box more danger-prone. 54
Justice Kennard proceeded with her dissent by discrediting those
sources relied upon by the majority."6 Justice Kennard described the
majority's reliance on the federal cases of Husovsky v. United States and
Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc. as misguided because these
cases already fit within what she recognized to be California's general
rule.' The cases were consistent with prior law because the defendants
in both cases had in some way contributed to the dangerous condition. 7
Thus, the cases could not justify the majority's amendment of the law.'
Justice Kennard found further fault in the majority's reading of the
Restatement Second of Torts.' The failure of the Chief Justice to incor-
porate the final sentence of comment (a) to section 328E into his analy-
sis led to, in Justice Kennard's opinion, an erroneous interpretation of
who is a possessor of land.' Justice Kennard pointed to the section's
use of the term "possessor" as one who is a "disseisor," defined as some-
one acquiring ownership via adverse possession."' Thus, under the
dissent's reading, Restatement Second of Torts section 328E refers to a
possessor, not as one who exerts any act of control, but rather as one
who exerts control for all intents and purposes, sufficient to be charac-
terized as an adverse possessor.'
54. See id. at 1178-79, 929 P.2d at 1258-59, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 466-67 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting). For support, Justice Kennard relied upon Hamilton v. Gage Bowl, Inc., 6
Cal. App. 4th 1706, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819 (1992) which was utilized in the defendant's
argument, and DonneU v. California Western School of Law, 200 Cal. App. 3d 715, 246
Cal. Rptr. 199 (1988). See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1179, 929 P.2d at 1259, 60 CaL Rptr.
2d at 467. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 1179-83, 929 P.2d at 1259-62, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 467-70 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
56. See id. at 1179-81, 929 P.2d at 1259-60, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 467-68 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
57. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
58. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
59. See i.d. at 1181-82, 929 P.2d at 1260-61, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468-69 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
60. See id. at 1181, 929 P.2d at 1260, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 468 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing).
61. See id. at 1181, 929 P.2d at 1260, 60 Cal. Rplr. 2d at 468-69 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
62. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting); 4 B.E. WMrnN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW
Real Property § 96 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1997) (describing acts of adverse possession
as those "which proclaim to the world, and bring notice to the owner, that a right is
Additionally, Justice Kennard remarked on the majority opinion's fail-
ure to acknowledge the test for liability established in Rowland v. Chris-
tian.' Rowland evaluated liability in light of five factors: (1) whether
the injured party and the defendant had a close affiliation; (2) whether
the defendant's behavior warranted any moral condemnation; (3) wheth-
er imposing liability would promote the public policy of avoiding future
injuries; (4) the degree to which imposing liability on the defendant
would have negative consequences to both the defendant and the larger
community; and (5) whether the defendant had access to insurance.'
Evaluating the present facts in view of these factors, Justice Kennard de-
duced that there was no connection between the injury and the
defendant's conduct, no moral blame was borne by the defendant, the
imposition of liability on the landowner would only serve to discourage
citizens from engaging in socially beneficial activity on adjacent property,
and that non-owners of property will not usually have an insurable inter-
est in the land possessing the hazard.'
The last component of Justice Kennard's dissent focused on the fact
that the majority failed to clearly define what constitutes an exercise of
control over adjacent property, leaving the jury to determine on a case-
by-case basis when an owner has exercised sufficient control.' Justice
Kennard noted that, despite the majority's contention that an occasional
mowing of a yard owned by another will generally not give rise to a duty
to warn or protect, the Chief Justice never settled the issue because he
never specifically answered whether the occasional mowing performed
by the instant defendant constituted the "'minimal, neighborly mainte-
nance of property owned by another that will not give rise to a duty."67
Without such a specific ruling, Justice Kennard opined that a jury might
decide that such acts do amount to an exercise of control.6
claimed in the land over which the claimant is seeking to exercise dominion").
63. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1182-83, 929 P.2d at 1261, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469
(Kennard, J., dissenting); see also 6 B.E. WrrIUN, SUMMARY OF CAUIFORNIA LAw, Torts
§ 944 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (discussing Rowland and UcceUo).
64. See Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1182-83, 929 P.2d at 1261, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469
(Kennard, J., dissenting) (citing Rowland, 69 Cal. 2d 106, 117, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103,
443 P.2d 561, 567 (1968)).
65. See id. at 1183, 929 P2d at 1261-62, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469-70 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
66. See id. at 1183-86, 929 P.2d at 1262-64, 60 CaL. Rptr. 2d at 470-72 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
67. Id. at 1184, 929 P.2d at 1262-63, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470-71 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1167, 929 P.2d at 1250, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 459).
68. See id. at 1184, 929 P.2d at 1263, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing).
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Justice Kennard further explained that a jury is not the appropriate
body to decide when certain acts result in a duty of care.' She reiterat-
ed that juries decide issues when the facts are in dispute, not issues of
when certain sets of facts produce a legal duty."0 In the present case,
Justice Kennard concluded that there were no actual issues for the jury
to decide because the parties did not dispute that the defendant mowed
the grass around the meter box at times and fenced the property after
the accident.7
Finally, Justice Kennard attacked the relevance of evidence relied upon
by the majority concerning the construction of a fence around the meter
box.' Justice Kennard reasoned that the evidence offered no indication
that the defendant had exercised control over the property prior to the
injury-causing event "as the action took place after the accident."' She
further recognized that such a ruling will be a disincentive for landown-
ers to take remedial steps to save others after injuries occur on neigh-
boring land.74
D. Justice Baxter's Dissenting Opinion
Agreeing with Justice Kennard that the majority holding is "bad public
policy,"75 Justice Baxter dissented to specifically enumerate the prin-
ciples precluding the defendant's liability.' Justice Baxter explained
that no case law cited by the majority or the other dissents establishes
that a nonowner should be liable if he: (1) has neither created the harm
nor made it worse; (2) has no legal claims of management or control
over the land or peril; (3) has not acted in a manner suggesting such con-
trol; (4) has not gained any visible advantage; and (5) has no power to
remove the hazard.77 According to Justice Baxter, comparison of these
69. See id. at 1183-84, 929 P.2d at 1262, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
70. Id. at 1184, 929 P.2d at 1262, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1184-85, 929 P.2d at 1263, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 1188, 929 P.2d at 1265, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 1186, 929 P.2d at 1264, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
77. See id. at 1187, 929 P.2d at 1264-65, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472-73 (Baxter, J., dis-
senting).
factors to the facts of the case revealed no reason to deny the defendant
summary judgment.m
E. Justice Brown's Dissenting Opinion
In a final dissenting voice, Justice Brown chastised the majority for
expanding tort liability beyond the bounds of precedent and good judg-
ment.tm He argued that liability for off-premises harm has been and
should be restrained by evidence of substantial control, the nonowners
receipt of a clear advantage from use of the land that caused the injury,
or a combination of both.' Justice Brown predicted that the majority
opinion's dissolution of the bond linking commercial benefit with a cor-
responding legal duty will effectively eradicate precedent and present the
possibility that "the majority is impliedly adopting a new rule.""1
III. IMPACT
As the dissent remarked, the effect of Alcamz creates uncertainty.' It
is only certain that a defendant is not guaranteed summary judgment
when he takes steps toward maintaining neighboring property which con-
tains a harm ultimately causing injury.' The extent of maintenance
which amounts to control and the subsequent duty to warn or protect
others remains unresolved by the ruling that the question of control is a
triable issue of fact left to a jury to decide.' Thus, future interpretations
78. See id. at 1187-88, 929 P.2d at 1265, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 473 (Baxter, J., dissent-
ing).
79. See id. at 1190, 929 P.2d at, 1266, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474 (Brown, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 1190, 929 P.2d at 1267, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 474-75 (Brown, J., dis-
senting). His own analysis of the federal appellate court cases, Swann, 22 Cal. app. 4th
1324, and Princess Hotels, 33 Cal. App. 4th 645 informs this opinion. See Alcaraz, 14
Cal. 4th at 1191-93, 929 P.2d at 1267-68, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475-76 (Brown, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Brown also based his conclusion on the court's own precedent, finding a
requirement of at least one or a combination of these factors in: Southland Corp. v.
Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 3d 656, 250 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1988), Johnston v. De La
Guerra Properties, Inc., 28 Cal. 2d 394, 170 P.2d 5 (1946), Schwartz v. Helms Bakery
Limited, 67 Cal. 2d 232, 430 P.2d 68, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1967), and Ross v. Kirby, 251
Cal. App. 2d 267, 59 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1967). Id. at 1193-97, 929 P.2d at 1269-72, 60 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 476-79 (Brown, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 1197, 929 P.2d at 1272, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at, 479 (Brown, J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 1186, 929 P.2d at 1264, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing).
83. See id. at 1170-71, 929 P.2d at 1253, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 461.
84. See id.
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of Alcaraz will determine the consequences of precluding summary judg-
ment when a landowner is held accountable for injuries occurring off his
land.
By allowing a plaintiff to survive this initial step, Alcaraz expanded the
range of claims that may be brought under a premise liability theory.'
Justice Kennard's dissenting opinion forewarned that any "innocuous or
good-neighborly acts on the land of another.., can now make him or
her liable to anyone coming on that land, even though there is no causal
connection between the acts and the subsequent injury." Justice
Brown echoed this predicted negative effect of Alcaraz with incantation
of the proverb that "no good deed goes unpunished."87
IV. CONCLUSION
In Alcaraz v. Vece, the California Supreme Court held that a landowner
who occasionally mowed a strip of lawn adjacent to his property and
who erected a fence around the lawn containing the hazard of an uncov-
ered meter box was not entitled to summary judgment simply because he
did not own the land harboring the source of injury. Instead, the court
concluded that the question of whether those acts amounted to an exer-
cise of control over the property giving rise to a duty to warn and pro-
tect was a decision for a jury.8
TERRI SCHALLENKAMP
85. Other states have also broadened the scope of their premise liability laws. See
Jacqueline L Hourigan, Where Hazardous Condition is of an Open and Obvious Na-
ture, Premises Owner Retains Duty to Warn of Unreasonable Risk, 73 U. DET. MERCY
L REV. 613 (1996) (summarizing the Michigan Supreme Court's ruling to impose liabili-
ty on landowners who fail to warn invitees of an "open and obvious" danger); see also
Eric Carlson, Note, Premises Liability: The Exception that Swallowed the Rule, 19 S.
ILL U. LJ. 217 (1994) (discussing an Illinois Supreme Court case requiring landowners
to exercise reasonable care to warn or protect a trespasser from a man-made danger
when the trespassers presence can reasonably be expected). See generally Michael
Sears, Comment, Abrogation of the Traditional Common Law of Premises Liability, 44
U. KAN L REV. 175 (1995).
86. Alcaraz, 14 Cal. 4th at 1186, 929 P.2d at 1264, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 1198, 929 P.2d at 1272, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 480 (Brown, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 1170-71, 929 P.2d at 1253, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 461-62.
IV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
There is a cause of action for strict liability based on
failure to warn when the manufacturer of a prescription
drug fails to warn of risks that are known or reasonably
scientifically knowable: Carlin v. Superior Court
(Upjohn Co.).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Carlin v. Superior Court (Upjohn Co.),' the California Supreme
Court considered whether knowledge of risks was a necessary element
to state a cause of action against prescription drug manufacturers for
strict liability based on failure to warn.2 The superior court granted the
defendant's demurrer holding that there was no cause of action in strict
liability for failure to warn in a suit brought against a prescription drug
manufacturer.3 The court of appeal issued a writ of mandate instructing
the lower court to vacate its order.4 Affirming the decision of the court
of appeal, the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could state
a cause of action for strict liability based on failure to warn when the
1. 13 Cal. 4th 1104, 920 P.2d 1347, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 162 (1996). Acting Chief Justice
Mosk wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Werdegar, Spencer, and Vogel con-
cuffed. See id. at 1108-18, 920 P.2d at 1348-55, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163-70. Justice
Kennard wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion. See id. at 1118-35, 920
P.2d at 1355-66, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170-82 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
Justice Turner also wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion. See id. at
1135-46, 920 P.2d at 1366-74, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182-89 (Turner, J., concurring and
dissenting). Justice Baxter wrote a dissenting opinion. See id. at 1146-63, 920 P.2d at
1374-86, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189-201 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
Justices Spencer, Vogel, and Turner are not members of the California Supreme
Court; they are the Presiding Justices of Divisions One, Four, and Five, respectively,
for the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District. See id. at 1105, 920 P.2d
at 1355, 1366, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170, 182. Acting Chief Justice Mosk assigned Justices
Spencer, Vogel, and Turner to sit on this case pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the
California Constitution. See id.; CAL CONsr. art. VI, § 6.
2. See Carlin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1108-18, 920 P.2d 1348-55, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 163-70. The
plaintiff, Peggy Carlin, attempted to sue Upjohn, a drug manufacturer, for injuries she
allegedly received from ingesting the prescription drug Halcion. See id. at 1109, 920
P.2d at 1349, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164. The plaintiff claimed that Upjohn lkew that the
drug could and did cause severe physical, mental, and emotional injuries in some indi-
viduals. See id. She further claimed that Upjohn was strictly liable for its failure to
warn of such "dangerous propensities of Halcion." See id.
3. See id. at 1109-10, 920 P.2d at 1349, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at .164.
4. See id. at 1110, 920 P.2d at 1349, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164.
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prescription drug manufacturer fails to warn of risks that are known or
reasonably scientifically knowable.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
The court found there is a strict liability cause of action against pre-
scription drug manufacturers for failure to warn about drugs with known
or reasonably scientifically knowable dangerous propensities.6 The ma-
jority opinion considered whether knowledge of the risks by the drug
manufacturer is necessary to bring a claim of strict liability for failure to
warn.7 Acting Chief Justice Mosk found primary support for the proposi-
tion that a drug manufacturer must know of the risks in two of the
court's previous decisions.8 The majority first relied on Anderson v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.9 Justice Mosk noted that in Anderson
5. See id. at 1110, 920 P.2d at 1349, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 164. For a general discus-
sion on failure to warn, see 6 B.E. WrrxIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1265
(9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996). See also 6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAIFORNIA LAW,
Torts § 1268 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (discussing drug manufacturers specifically);
50 CAL JUR. 3D Products Liability § 62 (1993 & Supp. 1996).
6. See Carlin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1108, 920 P.2d at 1348, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163. The
California Supreme Court first established the notion of strict liability in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). For
a discussion of the Greenman case, see 6 B.E. WrruN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Torts § 1242 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996).
7. See Cartin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1108-18, 920 P.2d at 1348-55, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163-
70. For a lliscussion on what is necessary to establish a manufacturer as a defendant,
see 51 A.LR. 3d 1344 (1996). See also 50 CAL JuR. 3D Products Liability § 63 (dis-
cussing a drug manufacturer's duty to warn); 6 A.L.R. 3d 91 (1996) (discussing a
manufacturer's duty to test or inspect and its relation to his liability).
8. See Cartin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1108-18, 920 P.2d at 1348-55, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 163-
70. For a look into the difficulties the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is having with this
issue and fi discussion of its controversial strict liability decision, see Sally Apter,
Strict Liability-Pharmacist Liability in Dispensing Prescription Drugs-Drugs and
Narcotics, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 181 (1991).
9. 53 Cal. 3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1991). The issue presented in
Anderson was whether a manufacturer of asbestos could be held strictly liable for
failure to warn. See id. at 1000, 810 P.2d at 557, 281 Cal. Rptr. 536. The Carlin court
defended its use of Anderson, which does not involve a drug manufacturer, by noting
that the Anderson court's reasoning was based on cases that involved drug manufac-
turers. See Cartin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1111, 920 P.2d at 1350, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165. In
Anderson, the court noted that "'[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an
article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
the California Supreme Court had already expressly held that knowledge
is a component of a strict liability cause of action for failure to warn."
The majority also relied on Brown v. Superior Court," in which the
court reasoned that if a manufacturer's liability was not limited to risks
that are known, or knowable, a manufacturer would be "discouraged
from developing new and improved products for fear that later signifi-
cant advances in scientific knowledge would increase its liability."2
Combining notions from both Anderson and Brown, the majority recog-
nized that the manufacturer is not held to a standard of actual knowl-
edge, but rather the manufacturer is "held to the knowledge and skill of
an expert in the field." 3
Justice Mosk then acknowledged that by making knowledge a re-
quirement, the line between strict liability and traditional negligence
becomes more nebulous. 4 The majority rejected, however, the notion
that the incorporation of a knowledge standard in strict liability actions
implies the use of a simple negligence test.5
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.'" Anderson, 53
Cal. 3d at 994, 810 P.2d at 552, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 531 (quoting Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at
62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700). The Anderson court also noted that strict
liability was never intended to be absolute liability. See id. For a discussion on the
California Supreme Court's decision in Anderson, see Dana K. Astrachan, Anderson v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglass [sic] Corp.: Asbestos Manufacturers and Strict Liability: Just
How Strict Is It?, 23 PAc. UJ. 1807 (1992).
10. See Carlin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1110, 920 P.2d at 1350, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165; An-
derson, 53 Cal. 3d at 990, 810 P.2d at 550, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 529. See also Michael A.
Pittenger, Reformulating the Strict Liability Failure to Warn, 49 WASH. & IEE L REV.
1509 (1992) (discussing the problems surrounding strict liability failure to warn laws);
Kevin J. Dunne, Drafting Warnings for Medical Products: Practical Considerations for
Minimizing Litigation, 10 No. 8 HEALTHSPAN 11 (1993) (discussing steps that manufac-
turers should take to avoid suits).
11. 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988).
12. See Carlin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1111, 920 P.2d at 1350, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165 (quot-
ing Anderson, 53 Cal. 3d at 999, 810 P.2d at 549, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 528). For a discus-
sion on products liability citing specific health-related items, see 63 AM. JUR. 2D, Prod-
ucts Liability, §§ 718-732 (1984 & Supp. 1993).
13. See Carlin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1113 n.3, 920 P.2d at 1351 n.3, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166
n.3.
14. See id. at 1111, 920 P.2d at 1350, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 165-66. For a comparison
on the principles of negligence and strict liability, see 6 B.E. WrrKI N, SUMMARY OF CAU-
FORNIA LAw, Torts § 1244 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996).
15. See Cartin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1112, 920 P.2d at 1351, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166. Jus-
tice Mosk explained that the actual standard for strict liability for failure to warn is a
fusion of traditional strict liability and traditional negligence principles. See id. at 1112,
920 P.2d at 1350-51, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166. Justice Mosk focused on a key difference
between the current negligence standard and a strict liability standard in failure-to-warn
cases. See id. at 1112, 920 P.2d at 1351, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 166. Negligence imposes a
reasonableness standard on manufacturers, while a strict liability standard considers
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Justice Mosk concluded by dismissing Upjohn's contention that regu-
lations by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) preempt state law."
B. Justice Kennard's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard both concurred and dissented from the majority opin-
ion. 7 Although Justice Kennard agreed with the majority's finding that
knowledge should be a requirement of strict liability for failure to warn,
she would hold that this knowledge does not by itself impose liability
and that the manufacturer should be able to raise as a defense that it
acted reasonably in not warning the consumer."8 She believed that this
"intermediate approach" would cure the flaws in the majority and dis-
senting approaches by imposing neither traditional strict liability nor
traditional negligence. 9 Her approach would negate both the
manufacturer's disincentive to produce for fear of suit and the great
burden on the consumer.'
C. Justice Turner's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Turner began his concurring and dissenting opinion by agreeing
with the majority's finding that the plaintiff did state a cause of action
only actual or constructive knowledge, regardless of what a reasonable manufacturer
would do. See id.
16. See id. at 1113-17, 920 P.2d at 1352-54, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167-70. The court
noted that the regulations of the FDA are not without impact on a discussion of strict
liability. See id. at 1114, 920 P.2d at 1352, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167. The FDA prohibits
a manufacturer from placing a warning on a product when the hazard is not clear. See
id. The court noted that a pharmaceutical manufacturer will not be held liable for
failure to give a warning that the FDA has prohibited it from giving. See id, at 1115
n.4, 920 P.2d at 1353 n.4, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168 n.4. For a more in-depth discussion,
see Vicki Lawrence MacDougall, Products Liability Law in the Nineties: Will Federal
or State Law Control?, 49 CONSUMER FN. LQ. REP. 327 (1995) (discussing the evolu-
tion of products liability law); see also Tim Moore, Comment K Immunity to Strict
Liability: Should All Prescription Drugs Be Protected?, 26 HOUS. L REV. 707 (1989)
(arguing against strict liability immunity for prescription drugs).
17. See Carlin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1118-35, 920 P.2d at 1355-66, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170-
82 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
18. See id. at 1119, 920 P.2d at 1356, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
19. See id. at 1131, 920 P.2d at 1364, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
20. See id.
for a failure to warn of a known risk.2 Justice Turner, however, di-
verged from the majority in his belief that failure to warn is not an ac-
tion in strict liability.22 Rather, Justice Turner contended that failure to
warn cases create a heightened liability which does not reach the level of
strict liability but is above the simple negligence standard.'
D. Justice Baxter's Dissenting Opinion
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Baxter argued that the court in Broun
suggested that liability for failure to warn was governed by comment k
to section 402A of the Restatement Second of Torts.2 4 Justice Baxter
further noted that if drug manufacturers are held to the elevated stan-
dard of strict liability, they will surely be impaired in their pursuit to find
new drugs and cures.2 Justice Baxter concluded by stating that the ap-
propriate standard is one of negligence.26
21. See id. at 1135, 920 P.2d at 1367, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182 (Turner, J., concurring
and dissenting).
22. See id. at 1136, 920 P.2d at 1367, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182 (Turner, J., concurring
and dissenting).
23. See id. For a thorough discussion on an intermediate standard for failure to
warn, see Richard L Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription
Drugs: The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO.
WASH. L REv. 76 (1994) (analyzing the new restatement's proposed approach to pre-
scription drugs).
24. See Carlin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1154, 920 P.2d at 1379, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194-95
(Baxter, J., dissenting). Comment k has been adopted in a majority of jurisdictions. See
id. at 1151, 920 P.2d at 1377, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192-93 (Baxter, J., dissenting). The
California Supreme Court had previously noted that the standard set by comment k
was a negligence standard. See Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1059 n.4, 751
P.2d 470, 476 n.4, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 417 n.4 (1988).
Comment k to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides:
There are some products which, in the present state of human
knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs .... It is
also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, be-
cause of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there
can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug not-
withstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products, again
with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to
strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely be-
cause he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToimS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
25. See Carlin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1162, 920 P.2d at 1385, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 200 (Baxter,
J., dissenting).
26. See id. at 1162-63, 920 P.2d at 1385, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 200-01 (Baxter, J., dis-
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I. IMPACT
The majority opinion did not state that this ruling was a change in the
law.27 In fact, the majority implied that Carlin simply reiterated the
law.' However, if the law always provided a cause of action in strict
liability based on failure to warn by a drug manufacturer, then many of
the lower courts did not recognize it.'
Whatever label the California Supreme Court decides to use, this deci-
sion does not create a cause of action based on traditional strict liability.
Instead of creating a new intermediate standard, as proposed by the
concurring and dissenting opinions, the court created a new "strict liabili-
ty" standard that applies only to drug manufacturers which relaxes the
traditional strict liability rules while still requiring more than traditional
negligence.'
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court held that there is a cause of action
based on strict liability for a drug manufacturer's failure to warn of risks
that are known or reasonably scientifically knowable.
KELLY C. QUINN
senting).
27. See id. at 1104-18, 920 P.2d at 1347-55, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162-70.
28. See id.
29. See Brown, 44 Cal. 3d at 1069, 751 P.2d at 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 412 (noting
that the standard for design and warning defects for drug manufacturers is negligence);
see also Hufft v. Horowitz, 4 Cal. App. 4th 8, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377 (1992) (holding that
Brown sets a negligence standard for drug manufacturers); Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 172
Cal. App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985) (holding that drugs are subject to negli-
gence liability for warning defects).
30. See Carlin, 13 Cal. 4th at 1118-35, 920 P.2d at 1355-66, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170-
82 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); see also id. at 1135-46, 920 P.2d at 1366-74,
56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182-89 (Turner, J., concurring and dissenting).
XV. SCHOOLS
Education Code section 44919(b), governing the hiring
of athletic coaches, requires school districts to give an
advantage to their credentialed teachers currently em-
ployed in the district by considering their applications
before others. If the district determines that its cred4m-
tialed teachers fail to meet the district's qualification
standards, it is free to consider other applicants: Cali-
fornia Teachers Ass'n v. Governing Board of RiaIto
Unified School District.
I. INTRODUCTION
In California Teachers Ass'n v. Governing Board of Rialto Unified
School District,' the California Supreme Court addressed whether the
Legislature enacted Education Code section 44919(b) to create an em-
ployment preference for teachers currently employed in a particular
school district by providing that athletic coaching assignments "first be
made available" to a school district's teachers.2 The California Supreme
1. 14 Cal. 4th 627, 927 P.2d 1175, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (1997). Justice Werdegar
wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice George and Justices Mosk and
Kennard concurred. See id. at 630-53, 927 P.2d at 1175-90, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 671-86.
Justice Chin filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Baxter and Brown joined. See
id. at 653-67, 927 P.2d at 1190-1200, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686-96 (Chin, J., dissenting).
2. See id. at 630, 927 P.2d at 1176, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 672 (quoting CAL EDUC.
CODE § 44919(b) (West 1993)). Rialto Unified School District (District) opened Rialto
High School in September 1992, and distributed flyers to encourage applications for a
boys varsity basketball coach at the high school. See id. at 631, 927 P.2d at, 1176, 59
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 672. Gary Stanley, an appellant in this case, was a credentialed
teacher employed at the District's junior high school when he applied for the position
of varsity basketball coach, varsity assistant coach, and freshman assistant coach. See
id. The District hired Martin Sipe, a credentialed teacher currently employed in the
District at Eisenhower High School, as the new boys varsity basketball coach. See id.
The District then hired a noncredentialed employee to be the new assistant varsity
coach. See id. Gary Stanley was not interviewed for these positions. See id. The Dis-
trict interviewed Stanley and two additional applicants for the position of freshman
assistant coach, and eventually hired a noncredentialed teacher to fill that position. See
id. Stanley, the California Teachers Association and the Rialto Education Association
filed a petition in superior court, seeking the District's compliance with Education
Code section 44919(b). See id. The trial court rejected the petition, finding that section
44919(b) did not create a hiring preference for credentialed teachers employed in a
given school district. See id. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the statute
gave credentialed employees a "right of first refusal" when applying for athletic coach-
ing positions. See id.
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Court interpreted section 44919(b) by giving effect to the plain meaning
of the language and the Legislature's probable intent, and held that
school districts are required to give an employment preference to creden-
tialed employees by considering their applications before those of
noncredentialed employees or nonemployees? The court also held that if
school districts determine that credentialed employees do not meet the
qualification standards set forth by the districts, they are free to consider
outside applicants.4
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Werdegar's majority opinion focused on the language of Edu-
cation Code section 44919(b), which provides in relevant part:
Governing boards shall classify as temporary employees persons, other than sub-
stitute employees, who are employed to serve in a limited assignment supervising
athletic activities of pupils; provided, such assignment shall first be made avail-
able to teachers presently employed by the district.'
The court was required to interpret this statute according to the plain
meaning of its words to give effect to the probable legislative intent.6
The Governing Board of Rialto School District (the "District") argued
that the phrase "made available" simply required school districts to
"make the application and interview process available" to its currently
employed, certified teachers.7 The court rejected the District's argument
on three grounds. First, the court stated that such an interpretation
would be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute because the
application and interview process was not mentioned.9 Second, the court
3. See id. at 652, 927 P.2d at 1190, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686.
4. See id.
5. Id. at 632, 927 P.2d at 1176, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 672 (quoting CAL EDUC. CODE
§ 44919(b) (West 1993) (emphasis added)).
6. See id. at 632, 927 P.2d at 1177, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 673. See also 58 CAL JUR.
3D Statutes § 83 (1980 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the importance of determining legis-
lative intent when interpreting a statute).
7. Rialto, 14 Cal. 4th at 633, 927 P.2d at 1177, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 673.
8. See id. at 633-34, 927 P.2d at 1177-78, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 673-74.
9. See id. at 633, 927 P.2d at 1177-78, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 673-74. See generally 58
CAL. JuR. 3D Statutes § 102 (1980 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the theory that a court
cannot find legislative intent if such an intention is inconsistent with the words of a
statute).
asserted that, under the District's interpretation, the statute would be
superfluous because it would not have any effect on the employment
process.'" Third, the court noted that the suggested interpretation would
not give effect to the term "first"-language which the court argued was
a clear indication of the Legislature's intent to give an advantage to the
District's credentialed employees."
The appellant in the instant case argued that the statute required
school districts to give credentialed employees a right of first refusal for
athletic coaching positions--an argument upheld by the court of ap-
peal. 2 The supreme court rejected this interpretation as too rigid, be-
cause it failed to consider a school district's ability to create standards
regarding the qualifications and skills offered by various applicants. 3
After determining that Education Code section 44919(b) created an
employment preference for credentialed employees seeking athletic
coaching assignments, the court then addressed the degree to which this
advantage should be applied by examining a public policy decision artic-
ulated by the Legislature in related statutes. 4 After reviewing some leg-
islative history regarding statutes governing the hiring of athletic coach-
es, 5 the court determined that the Legislature delegated broad discre-
10. See Rialto, 14 Cal. 4th at 633-34, 927 P.2d at 1178, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674.
11. See id. at 634, 927 P.2d at 1178, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674. The dissent suggested
that the term "first" meant that school districts must first give notice to its creden-
tialed employees before other applicants could be hired. See id. at 688, 59 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 688 (Chin, J., dissenting). However, the court rejected this interpretation because
it would not provide an advantage to credentialed employees and would render the
statute ineffective. See id. at 634-35, 927 P.2d at 1178, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 674. See
generally Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common, Law: Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L REv. 892 (1982) (discussing the Court's "strict
adherence" to the legislature's chosen words when interpreting statutes).
12. See Rialto, 14 Cal. 4th at 635-36, 927 P.2d at 1179, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 1375.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 636, 927 P.2d at 1179, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675.
15. See id. at 636-37, 927 P.2d at 1179-80, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675-76. The court
recognized that, before 1981, the Legislature had given the State Department of Edu-
cation primary control over athletic activities in public schools. See id. In 1981, the
Legislature began delegating control over athletic activities to the individual school
districts. See id. at 636, 927 P.2d at 1179, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 675. The state Board of
Education established statewide regulations enabling it to set minimum qualification
standards for athletic coaches, while acknowledging that individual school districts
would be permitted to set their own regulations according to local standards. See id.
at 637-38, 927 P.2d at 1180-81, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676-77. In addition, the state Board
of Education permitted each district to evaluate the competency of temporary athletic
coaches in four general areas: "(1) Care and prevention of athletic injuries, basic first
aid and emergency procedures; (2) Coaching techniques; (3) Rules and regulations in
the athletic activity being coached; and (4) Child or adolescent psychology." I& at 637
n.5, 927 P.2d at 1180 n.5, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 676 n.5.
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tion to individual school districts by allowing them to establish qualifica-
tions for athletic coaches and to assess the competency of coaching
applicants in accordance with established qualifications.'" With this pub-
lic policy in mind, the court held that school districts were required to
consider applications of qualified credentialed employees in the district
before considering other applicants, and then make a hiring decision in
accordance with the individual school district's qualification standards.17
In contrast, the District argued that the Legislature used clear and un-
ambiguous -language in other sections of the Education Code when they
intended to establish an employment preference, and thus, the
Legislature's failure to use clear language indicated that it did not intend
to give credentialed employees such an advantage.'8 The court rejected
this argument, however, stating that the Legislature did not duplicate any
"term of art" when creating employment preferences in other sections of
the Education Code, and their failure to use unambiguous language simi-
lar to other statutes did not refute such an intention."
16. See id. at 640, 927 P.2d at 1182, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678.
17. See id. at 641, 927 P.2d at 1182, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678. With this public policy
in mind, the court rejected two additional arguments made by the District See id.
First, the District argued that the court's interpretation would force school districts to
hire unqualified athletic coaches on the basis of their position as a credentialed em-
ployee. See id. at 643, 927 P.2d at 1184, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 680. The court rejected
this argument, stating that the school district was allowed to establish its own qual-
ification standards, and therefore, it would not be forced to hire unqualified applicants.
See id. at 643-44, 927 P.2d at 1184, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 680. Second, the District argued
that such an interpretation would require them to violate the 'Right to Safe Schools"
provision found in the California Constitution, art. I, section 28, subdivision (c), by
requiring them to hire unqualified coaches and resulting in an unsafe school environ-
ment. See id. at 644-45, 927 P.2d at 1185, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 681. The court rejected
this argument on the same grounds. See id. at 645, 927 P.2d at 1185, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 681. See also Anthony S. McCaskey & Kenneth W. Biedzynski, A Guide to the Legal
Liability of Coaches for a Sports Participant's Injuries, 6 SEToN HALL J. SPORT L 7
(1996) (discussing the liability of athletic coaches when students are injured playing
sports); J. Barton Goplerud, Note, Liability of Schools and Coaches: The Current Sta-
tus of Sovereign Immunity and Assumption of the Risk, 39 DRAKE L REv. 759 (1989-
1990) (discussing the liability of schools and athletic coaches when students are injured
while involved in school-related athletic activities).
18. See Rialto, 14 Cal. 4th at 641-42, 927 P.2d at 1182-83, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 678-79.
19. See id. at 642-43, 927 P.2d at 1183-84, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 679-80. See also infra
text accompanying note 26 (discussing the claim that a lack of legislative intent is
evidenced by the use of ambiguous language).
The District next suggested that public policy mandated that school
districts be free to "hire the most qualified coach available." ° However,
neither the court nor the District were able to find any clear legislative
policy to support this contention, and the court stated that the resulting
unsupported argument was inadequate to outweigh the Legislature's ex-
pressed employment preference for credentialed employees.2
Establishing that Education Code section 44919(b) requires school
districts to give an advantage to qualified credentialed employees in a
given school district, the court vacated the judgment of the court of
appeal and remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether
the appellant's application was rejected on the basis of his
qualifications.'
B. Justice Chin's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Chin disagreed with the majority's "tortured interpretation" of
Education Code section 44919(b).' In his dissent, Justice Chin argued
that Education Code section 44919(b) meant that a school district may
not hire an outside applicant until it has given credentialed employees
notice of vacant coaching positions.' To support this interpretation,
Justice Chin referred to Black's Law Dictionary for a synonym of the
term "available," and found the term "accessible," which could reason-
ably be interpreted to mean "giving notice to teachers."25 In further sup-
port of this interpretation, Justice Chin stated that the Legislature used
clear and unambiguous language in the past when creating an employ-
ment preference, and thus, the use of ambiguous language seemed to
indicate a lack of legislative intent to create such a preference under sec-
tion 44919(b)."
Justice Chin examined the legislative history of section 44919(b) to
support his interpretation of the statute. Examining Assembly Bill
20. Id. at 649, 927 P.2d at 1188, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684 (quoting Amicus Curiae
Brief by Templeton Unified School District). See also infra note 32 and accompanying
text (arguing that public policy requires school districts to hire the most qualified ap-
plicants).
21. See id. at 650, 927 P.2d at 1188-89, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 684-85.
22. See id. at 652-53, 927 P.2d at 1190, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 686.
23. Id. at 653, 927 P.2d at 1191, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 687 (Chin, J., dissenting).
24. See id. at 654, 927 P.2d at 1191, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 687 (Chin, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 655, 927 P.2d at 1192, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 688 (Chin, J., dissenting).
26. See id. at 657, 927 P.2d at 1193, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 689 (Chin, J., dissenting).
27. See id. at 659-62, 927 P.2d at 1194-196, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 690-92 (Chin, J., dis-
senting). See also 7 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAuFoRNiA LAw, Constitutional Law
§§ 97-98 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1997) (discussing subsequent expressions by the Leg-
islature and their bearing upon the interpretation of a previously enacted statute); W.
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1690, Justice Chin explained that the bill, which was created to increase
the flexibility of local school districts when hiring athletic coaches, was
initially ambiguous regarding a district's ability to hire tenured teachers
as athletic coaches.2 Thus, the Legislature amended the bill, adding the
current language of section 44919(b).' Justice Chin argued that the
amendment was merely intended as a "clarification" to indicate that
school districts could hire both tenured teachers and outside applicants
as coaches.' In addition, the Legislative Counsel's Digest, in the pref-
ace to Assembly Bill 1690, did not discuss the language at issue in the
instant case, which, Justice Chin asserted, indicated support for his con-
tention that the amendment served merely to clarify. 1
Finally, Justice Chin argued that public policy should prevail-allowing
public school districts to hire the most qualified applicants for vacant
coaching positions and encouraging public schools to pursue excellence
in their hiring decisions.' Therefore, the dissent would reverse the
court of appeal and reinstate the trial court's decision because the school
district made the coaching positions available to credentialed
employees.33
David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation
Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383 (1992) (discussing the use of legislative
history in interpreting statutes).
28. See Rialto, 14 Cal. 4th at 660, 927 P.2d at 1195, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 691 (Chin,
J., dissenting).
29. See id. (Chin, J., dissenting).
30. See id, (Chin, J., dissenting).
31. See id. at 661, 927 P.2d at 1196, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692 (Chin, J., dissenting).
32. See id. at 662-63, 927 P.2d at 1196-97, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692-93 (Chin, J., dis-
senting). For a general discussion of the need for academic excellence in the public
school system, see Peggy S. Bittick, Comment, Equality and Excellence: Equal Educa-
tion Opportunity for Gifted and Talented Children, 36 S. TEx. L REv. 119 (1995) (not-
ing that "[t]he United States... seems to encourage students to strive for academic
adequacy rather than for academic excellence"). See also Jonathan R. Macey, Promot-
ing Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 CoLuM. L REV. 223 (1986) (discussing statutory interpretation which pro-
motes the broader public good).
33. See Rialto, 14 Cal. 4th at 654, 927 P.2d at 1191, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 687 (Chin,
J., dissenting).
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
Prior to Rialto, school districts had broad local authority to hire athlet-
ic coaches.' The majority argued that their interpretation of section
44919(b), which gives an employment preference to teachers currently
employed in a school district, remained consistent with the Legislature's
intent to provide school districts with greater flexibility in hiring athletic
coaches.' However, the majority's interpretation of Education Code sec-
tion 44919(b) is certain to hinder the school district's ability to hire supe-
rior candidates for positions as athletic coaches in public schools, which,
as the dissent argues, will harm the public school system and increase
the gap between public and private school systems in their search for
excellence.' Although this outcome may impede the school district's
flexibility in hiring athletic coaches, the court is bound by the
Legislature's language when they interpret statutes;37 any unintended
harm to individual school districts is more properly corrected by the
legislative branch, not the judicial branch.
CHRISTIANE E. CARGIL
34. See, e.g., San Jose Teachers Ass'n v. Barozzi, 230 Cal. App. 2d 1376, 281 Cal.
Rptr. 724 (1991). The dissenting opinion in Rialto discussed this case, stating that the
majority's interpretation of section 44919(b) has been overlooked for approximately two
decades by the Barozzi court of appeal, the Legislative Counsel, and the State Board
of Education. See Rialto, 14 Cal. 4th at 656-57, 927 P.2d at 1193, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
689 (Chin, J., dissenting).
35. See id. at 648, 927 P.2d at 1187, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 683.
36. See id. at 662-63, 927 P.2d at 1196-97, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 692-93 (Chin, J., dis-
senting). See also Lewis D. Solomon, The Role of For-Profit Corporations in Revital-
izing Public Education: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 24 U. TOL. L REV. 883 (1993)
(focusing on the need to revitalize the public school system); James S. Liebman, Voice,
Not Choice, 101 YALE L J. 259 (1991) (reviewing JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE,
POLMCS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990)) (discussing the differences between
public and private school systems, the teachers, and the levels of achievement by stu-
dents).
37. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L REV. 621 (1990)
(discussing the judge's limited role in interpreting statutes in accordance with the tex-
tual approach to interpretation); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Article, "Plain Meaning". Jus-
tice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARv. J.L & PuB. POL'Y
401 (1994) (arguing for the textual approach to statutory interpretation).
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XVI. TRADE REGULATION/UNFAIR COMPETITION
A purchaser may bring a cause of action against a seller
by alleging that special discounts given to other buyers
injured the purchaser and had a tendency to destroy
competition among purchasers; a purchaser need not
show harm to competition among sellers. Furthermore, a
party may seek restitution under the Unfair Practices
Act without additionally seeking an injunction: ABC
International Traders, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric
Corp. of America.
I. INTRODUCTION
In ABC International Traders, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of
America,1 the California Supreme Court considered whether section
17045 of the Business and Professions Code was limited in scope to
competition between sellers of particular products or services, or includ-
ed in its definition competition between buyers.2 The court further con-
sidered whether section 17203 required a request for injunctive relief be-
fore a court can award restitution.3 The trial court dismissed ABC Inter-
1. 14 Cal. 4th 1247, 931 P.2d 290, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112 (1997). Justice Werdegar
delivered the majority opinion in which Chief Justice George and Justices Kennard,
Baxter, and Chin concurred. See id. at 1252-71, 931 P.2d at 291-304, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
113-26. Justice Mosk wrote a concurring opinion. See id. at 1271, 931 P.2d at 304-05,
61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126-27 (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Brown wrote a dissenting
opinion. See id. at 1272-82, 931. P.2d at 305-12, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127-34 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
2. See id. at 1252, 931 P.2d at 292, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114.
3. See id. ABC International Traders, Inc. (ABC) distributed electronic products,
including telephones. See id. Like its competitors Procom Supply Corp. (Procom) and
Tele-Com Office Products Corp. (Tele-Com), ABC purchased products for distribution
from Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (MECA) under the name Panasonic. See id.
at 1253, 931 P.2d at 292, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114. In 1989, ABC suspected that MECA
was providing Procom and Tele-Com with 5% discounts on its products; a discount was
not provided to ABC. See id. In 1991, MECA completely stopped selling its products to
ABC. See id. A Procom employee informed ABC in 1992 that MECA had been provid-
ing the suspected discounts to Procom and Tele-Com, but not other purchasers, for
several years. See id. ABC filed suit against MECA, alleging that the discounts were
"unearned" and "secret." See id. ABC claimed damages for the withheld discounts and
lost profits. See id. ABC asserted that the secret discounts "'tended to destroy
national Traders' (ABC) action against Matsushita Electronics Corp. of
America (MECA), sustaining MECA's demurrer without leave to amend.4
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling, finding on the first
issue that ABC failed to state a claim against MECA by not alleging inju-
ry to MECA's competitors.' As to the second issue, the court found that
ABC failed to state a cause of action when ABC requested restitution
without also requesting injunctive relief, which the court found to be a
prerequisite to restitution.'
The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal on the
section 17045 claim, holding that section 17045 competition included not
only competition between wholesalers, but also between retailers.7 The
supreme court also reversed on the section 17023 claim, holding that the
issuance of an injunction is not a prerequisite to a restitution award for
money lost due to unfair competition.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Competition Under Section 17045 Includes Competition Between
Retailers, as Well as Wholesalers.
a. The statutory language and context provide that the intent was
to include retailers.
The court first analyzed the statutory language, as well as the context
of section 17045.' The court found no language in the statute containing
competition'" because the purchasers receiving the discount were able to offer lower
prices. Id. ABC finally stated that MECA's conduct violated unfair competition law and
requested restitution of money lost and the profits gained by the defendants as a result
of the unfair conduct. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 1253-54, 931 P.2d at 292-93, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114-15.
6. See id. at 1254, 931 P.2d at 293, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115.
7. See id. at 1268, 931 P.2d at 302, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124.
8. See id. at 1271, 931 P.2d at 304, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126. For a discussion of the
availability of injunctive relief in unfair competition actions, see 61 CAL. Jun. 3D Unfair
Competition § 20 (1980 & Supp. 1997).
9. See ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th at 1254-56, 931 P.2d at 293-94, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 115-16. The statute states:
The secret payment or allowance of rebates, refunds, commissions, or un-
earned discounts, whether in the form of money or otherwise, or secretly
extending to certain purchasers special services or privileges not extended to
all purchasers purchasing upon like terms and conditions, to the injury of a
competitor and where such payment or allowance tends to destroy competi-
tion, is unlawful.
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a restriction of the term "competition" to the "primary line of com-
merce," as opposed to the "secondary line of commerce. " ° The court
reasoned that the purpose behind California's Unfair Practices Act
(UPA) 11 was analagous to the purposes of the federal Clayton Act of
191412 and the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936."3 The court noted that
both federal acts focus on competition between buyers while section
17045 does not provide similar language. 14 The sections surrounding sec-
tion 17045 do, however, evidence such an intent.15 Additionally, while no
explicit language exists in section 17045, the court found no reason to
infer from this absence an implied restriction against such coverage by
the statute.'" The court found that the Legislature's focus went beyond
the giving or receiving of special discounts, governing the effect such dis-
counts would have on the recipient's competitors."
b. The purpose and history behind section 17045 show an intent to
include retailers.
The court next considered the purpose and history behind section
17045."s The court explained that the purposes of the UPA are to pro-
tect the public against monopolies and to prevent trade practices that
would handicap "'fair and honest competition.'" 9 Following another
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17045 (West 1997); see ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th
at 1254, 931 P.2d at 293, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115.
10. Id. The primary line includes those competitors on the level of the one offering
the discounts; the secondary is among those receiving the discount See id.
11. See CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 1997).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994).
13. Id. For a discussion of federal regulation of unfair competition, see Jeffrey H.
Liebling, Comment, Judicial Usurpation of the F.T.C.'s Authority: A Return to the Rule
of Reason, 30 J. MARSHALL L REV. 283, 285-96 (1996). For a more detailed discussion
of the requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act, see Michael M. Briley, Antitrust Sym-
posium, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 401,
401-13 (1996).
14. See ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th at 1254, 931 P.2d at 293, 61 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 115; see also CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17045 (West 1997).
15. See ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th at 1255, 931 P.2d at 293-94, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 115-16; see also CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17046-17048 (West 1997) (mak-
ing it unlawful to solicit or participate in a violation of the UPA).
16. See ABC Int'l Traders, 14 Cal. 4th at 1255-56, 931 P.2d at 294, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 116.
17. See id. at 1255, 931 P.2d at 294, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116.
18. See id. at 1256-63, 931 P.2d at 294-99, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116-21.
19. Id. at 1256, 931 P.2d at 294, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116 (quoting CAL Bus. & PROF.
section of the UPA, the court noted that the UPA is to be construed
liberally to effectuate these purposes." The court held that the inclusion
within the statute's purview of injury to retail competition effectively
addresses the legislative intent.2' The court further explained that the
statute's allowance of actions by "'[a]ny person or trade association'"'
injured by unfair trade practices, includes a purchaser.'
The court found the history of the UPA evidenced an intent to protect
competition among retailers, specifically smaller shops, from the unfair
practice of wholesalers offering special discounts to chain stores.24 Be-
cause under such circumstances, the injury to competition was on the
secondary level,25 the court found support in the statute's history for
inclusion within the statutory coverage of competition in the secondary
line of commerce.26
c. Judicial interpretation in Harris v. Capitol Records Corp." does
not limit section 17045 to the primary line of commerce.
The court next examined the court of appeal's conclusion that the
prior ruling in Harris limited competition under the UPA to the primary
line of commerceY The court explained that the holding in Harris was
not applicable to the present case.' The court concluded that Harris'
focus on locality discrimination posed a "fundamentally different" threat
to competition than the special discounts discussed under section
17045.0 The court noted that the threat to competition caused by locali-
ty discrimination was to the primary line, while special discounts
CODE § 17001 (West 1997)).
20. See id.; see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17002 (West 1997). For a discussion
of issues facing courts when interpreting unfair business practices legislation, see
James P. Nehf, Comment, Textualism in the Lower Courts: Lessons from Judjes Inter-
preting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS UJ. 1, 34-39 (1994).
21. See ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th at 1256, 931 P.2d at 294, 61 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 116.
22. Id. at 1257, 931 P.2d at 295, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117 (quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 17070 (West 1997)) (alteration in original).
23. See ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th at 1257, 931 P.2d at 295, 61 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 117.
24. See id. at 1261, 931 P.2d at, 297, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 1261-62, 931 P.2d at 298, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120.
27. 64 Cal. 2d 454, 413 P.2d 139, 50 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1966).
28. See ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th at 1263-68, 931 P.2d at 299-302, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 121-24.
29. See id. at 1263-64, 931 P.2d at 299-300, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121-22.
30. Id. at 1265-66, 931 P.2d at 300-01, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122-23.
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threaten competition on the secondary line.3 ' Thus, the court reversed
the court of appeal on the section 17045 claim, as the language, purpose,
and history of the section permit a claim by a retailer based on injury to
competition among retailers.32
2. Section 17023 Does Not Require an Injunction Prior to
Awarding Restitution.
Finally, the court looked to section 17 0 2 3 ' to determine whether a
court must grant. an injunction as a prerequisite to awarding restitu-
tion.' The court stated that no language in the statute supports such a
contention.' The court further rejected the reasoning of the appellate
court, which found such a prerequisite to exist based on the holdings of
three previous cases: People v. Superior Court (JayhiU), Fletcher v.
Security Pacific, and People v. Thomas Shelton Powers, M.D.' The
court opined that although the court in each of these cases found mon-
etary damages were ancillary to the injunction granted, none of these
cases stated that such a relationship must exist between the two forms
of relief.37 The court concluded that requiring an injunction prior to res-
titution would circumvent the purpose behind the UPA, particularly in
cases where the injunction would not prove to be a viable remedy. 8
31. See id.
32. See id. at 1268, 931 P.2d at 302, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124.
33. Section 17023 states:
Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair com-
petition may be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction. The court
may make such orders or judgments . . . as may be necessary to restore to
any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may
have been acquired by means of such unfair competition.
CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17023 (West 1997). See ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th
at 1268, 931 P.2d at 302, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124.
34. See ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th at 1268-71, 931 P.2d at 302-04, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 124-26.
35. See id. at 1268, 931 P.2d at 302, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124.
36. People v. Superior Court (JayhiU), 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr.
192 (1973) (granting restitution, but describing this remedy as ancillary to the in-
junction provided in the statute); Fletcher v. Security Pacific, 23 Cal. 3d 442, 591 P.2d
51, 153 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1979) (accord); People v. Thomas Shelton Powers, M.D., 2 Cal.
App. 4th 330, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (1992) (accord). See ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 14 Cal.
4th at 1268-71, 931 P.2d at 303-04, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125-26.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1271, 931 P.2d at 304, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126.
Therefore, the court reversed the court of appeal, holding that restitution
is available for unfair competition, regardless of whether or not an in-
junction is granted.'
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk concurred with the majority opinion, noting, however,
that certain issues were not addressed.' Justice Mosk agreed that sec-
tion 17045 implicitly defines "'unfair competition'"'" and "injury to a
competitor."42 He stated, however, that the statute does not address a
definition for "tendency to destroy competition."' Although this defini-
tion is not given in the case at bar, Justice Mosk explained that it was a
question reserved for a future time.44
C. Justice Brown's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brown disagreed with the court's reading of the statutory lan-
guage of section 17045.4  She explained that the court erroneously
looked to outside sources when the language of the statute was clear.'
Justice Brown stated that the statute's language showed the Legislature's
concern with acts of the seller, not the purchaser.47 She explained that
the language clearly referred to acts by the party granting the discounts,
not the recipient.'
Justice Brown further disagreed with the majority's reading of Har-
ris." Justice Brown explained that the decision in Harris referred to
the UPA as a whole, and thus, the entire statute only prohibited unfair
39. See id.
40. See id. at 1271, 931 P.2d at 304-05, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126-27 (Mosk, J., con-
curring).
41. Id. at 1271, 931 P.2d at 304, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126 (Msk, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Mosk stated that the statute defines the term as "secret discrimination by a seller
between or among its buyers." Id. (Mosk, J., concurring).
42. Id, (Mosk, J., concurring). "Injury to a competitor" is defined as "harm to a
competitor of either the seller or a favored buyer." Id. (Mask, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 1271, 931 P.2d at 304-05, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126-27 (Mosk, J., concurring).
Justice Mosk recognized that "[w]hether the phrase should be understood so as to
further '[c]onsumer welfare' . . . and to prevent 'output restriction,' . . . is a question
for another day." Id. (Mosk, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
44. See id. at 1271, 931 P.2d at 305, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127 (Mosk, J., concurring).
45. See id. at 1272, 931 P.2d at 305, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127 (Brown, J., dissenting).
46. See id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 1274, 931 P.2d at 306, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 128 (Brown, J., dissenting).
48. See id. (Brown, J., dissenting)
49. See id. at 1276-80, 931 P.2d at 308-10, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 129-32 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
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practices by sellers and did not include the secondary line of com-
merce.' Justice Brown further noted that at about the same time as the
UPA was consolidated into one act, the Fair Trade Acte' was enacted,
which provided protection to retailers.' She concluded that the original
focus of the UPA was, and should be, on the primary line of com-
merce.3
Justice Brown lastly questioned the majority's holding and its impact
on trade regulation.' Justice Brown stated that the majority's restriction
will not only inhibit competition, but may also cause a backlash against
California as being an "'unfriendly' regulatory and legal climate."5
III. IMPACT
The holding in ABC International Traders, Inc. will place further re-
strictions on the actions of wholesalers, as it broadens the scope of the
injury that parties may claim against such entities. ' The holding extend-
ed to the secondary line of commerce, 7 a claim previously recognized
as exclusive to the primary line.' Under this holding, the court will
force wholesalers to allow retailers to purchase on equal footing with
one another. Such a ruling will better serve the goal of promoting compe-
tition.' While some concern may arise that such restrictions will actual-
ly hinder competition by imposing restrictions where no competitive
injury would otherwise be present,' the court has not overlooked the
50. See id. at 1276, 931 P.2d at 307-08, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 129-30 (Brown, J., dis-
senting).
51. See CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16900-16905, repealed by Stats. 1975, c. 402, § 1
and Stats. 1975, c. 429, § 1. For a discussion of the Fair Trade Act and its repeal, see
1 B.E. WTKJN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 597 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp.
1997).
52. See ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th at 1277-78, 931 P.2d at 308-09, 61 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 130-31 (Brown, J., dissenting).
53. See id. (Brown, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 1280-82, 931 P.2d at 310-11, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 132-33 (Brown, J.,
dissenting).
55. Id. at 1281, 931 P.2d at 311, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 133 (Brown, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 1268, 931 P.2d at 302, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124.
67. See id.
58. See, e.g., 61 CAL JUR. 3D Unfair Competition § 22 (1980 & Supp. 1997); 1 B.E.
WrrIaN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Contracts § 594 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1997)
(stating that the UPA extends only to the primary line of commerce).
59. See Dr. Anthony J. Greco, Vertical Restraints and Market Power. Killing Price
Competition in Court, 20 ANTrrRusT L & ECON. REV. 79, 80 (1988).
60. See generally Sherie L Coons, Note, Robinson-Patman Act Jurisdiction Over
statutory requirement of a "tendency to destroy competition."' In fact,
the court did not find such a violation existed in this case, but merely
allowed a claim to be brought alleging such misconduct.62 Thus, the
holding will allow greater protection to retailers from conduct that tends
to destroy their ability to compete by broadening their right to take ac-
tion against wholesalers.' The holding also ensures the recovery of res-
titution without a prior request for injunctive relief, where such a right
was previously unclear.'4
IV. CONCLUSION
Before the decision in ABC International Traders, Inc., uncertainty
existed as to whether California law limited restrictions on special dis-
counts that injured trade to the primary line of commerce.' The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's holding extended the restrictions to the second-
ary line of commerce by allowing those retailers in the secondary line to
bring an action against wholesalers.' The court also solidified the abili-
ty to claim restitution without seeldng an injunction against future acts
of unfair competition.67
LEALLEN FROST
Retail Sales: A Reexamination of the Cases and the Case for Reform, 20 JUl). CORP. L
541, 571-74 (1996) (expressing the same concerns over the Robinson-Patman Act's simi-
lar provisions).
61. ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th at 1262, 931 P.2d at 298, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
120. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17045 (West 1997).
62. See ABC Int'l Traders, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th at 1252, 931 P.2d at 292, 61 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 114.
63. See id. at 1256, 931 P.2d at 294, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116.
64. See id. at 1268-71, 931 P.2d at 302-04, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124-26.
65. See id. at 1252, 931 P.2d at 292, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114.
66. See id.
67. See id.
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XVII. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Administrative law judges do not have statutory authori-
ty to order pre-judgment interest on a routine award of
retroactive unemployment insurance benefit payments:
AFL-CIO v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.
I. INTRODUCTION
In AFL-CIO v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,' the Califor-
nia Supreme Court considered "whether an administrative law judge may
award interest on a payment of retroactive insurance benefits."2 The
superior court concluded "that administrative law judges have 'the power
and the duty' to award prejudgment interest" and reversed the decision
of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board to deny such interest.'
1. 13 Cal. 4th 1017, 920 P.2d 1314, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109 (1996). Justice Chin wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice George and Justices Baxter and Brown
concurred. See id. at 1021-43, 920 P.2d at 1315-30, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111-25. Justice
Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Werdegar concurred. See id. at 1043-
46, 920 P.2d at 1330-32, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125-27 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennard also wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Werdegar concurred. See id.
at 1046-54, 920 P.2d at 1332-37, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127-32 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 1021, 920 P.2d at 1315, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 110. To obtain benefits from
an earlier period, claimant wanted to "backdate" her unemployment insurance. See id.
at 1028, 920 P.2d at 1319, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115. The Employment Development De-
partment (EDD) denied her request and she sought an administrative appeal. See id. at
1028, 920 P.2d at 1319-20, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115. Following an administrative hearing,
the administrative law judge reversed the EDD's decision, and ordered retroactive
benefits dating back to the initial denial of eligibility. See id. at 1028, 920 P.2d at 1320,
56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115. Claimant then sought interest on the retroactive benefits from
the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (Board). See id. The Board denied the
claimant's request for payment of interest on the grounds that it lacked the authority
for such an award. See id. The AFL-CIO, an outside party to the prior actions, brought
this action in the superior court challenging the Board's conclusion that administrative
law judges lack the power to award interest. See id.
3. Id. at 1028, 920 P.2d at 1320, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115. To bring an unemploy-
ment action before a superior court, a claimant must first complete each step of the
judicial process. First, a claimant must apply to the EDD for unemployment benefits.
See 60 CAL Ju. 3D Unemployment Compensation §§ 25, 28 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (de-
scribing the powers of the EDD and its procedures for determining unemployment
benefits). If the EDD denies benefits, a claimant may appeal to an administrative law
judge. See 60 CAL JUR. 3D Unemployment Compensation § 31 (1994 & Supp. 1996)
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court, reasoning that "the claimant
successfully recovered benefits in the normal course of administrative
review."' The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that adminis-
trative law judges do not have the power to award interest.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Chin, writing for the majority, held that interest awards on
wrongfully withheld benefits are available only in mandamus actions.6
Relying on Tripp v. Swoap,7 Justice Chin stated that trial courts may
award interest in judicial mandamus actions in which the government
has wrongfully withheld benefits.8 Justice Chin reasoned that the interest
award is designed to compensate a claimant forced to file a mandamus
action for the egregious delay in receiving benefits.9 However, Justice
Chin found that the same rationale did not apply to administrative hear-
ings on appeal.' °
(discussing appeals of EDD decisions); 2 B.E. WTMu, SUMMARY OF CALI)RNIA LAW,
Agency and Employment § 351 (9th ed. 1987) (discussing the same). If the adminis-
trative law judge denies the claimant benefits, the claimant may appeal to the Board.
See id. § 353 (9th ed. 1987) (discussing appeals to the Board). Finally, after a decision
from the Board, one may appeal that decision to a superior court. See 60 CAL JuR. 3D
Unemployment Compensation § 39 (1994) (discussing the reviewability and procedures
for judicial review of administrative decisions).
4. AFL-CIO, 13 Cal. 4th at 1029, 920 P.2d at 1320, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115.
5. See id. at 1043, 920 P.2d at 1330, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125. For a historical anal-
ysis of unemployment insurance, see Kenneth M. Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance:
American Social Wage, Labor Organization and Legal Ideology, 35 B.C. L REv. 259
(1994).
6. See 13 Cal. 4th at 1030, 920 P.2d at 1321, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116. Section
3287(a) of the California Civil Code provides, "Every person who is entitled to recover
damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to
recover which is vested in him upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover inter-
est thereon from that day . .. ." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3287(a) (West 1978). Justice Chin
concluded that this section's meaning clearly allows interest "in damage actions based
on a general monetary obligation." 13 Cal. 4th at 1030, 920 P.2d at 1321, 56 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 116.
7. 17 Cal. 3d 671, 552 P.2d 749, 131 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1976). While allowing interest
in mandamus actions, the decision in Tripp left unresolved the question of whether an
award of interest was appropriate in the administrative stages. See AFL-CIO, 13 Cal.
4th at 1031-32, 552 P.2d at 1322, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 117.
8. See id. at 1030, 920 P.2d at 1321, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116.
9. See id. at 1022, 920 P.2d at 1316, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111.
10. See id. at 1023, 920 P.2d at 1316-17, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111-12. Justice Chin rea-
soned that an interest award is not justified "[b]ecause there is no potential 'wrongful
withholding' of benefits ... and no damages 'capable of being made certain' that
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The court next distinguished the function of the administrative process
from that of courts of general jurisdiction." The court stated that "the
function of the administrative law judge in a proceeding to recover un-
employment insurance benefits is simply tb determine if claimants are
eligible and then... to calculate benefits owed... . 2 However, the
court found that administrative law judges, as compared to trial court
judges, do not consider wrongdoing or delay when determining a
claimant's benefits. a Thus, because the administrative process only
determines eligibility, no delay occurs until after eligibility is denied and
a mandamus action is sought."
Finally, the court found that a prior lower court opinion granting ad-
ministrative judges the power to award interest was decided incorrect-
ly.'5 In Knight v. McMahon,'" the court of appeal reasoned that "[i]f in-
terest is part of the 'damage' to a recipient by not being awarded benefits
would give rise to even an implied obligation to award interest on the benefits recov-
ered during the administrative process." Id. at 1023, 920 P.2d at 1316-17, 56 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 112 (citing Tripp, 17 Cal. 3d at 683, 552 P.2d at 758, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 798).
11. See id. at 1035-37, 920 P.2d at 1324-26, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119-21. In its analysis,
the court cited Dyna-Med Inc. v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission, 43 Cal.
3d 1379, 743 P.2d 1323, 241 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1987), which held that the Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA) did not grant the Fair Employment and Housing Commission
(FEHC) the power to award punitive damages. See id. at 1035, 920 P.2d at 1324, 56
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119 (citing Dyna-Med, 43 Cal. 3d at 1393, 743 P.2d at 1331, 241 Cal.
Rptr. at 74 (denying the FEHC the power to award punitive damages where such pow-
er is not specifically granted by the Legislature)).
12. Id. at 1036-37, 920 P.2d at 1326, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121.
13. See id. at 1037, 920 P.2d at 1326, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121.
14. See id. In 1996, the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform published an
issue dedicated solely to issues regarding unemployment compensation. A few of the
articles published in that issue include: Marla D. Clark & Jesse S. Reyes, Procedural
Reform in the Unemployment Insurance System, 29 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 217 (1996)
(discussing the tension between the need for more unemployment resources versus "the
scarcity of resources available to meet this need"); Sharon M. Dietrich & Cynthia L
Rice, Timeliness in the Unemployment Compensation Appeals Process: The Need for
Increased Federal Oversight, 29 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 235 (1996) (proposing methods
for improving state backlog and delay in the unemployment insurance appeals process);
Richard W. Fanning, Jr., The Federal-State Partnership of Unemployment Compensa-
tion, 29 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 475 (1996) (discussing the relative power between the
federal government and the states with respect to unemployment compensation and
their responsibilities in its administration).
15. See AFL-CIO, 13 Cal. 4th at 1037-41, 920 P.2d at 1326-29, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
121-24.
16. 26 Cal. App. 4th 747, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 832 (1994).
in a timely fashion, then an award of interest is no different than an
award of the benefits withheld."17 However, the majority in AFL-CIO
agreed with the dissent in Knight that the court of appeal was improper-
ly acting as a "super-legislature" by granting administrative judges this
power.8 Finding neither express nor implied legislative authority, the
supreme court refused to grant administrative judges the power to award
interest. 9
B. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting from the majority, Justice Mosk argued that the court's
ruling would undermine the policy of the Unemployment Insurance Code
"to reduce involuntary unemployment and the suffering caused thereby
to a minimum."" Justice Mosk stated that requiring a court proceeding
is inefficient because it would require much time and expense in relation
to the amount of the interest award.2" Furthermore, he noted that re-
quiring court proceedings will burden the system with a "multiplicity of
proceedings."' Lastly, Justice Mosk argued that administrative law judg-
es have no discretion in awarding interest because under Civil Code
section 3287(a), interest must be awarded once it is determined that
retroactive compensation is due.23
17. AFL-CIO, 13 Cal. 4th at 1038, 920 P.2d at 1326, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121 (quoting
Knight, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 756, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838).
18. See id. at 1038, 920 P.2d at 1326-27, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122 (citing Knight, 26
Cal. App. 4th at 758, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839 (Yegan, J., dissenting)).
19. See id. at 1041, 920 P.2d at 1328-29, 56 Cal. Rpt-. 2d at 124. The court briefly
discussed whether federal law authorized administrative judges to award interest See
id. at 1041-42, 920 P.2d at 1329, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124-25. The court found no such
authorization in the United States Code or federal case law. See id. See generally 2
B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency and Employment § 3,48 (9th ed.
1987 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the effect of federal statutes on the state unemploy-
ment compensation code).
20. AFL-CIO, 13 Cal. 4th at 1043, 920 P.2d at 1330, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125 (Mosk,
J., dissenting). For a discussion of the purposes of unemployment insurance laws, see
2 B.E. WrrEiN, SUMMARY OF CAuFORuNIA LAW, Agency and Employment § ,347 (9th ed.
1987 & Supp. 1994).
21. See AFL-CIO, 13 Cal. 4th at 1045, 920 P.2d at 1331, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
22. See id. at 1045, 920 P.2d at 1331, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(quoting Knight, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 755-56, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837-38).
23. See id. at 1045, 920 P.2d at 1331, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Prejudgment interest denial is also an issue with regard to unemployment discrimina-
tion. See William L Kandel, Age Discrimination: Recent Decisions by Appellate Courts
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act Through Mid-1996, in 25TH ANNUAL
INSTrrUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW, at 7, 995-1212 (PLI/itig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series N. H4-5237, 1996), available in WESTLAW, 549 PLI/LIT 7. See gener-
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C. Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion
In a separate opinion, Justice Kennard argued that a claimant is enti-
tled to retroactive interest from the date the Employment Development
Department (EDD) initially denied eligibility.24 Justice Kennard reasoned
that the same public interests in awarding retroactive benefits justify an
award for interest." Denying benefits forbids the use of salary for a giv-
en time period, thus, an unemployment claimant "is denied the use of the
funds at a time of particular hardship" as a result of delay while pending
an administrative appeal." In closing, Justice Kennard argued that the
majority erred by characterizing a delay in receiving benefits as "inconse-
quential" when the normal processing time for an administrative appeal
is seven weeks.27
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
The supreme court's decision in AFL-CIO prohibits administrative law
judges from awarding prejudgment interest to claimants who are suc-
cessful in appealing for benefits denied by the EDD. As Justice Kennard
indicates, claimants will be denied compensation for the period of time
during which they were denied benefits to which they were otherwise
entitled.' In essence, the state is enriched at the expense of the unem-
ployed claimant. Furthermore, as Justice Mosk emphasizes, the decision
may have a substantial impact on the caseloads of courts because
ally Thomas W. Lee, Comment, Deducting Unemployment Compensation and Ending
Employment Discrimination: Continuing Conflict, 43 EMORY LJ. 325 (1994) (arguing
for a "clear and consistent policy of denying reductions of back pay awards").
24. See AFL-CIO, 13 Cal. 4th at 1047, 920 P.2d at 1332, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
25. See id. at 1050, 920 P.2d at 1334-35, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 130 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
26. See id. at 1050, 920 P.2d at 1335, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 130 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing). Another problem claimants face in some states is collateral estoppel. See Ann C.
Hodges, The Preclusive Effect of Unemployment Compensation Determinations in Sub-
sequent Litigation: A Federal Solution, 38 WAYNE L REV. 1803 (1992) (arguing that the
use of collateral estoppel has an adverse effect in unemployment compensation cases
and proposing federal legislation denying the use of the doctrine in these cases).
27. See AFL-CIO, 13 Cal. 4th at 1051, 920 P.2d at 1335-36, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 130-31
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
28. See id. at 1047, 920 P.2d at 1332, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 127 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing).
claimants will have to look to the superior courts for recovery of inter-
est.' Thus, this case may place an additional burden on the already
backlogged courts.
JEREMY D. DOLNICK
29. See id. at 1045, 920 P.2d at 1331, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 126-27 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing).
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XVIII. WATER LAW
When a public entity's flood control measures, which
divert and re-channel water, fail in areas historical-
ly known for flooding, private property owners seek-
ing recovery for inverse condemnation must prove
that the failure was due to unreasonable conduct on
the part of the public entity. In determining reason-
ableness, courts must consider the following: (1) the
overall public purpose served by such flood control
measures; (2) the degree to which plaintiffs loss is
offset by reciprocal benefits; (3) the availability of
low risk alternatives; (4) the severity of plaintiffs
damage in relation to risk-bearing capabilities; (5)
the extent to which the kind of damage is a normal
risk of land oumership; and (6) the degree to which
the damage is distributed to a benefited public:
Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water District.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bunch v. Coachella Valley Water District,' the California Supreme
Court considered whether to apply a strict liability or a reasonableness
standard in determining inverse condemnation liability' where a flood
control facility, located in an area historically subject to flooding, failed
to function properly, thus damaging the plaintiffs property.3
1. 16 Cal. 4th 432, 935 P.2d 796, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89 (1997). Justice Chin delivered
a unanimous opinion. See id. at 435-55, 935 P.2d at 797-810, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90-103.
Justice Mosk also wrote a separate concurring opinion. See id. at 455, 935 P.2d at 810,
63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (Mosk, J., concurring).
2. See id. at 439, 935 P.2d at 800, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93. See generally 29A C.J.S.
Eminent Domain § 375 (1992 & Supp. 1997) (defining inverse condemnation as the
taking of private property for public use); Arvo Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of
Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L REv. 727 (1967)
(discussing the constitutional basis for all inverse condemnation actions); 29 CAL JUR.
3D Eminent Domain § 318 (1986 & Supp. 1997) (explaining that compensation must be
made when a public entity causes flooding that damages private property).
3. See id. at 438, 935 P.2d at 799, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92. The Coachella Water
District (defendant), a state agency, maintained the flood control facility in the
Coachella Valley. See id. at 437, 935 P.2d at 798, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91. The defendant
The trial court applied a reasonableness test and held that the defen-
dant had acted reasonably regarding the facilities' design, construction,
and maintenance.4 The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the plaintiffs
argument that the trial court erroneously applied the reasonableness
standard instead of strict liability.' The California Supreme Court af-
firmed the court of appeal, holding that the proper standard in cases
involving public flood control failures that cause physical damage to
private property is not strict liability, but reasonableness.'
constructed a number of dikes and levees in order to divert storm floodwaters from
populated areas. See id. The Bunches (plaintiffs) owned an apartment building within
the Coachella Valley that was "subject to flooding before the flood control facilities
were built" Id. Between 1976 and 1979, three intense tropical storms struck the region.
See id. Following the first storm, the damaged facilities needed emergency repairs. See
id. at 438, 935 P.2d at 798-99, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92. The defendant's repairs to the
facility withstood the second storm; however, the 1979 storm, the worst in the state's
recorded history, created floods beyond the capacity of the dikes and levees. See id. at
438, 935 P.2d at 799, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 92. As a result, floodwaters overflowed the dikes
and flooded property in the Coachella Valley. See id. Water inundated the plaintiffs'
apartment, mud buried cars, and a property line wall collapsed. See id. The plaintiffs
filed an inverse condemnation suit, seeking recovery "for [the] physical invasion and
destruction of their property." Id. The trial court applied the traditional strict liability
standard and the jury awarded the plaintiffs $690,000.00. See id. Subsequently, both
sides appealed. See id. While awaiting the appeal, the California Supreme Court decid-
ed Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist., 47 Cal. 3d 550, 764 P.2d 1070, 253
Cal. Rptr. 693 (1988), and held that when a public flood control facility fils in areas
historically known for flooding, the property owner must show that the failure was due
to some unreasonable conduct of the public entity. See Bunch, 15 Cal. 4th at 438-39,
935 P.2d at 799, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92 (quoting Belair, 47 Cal. 3d at 567, 764 P.2d
1070, 1080, 253 Cal. Rptr. 693, 703). Accordingly, the court of appeal remanded the
present case for a determination of whether the defendant acted reasonably in regards
to the facilities construction, design, and maintenance. See id. at 439, 935 P.2d at 799,
63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92.
4. See Bunch, 15 Cal. 4th at 437, 935 P.2d at 799, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92. The trial
court based its decision on expert witnesses and other relevant evidence. See id. at
452, 935 P.2d at 809, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102.
5. See id. at 439, 935 P.2d at 800, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93.
6. See id. at 454, 935 P.2d at 810, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103. The court asserted that
the Belair reasonableness test was applicable in all cases involving public flood con-
trol, and that, therefore, both the court of appeal and trial court were correct in their
understanding and application of that standard. See id.
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II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. An Historical Overview
The court began its opinion by addressing the different rules governing
inverse condemnation actions.7 The court noted that, at common law,
these actions were based on real property and tort law.' Common law
courts recognized two immunities from liability: (1) private landowner
actions defending their property from "the 'common enemy' of
floodwaters" despite physical damage to a neighbor's property down-
stream; and (2) government actions where an overriding public purpose
governed the damage-causing activity.9
7. See Bunch, 15 Cal. 4th at 439, 935 P.2d at 800, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93. See gen-
erally Robert Kratovil & Frank J. Harrison, Jr., Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept,
42 CAL. L REV. 596, 596-604 (1954) (tracing the constitutional and case law history of
just compensation for damaged property).
8. See Bunch, 15 Cal. 4th at 439, 935 P.2d at 800, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 93. The court
explained that inverse liability issues generally involved situations where both plaintiff
and defendant were private property owners. See id.
9. Id. at 440-41, 935 P.2d at 800-01, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93-94. The "common ene-
my" privilege resulted in a classification system regarding inverse condemnation liabili-
ty. See id. Under the classification system, "a public ... entity's liability for damage
substantially caused by its flood control improvement efforts depended on whether its
flood control system was intended to 'improve' or 'divert' the water's natural flow." Id.
at 441, 935 P.2d at 801, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94 (citing Archer v. City of Los Angeles,
19 Cal. 2d 19, 26, 119 P.2d 1, 5-6 (1941)). A public or private attempt at flood control
which involved water diversion, as opposed to flood control improvements, resulted in
strict liability for damage from such facilities. See id. See generally 4 B.E. WrrKIN,
SUMMARY OF CAIJ'ORNiA LAW, Real Property § 800 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1997) (defin-
ing the common enemy doctrine and discussing its applicability); 63 CAL JUR. 3D Water
§ 716 (1981 & Supp. 1997) (explaining that the "upper or dominant estate has a legal
and natural easement or servitude in the lower or servient estate to discharge all sur-
face waters").
The court then analyzed Albers v. County of Los Angeles"° that held
public entities strictly liable to private property owners for actual physi-
cal injury to their land when a public improvement was the proximate
cause of the damage." The Albers court was reluctant, however, to ex-
tend a strict liability standard to cases involving the two common law
exceptions. 2
The court then discussed Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control
District,'3 a case which further defined California flood control law. 4
Under Belair, a reasonableness standard replaced the harsh doctrine of
strict liability set forth in Albers."6 The reasonableness standard empha-
sized the need to balance public interests with the "gravity of private
harm."6 Similar to the court in Albers, the Belair court was reluctant to
extend the reasonableness test to areas of traditional immunity. 7 How-
10. 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965). In Albers, the court con-
sidered whether a county was liable to private landowners whose property was dam-
aged by a mudslide resulting from county road construction. See id. The Albers court
found the county liable despite an absence of negligent conduct, rejecting the "'"notion
that there need be a congruence between public and private liability in inverse con-
demnation actions"'." See Bunch, 15 Cal 4th at 440, 935 P.2d at 800, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 93 (quoting Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist., 47 Cal. 3d at 563-64,
764 P.2d at 1078, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (1988) (quoting Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.
3d 296, 302, 475 P.2d 441, 445, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345, 348 (1970))). See generally Arvo Van
Alstyne, Inverse Condemnation: Unintended Physical Damage, 20 HASTINGS LJ. 431,
432-38 (1969) (discussing the rationale supporting the Albers court's introduction of
strict liability in inverse condemnation actions).
11. Bunch, 15 Cal. 4th at 440, 935 P.2d at 800, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93. See generally
8 B.E. WrrKN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 941 (9th ed. 1988 &
Supp. 1997) (explaining that the court in Albers limited the application of strict liability
in order to avoid open-ended liability which might produce a reluctance on the part of
public entities to become involved in constructing and improving vitally needed flood
control facilities).
12. Bunch, 15 Cal. 4th at 441, 935 P.2d at 801, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94.
13. 47 Cal. 3d 550, 764 P.2d 1070, 253 Cal. Rptr. 693 (1988). Belair involved the
failure of a levee to hold back floodwaters after several days of heavy rain; once the
levee broke, the San Jacinto River damaged the plaintiffs property. See id. at 555, 764
P.2d at 1071, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
14. See Bunch, 15 Cal. 4th at 442-44, 935 P.2d at 802-03, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95-96.
15. See id. at 442-43, 935 P.2d at 802, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95. In Bunch, the plain-
tiffs argued that Belair's holding applied only to conduct privileged under the common
enemy doctrine and was therefore not applicable to the instant case. See id. at 447,
935 P.2d at 805, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98.
16. Id. at 443, 935 P.2d at 802, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 95 (quoting Belair, 47 Cal. 3d at
565-66, 764 P.2d at 1079, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 702 (quoting Van Alstyne, supra note 10, at
455)).
17. See id. at 441-42, 935 P.2d at 801-02, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94-95.
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ever, the court in Bunch did note that Belair dictum alluded to the use
of a reasonableness standard in all future flood control cases.' 8
Next, the court briefly analyzed the Locklin v. City of Lafayette'9 de-
cision which expanded the use of the reasonableness test beyond Belair
to instances where a public entity had intentionally "drained excess sur-
face water into a natural watercourse, eventually causing damage to
downstream property."2'
Traditionally, the common enemy doctrine protected upstream prop-
erty owners from liability for damage to downstream property.2' Yet, the
Locklin court held that a "public agency is liable only if its conduct
posed an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiffs. ... "' In determin-
ing whether the public entity acted unreasonably, the Locklin court set
forth the following six factors for review: (1) the overall purpose of the
flood control; (2) "the degree to which plaintiffs loss is offset by recipro-
cal benefits"; (3) the availability of low risk alternatives; (4) "the severity
of the plaintiffs damage in relation to risk-bearing capabilities"; (5) the
extent to which the kind of damage is "a normal risk of land ownership";
and (6) the degree to which the damage is distributed to a benefited pub-
lic. 1
3
2. The Applicability of Belair and Locklin to Bunch
The court then considered whether the rules of Belair and Locklin
applied in cases involving flood control improvements where the public
entity diverted and re-channeled water in areas historically subject to
18. See id. at 444, 935 P.2d at 803, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96.
19. 7 Cal. 4th 327, 867 P.2d 724, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 613 (1994). In Locklin, the court
considered whether a public entity was liable for private property damage when public
and private developments along a creek increased the amount of water in the creek
resulting in floods. See id. at 33840, 867 P.2d at 729-31, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 618-20.
20. Bunch, 15 Cal. 4th at 444, 935 P.2d at 803, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96. See generally,
Eric Masald Tokuyama, Note, California Supreme Court Survey: A Review of Deci-
sions, Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 22 PEPP. L REV. 1352 (1995) (discussing the court's
willingness to expand the reasonableness test to cases where traditional common ene-
my inununity applies).
21. See Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 348, 867 P.2d at 736, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 625.
22. Bunch, 15 Cal. 4th at 445, 935 P.2d at 806, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97 (quoting
Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at 367, 867 P.2d at 749, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 638).
23. Id. at 446, 935 P.2d at 804, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 97 (quoting Locklin, 7 Cal. 4th at
368-69, 867 P.2d at 750, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639).
flooding. 4 The court asserted that public policy mandated an expansion
of Belair and Locklin to all flood control failures that result in private
property damage.
The court found that the policy reasons underlying Belairs reason-
ableness test "extend[s] logically to all cases involving flood control im-
provements affecting property historically subject; to flooding,... wheth-
er the activity was privileged at common law."' The court held that the
Locldin factors were crucial in determining the reasonableness of flood
control projects and the lower courts "should apply [them] uniformly in
all flood control cases."26 The court reasoned that failing to extend the
reasonableness standard would result in open-ended liability, unnecessar-
ily burdening the development of vital flood control facilities, and possi-
bly resulting in a reluctance of public entities to construct or repair
needed facilities in an urbanizing society.27 Based on precedent and pub-
lic need, the court eliminated the two common law privileges and im-
posed a general reasonableness standard in all instances.'
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
Justice Mosk concurred with the majority opinion, yet explained that
his opinion presented in this case was not inconsistent with his dissent
in Belair.' In Belair, Justice Mosk opined that liability in inverse con-
demnation actions should not rest on archaic classifications and tradi-
tional immunities.' Instead, Justice Mosk argued that liability should
"rest directly on an explicit balancing of the interests implicated by the
constitutional provision."" Therefore, the court's decision in Bunch to
replace strict liability with a reasonableness standard reflected Justice
Mosk's dissent in Belair.
24. See id. at 448, 935 P.2d at 806, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
25. Id. at 449, 935 P.2d at 806, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99.
26. Id. at 454, 935 P.2d at 810, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103.
27. See id. at 450, 935 P.2d at 807, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100 (citing Belair v. River-
side County Flood Control Dist., 47 Cal. 3d 556, 565, 764 P.2d 1070, 1079, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 693, 702 (1988)).
28. See id. at 454, 935 P.2d at 810, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103.
29. See id. at 455, 935 P.2d at 810, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 (Mosk, J., concurring).
30. See Belair, 47 Cal. 3rd at 570-71, 764 P.2d at 1083, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 706 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
31. See id. at 574, 764 P.2d at 1086, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 709 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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Ill. IMPACT
Prior to Bunch, the law governing public entity liability where a flood
control facility had failed was inconsistent and complex. Moreover,
courts appeared reluctant to abandon the common law privileges and
adopt a general standard.' However, in Bunch, the court created a con-
cise and uniform test that is applicable when a public entity's flood con-
trol measures fail.' By employing a reasonableness test, as opposed to
an inconsistent strict liability standard, the unique facts of each inverse
condemnation case will determine liability.' The assurance of a case by
case analysis to determine liability, coupled with the six Locklin factors
that courts must evaluate, will increase public entities' willingness to in-
volve themselves with needed flood control facilities and improve-
ments.'
Conversely, to employ a strict liability standard would result in public
entity accountability for events outside their control that cause flood
control failures. Such a liability risk would deter future involvement in
flood control-a pressing and vital need in our growing society.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Bunch, the court created a fair and concise reasonableness standard
for trial courts to apply in inverse condemnation actions resulting from
flood control failures.' This standard promotes the important public
need of flood control, while guaranteeing property owners a fair opportu-
nity to seek compensation for physical injury to their land, in a manner
32. See Van Alstyne, supra note 10, at 431 (noting that "the law of inverse condem-
nation liability of public entities for ... injuries to private property is entangled in a
complex web . ").
33. See Bunch, 15 Cal. 4th at 454, 935 P.2d at 810, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103. See
generally John H. Abbott, Note, Weaver v. Bishop and Negligence: A Path Toward
Clearing the Muddy Water, 26 SAN DIEGO L REV. 685 (1989) (discussing the need for a
reasonableness standard which, once adopted, would develop a single rule and clear
precedent when evaluating inverse condemnation liability).
34. See generally Abbott, supra note 33, at 698 (noting that the flexibility of a rea-
sonableness standard guarantees fairness to all landowners when seeking compensation
for damage to their property).
35. See Bunch, 15 Cal. 4th at 449-50, 935 P.2d at 806-07, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99-100.
36. See id. at 454, 935 P.2d at 810, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103. See generally Abbott,
supra note 33, at 698 (discussing the advantages of applying a reasonableness standard
to property owners, public entities, and the courts).
that does not employ the traditional common law privileges which de-
prived property owners compensation. 7
MAIRI J. SANFORD
37. See Abbott, supra note 33, at 686.
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XIX. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
When a maritime employee suffers an industrial injury
that falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA) and the California Workers' Compensation Act
(the California Act), credit for LHWCA disability bene-
fits previously paid by the employer against an award
under the California Act must be calculated on a dollar-
for-dollar basis, regardless of whether the payment was
categorized as temporary or permanent indemnity: Sea-
Land Service, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board,'
the California Supreme Court addressed whether the total amount of
disability benefits paid to an employee under the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act2 (LHWCA) must be credited against the to-
tal amount of disability benefits awarded under the California Workers'
Compensation Acte (the California Act) or be determined by comparing
1. 14 Cal. 4th 76, 925 P.2d 1309, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190 (1996). Justice Baxter deliv-
ered the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice George and Justices Brown and Chin
concurred. See id. at 80-92, 925 P.2d at 1310-18, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191-99. Justice
Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kennard and Werdegar concurred.
See id. at 92-100, 925 P.2d at 1318-23, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199-204 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing).
2. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1994). The crediting provision of the LHWCA, added by
Congress in 1984, provides in pertinent part "Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, any amounts paid to an employee for the same injury, disability, or death for
which benefits are claimed under this Act pursuant to any other workers' compensa-
tion law ... shall be credited against any liability imposed by this Act'" Sea-Land
Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 84-85, 925 P.2d at 1313, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194 (emphasis
omitted) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 903(e) (1994)). See generally Gerald Marvin Bober &
Michael Wible, Compensable Injury or Death Arising Under the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 35 LOy. L REv. 1129 (1990) (discussing disability compen-
sation under the LHWCA).
3. CAL LAB. CODE §§ 3200-6208 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997). Although the California
Act does not explicitly require that payments made under the LHWCA be credited
against a Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) award, Labor Code section
the amounts paid or awarded in each specific category-temporary or
permanent disability payments-under each act.4 While the court of ap-
peal affirmed the WCAB application of the category-by-category crediting
system,5 the California Supreme Court reversed the decision and held
4909 contains a crediting provision, which provides in pertinent part
'Any payment, allowance, or benefit received by the injured employee during
the period of his incapacity, . .. which by the terms of this division was not
then due and payable or when there is any dispute or question concerning
the right to compensation, shall not, in the absence of any agreement, be an
admission of liability for compensation on the part of the employer, but any
such payment, allowance, or benefit may be taken into account by the ap-
peals board in fixing the amount of the compensation to be paid .... '
Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 86, 925 P.2d at 1314, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 195 (quoting
CAL LAB. CODE § 4909 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997)). See generally Howard A. Emmer,
California Workers' Compensation and Third-Party Litigation: A Survey of Recent
Developments, 15 U. WEST L.A. L REv. 1 (1983) (discussing disability compensation
under the California Workers' Compensation Act).
4. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 80-92, 925 P.2d at 1310-18, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
191-99. In the instant case, Sea-Land Service, Inc. (Sea-Land) employed Chris Lopez
(Lopez) as a maritime warehouse worker, who was injured while working for Sea-Land.
See id. at 80, 925 P.2d at 1310, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191. The parties stipulated that
Lopez's injury fell within the concurrent jurisdiction of the California Act and the
LHWCA. See id. Disability payments by Sea-Land to Lopez were as follows: (1) under
the LHWCA, $25,457 in temporary disability payments ($9,617 more than the $15,840 in
temporary disability indemnity to which Lopez was entitled under the California Act)
and $7,041 in permanent disability benefits (later reversed on appeal), and (2) under
the California Act, $9,020 in permanent disability indemnity. See id. at 80-81, 925 P.2d
at 1311, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192. In sum, the maximum amount of temporary disability
benefits available under the LHWCA ($25,457) exceeded the total amount of temporary
and permanent disability benefits available under the California Act ($24,860) by $1,979.
See id. at 81, 925 P.2d at 1311, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192.
5. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 46 Cal. App. 4th
94, 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 865 (1995), rev'd, 14 Cal. 4th 76, 925 P.2d 1309, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d
190 (1996). Because the LHWCA did not provide permanent disability benefits, Lopez
sought state permanent disability benefits. See Sea-Land Sem., 14 Cal. 4th at 81, 925
P.2d at 1311, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192. Lopez agreed that Sea-Land could credit the
amount of state permanent disability owed with the amount already paid by Sea-Land
for the federal permanent disability paid prior to the reversal of the federal award for
permanent disability. See id. Lopez also agreed that he was not entitled to any state
award for temporary disability because the federal award exceeded any amount al-
lowed by California state law. See id. Sea-Land filed a petition for credit of its excess
federal temporary disability payments of $9,617 against its remaining liability of $1,979
for state permanent disability benefits ($9,020 award for state permanent disability
indemnity less $7,041 credit from reversal of federal permanent disability award). See
id. Lopez conceded, and the WCAB held in its denial of Sea-Land's petition, that feder-
al temporary disability payments must be credited against state temporary disability
payments and that federal permanent disability payments must be credited against state
permanent disability payments. See id. at 81-82, 925 P.2d at 1311, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
192. The court of appeal affirmed the WCAB's grant of a category-by-category credit
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that credit for LHWCA disability benefits must be calculated according to
the dollar-for-dollar credit system.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Justice Baxter's Majority Opinion
As a basis for its analysis, the majority set forth two basic premises of
compensation law: (1) "'[Tjhere shall be but a single recovery... [for] a
single injury or disability;'"7 and (2) "'the right to recovery of compensa-
tion from more than one source is subject to the rule that a credit shall
be allowed against an award for any payment to the extent that it per-
mits double recovery.'"' Recognizing the foregoing principles, the majori-
ty summarized the parties' stipulations as follows: (1) Because Lopez's
injury fell within the concurrent jurisdiction of the LHWCA and the Cali-
fornia Act, Lopez was not entitled to a double recovery of disability ben-
efits,9 and (2) benefit payments made by Sea-Land pursuant to the
LHWCA should be credited against an award for the same injury under
the California Act to prevent such double recovery.' 9 Notwithstanding
the foregoing stipulations, the majority, prior to undertaking the resolu-
tion of the parties' disagreement as to the appropriate method of credit-
ing, distinguished the two crediting systems."
See id. at 82, 925 P.2d at 1311, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192. The supreme court granted
Sea-Land's petition for review. See id.
6. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 92, 925 P.2d at 1318, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199.
7. See id. at 82, 925 P.2d at 1311-12, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192-93 (quoting Raischell
& Cottrell, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 249 Cal. App. 2d 991, 997, 58
Cal. Rptr. 159, 163 (1967)).
8. See id. (quoting Raische/, 249 Cal. App. 2d at 997, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 163). See
generally Marie R Yeates et al., Contribution and Indemnity in Maritime Litigation,
30 S. TEx. L REV. 215 (1989) (providing an overview of disability compensation in the
context of injuries to maritime workers).
9. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 82, 925 P.2d at 1312, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193.
See generally 2 B.E. WITION, SUMMARY OF CAuFORNIA LAW, Workers' Compensation
§§ 124-131 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the LHWCA and the impact of
concurrent federal and state jurisdiction); 57 CAL JUI. 3D Ships and Shipping §§ 98-
106 (1980 & Supp. 1997) (summarizing the compensatory provisions of the LHWCA and
their relation to the remedies provided by the state workers' compensation law).
10. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 82, 925 P.2d at 1312, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193.
11. See id. Sea-Land contended that a dollar-for-dollar system, under which the court
compared the total payments or awards made under each act (LHWCA and California
Act) in determining the credit that should be given, was the appropriate method of
After establishing the court's concurrent jurisdiction over both the
LHWCA and California Act claims, 2 the majority addressed the issues of
double recovery and crediting in the context of LHWCA disability
awards. 3 Justice Baxter then cited Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania for
the proposition that "a system of concurrent federal-state workers' com-
pensation jurisdiction does not threaten double recovery since awards
under one compensation system are credited against any recovery under
the second system."4 Although the majority concluded that neither Sun
Ship nor Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co. were dispositive, it deter-
mined that both decisions supported the application of a dollar-for-dollar
crediting system to LHWCA benefit payments."6
crediting in the instant case. See id. On the other hand, Lopez urged the court to
utilize a category-by-category system, under which credit for payments under the
LHWCA would be determined on a category-by-category basis (temporary versus perma-
nent disability payments). See id, The difference between the two systems is that a
category-by-category system permits an employee's total recovery to exceed that avail-
able under the LHWCA or the. California Act alone, while a dollar-for-dollar system
limits an injured employee's total recovery to the higher available recovery under one
act or the other. See id. at 83, 925 P.2d at 1312, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193. See generally
George R. Alvey, Jr. & John 0. Pieksen, Jr., Falling In and Out of Coverage: Jurispru-
dential Legislating Eviscerates the Status Requirement of the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 19 Tt.. MA& LJ. 227 (1995) (outlining the historical devel-
opment of the LHWCA and the effect of the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA on state
workers' compensation claims).
12. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 83, 925 P.2d at 1312, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193.
See generally Charles M. Davis, Federal Supersession of State Workers' Compensation
Acts as Applied to Jones Act Seamen, 8 U.S.F. MA. LJ. 185, 201-02 (1996) (discussing
the term "twilight zone" as it applies to situations where concurrent LHWCA-state juris-
diction exists).
13. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 83, 925 P.2d at 1312, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA
as "allowing states to apply their own workers' compensation schemes to injuries fall-
ing within the coverage of the federal act." See id. (citing Sun Ship, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 723-26 (1980)). See generally 32B AM. JuR. 2D Federal
Employers' Liability and Compensation Acts §§ 104-144 (1996 & Supp. 1997) (sum-
marizing the applicability of the LHWCA and its relation to state workers' compensa-
tion acts).
14. Sea-Land Ser., 14 Cal. 4th at 83, 925 P.2d at 1312, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193
(citing Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 725 n.8). In further support of this proposition, the major-
ity relied on a United States Supreme Court decision for its observation that "'in the
order [to pay compensation under the LHWCA] the full amount of all payments made
by the employer [under the state act] was credited against the [LHWCA] award, and
no impermissible double recovery [was] possible.'" Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 131 (1962)).
15. See id. at 84, 925 P.2d at 1313, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194. According to the ma-
jority, the two decisions were not dispositive because both concerned injured workers
who initially sought state compensation. See id. at 86, 925 P.2d at 1312-13, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 195. Significant to the instant case, however, was the fact that neither case
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In further support of the dollar-for-dollar system, the majority exam-
ined the LHWCA and its crediting provision. 6 Courts construing the
LHWCA have determined that it entitles an employer to full economic
credit, indicative of a dollar-for-dollar system, for all state workers' com-
pensation payments arising from the same injury, regardless of whether
the payments were made for temporary or permanent disability. 7 Thus,
although the majority stated that such interpretative decisions, such as
Sun Ship and Calbeck, were not dispositive, it did conclude that "federal
law strongly supports application of full economic credit (a dollar-for-
dollar system) for LHWCA benefit payments.""8
After determining that federal law supported the application of a dol-
lar-for-dollar approach, the majority shifted its focus to ascertaining
whether the California Act provided similar support.9 Although the
court found that no statute expressly provided for a credit against a
WCAB award for payments made under the LHWCA, it did consider the
applicability of the California Act's crediting provision, Labor Code sec-
tion 4909.20 After determining that section 4909 was inapplicable,2' the
premised its conclusion on whether the state or the federal award occurred first See
id. at 86, 925 P.2d at 1313, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 195. Accordingly, the majority stated
that declining to employ a dollar-for-dollar system would "seriously undermine one of
the express assumptions underlying the Sun Ship decision." See id.
16. See id. at 84-85, 925 P.2d at 1313-14, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194-95; see also supra
note 2 (setting forth the language of the LHWCA's crediting provision).
17. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 84-85, 925 P.2d at 1313-14, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
194-95; see also D'Errico v. General Dynamics Corp., 996 F.2d 503, 505 (1st Cir. 1993)
(stating that "because [the] statute lists injury, disability, or death in the disjunctive,
[the] employer's liability under the LHWCA for temporary... and permanent total
disability must be offset by its previous payments under [the] state workers' compensa-
tion act for permanent loss").
18. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 85, 925 P.2d at 1314, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 195.
19. See id. at 85-88, 925 P.2d at 1314-16, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 195-97. See generally 2
B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAuFORNiA LAW, Workers' Compensation § 331 (9th ed. 1987
& Supp. 1997) (discussing the application of section 4909 and its discretionary preven-
tion of double recovery).
20. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 85-86, 925 P.2d at 1314, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
195; see also supra note 3 (setting forth the language of section 4909). See generally
65 CAL JUR. 3D Work Injury Compensation §§ 137, 156 (1981 & Supp. 1997) (discuss-
ing Labor Code section 4909 and the circumstances under which credit has been al-
lowed).
21. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 86, 925 P.2d at 1314, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
Section 4909 provides for credit in two situations: (1) where payments exceed com-
pensation liability and such payments are intended as an advance on compensation to
become due, or (2) absent an agreement, where the WCAB has discretion to permit
majority addressed two California cases that proscribed a rule against
double recovery in the context of concurrent jurisdiction and the
LHWCA.2
After finding that both Duong v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board and Bobbitt v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board supported
the conclusion "that double recovery is impermissible and that full eco-
nomic credit for LHWCA benefit payments is proper," the majority dis-
cussed its reasons for rejecting the court of appeal's application of a
category-by-category crediting systemY
Furthermore, the majority highlighted several cases that approved the
use of a dollar-for-dollar crediting system in an analogous context where
two sister state workers' compensation statutes applied to a single com-
pensable ijury.24
credit where payments described in the statute were voluntarily made by the employer..
See id. (citing Ott v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 118 Cal. App. 3d 912, 920-21,
173 Cal. Rptr. 648, 653-54 (1981)). Section 4909 was not applicable because the pay-
ments to Lopez were not intended as an advance, and the payments made by Sea-Land
were compelled by the LHWCA. See id.
22. See id. at 86-87, 925 P.2d at 1314-15, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 195-96. The majority
discussed Duong v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 169 Cal. App. 3d 980, 215
Cal. Rptr. 609 (1985), and Bobbitt v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 143 Cal.
App. 3d 845, 192 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1983). See id. In Duong, after the court determined
that the injured employee was entitled to seek compensation under the LTIWCA and
the California Act simultaneously, it stated that "'there is no danger of double recovery
because an employer's contributions under one [act] will be credited against the oth-
er.'" See Sea-Land Sero., 14 Cal. 4th at 86-87, 925 P.2d at 1314-15, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
195-96 (quoting Duong, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 982, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 611). Also, following
a similar employee injury in Bobbitt, the court stated that "'any benefits [the employee]
might receive in the federal proceeding may be credited against benefits [the employee]
might receive in the instant [state] proceedings.'" See id. at 87, 925 P.2d at 1315, 58
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 196 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bobbitt, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 849, 192
Cal. Rptr. at 269).
23. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 87-88, 925 P.2d at 1315-16, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
196-97. The court of appeal reasoned that the application of a category-by-category
crediting system was consistent with section 4661 of the Labor Code. See id. at 87,
925 P.2d at 1315, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 196; see also CAL LAB. CODE § 4661 (Nest 1989
& Supp. 1997) ("Where an injury causes both temporary and permanent disability, the
injured employee is entitled to compensation for any permanent disability sustained by
him in addition to any payment received by such injured employee for temporary dis-
ability."). Although the supreme court supported the court of appeal's distinction be-
tween temporary and permanent disability indemnity, the majority of the supreme court
concluded that the history and context of section 4661 suggests that it is inapplicable
in the instant case. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 88, 925 P.2d at 1315-16, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 196-97.
24. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 88-89, 925 P.2d at 1316, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
197. See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 281 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (holding that successive sister-state workers' compensation awards do not
[Vol. 25: 183, 1997] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Finally, Justice Baxter indicated that public policy notions of fairness
and predictability supported the application of a dollar-for-dollar credit-
ing system.25 Accordingly, the majority held that such a system was ap-
propriate in the context of successive LHWCA and state workers' com-
pensation awards.26
B. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Mosk contended that Labor Code
section 4661 was controlling in the instant case even though the majority
found it inapplicable.27 According to Justice Mosk, the language of the
statute was clear and unambiguous in entitling employees to permanent
disability benefits "in addition to any payment... for temporary disabili-
ty."2' Focusing primarily on the distinction between temporary and per-
manent disability, as set forth in Maples v. Workers' Compensation Ap-
peals Board,' Justice Mosk concluded that the category-by-category
allow a double recovery because an earlier award is credited against a subsequent
award); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 240 Cal. App. 2d 804, 810, 50
Cal. Rptr. 114, 119 (1966) (allowing benefits received under an Alaska workers' com-
pensation program to be credited against a California workers' compensation award);
Industrial Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 80 Cal. App. 2d 480, 486, 182
P.2d 309, 313 (1947) (allowing successive sister-state workers' compensation awards,
but requiring the amounts received under Utah's compensation program to be credited
against the subsequent California worker's compensation award).
25. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 89-91, 925 P.2d at 1317, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
197-98.
26. See id. at 92, 925 P.2d at 1318, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199. See generally 2 B.E.
WITlUN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Workers' Compensation § 263 (9th ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1997) (summarizing indemnity for disability in general and specifying the effect
of section 4661 on awarding compensation for disability); 65 CAL. JuR. 3D Work Injury
Compensation § 151 (1981 & Supp. 1997) (setting forth the effect on compensation
under section 4661 where an injury causes both temporary and permanent disability).
27. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 92-100, 925 P.2d at 1318-23, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 199-204 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also supra note 24 (setting forth the language of
Labor Code section 4661).
28. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 94, 925 P.2d at 1319, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 200
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). Furthermore, the dissent stated that an in-
jured employee must receive both temporary and permanent disability if entitled to
both, and section 4661 did not limit such temporary disability payment to that received
under the California Act. See id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
29. 111 Cal. App. 3d 827, 836-37, 168 Cal. Rptr. 884, 889 (1980). See generally An-
notation, Workmen's Compensation: Right to Compensation for Temporary Total Dis-
ability in Addition to Compensation for Permanent Partial Disability, 88 A.LR. 385
crediting system embodied in section 4661 would have been appropriate
in deciding the instant case.'
Ill. IMPACT
Prior to Sea-Land Service, the supreme court had not determined the
appropriate crediting system for situations in which the court had con-
current jurisdiction over both LHWCA and California Act claims for in-
demnity. By virtue of its application of a dollar-for-dollar system, appar-
ently ignoring the explicit language of section 4661, the majority's deci-
sion may "upset the balance of distinct economic interests embodied in
California workers' compensation law."3'
Furthermore, allowance of credit for excessive temporary disability
payments against permanent disability payments may be "'disruptive and
in some instances totally destructive of the purpose of permanent dis-
ability indemnity[, which is to aid the employee in his return to the job
market].'" 2
IV. CONCLUSION
After considering the language of both the LHWCA and the California
Act, the majority concluded that a dollar-for-dollar crediting system was
appropriate in cases where the court has concurrent federal-state juris-
diction over an injured employee's indemnity claims.' To allow an in-
jured employee to receive the maximum disability benefits under both
acts, without crediting, would entitle the employee to the "best of both
worlds."' According to the dissent in the court below, that is "exactly
what the United States Supreme Court had in mind when it twice cau-
tioned that 'double recovery' should not be permitted."'
JOSEPH E. Foss
(1934) (discussing the right to compensation for temporary total disability in addition
to compensation for permanent partial disability).
30. See Sea-Land Serv., 14 Cal. 4th at 92-100, 925 P.2d at 1318-23, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 199-204 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
31. See id. at 93, 925 P.2d at 1318, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
32. See id. at 94, 925 P.2d at. 1319-20, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 200-01 (Mosk, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Maples, 111 Cal. App. 3d at 836-37, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 889).
33. See id. at 92, 925 P.2d at 1318, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 199.
34. See id.
35. Id.; see Sun Ship, 447 U.S. at 725 n.8; Calbeck, 370 U.S. at 131.
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SUMMARIES
I. Abatement, Survival and Revival
Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34, which pro-
hibits recovery of damages for pain and suffering in
an action brought or maintained on behalf of a de-
ceased plaintiff, applies when the plaintiff dies be-
fore a final appealable judgment; section 377.34 does
not bar recovery for such damages when the plaintiff
dies following the trial court's judgment but before
resolution of an appeal from that judgment.
Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Supreme Court of
California, Decided May 5, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 288, 935
P.2d 781, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74.
Facts. As a result of his termination from employment, the plaintiff
brought fourteen causes of action against his employer based on multiple
legal theories. The defendant prevailed on ten causes of action. Of the
four remaining causes of action, the jury returned special verdicts for the
plaintiff on three claims awarding the plaintiff $275,000 in damages for
emotional distress. The jury deadlocked on the plaintiffs sixth cause of
action resulting in a mistrial on that claim. On May 10, 1994, the trial
court rendered a purported judgment on the three plaintiff verdicts,
granted the plaintiffs motion for new trial on the sixth cause of action,
but failed to render judgment on the ten causes of action decided in the
defendant's favor. The defendant appealed from the trial court's purport-
ed judgment, new trial order and the denial of its motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
The plaintiff died on February 19, 1995 during the pendency of the
appeal, and the special administrator of his estate substituted as plaintiff.
The court of appeal did not reach the merits of the appeal, but consid-
ered only the issue of whether it should reverse the trial court's judg-
ment for the plaintiff on the ground that the damages were no longer
recoverable due to the plaintiffs death. The court of appeal concluded
that California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34 barred recovery of
damages for pain and suffering awarded in a judgment if the plaintiff
dies while an appeal is pending. Consequently, the court of appeal re-
versed both the judgment for the plaintiff and the new trial order and di-
rected the trial court to dismiss the action. The California Supreme Court
granted review to determine the correct application of section 377.34.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court held that
Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34 does not preclude recovery of
pain and suffering damages awarded in a judgment if the plaintiff dies
after that judgment is rendered but while an appeal is pending. Section
377.34 limits the damages recoverable "[iun an action or proceeding by a
decedent's personal representative or successor in interest on the
decedent's cause of action" and specifically prohibits recovery of dam-
ages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement in such an action. After examin-
ing the history of section 377.34 and its predecessors, former Probate
Code section 573 and former Civil Code section 956, the court deter-
mined that the Legislature had not abrogated the longstanding common
law rule, expressed in the leading case of Fowden v. Pacific Coast
Steamship Co., 149 Cal. 151, 86 P. 178 (1906). Fowden held that the
death of the plaintiff following a judgment but during the pendency of an
appeal or a motion for new trial does not abate the action or affect the
validity of the judgment. The court noted that such a judgment is fully
enforceable by the representatives of the decedent's estate.
The court first determined that the current statutory language, "[iun an
action or proceeding by the decedent's personal representative or succes-
sor in interest," has the same meaning as the language in former section
573, "[wlhere a person having a cause of action dies before judgment."
Second, the court disagreed with the court of appeal's inference that the
word "action" in the current statute also includes an "appeal," explaining
that the drafters of the legislation, the California Law Review Commis-
sion, did not intend to abrogate the common law rule expressed in
Fowden by implication. Moreover, the drafters would not have character-
ized section 377.34 as a restatement of former section 573 "without sub-
stantive change" if they had intended to abolish or modify the Fowden
rule.
The supreme court construed the phrase "before judgment" to mean an
"appealable judicial determination," and not a "final judgment" in the
sense that it has been affirmed on appeal or the time for an appeal has
expired. The court reasoned that this construction is consistent with
both the Legislature's omission of the word "final" from the statute and
the common law rule of Fowden. Applying this construction, section
377.34 will not prohibit recovery for pain and suffering when the pre-
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vailing plaintiff dies after the trial court has rendered a final appealable
judgment, but while the appeal is pending.
Finally, the supreme court held that the purported judgment in this
case did not violate the one final judgment rule. In the interest of justice,
the supreme court exercised its discretion to cure the trial court's inad-
vertent failure to dispose of the ten causes of action decided in the
defendant's favor by directing the appellate court to amend the judgment
nunc pro tunc to reflect the trial court's manifest intent. Additionally,
because the plaintiff in substitution expressly waived the right to retrial
on the sixth cause of action, the court exercised its discretion and direct-
ed the court of appeal to amend the judgment nunc pro tunc to reflect
dismissal of that claim with prejudice. Thus, as amended, the judgment
was a final appealable judgment effective as of May 10, 1994, before the
plaintiffs death.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Chin asserted that the majority had
unnecessarily gone too far by construing the phrase "before judgment" to
mean before a final appealable judgment. Justice Chin argued that an
interlocutory judgment may also be sufficient to preserve the pain and
suffering damages that are part of that judgment. Justice Chin observed
that the majority's construction presents a "cruel Hobson's choice" to a
plaintiff suffering from a life-threatening condition. Under those circum-
stances, the plaintiff must either waive any unresolved claim or risk the
loss to his estate of any pain and suffering damages already awarded if
the court does not render a final appealable judgment before his death.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.34 (West 1973 & Supp. 1996) (limiting the
damages recoverable by decedent's representatives when the plaintiff
dies before judgment and barring recovery of pain and suffering damages
in such actions).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997) (replaced by Civil Pro-
cedure Code section 377.34).
CAL CIV. CODE § 956 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997) (replaced with certain
modifications by Probate Code section 573).
CAL L. REVISION COMM'N, RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELATING TO SUR-
VIVAL OF ACTIONS, 3 CAL L REVISION COMM'N REP. F-1 (1961).
CAL. L REVISION COMM'N, COMMENT TO CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 377.34, 22
CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 895 (1992) (noting that section 377.34 re-
placed former Probate Code section 573 "without substantive change").
Legal Texts:
1 AM. JUR. 2D Abatement, Survival, and Revival §§ 51-60 (1962) (discuss-
ing the common-law principles and statutory modifications governing
survival of actions and the effect of death after judgment).
1 AM. JUR. 2D Abatement, Survival, and Revival § 61 (1994) (explaining
the effect of death after judgment).
46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 111 (1994) (noting the common law rule that
a judgment rendered after a party's death is generally regarded as void).
1 C.J.S. Abatement and Revival §§ 117-129 (1985) (discussing, in general,
the abatement and survival of pending actions and proceedings and the
effect of death before and after final judgment).
1 CAL. JUR. 3D Actions §§ 316-319, 331-338 (1996) (respectively discussing
the survival of an action following the death of a party and the damages
recoverable from judgment in favor of the decedent).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages Jbr Pain and S4ffering
Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 260-70 (1989) (describing the na-
ture of pain and suffering damages).
Lawrence Livingston, Survival of Tort Actions: A Proposal for California
Legislation, 37 CAL. L REV. 63 (1949) (discussing proposed changes to
tort law which provide for survival of tort actions, including proposed
section 956 of the Civil Code).
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Thomas E. Stanton, Jr., Survival of Tort Actions, 24 CAL ST. B.J. 424
(1949).
Lawrence 0. Erickson, Jr., Note, Survival of Personal Injury Actions: A
Legislative Proposal, 24 CAL. L. REV. 716 (1936) (discussing new section
956 of the Civil Code and other proposed amendments applicable to sur-
vivability and assignability).
SHANNON M. MASON
II. Appellate Review
California Civil Code section 3295, subdivision (d)
does not entitle a defendant to a new trial on liabil-
ity and compensatory damages following the reversal
of an award of punitive damages.
Torres v. Automobile Club of Southern California, Su-
preme Court of California, Decided June 2, 1997, 15 Cal.
4th 771, 937 P.2d 290, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859.
Facts. The plaintiffs, Richard Torres and his son Anthony Torres, filed
suit against the Automobile Club of Southern California, the defendant,
for violations of Insurance Code section 790.03. A jury awarded 'Richard
Torres $4251 in economic damages and twenty thousand dollars for emo-
tional distress while Anthony Torres was awarded no economic damages
but ten thousand dollars for emotional distress. The defendant was also
found guilty of malice, fraud, or oppression, and the jury awarded $1.7
million in punitive damages.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgement notwith-
standing the verdict with regard to Anthony Torres, but affirmed the
judgment for Richard Torres and the punitive damages award. The de-
fendant appealed only the noneconomic and punitive damages awards.
Neither the award of economic damages nor the jury's finding of liability
for insurance code violations was challenged on appeal. The court of
appeal held that Richard Torres had made an insufficient showing for the
recovery of noneconomic damages and found that the $1.7 million in pu-
nitive damages was excessive in relation to his actual damages. The
court of appeal then remanded the entire case for a complete retrial
based on the court of appeal's opinion that Civil Code section 3295(d)
did not allow a retrial only for punitive damages even though there was
no question of error regarding the amount of economic damages or the
issue of liability.
Holding. The supreme court reversed the decision of the court of ap-
peal, holding that Civil Code section 3295(d) does not require a complete
retrial upon the reversal of a punitive damages award. The court first
stated that established principles of law allow appellate courts to order a
retrial on the limited issue of punitive damages. Next, the court exam-
ined the language of the statute while considering the legislative intent
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behind the overall statutory scheme. In doing so, the court found nothing
to suggest that the Legislature intended to give defendants the right to a
complete retrial when punitive damages are reversed on appeal.
The court also noted that courts should not assume that the Legisla-
ture intends to discard well-established principles of law unless there is a
clear expression of such intent. In addition, the court stated that there
are adequate safeguards to ensure that a jury in a limited retrial will
maintain a reasonable relationship between punitive and actual damages.
In closing, the court noted that their decision was not based on consid-
erations of public policy, but was based solely on legislative intent and
firmly established rules of statutory construction. Therefore, the court
concluded that Civil Code section 3295(d) does not entitle a defendant to
a complete retrial following the reversal of a punitive damages award.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295 (West 1997) (the last sentence of subdivision (d)
holding that "[e]vidence of profit and financial condition shall be pre-
sented to the same trier of fact").
1987 CAL. STAT. 1498 (part of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act that added subdivision (d) to Civil Code section 3295).
Legal Texts:
16 CAL. JuR. 3D Courts § 192 (1983 & Supp. 1997) (generally discussing
how courts construe statutes).
23 CAL. JuR. 3D Damages §§ 116-134 (1975 & Supp. 1997) (discussing all
aspects of punitive damages).
.6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1374 (1988 & Supp.
1996) (discussing the relation of actual damages to punitive damages).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Barbara Eckert Buchanan, New Limits, New Licenses? Impact of Adams
v. Murakami on the California Punitive Damages System, 33 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 735 (1993) (discussing the Murakami case where the retri-
al was limited to the issue of punitive damages).
Patrick M. Malone, Adams v. Murakami-New Judicially Made Rules
Affecting Punitive Damages in California, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1441
(1992) (providing the history of development of punitive damages in
California and a discussion of introducing evidence of a defendant's fi-
nancial condition).
Gary T. Walker, Punitive Claims in Bad Faith Cases, in BAD FAITH Lm-
GATION AND INSURER VS. INSURER DISPUTES 1987 (Practising Law Institute
1987).
MARK W. ROBERTSON
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III. Civil Procedure
For a notice of entry mailed by the court clerk to
qualify as notice under California Code of Civil
Procedure section 664.5, and thus constitute the
date on which the time to rule on a motion for
new trial begins, the notice must "affirmatively
state that it was given 'upon order by the court' or
'under section 664.5.'
Van Beurden Insurance Services, Inc. v. Customized
Worldwide Weather Insurance Agency, Inc., Supreme
Court of California, Decided March 6, 1997, 15 Cal.
4th 51, 931 P.2d 344, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 166.
Facts. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover
damages resulting from the breach of a written agreement and for money
had and received. The defendant filed a cross-complaint for breach of an
oral contract. On April 1, the jury found the defendant liable to the
plaintiff for $52,081.69, and found the plaintiff liable to the defendant for:
$187,654.48. The court directed the defendant to prepare a written judg-
ment. On July 28, the court signed the judgment and the clerk filed it.
That same day, the clerk mailed a file-stamped copy of the judgment to
the parties. The defendant, however, did not serve notice of entry of
judgment on the plaintiff. On August 5, the plaintiff served notice of a
motion for new trial, which was subsequently filed on August 8. The
motion was denied, however, on October 8. Finally, on November 4, the
plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. The defendant moved to dismiss the
appeal as untimely.
The court of appeal held that because the trial court ordered the clerk
to mail the notice of entry, the time to rule on the plaintiffs motion for
new trial began to toll on the date of this mailing, and not on the filing
date of the plaintiffs notice. Because the plaintiffs notice of appeal fell
outside the required time limit, the court held the appeal to be untimely.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court held that the
plaintiffs appeal was timely for two reasons. First, the defendant did not
serve proper notice on the plaintiff. Second, the court found that the trial
court did not order the court clerk to mail such notice. Therefore, the
court concluded that the proper date from which the time to rule on the
new trial motion extended was the filing date of the plaintiffs motion for
new trial.
In so holding, the court stated that evidence that the court ordered the
mailing of the notice of entry can only be found where such notice ex-
pressly states "'upon order by the court' or 'under section 664.5.'" With-
out such a statement, the notice of entry will not be valid for the purpos-
es of inception of the time period to rule on the motion. Because the
notice of entry in this case did not make such statements, the court held
that the time to rule on the motion extended from the date of its filing.
Consequently, the notice of appeal fell within the mandated statutory
period, and the court held that the plaintiffs appeal was timely and re-
manded the case to be heard on appeal.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative listory:
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 659 (West 1997).
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 659a (West 1997).
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 660 (West 1997).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 664 (West 1997).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 664.15 (West 1997).
CAL. RULES OF CT., Rule 2(a).
CAL RULES OF CT., Rule 3(d).
Case Law:
Erickson v. Weiner, 48 Cal. App. 4th 1663, 56 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996).
Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1484, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d
802 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
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Steinhart v. South Coast Area Transit, 183 Cal. App. 3d 770, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
Sauchez-Corea v. Bank of Am., 38 Cal. 3d 892, 701 P.2d 826, 215 Cal.
Rptr. 679 (Cal. 1985).
Bunton v. Arizona Pac. Tanklines, 141 Cal. App. 3d 210, 190 Cal. Rptr.
295 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
Legal Texts:
8 B.E. WrrKIN, CAL. PROCEDURE, Attack §§ 76-77 (4th ed. 1997).
7 B.E. WrrKIN, CAL. PROCEDURE, Trial § 450 (4th ed. 1997).
8 B.E. WrrKIN, CAL. PROCEDURE, Attack § 66 (4th ed. 1997).
7 B.E. WrrEIN, CAL. PROCEDURE, Judgment § 59 (4th ed. 1997).
Civil Trials on Evidence, [1993-1996] William E. Wegner, et al., CAL.
PRAC. GUIDE §§ 17:69-:73.
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Annotated Calif. Statutes of Limitations: Code of Civ. Proc., 25 Sw. U.
L. REV. 814, 853-54 (1996).
LEALLEN FROST
IV. Criminal Law
A. The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
does not extend to pretrial disclosure of confi-
dential or privileged records in camera.
People v. Hammon, Supreme Court of California,
Decided July 7, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 1117, 938 P.2d
986, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74.
Facts. The defendant was convicted by the trial court on eight counts of
committing lewd and lascivious acts on a minor under the age of four-
teen. The minor was the defendant's foster child who lived at the
defendant's home from the age of twelve to the age of sixteen. The de-
fendant confirmed having sex with the minor but denied anything oc-
curred before she was fourteen years old. On appeal, the defense argued
that the trial court erred in quashing subpoenas directed to the psycholo-
gists of the minor because the information was necessary to challenge
the plaintiffs credibility on cross-examination. The court of appeal af-
firmed the trial court's decision, holding that the defendant failed to
make a proper showing of good cause. The court noted that; the time
period of the requested records was not relevant and there was no evi-
dence of psychosis on the part of the minor. The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia granted the petition for review to determine whether the trial
court erred by not reviewing the subpoenaed records in camera.
Holding. The California Supreme Court held that the defendant did not
have a Sixth Amendment right to trial court in camera review of privi-
leged or confidential records. The court began its analysis by reviewing
the case authority cited by the defense concerning disclosure of docu-
ments protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. The supreme
court disagreed with the determination that the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment required pretrial disclosure when the defendant's
need for the information outweighed the plaintiff/patient's need for confi-
dentiality. The court stated that the line of cases offered by the defense
involved the defendant's trial rights, not pretrial rights. The court next
examined the United State's Supreme Court decision in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). In Ritchie, a case involving pretrial discovery
in a child molestation case, no majority consensus emerged on the prop-
er application of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to
the pretrial discovery issue. However, the lead opinion articulated that
the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is a trial right, not a pretrial
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right. Finally, the court acknowledged the strong public policy of protect-
ing a patient's treatment history. Because of the reasons stated, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court declined to extend the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights of confrontation and cross-examination to pretrial
disclosure of privileged information.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees that a criminal defendant will have the right "to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him." The right to confrontation in-
cludes the right to cross-examine witnesses.).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997).
Legal Texts:
7 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 415
(9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (discussing right of the defendant to be con-
fronted with adverse witness).
19 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2063, 2123-2124 (1984 & Supp. 1997)
(respectively discussing guaranteed rights of the accused, the general
right of the accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him and
the fact that the right of confrontation is basically a trial right).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Christopher K Descherer & David L. Fogel, Sixth Amendment at Trial,
84 GEo. L.J. 1222, 1230 (1996) (discussing the Confrontation Clause and a
defendant's right to be present at any crucial stage in which his presence
would contribute to his opportunity for effective cross-examination).
Dana D. Anderson, Assessing the Reliability of Child Testimony in Sex-
ual Abuse Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 2117 (1996).
CAROL SOVINSEI
[Vol. 25: 183, 19971 California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
B. Penal Code section 1170.12, which provides for
sentence enhancements for "third strike" con-
victions, is not violated when an indeterminate
term is imposed and runs consecutive to a prior
determinate term; section 1170.12 does not vio-
late the state and federal ex post facto consti-
tutional provisions by mandating that a sentence
for a third strike offense run consecutive to a
sentence imposed before the third strike law
was enacted.
People v. Helms, Supreme Court of California, De-
cided May 22, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 608, 936 P.2d 1230,
63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620.
Facts. The defendant, convicted in Matin County for possessing a con-
trolled substance with a state prison prior, was sentenced to four years
in state prison but was placed on probation. Shortly after California vot-
ers enacted the three strikes law, California Penal Code section 1170.12,
the defendant committed a felony in Santa Clara County, which was
prosecuted as a third strike offense. The trial court convicted the defen-
dant and sentenced him to an indeterminate term of twenty-five years to
life. The trial court also revoked probation of the Main County convic-
tion and ordered the previously-imposed four year sentence to run con-
secutive to his indeterminate term pursuant to California Penal Code
section 1170.12(c)(2)(B). The defendant appealed. The court of appeal
modified the defendant's sentences to run concurrently on the basis that
sentencing the defendant to consecutive terms violated the state and
federal ex post facto provisions by altering the consequences of violating
probation. The California Supreme Court granted review to determine the
correct interpretation of section 1170.12 and whether its mandate that
the defendant serve consecutive terms violated the state and federal ex
post facto provisions.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court first held that
Penal Code section 1170.12 was not violated when the trial court ordered
the defendant's third strike indeterminate term to run consecutive to his
prior four year term. The court held that although the language of sec-
tion 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(B), which provides that a third strike
term "shall be served consecutive to any other term of imprisonment for
which a consecutive term may be imposed by law," was imprecise, the
most reasonable interpretation of it is that "the voters intended for the
third strike term to be served consecutively to any other for which a
consecutive term was legally permissible, without regard to the chronolo-
gy of imposition and execution of judgment and sentence." Further, the
court stated that the language of section 1170.12(c)(2)(B) is comprehen-
sive, thereby requiring consecutive sentencing for an offense committed
before the three strikes law was enacted.
Second, the supreme court held that section 1170.12 did not violate the
ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions by mandating
that a sentence for a third strike offense run consecutive to a sentence
imposed before the law was enacted. The court reasoned that the appli-
cable provisions of the three strikes law did not in any way alter the
punishment for the defendant's pre-three strikes offense, a determinate
term, because the defendant would have served the same time for his de-
terminate term as he would have served if the three strikes law had nev-
er been enacted. In particular, the three strikes law did not eliminate any
potential concurrency of his prior term. Finally, the court reasoned that
the new law's only effect was that, whenever imposed or executed, the
term for a three strikes offense must be consecutive to all other previ-
ously-imposed terms.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (mandating sen-
tence enhancements for prior felony convictions).
CAL PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(B) (West 1988 & Supp. 1997) (providing
that a defendant with two or more felony convictions shall serve an inde-
terminate term consecutive to any other term of imprisonment for which
a consecutive term may be imposed by law).
Legal Texts:
16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law §§ 409-413, 321, 424-426 (1984) (discuss-
ing, in general, the nature and extent of ex post facto laws).
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16A AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law §§ 634-661 (1979) (discussing, in
general, the nature and extent of ex post facto laws).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
David C. Owen, Striking Out Juveniles: A Reexamination of the Right to
a Jury Trial in Light of California's 'Three Strikes" Legislation, 29 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 437 (1996) (exploring the constitutional problems of using
prior juvenile adjudications as felony convictions for the purpose of sen-
tence enhancement).
Gary R. Nichols & Harry M. Caldwell, Consecutive Misdemeanor Sen-
tencing: Curing the Inequity, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 965 (1986).
ERIc W. SwANIs
C. When a criminal defendant is convicted and sen-
tenced for a felony offense while on probation
for a prior felony conviction, the probationary
conviction is not a current conviction for the
purposes of California Penal Code section
667(c)(7), nor is the probation term considered
as already serving another sentence for the pur-
poses of California Penal Code section
667(c)(8), so that the sentences imposed for the
felony conviction and the probation violation
should be served concurrently rather than con-
secutively.
People v. Rosbury, Supreme Court of California,
Decided March 17, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 206, 932 P.2d
207, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 635.
Facts. The defendant was convicted of attempted robbery while still on
probation for a prior robbery committed in 1993. The trial court, applying
Penal Code section 667, California's "three strikes law," sentenced the
defendant to a nine year prison term for the attempted robbery and a
three year prison term for violating probation; the sentences were to be
served concurrently. Subsequent to the defendant's appeal of his convic-
tion, the state argued that section 667(c)(8) required the sentences to be
served consecutively rather than concurrently because the defendant's
probation equated to "already serving another sentence" when he was
sentenced for the attempted robbery.
The court of appeal held that the trial court erred in the defendant's
concurrent sentencing, reasoning that the 1993 probation conviction was
a "current conviction" for purposes of section 667(c)(7), and therefore,
the section required the sentences to run consecutively rather than con-
currently.
Holding. The supreme court reversed the court of appeal, determining
that section 667(c)(7) did not require the defendant's sentences to be
served consecutively. The court stated that the trial court correctly ap-
plied section 667 when it determined that the defendant's two year
sentence should be increased to nine years as the result of a "second
strike," premised on the state's proof that the defendant had a prior
felony conviction. The court reasoned that because the state proved the
defendant's 1993 conviction was a prior conviction in the present pro-
ceeding, it could not also be considered a current conviction for the
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purposes of section 667(c)(7); therefore, the defendant's sentences
should run concurrently rather than consecutively.
The supreme court also addressed the state's contention that section
667(c)(8) required consecutive sentences in the present case. The court
disagreed with the state, determining that a defendant is not serving
another sentence while on probation. The court indicated that the Leg-
islature distinguished between the concepts of sentence and probation in
the wording of its three strikes legislation, and noted that a sentence
does not begin to be served until the defendant is remanded to custody
and delivered to prison. The court concluded that because the defendant
was on probation at the time of his sentencing for the attempted rob-
bery, rather than incarcerated, he was not serving another sentence for
the purposes of section 667(c)(8), and therefore, his sentences should
run concurrently.
As a final note, the court added that if the defendant's probation had
been revoked and a sentence imposed prior to sentencing for his at-
tempted robbery conviction, he might have been subject to consecutive
sentences under section 667(c)(8). The court expressed distaste with this
"race to the courthouse" scenario, but stated that it was bound to en-
force the wording of the statute.
REFERENCES
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CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (Deering 1983 & Supp. 1997).
Legal Texts:
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(1985 & Supp. 1997).
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3 B.E. WrrITN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 2D, Con-
secutive or Concurrent Sentences §§ 1475-1477 (1989 & Supp. 1997).
3 B.E. WITHIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw 2D, Prior
Serious Felony § 1515 (1989 & Supp. 1997).
3 B.E. WIrK1N & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 2D, Im-
position or Execution of Sentence Following Revocation of Probation
§§ 1708-1715 (1989).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Meredith McClain, Note, "Three Strikes and You're Out": The Solution
to the Repeat Offender Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97 (1996).
Christine Markel, Note & Comment, A Swing and a Miss: California's
Three Strikes Law, 17 WHITTIER L. REV. 651 (1996).
Victor S. Sze, Note & Comment, A Tale of Three Strikes: Slogan Tri-
umphs Over Substance as Our Bumper-Sticker Mentality Comes Home
to Roost, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1047 (1995).
Mark W. Owens, Legislative Note, California's Three Strikes Law: Des-
perate Times Require Desperate Measures-But Will It Work?,, 26 PAC.
L.J. 881 (1995).
Keith C. Owens, Comment, California's "Three Strikes" Debacle: A Vola-
tile Mixture of Fear, Vengeance, and Demagoguery Will Unravel the
Criminal Justice System and Bring California to Its Knees, 25 Sw. U. L.
REv. 129 (1995).
JOHN W. CORRINGTON
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D. A request for reversal of a criminal conviction
based on ineffective assistance of counsel is
appropriate in a habeas corpus proceeding, but
not on direct appeal unless the record is suffi-
ciently clear concerning the motivations of coun-
sel.
People v. Tello, Supreme Court of California, Decid-
ed April 17, 1997, As Modified June 11, 1997, 15
Cal. 4th 264, 933 P.2d 1134, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437.
Facts. The defendant was convicted in a jury trial of cocaine possession
following his arrest by Orange County Deputy Sheriff Gomez. Deputy
Gomez testified at trial that he stopped the defendant's car when he no-
tice that the passenger was lighting a marijuana cigarette. After the de-
fendant "consented to a search of the car," Deputy Gomez decided to
conduct a patdown search, and he told the defendant to turn around.
When the defendant obeyed the deputy's instruction, "a vial of cocaine
fell from his right pant leg."
The court of appeal reversed the defendant's conviction on the ground
of ineffective assistance of counsel because defense counsel never
moved to suppress the cocaine. Relying solely on the trial record, the
court of appeal recognized that the cocaine was appropriate evidence for
suppression, as it was discovered in an illegal demand for a patdown
search.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, Justice Chin, writing for the
majority, held that the facts on the record were inadequate for determin-
ing whether or not representation was inadequate. The court recognized
that a habeas corpus proceeding, rather than a direct appeal, was the
proper avenue for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where
there was no indication on the record why counsel acted the way that he
did, counsel was not asked to explain, and there is a possibility of some
"satisfactory explanation." The court acknowledged that it did not know
why defense counsel did not make a motion to suppress the cocaine.
Referring to Justice Rylaarsdam's dissent at the court of appeal, the su-
preme court stated that facts not raised at trial might justify the actions
of both the officer and defense counsel. Likewise, the prosecution was
never afforded an opportunity to explain why the evidence should not be
suppressed. The court noted that the court of appeal should not have
reversed when the prosecution and the police were never given an op-
portunity to explain why the evidence was admissible. Although the
court explained that an appeal may be the proper avenue for claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel where the record contains sufficient
information, the court determined that the instant record did not, achieve
this level of adequacy.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997).
Legal Texts:
21A AM. JuR. 2D Criminal Law §§ 732-763, 967-992 (1981 & Supp. 1997)
(regarding effectiveness of counsel).
39 AM. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 53 (1968 & Supp. 1997) (discussing ha-
beas corpus with regard to denials of counsel, in which the authors in-
clude ineffective assistance).
6 B.E. WrrgN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 2D, Ex-
traordinary Writs § 3350 (1989 & Supp. 1997) (recognizing ineffective
assistance as grounds for habeas corpus attack of a judgment).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Justine A. Fitzgerald & Ashley Whitesides, Right to Counsel, 85 GEO. L.J.
1215 (1997).
John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Pro-
cedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (1990).
Gregory G. Samo, J.D., Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of
Criminal Client Regarding Search and Seizure Issues, 12 A.L.R. 4th 318
(1981).
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E. Failure by a trial court to obtain a personal
waiver of the statutory right to jury trial on the
issue of prior prison terms from a defendant will
result in error if the issue is tried to the court,
but does not implicate state or federal constitu-
tional issues of the right to jury trial or due pro-
cess; therefore, the error must be preserved by
objection in order to raise the issue on appeal.
People v. Vera, Supreme Court of California, Decid-
ed May 1, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 269, 934 P.2d 1279, 62
Cal. Rptr. 2d 754.
Facts. The defendant was charged with three counts each of robbery
and kidnapping. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to bifur-
cate the trial on the substantive charges from that of the trial on the
issue of prior prison terms. The defendant was convicted on all counts in
a jury trial. The trial court subsequently dismissed the jury conviction
based on defense counsel's prior indication at the time of the bifurcation
that the defendant would waive his statutory right to a jury trial concern-
ing the prior prison terms issue. The defendant did not personally waive
his jury trial right before the court. The prior prison terms issue was
tried to the court on the date of sentencing without objection by defense
counsel, and the court found the allegations to be true. The defendant
was sentenced to a seven year prison term, with two one year enhance-
ments for his prior convictions. The defendant appealed, claiming that
the finding of prior prison terms should be stricken because he did not
waive his right to a jury trial on the issue.
The court of appeal found that failure by the trial court to obtain the
defendant's personal waiver of his jury trial right was harmless error.
The defendant's conviction and sentence, including the trial court's impo-
sition of the one year sentence enhancements, were affirmed.
Holding. The supreme court affirmed the court of appeal's decision,
determining that the defendant's failure to timely object to the trial
court's error resulted in a waiver of the right to appeal the issue. The
court initially noted that the defendant's right to a jury trial on the prior
prison terms issue is created by California Penal Code section 1025. The
court then pointed out that prior California case law has established that
any deviation from this statutory procedure must be noted by a
defendant's timely objection in order to preserve the issue for appeal.
The court then discussed the potential constitutional issues raised by
the defendant's appeal. The court noted that if the defendant's claim
involved deprivation of constitutional rights, he would not be precluded
from raising those issues for the first time on appeal. The court then ana-
lyzed two potential constitutional issues raised by the defendant: the
right to jury trial and federal due process.
In discussing the right to jury trial, the court indicated that constitu-
tional rights were only implicated concerning the defendant's right to
jury trial on the substantive charges. The defendant's right to jury trial on
the prior prison terms issue was created by statute, not by the state or
federal constitutions, and, therefore, the defendant's claim of a depri-
vation of this right could not be raised for the first time on appeal.
In discussing the federal due process issue, the court indicated that
this issue arises in the context of the present case when a defendant is
denied a state-created right to jury discretion concerning sentencing. The
court reasoned that a statutory right to a jury finding on prior prison
convictions is distinctly different from jury discretion concerning sen-
tencing. Because the jury was not performing a discretionary function,
but rather was performing a fact-finding determination of the truth of
prior convictions, the court concluded that federal due process was not
implicated in the present case. The court concluded its analysis by stat-
ing that because no state or federal constitutional issues were involved,
the defendant had waived his right to appeal the jury trial issue by failing
to make a timely objection.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL PENAL CODE § 1025 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (granting a defendant
the right to jury trial on alleged prior convictions by the same jury that
tried the substantive issues).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1158 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (stating that prior
prison terms issue may be tried to the court if jury trial right is waived
by a defendant).
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Legal Texts:
19 CAL. JUR. 3D Trial by Jury §§ 2114-2122 (1985 & Supp. 1997) (discuss-
ing waiver of right to jury trial by a defendant).
22 CAL. JiR. 3D Enhancement of Punishment §§ 3384-3391 (1985 & Supp.
1997) (discussing procedures for enhancement of criminal sentences).
5 B.E. WITrIN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRMINAL LAw 2D,
Waiver of Right to Jury Trial §§ 2644-2649 (1989 & Supp. 1997) (discuss-
ing waiver of right to jury trial by a defendant).
6 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 2D, Re-
versible Error § 3306 (1989 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the denial or im-
pairment of jury trial).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Nancy Kornick, Twelfth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal 1981-1982, Right to Jury
Trial, 71 GEO. L.J. 615 (1982) (discussing constitutional right to jury
trial).
Robert E. Sabido, Note, California Supreme Court Survey: A Review of
Decisions, People v. Calderon, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1038 (1996) (discussing
the California law allowing bifurcation of criminal trials).
Miguel Schor, State v. Green-Recidivist Statutes: The Procedure for the
Introduction of Prior Crime Evidence, 61 TUL L. REV. 960 (1987) (sup-
porting criminal trial bifurcation as less prejudicial to a defendant than
unified procedure).
Leonard N. Sosnov, No Mere Error of State Law: When State Appellate
Courts Deny Criminal Defendants Due Process, 63 TENN. L. REv. 281
(1996) (discussing due process issues of state sentencing procedures).
Eric Weitz, Note, California Supreme Court Survey: A Review of Deci-
sions, People v. Saunders, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 290 (1994) (discussing bifur-
cation procedure when a defendant fails to object or waives right to jury
trial).
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F. A sex offender's failure to register a change of
address pursuant to California Penal Code sec-
tion 290(f) is a continuing offense; thus, felony
prosecution after the effective date of amend-
ment increasing the crime from a misdemeanor
to a felony, did not violate the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Wright v. Superior Court, Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, Decided May 12, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 521, 936
P.2d 101, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322.
Facts. California Penal Code section 290(a) requires convicted sex of-
fenders to register with local law enforcement agencies. Subdivision (f)
requires a registered sex offender to notify the law enforcement agency
of last registration of a change of residence address within a specified
period. Effective January 1, 1995, violation of the notification require-
ments constitutes a felony. Prior to that date, failure to comply with sec-
tion 290(0 was a misdemeanor. The defendant, William Wright, regis-
tered with the Buena Park Police Department as a sex offender on Au-
gust 15, 1994. On March 23, 1995, a special agent with the California
Department of Justice discovered that the defendant had moved from his
last known address in Buena Park sometime in November 1994. The
defendant never informed the Buena Park Police Department of his
change of residence. The People initially filed a felony information al-
leging that the defendant violated section 290(f) sometime between No-
vember 1994 and March 23, 1995. Realizing that their pleading was defec-
tive, the People filed an amended information charging the defendant
with a felony violation of section 290(f) alleging that the failure to notify
occurred sometime between February 1 and March 23, 1995.
The defendant claimed that felony prosecution was an ex post facto
law and therefore moved to dismiss the charges pursuant to Penal Code
section 995. The defendant argued that his offense occurred in November
1994 when he initially failed to report his change of address. The trial
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss concluding that the viola-
tion was a continuing offense and thus properly was prosecuted as a
felony. The court of appeal disagreed and determined that a violation of
section 290(0 is an instantaneous offense that is completed upon expira-
tion of the thirty-day notification grace period. Thus, the court of appeal
concluded that, in this case, the defendant's offense occurred sometime
in December 1994, warranting only misdemeanor prosecution. The Cali-
fonda Supreme Court granted review to consider whether felony prose-
cution is prohibited as ex post facto if the defendant's failure to comply
with section 290(0 occurred prior to January 1, 1995.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the California
Supreme Court held that failure to comply with the notification require-
ments of section 290(0 is a continuing offense that is not completed as
long as the sex offender's obligation remains unfulfilled. Consequently,
the court further held that felony prosecution of a sex offender's con-
tinuing failure to comply with section 290(0 after January 1, 1995 did not
violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.
Although section 290(0 does not expressly state a continuing offense,
the "overarching legislative intent and comprehensive statutory scheme
governing the registration of sex offenders" indicates that the statute
imposes a continuing duty of notification on sex offenders. Thus, the
offense continues as long as the offender violates that duty by failing to
register an address change pursuant to the statute. The court reiterated
that the well-established purpose of section 290 is to assure that sex
offenders are "readily available for police surveillance at all times" to
protect the public from the high potential for sex offender recidivism.
The court explained that section 290(f) is one of the limited circumstanc-
es that warrant application of the doctrine of continuing offenses. "Fail-
ure by any sex offender to comply with any provision of section 290,
including subdivision (f), would substantially undermine the goal of as-
suring that such persons 'shall be readily available for police surveillance
at all times.'" The court further noted that characterization of a violation
as an instantaneous offense would essentially "eviscerate" the statute by
allowing sex offenders to escape prosecution by "laying low" until the
expiration of the statute of limitations.
Consequently, the supreme court rejected the court of appeal's narrow
construction of the statute and the assertion that the offense must occur
within the ten day (now five working days) statutory notification period.
The court explained that the notification grace period simply allows the
registrant reasonable time to comply with the notification requirements
and is not intended to provide a means for sex offenders to avoid com-
pliance by deliberately concealing their whereabouts until the expiration
of the statute of limitations.
Accordingly, prosecution of the defendant's failure to notify the Buena'
Park Police Department of his address change as a felony did not violate
the prohibition against ex post facto laws. The court reasoned that the
defendant's failure to comply with the statute continued after the Janu-
ary 1, 1995 amendment and thus did not change the legal consequences
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of the defendant's conduct prior to the effective date of the change. Al-
though the defendant's initial violation of the statute occurred prior to
January, 1, 1995, his continuing failure to notify the appropriate law en-
forcement authorities after that date constituted the more serious offense
of a felony. Because the defendant's failure to register continued after
the amendment of section 290(f), felony prosecution did not violate the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.
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shall be passed.").
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-
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cussing ex post facto laws).
20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2266 (1985 & Supp. 1997) (discussing
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Law Review and Journal Articles:
Robin L. Deems, Comment, California's Sex Offender Notification Stat-
ute: A Constitutional Analysis, 33 SAN *DIEGO L. REv. 1195, 1209-12
(1996) (analyzing the constitutional issues implicated by sex offender
registration, in particular, the implication of the ex post facto clause).
Abril R. Bedarf, Comment, Examining Sex Offender Community Noti-
fication Laws, 83 CAL. L. REv. 885 (1995) (discussing sex offender noti-
fication laws and concluding that they are constitutionally infirm because
they violate the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual
punishment).
Sean P. Lafferty, Criminal Procedure; Sex Offender Registra-
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V. Delinquent, Dependent and Neglected Children
Where orders of a juvenile court referee require
approval of a juvenile court judge to become effec-
tive, such orders do not become final until the later
of ten calendar days after service of a written copy
of the juvenile court referee's order and findings or
twenty judicial days after the hearing; Welfare and
Institutions Code section 250 finalizing an order ten
calendar days after service applies only to orders
which do not require juvenile court judge approval.
In re Clifford C., Supreme Court of California, Decided
July 3, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 1085, 938 P.2d 932, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 873.
Facts. On June 15, 1995 a juvenile wardship petition alleged that Clifford
C., the minor defendant, had committed several felonies including car-
jacking, robbery, assault, and evading a peace officer. The defendant, ap-
pearing before a juvenile court referee, admitted to the two car-jacking
allegations. The referee agreed to the truth of the admissions and dis-
missed the remaining charges. At the August 2 dispositional hearing, the
referee then committed the minor defendant to a youth camp. A juvenile
court judge approved the resulting dispositional order on August 4 and it
was served on the parties. On August 15, the district attorney objected
by letter and requested that the judge, on his own motion, grant a rehear-
ing of this order. On August 22, the judge granted the requested rehear-
ing. Ultimately, the judge overturned the referee's order and committed
the minor defendant to the California Youth Authority for a maximum
period of twenty-one years-not to exceed his twenty-fifth birthday.
The minor appealed this altered result on several grounds. The court
of appeal focused solely on the issue of timeliness of the rehearing order.
This court determined that the judge's rehearing order was untimely and
reinstated the referee's original dispositional order. The California Su-
preme Court granted the petition to review the issue of the order's time-
liness.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, a unanimous court found that
the express finality provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section
250 applied only to a juvenile court referee order which did not require
approval of a juvenile court judge to take effect. The court held that
orders that required such approval, on the other hand, did not enjoy final
status until the later of ten calendar days following service of a written
copy of the referee's order or twenty judicial days after the hearing.
The court first canvassed the applicable sections 247 through 253 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code. The controversy engendered by the
case arose out of the seemingly contradictory language as to time limita-
tions for rehearings. Section 250 in partnership with section 252 estab-
lished the finality of referee orders at ten calendar days after the date of
service. Contrarily, section 253 permitted a juvenile court, on its own
motion, to order a rehearing of at any point within 20 judicial days fol-
lowing the referee's hearing on the matter.
The California Supreme Court then deflated the logic of the court of
appeal. That court had relied heavily upon In re Henley, 9 Cal. App. 3d
924, 88 Cal. Rptr. 458 (1970), which had determined that the final provi-
sion section of the code precluded a juvenile court from ordering a re-
hearing on its own motion after the end of the ten day period. The court
of appeal further determined that the Legislature's amendment of section
253 about a year after Henley did not disturb that court's ruling. The
California Supreme Court punctured this reasoning, stating that "we
cannot agree with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that section 250, as
construed in Henley, poses an 'irreconcilable conflict' with section 253."
The court then "harmonized" the two statutes. The court noted that
section 250 applied only in cases where a referee's order took effect
without approval of a juvenile court judge and that not all referee orders
fell within this purview. The court then added that the Legislature "failed
to provide a comparable express finality provision governing orders of a
juvenile court referee which require the approval of a juvenile court
judge." According to the court, this category of referee orders,"as a prac-
tical matter," achieve finality upon the expiration of the time period in
which a judge may grant a rehearing.
The court further classified the types of rehearings and their separate
time constraints into two categories. First, pursuant to section 252, a
minor or a minor's parent have ten days after service to petition for a
rehearing. Second, pursuant to section 253, a juvenile court judge has 20
days to grant the judge's own motion for rehearing.
The court then held that the statutory scheme required a two-pronged
interpretation of section 250 and 253. Where a referee's order does not
require judge approval, it becomes final within ten calendar says follow-
ing service. The minor or the minor's parents may petition for rehearing
within this time frame and extend the finality period. Moreover, the
judge may grant a rehearing on the judge's own motion under section
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253 if the ten day period has not ended. Where a referee's order requires
a judge's approval, it achieves finality after the later of ten calendar days
after service or twenty judicial days after the referee's hearing. In addi-
tion, a minor or minor's parent may petition for rehearing during the first
ten days while judges, on their own motion, may grant a rehearing within
the twenty day time frame.
In clarifying the apparent conflict of the section 250 and 253 time
frames, the court added that even where the judge had "approved" the
order pursuant to requirements, such approval was only a requirement to
be "countersigned" by a judge for authentication purposes and that such
approval was not a "substantive" approval. Accordingly, the court noted
that where, as here, a judge has approved an order granting a rehearing,
the action was entirely consistent with legislative intent. As a result of its
holding the court found the juvenile judge's grant of rehearing to be
timely.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 249-253 (West 1984 & Supp. 1997).
Legal Texts:
27 CAL. JUR. 3D Delinquent and Dependent Children § 204 (3d ed. 1987 &
Supp. 1997) (discussing rehearing of referee matters).
10 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Parent & Child § 481 (9th
ed. 1989 & Supp. 1997) (discussing judge's review and approval of referee
orders).
10 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Parent & Child §§ 610-612
(9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1997) (discussing procedures for rehearing, appli-
cation and denial of rehearing).
KEVIN J. SLATrUM
VI. Employer and Employee
Statute of limitations in breach of contract action
based upon constructive termination of employment
begins to run when the employee is actually termi-
nated, not when the intolerable working conditions
occur.
MuUins v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, Decided May 29, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 731, 936 P,2d
1246, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 636.
Facts. The plaintiff, Cornelius Mullins, was employed by the defendant,
Rockwell International Corporation, for twenty-two years in various man-
agerial level positions. In October of 1989, the plaintiff resigned from his
position with the defendant. In September of 1991, the plaintiff filed a
complaint against the defendant for constructive discharge. The plaintiff
contended that the defendant forced his resignation by intending to de-
mote him and reduce his salary and benefit level. The complaint alleged
wrongful termination, wrongful termination based upon a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of an oral employ-
ment contract.
The defendant sought summary judgment for all causes of action as-
serting that the wrongful termination action was barred by the one-year
statute of limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure section
340(3), and the actions for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and breach of an oral employment contract were barred by the
two-year limit set out in California Code of Civil Procedure section 339.
The applicability of sections 339 and 340(3) was not at issue. Instead, the
issue was when the statutes of limitation began to run.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on the ground that all claims were barred by the applicable statutes of
limitation. The court held that the first cause of action was barred by the
one-year statute of limitations period because the plaintiff resigned on
September 20, 1989, and did not file his complaint until September 19,
1991. The second and third causes of action were barred by the two-year
statute of limitations which "began to run once plaintiff suffered appre-
ciable harm." The plaintiff, according to the trial court, suffered apprecia-
ble harm in January of 1988 when he was notified of his change in em-
ployment status. Thus, the complaint filed in September of 1991 was untimely.
The court of appeal affinned, holding that the first cause of action was
barred by the one-year limit because the complaint was not filed within a
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year of the plaintiffs resignation. The court further held that the second
and third breach of contract causes of action were barred by the two-
year statute of limitations which began to run when the employee was
given notice of the constructive termination, not when the termination
actually occurred. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
breach of contract claims accrued in January of 1989, at the latest, when
the plaintiff became aware of the defendant's attitude towards him.
The California Supreme Court granted review to determine whether
the statute of limitations in a breach of contract action based upon al-
leged constructive termination of employment begins to run when the
intolerable working conditions occur, or upon actual termination.
Holding. The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
court of appeal insofar as the judgment barred the plaintiffs breach of
contract causes of action on statute of limitations grounds. The court
held that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until actual
termination of employment.
The court analogized this case to its recent decision in Romano v.
Rockwell Int'l, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 479, 926 P.2d 1114, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20
(1996). In Romano, the court held that the statute of limitations began to
run, for the purposes of an implied contract not to terminate employ-
ment without good cause, at the time of the actual termination even if
the employer previously issued a notification of termination. The court
reasoned that the breach occurred at the time of the actual termination
without good cause. Furthermore, even if the breach occurred at the
notification of termination, such breach constituted an anticipatory
breach, giving the plaintiff a number of possible remedies. The plaintiff
could sue on the breach immediately, or could continue employment
until the breach came to pass. Because the plaintiff continued to per-
form, the court concluded that the statute of limitations began to run
when the announced breach actually occurred-at termination.
The court applied the same reasoning to a breach of contract action
based upon an alleged constructive discharge. The breach of contract is
the actual termination of the employment without good cause. The cre-
ation of poor or intolerable working conditions to force resignation may
also be a breach in the same way notification of termination is a breach.
The court held that "[b]ecause (1) constructive discharge is an employer-
directed termination of employment, (2) termination normally is the
breach alleged, and (3) the employee may elect to overlook earlier ad-
verse actions of the employer in the hope of conciliation,... the statute
of limitations does not begin to run until actual termination."
JENNIFER B. HILDEBRANDT
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VII. Hospital Liens
When an insurer or payor, who has received timely
notice of a hospital lien, fails to honor the hospital
lien at the time of the judgment, compromise, or
settlement, the hospital may recover the 'original
amount imposed under the lien and no more.
Mercy Hospital v. Farmers Insurance Group, Supreme
Court of California, Decided March 20, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th
213, 932 P.2d 210, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638.
Facts. The plaintiff, a hospital and medical center that provided emer-
gency medical treatment for an accident victim, brought suit against the
defendant, an insurance company, to recover the full amount of its lien
under former California Civil Code section 3045, after the defendant
failed to pay the plaintiff "as much of its lien as [could] be satisfied out
of fifty percent" of the judgment, compromise, or settlement. In accor-
dance with former section 3045, the plaintiff provided timely notice of
the lien prior to the settlement. The defendant failed, however, to honor
the plaintiffs lien and disbursed the entire settlement to the injured par-
ty.
The trial court concluded that under former section 3045, the plaintiff
was entitled to fifty percent less one hundred dollars of the proceeds of
the insurance settlement, rejecting the plaintiffs assertion that it was
entitled to the full amount of the hospital costs because the defendant
failed to honor its lien at the time of disbursement.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that under former section 3045, when an insurance company,
with timely notice of a hospital lien, disburses a settlement without hon-
oring the lien, the hospital is entitled to the amount that "can be satisfied
out of fifty percent of the moneys exceeding one hundred dollars" at the
time of the settlement, and no more. The court explained that a reason-
able statutory interpretation of former section 3045, as well as the cur-
rent section 3045, demonstrates that the drafters used past tense lan-
guage. Accordingly, the court concluded that the "amount of [the hospi-
tal] lien claimed in the notice which the hospital was entitled to receive
as payment," relates back to the amount the hospital was to receive at
the time of the disbursement of the settlement, not the hospital's entire
costs. The court further reasoned that case law supports the conten-
tion that the hospital is entitled to the amount originally available had
the insurance company paid the lien prior to distributing the proceeds to
the injured party. The court noted that no case law exists which sup-
ports the position that "the amount of the debtor's obligation increases if
it neglects to pay the lien creditor. ... "
The court dismissed the plaintiffs argument that such an interpretation
of section 3045 would allow insurance companies to dishonor hospital
liens, leaving hospitals to collect the funds. Instead, the court demon-
strated how the interpretation urged by the plaintiff would allow hospi-
tals to recover the full amount due under the lien at the expense of the
injured party who, more frequently, would be left with little or no insur-
ance proceeds resulting in large debts to the hospital. The court conclud-
ed that had the Legislature wanted to provide hospitals with the ability
to collect their entire costs, or more than specified in the lien at the time
of disbursement, the Legislature could have included such a provision in
the statute. Here, however, the court found that neither former section
3045 nor the newly enacted section 3045 included such language, and
absent such legislative intent, the court based its decision on the lan-
guage and past case law interpreting section 3045.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3045.1-.6 (West Supp. 1997) (granting hospitals the
power to create and enforce liens for medical treatment).
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1250 (West Supp. 1990) (defining the
meaning of health facility and hospital as applied in California Civil Code
section 3045).
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 23004.1 (West Supp. 1997) (providing that in recover-
ing for care or treatment provided to an injured person by a third per-
son, the county shall notify the third person's insurer, when known to
the county, in writing of the lien within thirty days).
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Case Law:
San Francisco v. Sweet, 12 Cal. 4th 105, 906 P.2d 1196, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d
42 (stating that "any reduction of a county lien claim for hospital treat-
ment and related services are at the discretion of the county").
Legal Texts:
53 C.J.S. Liens § 14 (1987) (discussing generally the creation, existence,
and discharge of a lien).
50 C.J.S. Judgments § 552 (1997) (defining a lien as a security interest in
an underlying debt).
50 C.J.S. Judgments § 553 (1997) (detailing the ability of the Legislature
to divest discretionary power regarding liens in the courts).
41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 15 (1991) (outlining the filing and notice require-
ments that the hospital must follow to establish a valid lien for medical
treatment).
40 AM. JUR. 2D Hospitals and Asylums § 5 (1968 & Supp. 1996) (discuss-
ing the rights, powers, and duties of a hospital in creating a lien for ser-
vices).
51 AM. JUR. 2D Liens § 40 (1970 & Supp. 1996) (defining a lien as a debt
secured in a substantive property right).
51 AM. JUR. 2D Liens § 51 (1970 & Supp. 1996) (focusing on the general
rule that common law liens override all other rights in the secured prop-
erty).
19 A.L.R. 5th 262 (1993) (outlining the construction and operation, and
effect of a statute giving a hospital lien against recovery from a
tortfeasor causing the patient's injury).
36 CAL. JuR. 3D Healing Arts and Institutions § 17 (1977 & Supp. 1997)
(explaining that because public hospitals are created by the state for the
general welfare, they may operate as a business).
36 CAL. JuR. 3D Healing Arts and Institutions § 32 (1977 & Supp. 1997)
(stating that hospital districts have the power to "do any act necessary to
carry out the purposes of the law").
MAIRI J. SANFORD
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VIII. Insurance Contracts and Coverage
After the expiration of the contestability period, an
imposter defense is unavailable where the named in-
sured personally applied for the insurance policy, but
substituted an imposter for the required medical
examination.
Amex Life Assurance Company v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Supreme Court of California, Decided
February 24, 1997, 14 Cal. 4th 1231, 930 P.2d 1264, 60
Cal. Rptr. 2d 898.
Facts. The plaintiff, a purchaser of discounted life insurance policies
prior to the named insured's death, filed suit against the defendant, a life
insurance policy issuer, alleging breach of contract, insurance bad faith
and equitable estoppel after the defendant refused to honor the policy.
The defendant originally issued the policy to an HIV positive individual.
The defendant was unaware of the insured's medical condition because
the insured lied on the insurance application and sent an imposter to
take the required medical examination.
At trial, the defendant conceded that the contestability period had
expired, yet urged the court to adopt an imposter defense because some-
one other than the person named on the policy participated in the re-
quired medical examination. The use of an imposter, the defendant ar-
gued, created a life insurance policy in the imposter, not the deceased,
and thus, the defendant was not obligated to pay on the policy.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment
because the imposter defense was not recognized in California. Subse-
quently, the defendant sought a writ of mandamus from the court of
appeal in an attempt to direct the trial court to grant summary judgment.
The court of appeal granted the defendant's petition on the issue of in-
surance bad faith, but denied the petition in all other aspects, agreeing
with the trial court that the imposter defense, even if available, did not
apply to the case at bar.
Holding. Affirming the court of appeal, the supreme court held that the
imposter defense was not available where the insured personally applied
for the insurance policy and sent an imposter into the required medical
examination. The court reasoned that the requisite mutual assent to the
insurance contract was present where the named insured personally
applied for the policy. Thus, the court concluded that an imposter partic-
ipating in the medical examination did not affect the underlying insur-
ance contract. The court equated the use of an imposter in the medical
examination to other forms of fraud, such as someone switching blood
samples, and just as with other forms of fraud, the defendant had to
raise this affirmative defense prior to the expiration of the contestability
period.
The court also addressed the public policy reasons for rejecting an
imposter defense after the expiration of the contestability period. The
court noted that a contestability clause served two significant purposes:
(1) the clause allowed the insurer a reasonable time to investigate
whether the insured obtained the policy through fraud, and (2) the
clause guaranteed that after the contestability period expired, beneficia-
ries would collect the proceeds of the policy without delay or costly
litigation. The court believed that allowing an imposter defense after the
contestability period expired, subjecting beneficiaries to possible litiga-
tion after the insurer had a reasonable time to discover fraudulent behav-
ior, would undermine the fundamental purpose of a contestability clause.
REFERENCES
Legal Texts:
43 AM. JuR. 2D Insurance § 761 (1982 & Supp. 1997) (outlining incontest-
ability clauses generally).
43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 768 (1982 & Supp. 1997) (explaining the de-
fense of fraud following the expirations of the contestability period).
39 CAL. JUR. Insurance Contracts §§ 258-265 (1996 & Supp. 1997) (out-
lining contestability clauses, the scope of coverage, and the public policy
supporting contestability clauses).
39 CAL. JUR. Insurance Contracts § 263 (1996 & Supp. 1997) (discussing
the defense of fraud to a contestability clause, specifically).
46 C.J.S. Insurance § 854 (1993) (noting that the insurance company is
precluded from contesting coverage on any ground after the expiration
of the contestability period).
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44-46A C.J.S. Insurance Contents §§ 986-995 (1993) (discussing generally
insurance, insurance contracts, and liability).
1 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Contracts §§ 646-647
(9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1997) (defining the validity, effect
and reformation of an incontestable clause).
GEORGE J. COUCH, 18 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D, §§ 72:1-72:32
(1983) (discussing the general principles of incontestability
clauses).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
James H. Fleming, Recent Developments in California Life Insurance
Law, SB81 Au-ABA 285 (1997) (noting the resurgence of insurance litiga-
tion in California, including actions for misrepresentation and fraud).
Mark Hughes, Jr., Insurer's Ability to Contest Claims After the
Contestability Cutoff, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 537 (1996) (discussing the length
of contestability periods, as well as the effect of using an imposter in
obtaining life insurance).
MAIRI J. SANFORD
IX. Juvenile Adjudications
Penal Code section 667(d)(3)(C), requiring that in
previous adjudication a juvenile be found a fit and
proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile
court law to qualify as a prior felony subjecting a
defendant to increased penalty under the three
strikes law, does not require an express finding of
fitness.
People v. Davis, Supreme Court of California, Decided
July 3, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 1096, 938 P.2d 938, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 879.
Facts. The District Attorney charged the defendant with one count of
murder and one count of attempted murder, simultaneously alleging
three prior convictions under the three strikes law and subjecting the
defendant to the possibility of increased penalties. Two of the three prior
convictions were for juvenile adjudications of felony assault and residen-
tial burglary. The defendant challenged the two juvenile adjudications on
the ground that they did not qualify as a "strike" under subdivision
(d)(3), and the trial court granted the motion. The court of appeal af-
firmed the trial court's order striking the prior burglary adjudication, but
reversed the trial court as to the juvenile adjudication for assault. The
California Supreme Court granted review to consider whether subdivi-
sion (d)(3), setting forth the requirements for qualifying juvenile adjudi-
cations as strikes, necessitates an express finding of fitness, and specifi-
cally whether a residential burglary conviction qualifies as a prior juve-
nile adjudication.
Holding. Without reaching the specific question of whether a conviction
of burglary is a qualifying strike, the court affirmed the court of appeal,
finding that Penal Code section 667(d)(3) does not require an express
finding of fitness. Subdivision (d)(3) sets forth the four requirements to
qualify a prior juvenile adjudication as a strike: (1) the juvenile must be
at least 16 years old when he or she committed the prior offense; (2) the
offense is listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 or de-
scribed as a serious or violent felony conviction in paragraph (1) or (2)
of section 667 of the Penal Code; (3) the juvenile was found a "fit and
proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law;" and (4) the
juvenile was a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions
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Code section 602 for committing an offense listed in Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 707, subdivision (b).
Justice Brown, writing for the court, found that the language of (d)(3)
reasonably includes prior adjudications where the prosecutor does not
seek to qualify the juvenile as an adult under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 707. The "fit and proper subject" language of (d)(3) appears
in section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code which allows prose-
cutors to challenge the fitness of a juvenile to be tried under juvenile
court law. Thus, a finding of fitness under section 707 is a denial of re-
moval to adult court. The court interpreted the language of (d)(3)(C) as
distinguishing between those offenses adjudicated in juvenile rather than
adult court. The court reasoned that requiring an express finding would
so limit qualifying juvenile convictions that legislative intent-to reduce
recidivism-would be frustrated. Further, the court indicated that such a
construction would also raise constitutional questions as to the unequal
treatment of similarly situated defendants where the severity of punish-
ment depends solely on whether or not the prosecutor sought to qualify
the juvenile as an adult in the previous juvenile adjudications. Finally,
Justice Brown dismissed the argument that the court's interpretation of
(d)(3)(C) rendered that subdivision superfluous because subdivision
(d)(3) is repetitive under either an inclusive or exclusive interpretation
and, therefore, not instructive as the meaning of the statute. Because the
court's holding qualified the prior juvenile adjudication for felony assault
and the defendant had an adult robbery conviction which qualified him
for increased penalties under the three strikes law, the court did not
address the issue of whether a prior juvenile adjudication for residential
burglary also qualifies as a strike.
Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that subdivision
(d)(3)(C) required a finding of fitness which could only be found under
the auspices of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. Further,
because subdivision (d)(3)(A) requires adjudication as a juvenile, Justice
Mosk found that the court's interpretation of subdivision (d)(3)(C) was
repetitive. Justice Mosk argued that the purpose of (d)(3)(C) was to act
as a screening device for those offenses which the prosecutor deemed
serious enough to warrant a section 707 petition. Finally, Justice Mosk
challenged the court's interpretation as qualifying certain juvenile offens-
es as prior convictions under the three strikes law that would not qualify
if the offense was charged as an adult crime.
Justice Kennard also dissented with the court's interpretation of sub-
division (d)(3), favoring an express finding of fitness to differentiate
between offenses which result from "youthful immaturity" and those
which evince a "commitment to crime." Because the language of subdi-
vision (d)(3)(C) is identical. to that of section 707 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code and subdivision (d)(3) refers to section 707, Justice
Kennard reasoned that there exists a strong inference of legislative intent
supporting an exclusive interpretation. Arguing that the court's decision
interprets subdivision (d)(3)(C) out of existence, Kennard cited princi-
ples of legislative construction looking first to the statutory language and
second to interpretation of ambiguities in favor of criminal defendants.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (West 1988 & 1997 Supp.).
CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1984 & 1997 Supp.).
Legal Texts:
39 Am. JUR. 2d Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders §§ 2-3, 5
(Supp. 1997) (state authority and purpose in enacting statutes that en-
hance punishment for recidivists).
1 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1638 (1997 Supp.) (discussing habitual offender
statutes).
1 CAL. JuR. 3D Delinquent & Dependent Children § 215 (1987 & 1997
Supp.) (discussing juvenile court certification process).
1 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3369-3391 (1987 & 1997 Supp.) (discuss-
ing purpose and components of California's three strikes law).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
Constitutional Implications of California's 'Three Strikes' Initiative as
Applied to Juvenile Adjudications, 16 J. Juv. L. 129 (1995).
Steven Pressman & Jennifer Kaal, Three Strikes, 16 CAL. LAWYER 33
(1996).
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Lisa Forquer, Comment, California's Three Strikes Law--Should a Juve-
nile Adjudication Be a Ball or a Strike?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1297
(1995).
Christine Markel, Comment, A Swing and a Miss: California's Three
Strikes Law, 17 WHITTIER L. REV. 651 (1996).
CHRISTINA J. MOSER
X. Negligence
Where the noise in the operation of machinery
frightens a horse, causing injury to the rider, the
operator breaches no duty of care to the rider when
the operation of such machinery is socially benefi-
cial, and is performed in a "regular and necessary"
manner.
Parsons v. Croun Disposal Co., Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, Decided May 8, 1997, 15 Cal. 4th 456, 936 P.2d
70, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291.
Facts. The plaintiff was riding his horse on a bridle path. At one loca-
tion, the path ran within ten feet of a fence, which separated the path
from a parking lot. As the plaintiff was approaching this portion of the
path, a garbage truck owned by the defendant; was emptying a trash
dumpster in the parking lot across the fence. While the plaintiff and his
horse were still behind the truck, the operator lifted the dumpster to
empty it, causing a loud noise. The noise frightened the horse, causing it
to throw the plaintiff to the ground, injuring him. The plaintiff sued the
defendant, alleging that the defendant's negligent operation of the truck
scared the horse, thus causing the plaintiffs injuries.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the defendant owed a duty of
care to the plaintiff to not frighten horses on the trail. The court, apply-
ing Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 834 P.2d 696, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (Cal.
1992), further held that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to not
increase the risk of harm already present in the plaintiffs recreational
activity.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the California
Supreme Court held that the defendant owed no duty of care to the
plaintiff to not frighten horses ridden on the trail. The court balanced the
utility of the machine used, specifically a garbage truck, against the po-
tential for scaring a horse, and held that the social benefit derived from
the use of such a machine outweighed the possible harm that could re-
sult from a horse startled by its use. Thus, no duty of care is imposed
under such circumstances. The court did, however, note that exceptions
to this general policy exist where the noise emitted from such machinery
is unnecessary to its operation, where the defendant knows of the horse
becoming startled but takes no subsequent protective actions, where the
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defendant has acted maliciously to intentionally cause the fright, or
where the defendant's actions are violative of a statute designed to pro-
tect a class of which the plaintiff is a member. The court noted that none
of these exceptions applied; the truck was being operated in a usual
fashion and the driver was not even aware of the plaintiffs presence.
The court further held that the court of appeal's reasoning regarding
Knight was erroneous. The court stated that Knight imposed a duty of
care to not increase the risk of harm inherent in the plaintiffs recreation-
al activity only to those with a specific relationship with the participant,
such as the owner of the facility or a fellow participant. Thus, the defen-
dant owed no such duty in this case.
REFERENCES
Statutes and Legislative History:
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714(a) (West 1997).
Case Law:
Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 834 P.2d 696, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1992).
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1968).
Stanton v. Lewisville & N.R. Co., 8 So. 798 (Ala. 1891).
Simonds v. Maine Tel. & Tel. Co., 72 A. 175 (Me. 1908).
Johnson v. City of Santa Monica, 8 Cal. 2d 473, 66 P.2d 433 (1937).
Eddy v. Stowe, 43 Cal. App. 789, 185 P. 1024 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919).
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 563 P.2d 858, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 302 (1977).
Elden v. Sheldon, 46 Cal. 3d 267, 758 P.2d 582, 250 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1988).
Burger v. Pond, 224 Cal. App. 3d 597, 273 Cal. Rptr. 709 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990).
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 3 Cal. 4th 370, 834 P.2d 745, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
51(1992).
Legal Texts:
6 B.E. WrrITN, SUMMARY OF CALiFORm-A LAw, Torts § 748 (9th ed. 1988)
(discussing the balancing of social value against potential risks of actions
in determining duty).
6 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 751 (9th ed. 1988)
(discussing that a finding of unreasonable risk ofconduct requires that
risks to others outweigh utility of the conduct).
8 CAL. JuR. 3D Automobiles § 221 (1993) (discussing the requirement to
control a vehicle to prevent scaring a horse in a way that would injure
the rider).
46 CAL. JUR. 3D Negligence § 9 (1978) (discussing the consideration of
social utility of an action in determining duty in negligence action).
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31 at
171 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing the consideration of social value of con-
duct in a negligence action).
Law Review and Journal Articles:
John F. Emerson & Thomas A. Leggette, Recent Developments in Auto-
mobile Law, 32 TORT & INS. L. J. 203 (1997) (discussing generally, in part,
negligence associated with automobiles).
Frank L. Branson, Personal Torts, 50 S.M.U. L. REV. 1409,14 10 ( 19 9 7)
(discussing the consideration of social utility in determining the exis-
tence of duty).
LEALLEN FROST
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XI. Property Taxes
Fees imposed under the Childhood Lead Poisoning
Act on paint manufactures for failing to screen po-
tential child lead poisoning victims were regulatory
fees, not taxes, and required only a legislative
majority's approval.
Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Board of Equalization, Su-
preme Court of California, Decided June 26, 1997, 15
Cal. 4th 866, 937 P.2d 1350, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 447.
Facts. The plaintiff, Sinclair Paint Co., filed a complaint with the Board
of Equalization, demanding a refund for the $97,825.26 in fees it paid for
1991. The defendant authorized the fees under the Childhood Lead Poi-
soning Act of 1991 (the Act) for the purpose of screening children for
possible lead poisoning. The plaintiff argued that the fees were taxes in
violation of Proposition 13, Article XIIIA, Section 3 of the California Con-
stitution. The defendant, on the other hand, argued that the fees were
categorized as regulatory fees, and thus constitutional. The trial court
held that the fees collected were unconstitutional, in violation of Proposi-
tion 13 which was passed by a legislative majority as part of the Act
rather than by a two-thirds majority as required of tax measures. In addi-
tion, the court determined that the fees were actually taxes because no
part of the fees was used for the regulation of the plaintiff or to provide
any benefit or service to the plaintiff. The court of appeal affirmed the
trial court's decision to declare the fee invalid and require a refund.
The defendant appealed, arguing that the fees were regulatory fees
"imposed under police power, rather than the taxing power." The De-
partment of Health Services as well as two children who have lead poi-
soning intervened. The California Supreme Court granted review to deter-
mine whether the fees under the Act were a tax that needed a two-thirds
legislative vote under Proposition 13.
Holding. The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal,
holding that the Act imposed regulatory fees, not taxes. The court de-
termined that the fees were regulatory because they deterred manufac-
ture and distribution of dangerous products, and the manufacturers were
not free of state and federal regulation.First, the court discussed the
history of the Act in detail. Under the Act, various industries are directed
to pay fees for the screening of children for possible lead poisoning. The
Department of Health Services is given "broad regulatory authority to
fully implement and effectuate the purposes" of the Act. Section 105300
compels fees on lead companies, based on the percentage of lead-based
products the companies have produced in the past.
Next, the court discussed the enactment of Proposition 13, one of the
state's major taxpayer statutes. According to Proposition 13, a state im-
posed tax must be approved by two-thirds of the California Legislature,
not a majority.
The court then addressed whether the impositions were taxes or fees.
First, the court recognized that the determination of whether impositions
are taxes or fees is a question of law. The court defined special taxes
and development fees. The court stated that the fact that fees are as-
sessed on manufacturers "after, rather than before, the product's adverse
effects were realized is immaterial to the question whether the measure
imposes valid regulatory fees rather than taxes" for purposes of consti-
tutional provision placing restrictions on state and local taxes.
The plaintiff argued that the fees were indeed taxes, and not similar to
special assessments or development fees because "they neither reimburse
the state for special benefits conferred on manufacturers of lead-based
products nor compensate the state for governmental privileges granted to
those manufacturers." The defendant, however, argued that the fees were
analogous to regulatory fees "imposed under the police power, rather
than the taxing power." The court agreed with the defendant, citing
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 42 Cal. 3d 365, 375, 721 P.2d 1111, 228 Cal.
Rptr. 726 (1986). Pennell held that regulatory fees imposed by a city
under its rent control ordinance in amounts necessary to fulfill the
regulation's purpose were valid even though no benefit was given to the
fee payers.
Finally, the supreme court concluded that "the Act imposed bona fide
regulatory fees, not taxes, because the Legislature imposed the fees to
mitigate the actual or anticipated adverse effects of the fee payers' oper-
ations, and under the Act the amount of the fees must bear a reasonable
relationship to those adverse effects."
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XII. Workers' Compensation
Labor Code section 5814 prohibits the imposition of
multiple penalties for a workers' compensation
insurer's single unreasonable act in terminating pre-
award benefits; furthermore, a workers' compensa-
tion insurer's or an employer's refusal to reinstate
benefits after a claimant gives notice of an intention
to seek penalties under section 5814 does not consti-
tute a separate and distinct act for which multiple
penalties may be awarded.
Christian v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, Su-
preme Court of California, Decided May 12, 1997, 15
Cal. 4th 505, 936 P.2d 115, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336.
Facts. On February 3, 1993, the plaintiff sustained injuries in the course
of her employment at a law firm. The plaintiffs injuries left her in a
condition of "temporary total disability" (TTD); consequently, her
employer's workers' compensation insurer, State Compensation Insur-
ance Fund (SCIF), paid the plaintiff TTD benefits. However, on May 23,
1994, based upon medical reports, SCIF terminated the plaintiffs TTD
payments and began dispersing permanent disability payments to her.
A workers' compensation judge (WCJ) determined that SCIF's medical
reports were inadmissible and therefore, SCIF had no basis to conclude
that the injuries were permanent. Therefore, SCIF's termination of the
TTD benefits was found unreasonable, and the plaintiff was awarded the
TTD benefits SCIF had not made as well as "a penalty of 10 percent
'cumulative,' for each TTD payment due after June 16, 1994." SCIF had to
pay eleven total penalties for each of the terminated TTD payments.
SCIF petitioned the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (the
Board) to reconsider the WCJ's award. SCIF asserted that the WCJ mis-
applied Labor Code section 5814 and that one penalty should be imposed
for its stoppage of the TTD benefits. The Board agreed with SCIF's argu-
ment and imposed only one, rather than eleven, section 5814 penalty for
all of the TrD benefits due to the plaintiff. The Board reasoned that it
could not impose multiple penalties for the stoppage of the TrD pay-
ments, a single act of misconduct.
The court of appeal reversed the Board's decision and ordered the
reinstatement of the WJC's decision. The court of appeal reasoned that
multiple penalties must be imposed where the insurer engages in "sepa-
rate and distinct" acts of misconduct in nonpayment, and where the
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claimant give notice of her intent "to seek separate or additional penal-
ties for such acts."
The California Supreme Court granted review to determine if the impo-
sition of multiple penalties, after a finding that an insurer has unreason-
ably terminated an irjured employee's TTD benefits, is a correct appli-
cation of Labor Code section 5814.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court held that an
insurer's unreasonable termination of TTD benefits, a single unreason-
able act, cannot be a basis for imposing multiple penalties under section
5814. The court further held that notice of a claimant's intent to seek
penalties or an opportunity for an employer or insurer to reconsider its
decision does not constitute a separate and distinct act for which penal-
ties may be imposed under section 5814.
The court first looked to the language of section 5814 which requires
an insurer to pay an additional ten percent penalty "[wihen payment of
compensation has been unreasonably delayed, or refused, either prior to
or subsequent to the issuance of an award. .. ." The court also looked
to the legislative history of the statute. After examining both the lan-
guage and the history, the court concluded that the Legislature intended
a single penalty for the single act of refusing to pay benefits and did not
intend multiple penalties to be imposed "for every missed or delayed
TrD payment...."
The court cited Gallamore v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board,
23 Cal. App. 3d 815, 591 P.2d 1242, 153 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1979). Galtamore
held that multiple penalties are permitted in certain circumstances where
the insurer commits separate and distinct unreasonable acts in denying
or delaying the payment of separate categories of benefits. The court
stated that the situation here was distinguishable from Gallamore be-
cause refusing the TTD benefits constituted a single act; furthermore, the
plaintiffs giving SCIF "multiple notices that penalties [would] be sought
for each payment missed subsequent to the act of terminating the pay-
ments" did not constitute separate and distinctive acts. The court also
cited Davison v. Industrial Accident Commission, 241 Cal. App. 2d 15,
50 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1966), a case which the court of appeal relied upon in
its decision. Davison allowed multiple penalties to be imposed because
of the insurer's separate and distinct acts in refusing the payment of dif-
ferent categories of benefits. The Davison court noted that allowing the
multiple penalties served as a deterrent to insurers who might otherwise
procrastinate payment indefinitely. However, the supreme court held that
multiple penalties would not serve as a deterrent purpose in this case,
but rather would coerce insurers or employers to continue paying bene-
fits to which they believe the claimant is not entitled. The court added
that imposing multiple penalties in this situation would upset the balance
of fairness between the irjured worker and employer. Furthermore, the
single penalty still provides an incentive for insurers to make timely
payments.
Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion stating his belief that each
failure to pay a TTD installment constituted a separate and distinct act of
misconduct. Moreover, he asserted that the majority decision ignored the
fact that many workers live "paycheck to paycheck" and suffer great
hardship when insurers terminate payments. Justice Mosk concluded that
the majority's decision wrongly tipped the balance in the employer's and
insurer's favor and created an incentive for the employer or insurer not
to make payments.
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